Abstract

Impartiality in moral decision-making is often assumed to be monolithic and is frequently not defined explicitly. However, there are at least three different styles of impartiality, conceptualized as existing on a moral-psychological continuum, that are used both in moral deliberation and in moral theory, which yield systematically variable outcomes of deliberation. This study focuses on how and whether a given style of impartiality would either foster or discourage inclusiveness in the moral community. Sympathetic impartiality, characteristic of sentimentalist and/or some utilitarian theories, operates on a presumably natural fellow-feeling; this suggests that the individuals) being sympathized with must be sufficiently similar to the moral deliberator before sympathetic impartiality can be accessed. Detached impartiality , characteristic of contractarian theories, operates on the assumption that persons who must cooperate in a common venture are not necessarily alike enough to feel sympathy for one another and are generally not interested in one another's interests; it therefore requires a conscious separation from one's own interests in order to focus on presumably shared human commonalities. Although somewhat better situated to be inclusive, it strongly depends on the structures in place to assure impartiality, which often have had hidden biases imported into them, and at least one explicit bias---that of reciprocal or mutual benefit---thus tending once again to exclusion of certain individuals from the moral community. Kantian impartiality cuts through the biases of these other two styles of impartiality and plainly states that the characteristic of rationality confers dignity upon its possessor because of his capacity to respect the moral law. "Kantian" impartiality as a generic term does not always relate explicitly to Kant's philosophy but incorporates the respect for persons as a consistent reminder to affirm that all persons, by virtue of having the capacity to be rational, are equal as such, and are therefore equally members of the moral community. This style of impartiality does not depend either upon a selective sympathy or upon perhaps unstable methods to assure detached impartiality, but only upon this reminder.