Sacrifice and Relational Well-Being

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (3):335-353 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The well-being account of sacrifice says that sacrifices are gross losses of well-being. This account is attractive because it explains the relationship between sacrifice and moral obligation. However, sacrifices made on behalf of loved ones may cause trouble for the account. Loving sacrifices occur in a context where the agent’s well-being and the beneficiary’s well-being are intertwined. They present a challenge to individualism about well-being. Drawing inspiration from feminist philosophers and bioethicists, I argue that a notion of ‘relational well-being’, analogous to ‘relational autonomy’, can help account for loving sacrifices without either undermining the well-being theory of sacrifice or minimizing the very real sacrifices made in caregiving situations.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,865

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The central conflict: morality and self-interest.Joseph Raz - 2000 - In Roger Crisp & Brad Hooker (eds.), Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin. New York: Clarendon Press. pp. 209--238.
The Cross.Sophie-Grace Chappell - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (3):478-498.
No Theory-Free Lunches in Well-Being Policy.Gil Hersch - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):43-64.
Sacrifices of Self.Vanessa Carbonell - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (1):53-72.
Overvold on Self-Interest and Self-Sacrifice.R. B. Brandt - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:353-363.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-08-16

Downloads
113 (#189,278)

6 months
18 (#160,410)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Vanessa Carbonell
University of Cincinnati

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Perfectionism.Thomas Hurka - 1993 - New York, US: Oxford University Press. Edited by Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser.
Welfare and Rational Care.Stephen Darwall - 2002 - Princeton University Press.

View all 31 references / Add more references