Abstract

As a brief lexical analysis shows us, Descartes elaborated two concepts of reality (realitas, realité). His first concept of reality, mainly thematised in Meditation V, is rather traditionnal: reality is understood as an object of thought; thus, mathematical objects are the «true and immutable natures». His second concept of reality occurs in Meditation III, with the formal or objective reality; in such a context, reality (formal reality as much as objective reality) depends upon an efficient cause, and for this reason is properly a being. Such an account concerning reality gives rise to a new question: if reality means a kind of being, how does reality distinguish itself from existence? The paper aims at elucidating how Descartes answered this question. Unlike reality, existence admits no degree. Certainly, reality isn’t existence. Nevertheless, reality is understood in the framework of a metaphysics for which existence is the first meaning of being.