Abstract

RÉSUMÉCet article est une défense de la position exposée par Nelson Goodman dans Langages de l'art. Goodman affirme que les images fonctionnent dans des systèmes symboliques denses. La différence entre texte et image ne se situe pas là où nous l'aurions spontanément cherchée : dans l'expérience perceptuelle que nous avons des images. Une telle théorie de la dépiction peut sembler iconoclaste, voire complètement fausse, et ce, parce que nous y voyons à tort une explication de la représentation picturale. Elle offre cependant, rapportée à d'autres intuitions philosophiques qui essaiment ailleurs dans l’œuvre de Goodman, une meilleure compréhension du fonctionnement des images.ABSTRACTIn this paper, I draw unexpected conclusions from Nelson Goodman's views on depiction. Faithful to the symbolic turn of aesthetics in the twentieth century, Goodman argues that pictures are as conventional and natural as scripts. Unlike scripts, however, pictures work in dense symbolic systems. The difference between image and script cannot be found where we would have spontaneously looked: in our perceptual experience of pictures. Obviously, the structural approach which is at stake in Languages of Art is iconoclast; we often consider it surprising, or even absolutely misleading, perhaps because we do not connect the analyses Goodman conducts in his essay with the experience we ordinarily have of pictures. I argue that Goodman's position becomes clearer when it is reduced to a much more modest philosophical purpose: to offer a criterion for discrimination between scripts and pictures. Pictures, unlike scripts, are dense. Of course, that does not explain depiction. However, my account of Goodman's view, when connected to intuitions about cognitive processes that have spread elsewhere in his work, sheds light on the way pictures are connected with the objects they depict.