Abstract

Following Grażyna Żurkowska’s work presenting Jan Srzednicki’s views on Wittgenstein’s philosophy (Epistemologia po Wittgensteinie. Nowa perspektywa epistemologiczna Jana Srzednickiego, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2006) [Epistemology after Wittgenstein. A New Epistemological Perspective by Jan Srzednicki], the author of this paper ponders the effect of Wittgenstein’s conception upon the domain of epistemology. According to Srzednicki, such an effect is in having posed a skeptical challenge which opened a new epistemological perspective. The author is critical toward this approach and argues that the most genuine intention behind Wittgenstein’s investigations was to draw attention to the diversity of such our concepts as cognition, knowledge, truth, etc. Such diversity is not a challenge but a fact which needs to be accounted for in epistemological studies