Abstract

By unfolding the meaning of a Deleuzian formula from Difference and Repetition —“the virtual possesses the reality of a task to be performed, or a problem to be solved”— we attempt to show that the Deleuzian concept of the virtual implies the three main features of a philosophy of nature: a theory of ontogenesis, a theory of regimes of individuation and an ontological foundation of ethics. After demonstrating that the virtual-actual pair makes it possible to form a theory of ontogenesis, we show that, by distinguishing different regimes of individuation (physico-chemical, biological, psychic), Deleuze grants a certain privilege to thought, the only one capable of fully expressing the virtual reality that conditions it. By comparing this theory with that of Étienne Souriau, we show how this privilege is inseparable from an ethical task, and implies no anthropocentrism: for Deleuze, man is not the subject of thought.