In proof-theoretic semantics, model-theoretic validity is replaced by proof-theoretic validity. Validity of formulae is defined inductively from a base giving the validity of atoms using inductive clauses derived from proof-theoretic rules. A key aim is to show completeness of the proof rules without any requirement for formal models. Establishing this for propositional intuitionistic logic raises some technical and conceptual issues. We relate Sandqvist’s (complete) base-extension semantics of intuitionistic propositional logic to categorical proof theory in presheaves, reconstructing categorically the soundness (...) and completeness arguments, thereby demonstrating the naturality of Sandqvist’s constructions. This naturality includes Sandqvist’s treatment of disjunction that is based on its second-order or elimination-rule presentation. These constructions embody not just validity, but certain forms of objects of justifications. This analysis is taken a step further by showing that from the perspective of validity, Sandqvist’s semantics can also be viewed as the natural disjunction in a category of sheaves. (shrink)

In proof-theoretic semantics, model-theoretic validity is replaced by proof-theoretic validity. Validity of formulae is defined inductively from a base giving the validity of atoms using inductive clauses derived from proof-theoretic rules. A key aim is to show completeness of the proof rules without any requirement for formal models. Establishing this for propositional intuitionistic logic raises some technical and conceptual issues. We relate Sandqvist’s (complete) base-extension semantics of intuitionistic propositional logic to categorical proof theory in presheaves, reconstructing categorically the soundness (...) and completeness arguments, thereby demonstrating the naturality of Sandqvist’s constructions. This naturality includes Sandqvist’s treatment of disjunction that is based on its second-order or elimination-rule presentation. These constructions embody not just validity, but certain forms of objects of justifications. This analysis is taken a step further by showing that from the perspective of validity, Sandqvist’s semantics can also be viewed as the natural disjunction in a category of sheaves. (shrink)

The 3-valued paraconsistent logic Ciore was developed by Carnielli, Marcos and de Amo under the name LFI2, in the study of inconsistent databases from the point of view of logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs). They also considered a first-order version of Ciore called LFI2*. The logic Ciore enjoys extreme features concerning propagation and retropropagation of the consistency operator: a formula is consistent if and only if some of its subformulas is consistent. In addition, Ciore is algebraizable in the sense of (...) Blok and Pigozzi. On the other hand, the logic LFI2* satisfies a somewhat counter-intuitive property: the universal and the existential quantifier are inter-definable by means of the paraconsistent negation, as it happens in classical first-order logic with respect to the classical negation. This feature seems to be unnatural, given that both quantifiers have the classical meaning in LFI2*, and that this logic does not satisfy the De Morgan laws with respect to its paraconsistent negation. The first goal of the present article is to introduce a first-order version of Ciore (which we call QCiore) preserving the spirit of Ciore, that is, without introducing unexpected relationships between the quantifiers. The second goal of the article is to adapt to QCiore the partial structures semantics for the first-order paraconsistent logic LPT1 introduced by Coniglio and Silvestrini, which generalizes the semantic notion of quasi-truth considered by Mikeberg, da Costa and Chuaqui. Finally, some important results of classical Model Theory are obtained for this logic, such as Robinson’s joint consistency theorem, amalgamation and interpolation. Although we focus on QCiore, this framework can be adapted to other 3-valued first-order LFIs. (shrink)

This work contrasts the formalist approach to defining explanation in science, exemplified in the Deductive-Nomenological Model of Carl G. Hempel, with the contextualist approach of Thomas Kuhn. It is argued that both of these attempts to define the explanatory processes of science are inadequate. A connection is made between the view of rationality upon which each view is based and the way that it defines explanation. It is argued that a process of thought, which scientific explanation represents, is considered (...) rational by these thinkers only if it meets the criteria of constraint under a rule, distance from subjective considerations and instrumental connection of method and goal. Given this strong definition of rationality, explanation is defined by both Kuhn and Hempel as thought within the constraint of a theory or a theoretical paradigm. Under this construal, explanation is separated as a process from theory invention which both thinkers hold to involve primarily non-cognitive criteria of choice. It is argued in this work that such a view contradicts the actual practice of science where theory invention seems to be primarily a process of rational explaining. ;A detailed historical case of an attempt to explain organic morphogenesis is given. It centers on the theory of generation of Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, an 18th Century scientific thinker. This case is meant to illustrate the kinds of cognitive interest and strategies of invention that go into dealing with an explanatory problem in science. ;Finally some general programmatic conclusions are made relating the foregoing arguments and the case, to the need to explore the nature of scientific explanation in the domain of theory invention where the reasoning processes seem to involve analogical reasoning and critical metaphysical thought. (shrink)

Because they track the Model Penal Code, current criminal law formulations of risk offenses typically fail to distinguish the rule of conduct question—What risks does the criminal law prohibit?—from the adjudication question — When is a particular violator’s conscious disregard of, or his inattentiveness to, a risk in a particular situation sufficiently condemnable to deserve criminal liability? Instead, the formulations address only the second question — through their definition of reckless and negligent culpability — and fail to provide a (...) rule of conduct provision to define a prohibited risk. This reliance upon culpability definitions as the core of risk-creation offense definitions is problematic because it fails to announce a useable conduct rule that describes those risks the law prohibits. Instead, this approach subjectivizes the definition of prohibited risks. What may be held "reckless" or "negligent" for one person may not be "reckless" or "negligent" for another person in the identical situation — an effect that strips case adjudications of their value in educating the community as to risks that the rules of conduct prohibit. Current risk-creation offenses also are problematic because they make results — including the creation of a prohibited risk — irrelevant to criminal liability. While this is consistent with the Model Code’s view that resulting harm is insignificant, that only culpable state of mind ought to affect liability, it is inconsistent with the view of most state code drafters. Thus, while the Model Code grades offenses without regard to whether a prohibited risk in fact is created, most state codes logically would want to grade lower in the absence of a prohibited risk. These two fundamental problems—the failure to distinguish conduct rules and adjudication rules and the confusion over the significance of results — are related. The Model Penal Code’s general failure to distinguish conduct and adjudication rules made it less likely that state code drafters would notice what they would have seen as the Code’s inappropriate subjectivization of risk and risk offenses. If the Model Code had systematically segregated conduct and adjudication rules, it would have been more obvious to state code drafters that the Code’s formulation of risk-creation offenses was one that they could not accept. (shrink)

We prove the following algebraic characterization of elementary equivalence: $\equiv$ restricted to countable structures of finite type is minimal among the equivalence relations, other than isomorphism, which are preserved under reduct and renaming and which have the Robinson property; the latter is a faithful adaptation for equivalence relations of the familiar model theoretical notion. We apply this result to Friedman's fourth problem by proving that if L = L ωω (Q i ) i ∈ ω 1 is (...) an (ω 1 , ω)-compact logic satisfying both the Robinson consistency theorem on countable structures of finite type and the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem for some $\lambda for theories having ω 1 many sentences, then $\equiv_L = \equiv$ on such structures. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract The Model ‐ Theoretic Argument Difficulties and Differences Putnam's Progress Implications Objections and Replies References.

Abstract: Hilary Putnam has reformulated his model-theoretic argument as an argument against indirect realism in the philosophy of perception. This new argument is reviewed and defended. Putnam’s new focus on philosophical theories of perception (instead of metaphysical realism) makes better sense of his previous responses to the objection from the causal theory of reference. It is argued that the model-theoretic argument can also be construed as an argument that holders of a causal theory of reference should adopt direct (...) realism in the philosophy of perception. (shrink)

We prove that for a finitely generated infinite nilpotent group $G$ with structure $(G,\cdot,\dots)$, the connected component ${G^*}^0$ of a sufficiently saturated extension $G^*$ of $G$ exists and equals $$\bigcap_{n\in\N} \{g^n\colon g\in G^*\}.$$ We construct an expansion of ${\mathbb Z}$ by a predicate $({\mathbb Z},+,P)$ such that the type-connected component ${{\mathbb Z}^*}^{00}_{\emptyset}$ is strictly smaller than ${{\mathbb Z}^*}^0$. We generalize this to finitely generated virtually solvable groups. As a corollary of our construction we obtain an optimality result for (...) the van der Waerden theorem for finite partitions of groups. (shrink)

Abraham Robinson is well-known as the inventor of nonstandard analysis, which uses nonstandard models to give the notions of infinitesimal and infinitely large magnitudes a precise interpretation. Less discussed, although subtle and original–if ultimately flawed–is Robinson's work in the philosophy of mathematics. The foundational position he inherited from David Hilbert undermines not only the use of nonstandard analysis, but also Robinson's considerable corpus of pre-logic contributions to the field in such diverse areas as differential equations and aeronautics. (...) This tension emerges from Robinson's disbelief in the existence of infinite totalities (any mention of them is ‘literally meaningless’) and the fact that much of his work involves them. I argue that he treats infinitary avenues of mathematics as useful tools to avoid this difficulty, but that this is not successful to the extent that these tools must be justified by a conservative extension from finitary mathematics. While Robinson provides a compelling and unorthodox pragmatic justification for the role of formal systems in mathematical practice despite their apparent infinitary presuppositions, he deflates mainstream mathematics to a collection of games that occasionally produces meaningful results. This amounts to giving up on a commitment to reconciling his finitism with his mathematical practice. (shrink)

In "Realism and Reason" Hilary Putnam has offered an apparently strong argument that the position of metaphysical realism provides an incoherent model of the relation of a correct scientific theory to the world. However, although Putnam's attack upon the notion of the "intended" interpretation of a scientific theory is sound, it is shown here that realism may be formulated in such a way that the realist need make no appeal to any "intended" interpretation of such a theory. Consequently, it (...) can be shown that realism is immune to Putnam's criticism and that attempts at reformulating this criticism are not likely to meet with success. (shrink)

We study model theoretic tree properties and their associated cardinal invariants. In particular, we obtain a quantitative refinement of Shelah’s theorem for countable theories, show that [Formula: see text] is always witnessed by a formula in a single variable and that weak [Formula: see text] is equivalent to [Formula: see text]. Besides, we give a characterization of [Formula: see text] via a version of independent amalgamation of types and apply this criterion to verify that some examples in the literature (...) are indeed [Formula: see text]. (shrink)

Notions of k-asimulation and asimulation are introduced as asymmetric counterparts to k-bisimulation and bisimulation, respectively. It is proved that a first-order formula is equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic propositional formula iff it is invariant with respect to k-asimulations for some k, and then that a first-order formula is equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic propositional formula iff it is invariant with respect to asimulations. Finally, it is proved that a first-order formula is equivalent to a (...) standard translation of an intuitionistic propositional formula over the class of intuitionistic Kripke models iff it is invariant with respect to asimulations between intuitionistic models. (shrink)

We present a framework for model theoretic forcing in a non first order context, and present some applications of this framework to Banach space theory.

This work presents a model-theoretic approach to the study of first-order theories of classes of BL-chains. Among other facts, we present several classes of BL-algebras, generating the whole variety of BL-algebras, whose first-order theory has quantifier elimination. Model-completeness and decision problems are also investigated. Then we investigate classes of BL-algebras having (or not having) the amalgamation property or the joint embedding property and we relate the above properties to the existence of ultrahomogeneous models.

Revenge arguments purport to show that any proposed solution to the semantic paradoxes generates new paradoxes that prove that solution to be inadequate. In this paper, I focus on revenge arguments that employ the model-theoretic semantics of a target theory and I argue, contra the current revenge-theoretic wisdom, that they can constitute genuine expressive limitations. I consider the anti-revenge strategy elaborated by Field and argue that it does not offer a way out of the revenge problem. More generally, I (...) argue that the difference between ‘standard’ and ‘revenge’ paradoxes is ill-conceived and should be abandoned. This will contribute to show that the theories that provide a uniform account of truth and other semantic notions are the ones best equipped to avoid the paradoxes altogether—‘standard’ and ‘revenge’ alike. (shrink)

This paper studies some model-theoretic properties of special groups of finite type. Special groups are a first-order axiomatization of the algebraic theory of quadratic forms, introduced by Dickmann and Miraglia, which is essentially equivalent to abstract Witt rings. More precisely, we consider elementary equivalence, saturation, elementary embeddings, quantifier elimination, stability and Morley rank.

In 2004 Csima, Hirschfeldt, Knight, and Soare [1] showed that a set A ≤T 0' is nonlow₂ if and only if A is prime bounding, i.e., for every complete atomic decidable theory T, there is a prime model M computable in A. The authors presented nine seemingly unrelated predicates of a set A, and showed that they are equivalent $\Delta _{2}^{0}$ sets. Some of these predicates, such as prime bounding, and others involving equivalence structures and abelian p-groups come from (...) model theory, while others involving meeting dense sets in trees and escaping a given function come from pure computability theory. As predicates of A, the original nine properties are equivalent for $\Delta _{2}^{0}$ sets; however, they are not equivalent in general. This articale examines the (degree-theoretic) relationship between the nine properties. We show that the nine properties fall into three classes, each of which consists of several equivalent properties. We also investigate the relationship between the three classes, by determining whether or not any of the predicates in one class implies a predicate in another class. (shrink)

In the early days of natural language semantics, Donald Davidson issued a challenge to those, like Richard Montague, who would do semantics in a model-theoretic framework that gives a central role to a model-relative notion of truth. Davidson argued that no theory of this kind can claim to be an account of real truth conditions unless it first makes clear how the relativized notion relates to our ordinary non-relativized notion of truth. In the 1990s, Davidson’s challenge was developed (...) by Etchemendy into an argument against the model-theoretic account of logical consequence, one that also threatens the attempt to capture natural language entailment relations in modeltheoretic terms—one of the central desiderata of semantics. Nevertheless, the modeltheoretic framework has flourished within natural language semantics. But it has flourished without any consensus among semanticists as to how to answer Davidson’s challenge. The aim of this essay is to develop an answer. I argue that model-theoretic semantics is best understood as model-based science: a semantics for a natural language is a scientific model of truth conditions. This makes good sense of the way model-theoretic tools are used in natural language semantics. And it allows us to answer Davidson’s challenge by showing how a theory that employs a relativized notion of truth manages to tell us about ordinary truth conditions. Moreover, I argue that it helps us see how semantics can provide genuine explanations for natural language entailment and other truth-conditional phenomena. (shrink)

We study probabilistic logic under the viewpoint of the coherence principle of de Finetti. In detail, we explore how probabilistic reasoning under coherence is related to model- theoretic probabilistic reasoning and to default reasoning in System . In particular, we show that the notions of g-coherence and of g-coherent entailment can be expressed by combining notions in model-theoretic probabilistic logic with concepts from default reasoning. Moreover, we show that probabilistic reasoning under coherence is a generalization of default reasoning (...) in System . That is, we provide a new probabilistic semantics for System , which neither uses infinitesimal probabilities nor atomic bound (or big-stepped) probabilities. These results also provide new algorithms for probabilistic reasoning under coherence and for default reasoning in System , and they give new insight into default reasoning with conditional objects. (shrink)

[...] I will only investigate [Austin's] claims as challenges to present-day model theoretic semantics. My main point will be to draw a sharp line between the semantic and pragmatic aspects of performatives and thereby discover a gap in Austin’s treatment. This will in my view naturally lead to the proposal in Section 2, that is, to treating performatives as denoting changes in intensional models. The rest of Section 2 will be concerned with the status of felicity conditions and a (...) tentative extension of Montague’s PTQ. (shrink)

Let= {0,1, +,·,<} be the usual first-order language of arithmetic. We show that Peano arithmetic is the least first-order-theory containingIΔ0+ exp such that every complete extensionTof it has a countable modelKsatisfying(i)Khas no proper elementary substructures, and(ii) wheneverL≻Kis a countable elementary extension there isandsuch that.Other model-theoretic conditions similar to (i) and (ii) are also discussed and shown to characterize Peano arithmetic.

Weakly Aggregative Modal Logic ) is a collection of disguised polyadic modal logics with n-ary modalities whose arguments are all the same. \ has interesting applications on epistemic logic, deontic logic, and the logic of belief. In this paper, we study some basic model theoretical aspects of \. Specifically, we first give a van Benthem–Rosen characterization theorem of \ based on an intuitive notion of bisimulation. Then, in contrast to many well known normal or non-normal modal logics, we (...) show that each basic \ system \ lacks Craig interpolation. Finally, by model theoretical techniques, we show that an extension of \ does have Craig interpolation, as an example of amending the interpolation problem of \. (shrink)

The present paper studies the general implications of theprinciple of compositionality for the organization of grammar.It will be argued that Janssen''s (1986) requirement that syntax andsemantics be similar algebras is too strong, and that the moreliberal requirement that syntax be interpretable into semanticsleads to a formalization that can be motivated and applied more easily,while it avoids the complications that encumber Janssen''s formalization.Moreover, it will be shown that this alternative formalization evenallows one to further complete the formal theory of compositionality, inthat (...) it is capable of clarifying the role played by translation,model-theoretic interpretation and meaning postulates,of which the latter two aspects received little or no attention inMontague (1970) and Janssen (1986). (shrink)

We analyze model-theoretic connected components in extensions of a given group by abelian groups which are defined by means of 2-cocycles with finite image. We characterize, in terms of these 2-cocycles, when the smallest type-definable subgroup of the corresponding extension differs from the smallest invariant subgroup. In some situations, we also describe the quotient of these two connected components. Using our general results about extensions of groups together with Matsumoto–Moore theory or various quasi-characters considered in bounded cohomology, we obtain (...) new classes of examples of groups whose smallest type-definable subgroup of bounded index differs from the smallest invariant subgroup of bounded index. This includes the first known example of a group with this property found by Conversano and Pillay, namely the universal cover of [Formula: see text], as well as various examples of different nature, e.g. some central extensions of free groups or of fundamental groups of closed orientable surfaces. As a corollary, we get that both non-abelian free groups and fundamental groups of closed orientable surfaces of genus [Formula: see text], expanded by predicates for all subsets, have this property, too. We also obtain a variant of the example of Conversano and Pillay for [Formula: see text] instead of [Formula: see text], which was not accessible by the previously known methods. (shrink)

We use model-theoretic methods described in [3] to obtain ordinal analyses of a number of theories of first- and second-order arithmetic, whose proof-theoretic ordinals are less than or equal to Γ0.

Infinitary languages are used to prove that any strong isomorphism of substructures of isomorphic structures can be extended to an isomorphism of the structures. If the structures are models of a theory that has quantifier elimination, any isomorphism of substructures is strong. This theorem is a partial generalization of Steinitz’s theorem for algebraically closed fields and has as special case the analogous theorem for differentially closed fields. In this note, we announce results which will be proved elsewhere. DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n1p107.

Physicalism has, over the past twenty years, become almost an orthodoxy, especially in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers, however, feel uneasy about this development, and this volume is intended as a collective response to it. Together these papers, written by philosophers from Britain, the United States, and Australasia, show that physicalism faces enormous problems in every area in which it is discussed. The contributors not only investigate the well-known difficulties that physicalism has in accommodating sensory consciousness, but also bring (...) out its inadequacies in dealing with thought, intentionality, abstract objects, , and principles of both theoretical and practical reason; even its ability to cope with the physical world itself is called into question. Both strong "reductionist" versions and weaker "supervenience" theories are discussed and found to face different but equally formidable obstacles. Contributors include George Bealer, Peter Forrest, John Foster, Grant Gillett, Bob Hale, Michael Lockwood, George Myro, Nicholas Nathan, David Smith, Steven Wagner, Ralph Walker, and Richard Warner. (shrink)

If are structures for a first-order language , is said to be algebraically closed in just in case every positive existential -sentence true in is true in . In 1976 Elliott showed that unital AF algebras are classified up to isomorphism by corresponding dimension groups with order unit. This paper shows that one dimension group with order unit is algebraically closed in another just in case the corresponding AF algebras, viewed as metric structures, fall in the same relation.

:This essay advances a version of the flicker of freedom defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities and shows that it is invulnerable to the major objections facing other versions of this defense. Proponents of the flicker defense argue that Frankfurt-style cases fail to undermine PAP because agents in these cases continue to possess alternative possibilities. Critics of the flicker strategy contend that the alternatives that remain open to agents in these cases are unable to rebuff Frankfurt-style attack on the (...) grounds that they are insufficiently robust. Once we see that omissions are capable of constituting robust alternatives, even when they are not intentional, it becomes clear that agents in these cases do indeed possess robust alternative possibilities—alternatives that are ineliminable from cases of this sort. The upshot is that Frankfurt-style cases are theoretically incapable of providing us with good grounds for rejecting PAP. (shrink)

Moral principles play important roles in diverse areas of moral thought, practice, and theory. Many who think of themselves as ‘moral generalists’ believe that moral principles can play these roles—that they are capable of doing so. Moral generalism maintains that moral principles can and do play these roles because true moral principles are statements of general moral fact (i.e. statements of facts about the moral attributes of kinds of actions, kinds of states of affairs, etc.) and because general moral facts (...) explain particular moral facts (i.e. facts about the moral attributes of particulars). Moral holism maintains that what is a moral reason to φ in one case may not be one in another, and may even be a moral reason not to φ given suitable circumstances. Some ‘moral particularists’ maintain that moral holism motivates scepticism about the existence of and need for moral principles, along with scepticism about the viability of principle-based approaches to ethics and moral theory. But I argue that moral holism is itself a form of moral generalism, one that takes facts about the right- and wrong-making powers of (generic) moral factors to explain certain particular moral facts—namely, the rightness and wrongness of particular actions. I also argue that a moral-theoretic version of dispositionalism—the view that dispositions, powers, or capacities are the fundamental units of explanation—explains both why moral holism is true and why moral generalism is true. (shrink)

In this ambitious book, acclaimed writer Marilynne Robinson applies her astute intellect to some of the most vexing topics in the history of human thought—science, religion, and consciousness. Crafted with the same care and insight as her award-winning novels, _Absence of Mind_ challenges postmodern atheists who crusade against religion under the banner of science. In Robinson’s view, scientific reasoning does not denote a sense of logical infallibility, as thinkers like Richard Dawkins might suggest. Instead, in its purest form, (...) science represents a search for answers. It engages the problem of knowledge, an aspect of the mystery of consciousness, rather than providing a simple and final model of reality. By defending the importance of individual reflection, Robinson celebrates the power and variety of human consciousness in the tradition of William James. She explores the nature of subjectivity and considers the culture in which Sigmund Freud was situated and its influence on his model of self and civilization. Through keen interpretations of language, emotion, science, and poetry,_ Absence of Mind_ restores human consciousness to its central place in the religion-science debate. (shrink)

Ordinarily, in mathematical and scientific practice, the notion of a “theory” is understood as follows: (SCT) Standard Conception of Theories : A theory T is a collection of statements, propositions, conjectures, etc. A theory claims that things are thus and so. The theory may be true, and may be false. A theory T is true if things are as T says they are, and T is false if things are not as T says they are. One can make this Aristotelian (...) explanation more precise, as Tarski showed, in the cases where we understand how to give precise logical analyses of theories, by identifying an interpreted language L, Á) in which T may be formulated. Here L is some formalized language and Á is an L-interpretation. One can define the satisfaction relation ⊨, holding between L-sentences j and L-interpretations, and then define the notion L-sentence j is true in L, Á)” as Á ⊨ j”. What is essential about this is that theories are truth bearers . They are bearers of semantic properties. (shrink)

Most of the early proofs of the decidability or completeness of certain mathematical theories were based on the method of eliminations of quantifiers. Various more recent results on completeness were obtained independently of such procedures. However, it is shown in the present paper that, conversely, the completeness of a mathematical theory will in certain circumstances entail the existence of an elimination method. The proof involves the application of the extended first ε‐theorem of Hilbert‐Bernays.ZusammenfassungDie meisten früheren Beweise der Vollständigkeit oder Entscheidbarkeit (...) gewisser mathematischer Theorien benutzten die sogenannte Quantoren‐eliminierungsmethode. Dagegen sind einige neuere Ergebnisse über Voll‐ständigkeit unabhängig von diesem Verfahren. Es ist deshalb von Interesse festzustellen, dass umgekehrt die Vollständigkeit einer mathematischen Theorie unter Umständen die Existenz einer Eliminierungsmethode fürdiese Theorie nach sich zieht. Der Beweis benutzt das erweiterte erste ε‐Theorem von Hilbert‐Bernays.SommaireBeaucoup de démonstrations concernant la complétude de certaines théories mathématiques, ou concernant l'existence d'un procédé de décision pour une telle théorie, sont basées sur des méthodes d'élimination de quantificateurs. Or, il y a des résultats plus récents sur la complétude de certaines théories qui ne dépendent pas de telles méthodes d'élimination. Toutefois on démontre ici que la complétude d'une théorie mathématique entraîne sous certaines conditions l'existence d'une méthode d'élimination. Au cours de la démonstration on se sert d'un des théorèmes‐ε de Hilbert‐Bernays. (shrink)

The semantic view of theoriesis one according to which theoriesare construed as models of their linguisticformulations. The implications of thisview for scientific realism have been little discussed. Contraryto the suggestion of various champions of the semantic view,it is argued that this approach does not makesupport for a plausible scientific realism anyless problematic than it might otherwise be.Though a degree of independence of theory fromlanguage may ensure safety frompitfalls associated with logical empiricism, realism cannot be entertained unless models or (abstractedand/or idealized) (...) aspects thereof are spelled out in terms of linguistic formulations (such as mathematical equations),which can be interpreted in terms of correspondencewith the world. The putative advantage of thesemantic approach – its linguistic independence – isthus of no help to the realist. I consider recent treatmentsof the model-theoretic view (Suppe, Giere, Smith), and find that although some of these accounts harbour the promiseof realism, this promise is deceptive. (shrink)

One approach to validating simulation models is to formally compare model outputs with independent data. We consider such model validation from the point of view of Frequentist statistics. A range of estimates and tests of goodness of fit have been advanced. We review these approaches, and demonstrate that some of the tests suffer from difficulties in interpretation because they rely on the null hypothesisHypothesis that the model is similar to the observationsObservations. This reliance creates two unpleasant possibilities, (...) namely, a model could be spuriously validated when dataData are too few, or inappropriately rejected when data are too many. Finally, these tests do not allow a principled declaration of what a reasonable level of difference would be considering the purposes to which the model will be put. We consider equivalence tests, and demonstrate that they do not suffer from the previously identified shortcomings. We provide two case studies to illustrate the claims of the chapter. (shrink)

'Mass terms', words like water, rice and traffic, have proved very difficult to accommodate in any theory of meaning since, unlike count nouns such as house or dog, they cannot be viewed as part of a logical set and differ in their grammatical properties. In this study, motivated by the need to design a computer program for understanding natural language utterances incorporating mass terms, Harry Bunt provides a thorough analysis of the problem and offers an original and detailed solution. An (...) extension of classical set theory, Ensemble Theory, is defined, and this provides the conceptual basis of a framework for the analysis of natural language meaning which Dr Bunt calls Two-level model-theoretic semantics. The validity of the framework is convincingly demonstrated by the formal analysis of a fragment of English including sentences with quantified and modified mass terms. Separate chapters of the book are devoted to an axiomatic definition of Ensemble Theory and a detailed discussion of its status as a mathematical formalism. (shrink)

This article interprets Foucault's life-long involvement with transgressive experiences as an art of not being oneself, an effort to escape identity and become other. By bringing together Foucault's own theoretical practices with those drawn from Deleuze and Blanchot, and linking these with biographical material (modes of existence), I show how Foucault's `encounters' with passion and pleasure in film, philosophy, S/M, drugs, the Greeks and suicide amount to an `art of living', an intensification of the power to affect oneself and (...) others in processes of `subjectivation', creating new possibilities of life. This is what Foucault more precisely called an `ethics' - an immanent ethics in which one becomes worthy of what happens to oneself by becoming a work of art. (shrink)

We prove a generalization of the Elekes–Szabó theorem [G. Elekes and E. Szabó, How to find groups?, Combinatorica 32 537–571 ] for relations defina...

The rapid, recent emergence of new medical knowledge models has engendered a dizzying number of new medical initiatives, programs and approaches. Fields such as evidence-based medicine and translational medicine all promise a renewed relationship between knowledge and medicine. The question for philosophy and other fields has been whether these new models actually achieve their promises to bring about better kinds of medical knowledge—a question that compels scholars to analyze each model’s epistemic claims. Yet, these analyses may miss critical components (...) that explain how these models actually work and function. Using the case of translational medicine, this paper suggests that analyses which treat these models as a primarily epistemic interventions miss the way that new approaches are increasingly shaped by specific financial and commercial agendas. Ultimately, social epistemological analyses that are attentive to market forces are required to make sense of emerging bioscientific research models, which are increasingly tethered to or a manifestation of increasingly financialized models of science research and innovation. (shrink)

Presents the Presidential address by Daniel N. Robinson at the Division of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association in Boston on August 11, 1990. His remarks included a series of important developments within Psychology but also outside its traditional areas of interest, in such fields as anthropology, linguistics and ethnology. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

“Renascent Rationalism represents a new and provocative departure from the mostly barren currents of twentieth-century philosophy. The author, enlisting the aid of theoretical science, leads off from the tradition of Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Russell and then steps well beyond. The result is a single, integrated philosophical system resting in direct opposition to the contemporary positions of analysis, empiricism, pragmatism, existentialism, and phenomenology.There are four major effects of Helier Robinson’s acceptance of the Leibniz-Russell theory of perception as (...) his base: all the philosophic problems of perception are solved; a whole new philosophy of science develops; an entirely new theory of mind emerges; and some startling theological and ethical consequences ensue. The art of metaphysical speculation is thus revived.Renascent Rationalism offers a clear, if controversial, alternative to the dominating influence of Hume and Kant and the resulting blind alleys of much modern philosophizing.”- Publisher. (shrink)

Rationality in medicine is frequently construed as hypotheticodeductive. This article argues that such a model gives a distorted view of the rational character of an enterprise that makes judgments about individual human well-being. Medicine as a science is a practical human science. Seen as such, its rational orientation is one that applies general knowledge to particular situations. It is argued that such an orientation is not deductive but interpretative. The Aristotelian concept of practical wisdom (‘phron sis’) is used as (...) a model of the rational orientation of clinical judgment. Keywords: clinical judgment, rationality, human sciences CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

This chapter concentrates on the version of Putnam's argument set forth in his Reason, Truth and History. It explains how, in general terms, that argument is best conceived as working. Cursory inspection of Putnam's overall dialectic reveals it to incorporate three sub‐arguments, collectively designed to show that the metaphysical realist confronts an insuperable problem over explaining how our words may possess determinate reference. The chapter considers Putnam's version of the Permutation Argument, aimed at showing that reference cannot be determined by (...) fixing the truth‐conditions of whole sentences. It then reviews Putnam's 'just more theory' argument, designed to show that the metaphysical realist cannot rescue the situation by appeal to causal or other natural connections between our words and the world. The chapter considers how the considerations adduced by Hilary Putnam might be seen as an argument telling selectively against metaphysical realism. (shrink)

Mindfulness, defined in terms of greater attention and awareness concerning present experience, seems to have a number of psychological benefits, but very little of this research has focused on possible benefits within the workplace. Even so, mindfulness appears to buffer against stress and negative affect, which often predispose employees to deviant behaviors. Conversely, mindful employees may be more engaged with their jobs, which could support organizational citizenship. Two studies pursued these ideas. In Study 1, part-time employees who were higher in (...) dispositional mindfulness were less prone to job negative affect, which in turn predicted lower levels of workplace deviance. In Study 2, more mindful full-time employees were more engaged, and less stressed, and these variables mediated a portion of the relationship between mindfulness and organizational citizenship. Collectively, the two studies link mindfulness to both traditional forms of voluntary work behavior while highlighting mediational pathways. (shrink)

Through an engagement with Sylvia Wynter, this article explores how black feminist critiques of the human can inform critical genealogies of religion. Specifically, the article develops a theoretical framework to interrogate how the modern construction of religion and the secular also produces racial identities and hierarchies. To draw attention to the global dimensions of this project, the article foregrounds the seminal work of Jason Ā. Josephson-Storm in his book, The Invention of Religion in Japan. The article argues that studies (...) like Josephson-Storm's show how religion helps transform existing forms of social organization within a bio-evolutionary conception of the nation, and is used by the state to differentiate between who can be considered fully human and who cannot. In this process “superstition” or “irrationality” is rewritten as a biological threat to the health and well-being of “the people,” and political domination is represented as a struggle to purify the nation. (shrink)

Books and articles about the acceleration of daily life are themselves accelerating. A theoretical basis for expecting the inevitability of these trends has been traced in the writings of major sociologists including Durkheim, Marx, Weber and Sorkin. As deTocqueville observed more than 150 years ago, “The American is always in a hurry.” Economists have also weighed in on these issues of time compression, perhaps starting with Linder’s insightful treatise The Harried Leisure Class, predicting the frantic pace of modern life (...) and leisure. As specialized work led to higher rates of productivity, accelerated consumption led to an acceleration of the pace of life and a harried leisure class. Much of what Linder discussed in regard to time scarcity was perceived scarcity. Interestingly, his conclusions were not that people would work longer, but rather that they would attempt to increase the yield on a unit of time in all areas of life—minimizing activities such as singing or political debate, which could not easily have their yield on time spent increased. The value of efficiency and increased productivity, carried to extremes, he argued, produced a kind of decadence in which the goal of economic growth is never questioned. More recently, economists have played down the seriousness of concerns over a speeded up lifestyle, characterizing it in large part as “Yuppie Kvetch.” Not that higher income couples are making irrational decisions, they are simply facing the inevitable constraints on their ability to enjoy their wealth. This article reviews various of these philosophical issues in the context of US national survey data concerning trends in the time pressures and stress in the activities of Americans over the last 30+ years. It focuses both on the measurable amounts of free time Americans have and on the specific activities done in that free time. It also reviews survey data on Americans’ perceptions of and attitudes toward time and stress. It brings together data from different survey sources that often show conflicting trends and conclusions. (shrink)

I aim to explode a famous thesis about “the rise of fictionality,” argued in an essay of that title by Catherine Gallagher. I also have in mind related claims that the eighteenth or the nineteenth century first distinguished fiction from nonfiction or first differentiated literature from other modes of discourse. Gallagher places the rise of fictionality exactly where Ian Watt placed the rise of the novel—England, 1720 to 1740—and she connects it to the development of a credit economy. This article (...) argues that the relationship between fiction and credit goes deeper than this, insofar as fiction was classically theorized in relation to modal concepts like probability and as such had a direct relationship to what Aristotle called endoxa: what is believed by all or by most. Probability was understood in relation not to what happens but to what is thought to happen: that is, to a socially constituted sense of what and who is credible. The article takes account of the multiple disciplines in which fictionality was theorized in the premodern period, but it emphasizes the centrality of rhetoric and the dissemination of a model of fictionality through the early modern grammar schools. Finally, it reads Shakespeare’s Othello to show that probable fiction was not only an available concept but a crucial tool for the analysis of social life. In Othello, ideologies of race and gender define the unequal terms on which credibility is established. Probable fiction is directly tied to the work of making and unmaking social worlds. (shrink)

The simple model maintains that morally relevant factors combine in a simple, additive way, like weights on a scale. Although intuitive and familiar, this model entails that certain plausible views about particular cases and how morally relevant factors combine and interact therein are false. Shelly Kagan suggests that we could accommodate the relevant views and interactions by rejecting either of two assumptions the simple model makes: that the moral status of an act is determined by the sum (...) of the contributions made by each of the factors relevant thereto (additivity); and that neither the “weight” nor the “valence” of a factor’s contribution can be affected by other factors (atomism). But is there an atomistic option, a way of accommodating the relevant views and interactions by rejecting additivity rather than atomism? I argue that developing an atomistic option requires offering a conception of contribution that renders coherent the particular claims that must be true if there is, indeed, such an option. And I consider whether Rossian pluralism—the locus classicus for the idea of a contributory right-making factor—offers the resources necessary to offer such a conception, and whether it could accommodate the relevant views and interactions other than by rejecting atomism. (shrink)