- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Belief ascription and the illusion of depth
Facta Philosophica 5 (2):183-201 (2003)
Abstract
This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)Author's Profile
Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Other Versions
No versions found
Links
PhilArchive
External links
(no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver
- Configure custom resolver
My notes
Similar books and articles
The causal powers of belief: A critique from practical realism.Theo C. Meyering - 2001 - In Anthonie Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Where is the mind?Fred Dretske - 2001 - In Anthonie Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Practical realism defended: Replies to critics.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2001 - In Anthonie Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Contextual realism: The context-dependency and the relational character of beliefs.Albert Newen - 2001 - In Anthonie Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Two realms of mental life: The non-overlap of belief ascription and the scientific study of mind and behavior.Nick Chater & Martin J. Pickering - 2003 - Facta Philosophica 5 (2):335-353.
Brain states, causal explanation, and the attitudes.Reinaldo Elugardo - 2001 - In Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics.Anthonie Meijers (ed.) - 2001 - Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Belief Ascription, Simulation, and Opacity.François Recanati - 2003 - Facta Philosophica 5 (2):223-237.
Belief Ascription and the Anthropology of Religion.Maurice Bloch - 2003 - Facta Philosophica 5 (2):297-312.
Belief ascription: objective sentences and soft facts.Andreas Kemmerling - 2003 - Facta Philosophica 5 (2):203-222.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
45 (#497,997)
6 months
6 (#888,477)
2009-01-28
Downloads
45 (#497,997)
6 months
6 (#888,477)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Citations of this work
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-667477cd97-7qg25 dc2