The logic of logical revision formalizing Dummett's argument

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):15 – 32 (2005)
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Abstract

Neil Tennant and Joseph Salerno have recently attempted to rigorously formalize Michael Dummett's argument for logical revision. Surprisingly, both conclude that Dummett commits elementary logical errors, and hence fails to offer an argument that is even prima facie valid. After explicating the arguments Salerno and Tennant attribute to Dummett, I show how broader attention to Dummett's writings on the theory of meaning allows one to discern, and formalize, a valid argument for logical revision. Then, after correctly providing a rigorous statement of the argument, I am able to delineate four possible anti-Dummettian responses. Following recent work by Stewart Shapiro and Crispin Wright, I conclude that progress in the anti-realist's dialectic requires greater clarity about the key modal notions used in Dummett's proof.

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Jon Cogburn
Louisiana State University

References found in this work

Natural deduction: a proof-theoretical study.Dag Prawitz - 1965 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications.
General semantics.David K. Lewis - 1970 - Synthese 22 (1-2):18--67.
The taming of the true.Neil Tennant - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Anti-realism and logic: truth as eternal.Neil Tennant - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.
What is a Theory of Meaning? (II).Michael Dummett - 1976 - In Gareth Evans & John McDowell (eds.), What is a Theory of Meaning? Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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