Knowledge, Action, Defeasibility

In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press (2021)
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Abstract

One can intentionally do something only if one knows what one is doing while they are doing it. For example, one can intentionally kill one’s neighbor by opening their gas stove overnight only if one knows that the gas is likely to kill the neighbor in their sleep. One can intentionally sabotage the victory of one’s rival by putting sleeping drugs in their drink only if one knows that sleeping drugs will harm the rival’s performance. And so on. In a slogan: Intentional action is action guided by knowledge. This essay reviews some motivations for a ‘knowledge-centered psychology’ — a psychology where knowledge enters center stage in an explanation of intentional action (§2). Then it outlines a novel argument for the claim that knowledge is required for intentional action (§3) and discusses some of its consequences (§§4-5)

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Carlotta Pavese
Cornell University

Citations of this work

Separating action and knowledge.Mikayla Kelley - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
Probabilistic Knowledge in Action.Carlotta Pavese - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):342-356.
Practical knowledge first.Carlotta Pavese - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-18.
Knowledge How.Jeremy Fantl - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.

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