Wittgenstein, Russell, and Our Concept of the Natural Numbers

In Carl Posy & Yemima Ben-Menahem (eds.), Mathematical Knowledge, Objects and Applications: Essays in Memory of Mark Steiner. Springer. pp. 137-155 (2023)
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Abstract

Wittgenstein gave a clearly erroneous refutation of Russell’s logicist project. The errors were ably pointed out by Mark Steiner. Nevertheless, I was motivated by Wittgenstein and Steiner to consider various ideas about the natural numbers. I ask which notations for natural numbers are ‘buck-stoppers’. For us it is the decimal notation and the corresponding verbal system. Based on the idea that a proper notation should be ‘structurally revelatory’, I draw various conclusions about our own concept of the natural numbers.

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Saul Kripke
Last affiliation: CUNY Graduate Center

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