Cognitivism, naturalism, and normativity: a reply to Peter Railton

In John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 301--313 (1993)
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Thick Evaluation.Simon Kirchin - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Naturalism and normative cognition.Matthew S. Bedke - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):147-167.
Ethical phenomenology and metaethics.Simon Kirchin - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (3):241-264.
A Dilemma for Non‐Analytic Naturalism.Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):228-247.

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