Abstract

ABSTRACT Robert Brandom reads from Kant an account of reasoning and concept use centred upon normativity and autonomous freedom in the act of judgement. I claim that this reading is flawed because it screens from view another aspect of Kant’s reflections on freedom and reason. By comparing Brandom’s interpretation of Kant with that of Theodor W. Adorno, highlighting their contrasting views of the relation between transcendental and empirical, I contend that Brandom unduly conflates freedom and normativity and thereby takes the freedom of judgement to consist in the endorsement of or commitment to a conceptual norm and argue instead for a reading that takes such freedom as consisting also in the determination or creation of conceptual content. I further claim that the deficiencies of Brandom’s reading are carried over in his transition from Kant to Hegel. Finally, I outline initial elements of an Adornian conception of freedom and reason after Kant.