Abstract

Several philosophers have commented on the apparently strange fact that in loving another we tend to value the beloved as irreplaceable. In other words, we are reluctant to "swap" a loved one for another who possesses identical or even superior qualities. Some have gone on to claim that this tendency is in fact irrational. In this dissertation I argue that this natural attitude that we have towards loved ones, where we value them as tokens rather than types, is reasonable and not in need of revision. In addition, I argue that this aspect of our commitment to loved ones reveals something rather deep about our beliefs and values regarding persons in general, animals, and objects. Those who want to revise away this apparently irrational aspect of ourselves do not adequately appreciate the depths of this attitude, nor do they seem to realize the extent to which it coheres with our other deeply held attitudes and beliefs. ;In this first chapter of this dissertation I lay out the problem as it arises when considering love and personal relationships. After presenting the issue and considering the arguments of those who are critical of irreplaceability, I then go on to mount my defense. This defense consists of two main parts. The first part makes up Chapter Two, in which I consider the ways in which critics overlook Kantian insights regarding the importance of agency. Chapter Three offers further considerations drawn from the Wittgensteinian tradition, considerations that emphasize the primary role that the concept of a person plays in our lives and beliefs. In the second part of Chapter Three I go on to consider the ways in which similar considerations apply to our practice of holding some objects to be irreplaceable. In Chapter Four I look at the connections my position has with a generally Kantian vision of the worth of all people. Finally, in the Appendix I consider the ways in which the account of irreplaceability I have sketched has ramifications for the traditional personal identity debate