Intrinsic Value and the Argument from Regress

Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 12 (2):313-322. (2007)
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Abstract

Proponents of the argument from regress maintain that the existence of Instrumental Value is sufficient to establish the existence of Intrinsic Value. It is argued that the chain of instrumentally valuable things has to end somewhere. Namely with intrinsic value. In this paper, I shall argue something a little more modest than this. I do not want to argue that the regress argument proves that there is intrinsic value but rather that it proves that the idea of intrinsic value is a necessary part of our thinking about moral value.

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Julia Tanner
Durham University

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References found in this work

Rethinking intrinsic value.Shelly Kagan - 1998 - The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):277-297.
Rethinking intrinsic value.Shelly Kagan - 2005 - The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):97--114.
The Conception of Intrinsic Value.G. E. Moore - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
The Ethics of Environmental Concern.Robin Attfield - 1993 - Environmental Values 2 (1):76.
Between Means and Ends.Anthony Weston - 1992 - The Monist 75 (2):236-249.

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