Demystifying Meaning in Horwich and Wittgenstein

In James Conant & Sebastian Sunday (eds.), Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 164-184 (2019)
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Abstract

Paul Horwich has advocated, and attributed to the later Wittgenstein, a “use-theory of meaning” that aims to demystify meaning by reducing it to pure regularities of use. This chapter challenges Horwich’s appropriation of Wittgenstein and seeks to make room for a different conception of the demystification of meaning. It argues that Wittgenstein does indeed aim to demystify meaning, but does not think that this involves any attempt to reduce meaning to something else.

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Silver Bronzo
University of Chicago

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