Examining a variety of bio-objects in contexts beyond the laboratory, Bio-Objects: Life in the 21st Century explores new ways of thinking about how novel bio-objects enter contemporary life, analysing the manner in which the boundaries between human and animal, organic and non-organic, and being 'alive' and the suspension of living, are questioned, destabilised and in some cases re-established.

Umbilical cord blood has become the focus of intense efforts to collect, screen and bank haematopoietic stem cells in hundreds of repositories around the world. UCB banking has developed through a broad spectrum of overlapping banking practices, sectors and institutional forms. Superficially at least, these sectors have been widely distinguished in bioethical and policy literature between notions of the ‘public’ and the ‘private’, the commons and the market respectively. Our purpose in this paper is to reflect more critically on these (...) distinctions and to articulate the complex practical and hybrid nature of cord blood as a ‘bio-object’ that straddles binary conceptions of the blood economies. The paper draws upon Roberto Esposito’s reflections on biopolitics and his attempt to transcend the dualistic polarisations of immunity and community, or the private and the public. We suggest that his thoughts on immunitary hospitality resonate with many of the actual features and realpolitik of a necessarily internationalised and globally distributed UCB ‘immunitary regime’. (shrink)

Genes, Cells and Brains: The Promethean Promises of the New Biology Hillary Rose & Stephen Rose, Genes, Cells and Brains: The Promethean Promises of the New Biology. London and New York: Verso Books, 2014. ISBN-10: 178168314X (paperback). 336 pp. -/- Bio-Objects: Life in the 21st Century Niki Vermeulen, Sakari Tamminen & Andrew Webster (eds) Bio-Objects: Life in the 21st Century. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2012. ISBN: 978-1-4094-1178-9 (hardback). 240 pp.

This book is about the use of legal scholarship by judges. It discusses the possibility that legal scholarship may function as a genuine source of law in modern municipal legal systems. The book advances a number of claims, some conceptual, some empirical, some normative. The major conceptual claims are found in Chapters 2 and 3, where a general account of the notion of a source of law is provided. Roughly, sources of law are documents or practices (e.g. statutes, judicial decisions, (...) official customs) from which norms can be derived that function as sources of content-independent reasons for judges to decide legal cases one way or another. The relevant notion of content-independence is derived (with qualifications) from H.L.A. Hart's jurisprudence. Indeed, the book's analysis of the concept of a source of law relies at various points on Hartian insights about law and legal reasoning. Chapter 4 argues that legal scholarship - or, more precisely, a particular type of legal scholarship that might be described as standard or doctrinal - can be, and indeed is, used as a source of law in modern legal systems. The conclusion that legal scholarship is used as a source of law (and thus as a source of content-independent reasons for action) may come as a surprise to those who associate judicial recourse to legal scholarship with judicial activism. This association is discussed and criticized in Chapters 5 and 6. It is argued that, in spite of a relatively common opinion to the contrary, legal scholarship can be used to mitigate discretion. In fact, it is precisely because it can be used in this way that judges sometimes refer to scholarship deceptively and suggest that it limits discretion in situations in which it really does not. The concluding chapter addresses potential objections not explicitly discussed in earlier chapters.. (shrink)

This article explores and challenges notions and methodologies of conservation, including the use of blockchain technologies as a means of establishing provenance of a physical BioArtwork, of the artist’s documentation encapsulating their intentions and of the conservator’s records required for the artwork’s ongoing care. The exploration is done through a case study of an art project called ‘Unruly Objects and Biological Conservation’ created by Anna Dumitriu with support from Alex May. The artwork consists of three items containing RFID tags (...) sealed in resin – which point to the location of the artist’s documentation. Therefore, the works physically include instructions for maintaining their inherent concepts and materiality for the benefit of the conservators. Such instructions can often be difficult to track down, or become disassociated from the artwork while the digital preservation of this storage method also poses its own set of questions. The works also include biological material including mud from a bacterial ecosystem known as a Winogradsky Column, living plant material and SARS-CoV-2 (coronavirus) RNA from a plasmid construct. (shrink)

Biochemists investigating the problem of the vitamins in the early years of the twentieth century were working without an object, as such. Although they had developed a fairly elaborate idea of the character of the ‘vitamine’ and its role in metabolism, vitamins were not yet biochemical objects, but rather ‘functional ascriptions’ and ‘explanatory devices’. I suggest that an early instance of the changing status of the object of the ‘vitamins’ can be found in their stabilization, through the course of (...) World War I, as bio-political objects for the British and Allied war effort. Vitamins emerged as players, active agents, in Britain’s wartime bio-political problems of food distribution and population health and because of this they became increasingly real as bio-political objects, even prior to their isolation as bio-chemical molecules. I suggest that the materiality of our biology has agency in the development of political regimes and schemes. (shrink)

A prominent objection to non-cognitive moral bio-enhancements is that they would compromise the recipient’s ‘freedom to fall’. I begin by discussing some ambiguities in this objection, before outlining an Aristotelian reading of it. I suggest that this reading may help to forestall Persson and Savulescu’s ‘God-Machine’ criticism; however, I suggest that the objection still faces the problem of explaining why the value of moral conformity is insufficient to outweigh the value of the freedom to fall itself. I also question whether (...) the objection is compatible with Neil Levy’s parity principle. Accordingly, I go on to consider an alternative relational freedom-based objection to NCMBEs that aims to explain the fundamental moral importance of the freedom that NCMBEs would violate. I argue that although this strategy might allow the critic of NCMBEs to bypass a powerful criticism of Harris’ objection, it also weakens the freedom-based objection’s compatibility with the parity principle. (shrink)

The sociobiological and socio-political aspects of human existence have been the subject of techno-rationalistic control and manipulation. The investigation of the mutual complementarity of anthropological and ontological paradigms under these circumstances is the main purpose of present publication. The comparative conceptual analysis of the bio-power and bio-politics in the mentality of the modern technological civilization is a main method of the research. The methodological and philosophical analogy of biological and social engineering allows combining them in the nature and social implications (...) as part of a High Hume technologies class. As result of the transformation of somatic foundations of the human being and his behavior, stereotypes in the object of control and management the technogenic risk reached the existential level. The rapidly growing status of biopower and biopolitics in the conceptual field of contemporary political science becomes by phenomenological expression of these processes. (shrink)

Today, new artistic practices incorporate scientific techniques linked to medical research that modify the body’s biological performance in vivo, transforming it into a singular laboratory object. In this way, some artists are making works of their bodies by subjecting them to various biotechnological procedures, often invasive. Augmented, the biological body of these performance artists becomes a site for experimentation. DIY (Do It Yourself) enthusiasts or accompanied by biologists and doctors, are these ‘bio-artists’ evidence of the changes brought about by a (...) new mechanisation of the human body, the complexity of which we are only just beginning to understand? Could there be, in the name of art, reasons that justify the creation of utopian bodies that are not eschatological, and that could make us believe in the worst or the best of all worlds? Based on performances by Stelarc, Yann Marussich, Marion Laval-Jeantet and the Quimera Rosa duo, our aim is to analyse what is at stake in this new fabrication of the body outside its biological limits. (shrink)

Intended both as an introduction to the thought of the Italian philosopher Roberto Esposito and as a mapping of current biopolitical practice, this essay traces the contributions and the limits of recent Italian contributions to the discussion of biopolitics. The essay offers a summary of Esposito's insight into the relation of community and immunity and compares his thinking to other philosophers who take immunity as their object of study . Campbell goes on to read Esposito's privileging of bios in the (...) light of Giorgio Agamben's emphasis on zōē, while making reference as well to Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt's understanding of biopower. He concludes by arguing that the stakes of Esposito's analysis for an affirmative biopolitics concern fundamentally the nature of community and its opening to all life forms as bios. (shrink)

Christopher Boorse’s bio-statistical theory of health and disease argues that the central discipline on which theoretical medicine relies is physiology. His theory has been much discussed but little has been said about its focus on physiology or, conversely, about the role that other biomedical disciplines may play in establishing a theoretical concept of health. Since at least the 1950s, epidemiology has gained in strength and legitimacy as an independent medical science that contributes to our knowledge of health and disease. Indeed, (...) it not only provides important information about disease distribution and aetiology, but the risk-factor approach it employs seems to challenge BST’s binary conception of health and disease. The objective of the article is to show, firstly, how important information deriving from descriptive and analytical epidemiology forms part of our contemporary medical concepts of health and disease, and secondly, that these elements are not taken into account by BST in a satisfactory way. The article’s central contention, therefore, is that if the project of defining the theoretical concept of health is to be maintained, more importance should be accorded to the contribution made by epidemiology—alongside physiology—in defining health. (shrink)

In recent years, neural networks have attracted much attention in the machine learning and the deep learning technologies. Bio-inspired functions and intelligence are also expected to process efficiently and improve existing technologies. In the visual pathway, the prominent features consist of nonlinear characteristics of squaring and rectification functions observed in the retinal and visual cortex networks, respectively. Further, adaptation is an important feature to activate the biological systems, efficiently. Recently, to overcome short-comings of the deep learning techniques, orthogonality for the (...) weights in the networks has been developed for the signal propagation and the efficient optimization of the learning. In this paper, bio-inspired asymmetric networks with nonlinear characteristics are proposed, which are derived from the retinal networks in the biological visual pathway. The asymmetric network proposed here was verified to detect the movement of the object, efficiently in our previous studies. This paper shows a new characteristic of the adaptive orthogonality in the asymmetric networks. First, it is shown that the asymmetric network with nonlinear characteristics is effective for generating orthogonality. Second, the proposed asymmetric network with Gabor filters is compared with the conventional energy model from the point of the orthogonality characteristics. Finally, the asymmetric networks with nonlinear characteristics can generate the extended orthogonal bases in independent subspaces, which are useful for classification and efficient learning. (shrink)

Surveillance programs supporting the management of One Health issues such as antibiotic resistance are complex systems in themselves. Designing ethical surveillance systems is thus a complex task (retroactive and iterative), yet one that is also complicated to implement and evaluate (e.g., sharing, collaboration, and governance). The governance of health surveillance requires attention to ethical concerns about data and knowledge (e.g., performance, trust, accountability, and transparency) and empowerment ethics, also referred to as a form of responsible self-governance. Ethics in reflexive governance (...) operates as a systematic critical-thinking procedure that aims to define its value: What are the “right” criteria to justify how to govern “good” actions for a “better” future? The objective is to lay the foundations for a methodological framework in empirical bioethics, the rudiments of which have been applied to a case study to building reflexive governance in One Health. This ongoing critical thinking process involves “mapping, framing, and shaping” the dynamics of interests and perspectives that could jeopardize a “better” future. This paper proposes to hybridize methods to combine insights from collective deliberation and expert evaluation through a reflexive governance functioning as a community-based action-ethics methodology. The intention is to empower individuals and associations in a dialogue with society, which operation is carried out using a case study approach on data sharing systems. We based our reasoning on a feasibility study conducted in Québec, Canada (2018–2021), envisioning an antibiotic use surveillance program in animal health for 2023. Using the adaptive cycle and governance techniques and perspectives, we synthesize an alternative governance model rooted in the value of empowerment. The framework, depicted as a new “research and design (R&D)” practice, is linking operation and innovation by bridging the gap between Reflexive, Evaluative, and Deliberative reasonings and by intellectualizing the management of democratizing critical thinking locally (collective ethics) by recognizing its context (social ethics). Drawing on the literature in One Health and sustainable development studies, this article describes how a communitarian and pragmatic approach can broaden the vision of feasibility studies to ease collaboration through public-private-academic partnerships. The result is a process that “reassembles” the One Health paradigm under the perspective of global bioethics to create bridges between the person and the ecosystem through pragmatic ethics. (shrink)

This collection provides English readers with a critical update on current debates on biopolitics in and around Italian thought. More than a decade after the publication of seminal books such as Agamben’s _Homo Sacer_ and Hardt and Negri’s _Empire_, the names of, among others, Roberto Esposito, Paolo Virno, Christian Marazzi, and Andrea Fumagalli have recently been brought to the attention of Anglophone scholars and political activists. Several authors have rightly emphasised the evanescent character of biopolitics, and the difficulty in providing (...) a definition of it that could embrace all the conflicting theories of its most celebrated critics and supporters. The present collection is structured around the basic contention that bio-economy, human nature, and Christianity are the three visible contemporary manifestations of the theoretical object/problem of biopolitics in, respectively, Italian post-workerist economics, post-Marxist philosophical anthropology, and post-structuralist ontology. This book was originally published as a special issue of _Angelaki_. (shrink)

Biological organisms appear to have agency, goals, and meaningful behaviour. One possibility is that this is mere appearance, where such properties are not real, but only ‘as if’ consequences of the physiological structure of organisms. Another possibility is that these properties are real, as emerging from the organism's structure and from how the organism interacts with its environment. Here I will discuss a recent theory showing that the latter position is most likely correct, and argue that the theory is largely (...) consistent with the basics of the field of biosemiotics. The theory can be represented as a triad that resembles the semiotic triad proposed by Peirce, which connects a sign with its object through a process of interpretation. In the theory presented, the sign is an internalized version of fitness which refers to the true fitness through a feedback loop that in effect produces interpretation. The feedback loop entangles deterministic and stochastic forms of causation in such a way that genuine agency, goal-directedness, and their associated meaning emerge. It produces a strong form of emergence not reducible to its constituents. The result is that novel phenomena arise that are real and necessary components for a complete understanding of living organisms. (shrink)

La possibilité d’une définition naturaliste de la santé et d’une distinction entre le normal et le pathologique qui ne repose pas sur des normes culturelles, sociales ou subjectives est au cœur des débats en philosophie de la médecine. Or le concept statistique de la normalité, fondamental pour une définition objective de la santé, soulève d’importantes difficultés. Christopher Boorse défend une « théorie bio-statistique » qui, en articulant ce concept à une notion non normative de fonction biologique, résoudrait ces difficultés. L’identification (...) de la santé et de la normalité au sens statistique demeure toutefois centrale dans sa définition. Après avoir précisé le rôle que joue la normalité statistique dans la BST, nous dégageons, à partir de l’épidémiologie contemporaine, un certain nombre de problèmes et questions que cette définition naturaliste soulève.The liability for a naturalist definition of health and for a value-free distinction between the normal and the pathological is at the core of discussions on health and disease in philosophy of medicine. But the statistical concept of normality, a central one for any objective definition of health, raises numerous problems. Christopher Boorse argues for a « biostatistical theory » which aims at solving these difficulties by articulating a statistical concept of normality and a non-normative concept of biological function. However the BST is still based on identifying normality and health with the most frequent. After analyzing in details the true role of statistical normality in BST, I will show how results and data from modern epidemiology can be mobilized to reveal several limits and difficulties with respect to this naturalist definition of health and disease. (shrink)

In this article, I consider ‘skin portraiture’: a mode of representation that privileges quasi-anonymous, fragmented, magnified and anatomized images of skin. I argue that this mode of representation permits a heightened awareness of embodied experiences such as reflexivity, empathy and relationality. Expanding understandings of difference through its engagement with haptic imagery and visuality, skin portraiture reorients the boundaries between ‘I’/‘not I’ and subject/object – often through touch – and challenges the cultural commitment to traditional notions of bodily autonomy. By doing (...) so, skin portraiture functions as an antagonistic form of portraiture; that is, as a kind of anti-portraiture that pushes the genre into an expanded visual field and, at times, beyond representation. Exploring the skin-as-technology metaphor, I show that bio art skin portraiture creates chimeric skins through tissue culturing practices, permitting bodies to become radically relational. Bio art skin portraits celebrate the genetic and cellular differences between bodies through a visible collapse of epidermal boundaries, which engenders a hyper-haptic mode of seeing beyond the subject and her or his skin. Analysing the bio art of Jalia Essaïdi, ORLAN and Julia Reodica, and drawing on the work of Laura Marks and Erin Manning, this article explores the skin-as-technology metaphor in order to offer the arts and humanities an innovative understanding of contemporary embodiment. (shrink)

What value does genomics hold for industry? Ten years after the White House Press conference where the human genome sequence was first presented, we ask in which ways and to what extent the developments in genomics have been integrated into industry. This enables us to assess whether this integration has been as successful as expected, but also which unexpected developments in genomics advances have triggered additional benefits for industry. Genomics has contributed to the beginning of a global transition to a (...) bio-based economy, but there have been and there still are hurdles to be cleared. The hurdles are not merely of a technological nature, since the objectives are a complex between economic progress, environmental and global climate concerns, and energy security. Therefore, they are at the same time technological, societal and environmental in nature. These categorisations fall short of articulating the many issues that arise, such as economic development (for emerging economies), public opinion formation and scientific and technological progress. We argue that to make this transition happen, industrialists, policy makers and the wider public have to be prepared to be more actively involved in the debate, weighing the pros and cons and taking responsibility in creating the desired sustainable world.This paper will examine the advances of genomics in the industrial context, the role of these advances in current attempts to find sustainable solutions to a variety of problems, the enthusiasm with which they have been picked up, the implications for industrial innovation and the accompanying discussion about possible consequential social and ethical issues. It will also sketch out the nature of this ongoing establishment of a bio-based economy, the parties that are currently at the negotiation table, and whether the current situation has an impact on the way societal debates emerge. (shrink)

Christopher Boorse’s Health care ethics: an introduction, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, pp 359–393, 1987; in Humber, Almeder, Totowa What is disease?, Humana Press, New York City, pp 1–134, 1997; J Med Philos, 39:683–724, 2014) Bio-Statistical Theory comprehends diseases in terms of departures from natural norms, which involve an objectively describable deviation from the proper physiological or psychological functioning of parts of the human organism. I argue that while recent revisions and additional considerations shield the BST from a number of issues (...) raised by critics, they give rise to significant new challenges. These are related to the attribution of epistemic authority, the possibility of multiple concepts in the authoritative literature, and the framing of BST as “philosophical explication.” The conclusion is that, in its current form, the BST is unable to provide a robust framework for a naturalist classification. (shrink)

This article distinguishes three archetypal ways of articulating spatial cognition: (1) via metric representation of objective geometry, (2) via somatosensory constitution of the peripersonal environment, and (3) via pragmatic comprehension of the finalistic sense of action. The last one is documented by neuroscientific studies concerning mirror neurons. Bio-robotic experiments implementing mirror functions confirm the constitutive role of goal-oriented actions in spatial processes.

This article aims to explore Kazuo Ishiguro’sNever Let Me Gowithin the Foucauldian theoretical framework in order to analyse the manifold biopolitical issues, namely cloning, by stretching the discourse to a speculative, dystopian posthuman scenario wherein the dominant, privileged, affluent human society replenishes them by incorporating bio-matter from the clones. The article also proposes to unfold the myriad ways the institutions, namely Hailsham and recovery centres in the novel, exercise power and execute power relations with the clones. It describes the way (...) these institutions turn out to be what Foucault calls the regimes of truth and how the clones choose to remain docile to the institutional power, and consequently, they turn out to be rich sites for both medical gaze and disciplinary gaze. Nevertheless, the article also details the procedures by which the bizarre truth of organ donation of the clones is buried under the technical discourse of good work. (shrink)

The author attempts to advance and substantiate a novel theoretical - cosmist1 - approach to reaching the end of integrative universal, truly humane, bio-science.2The work is performed on the original basis of philosophical cosmology, ontology of Absolute Cosmist Wholism, cosmist epistemology, anthropology, and the core principle of CosmoBiotypology. Cosmist theory leads to a person-driven science that is able to integrate subjective and objective knowledge: humankind's personal experience with psychological, biological, and sociological knowledge about the person. In this, the cosmist approach (...) rises to a novel - cosmist functional universal - level of bio-reductionism that relies ultimately on objective scientific knowledge but, at the same time, is primarily person-driven: based on the feelings and perceptions of a person. The core notion of the theory is a person's Basic (Cosmist) Functionality, the realization of which leads to man's3entire ontogenetic well-being.4. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Contingent Object of PsychiatryDavid McCallum (bio)Keywordsmental illness, dangerousness, law, genealogyWilson and Adhead’s plea that the British Government’s proposed new mental health legislation might entail a misappropriation of psychiatry’s true mission will strike a chord in numerous jurisdictions. Many European countries during the last northern summer will adopt mental health legislation that moves in the opposite direction to the United Nations Convention on Human Rights for persons with disabilities, (...) and will allow for compulsory mental health treatment. In this author’s home state of Victoria, Australia, the Mental Health Act has five criteria that must be met for someone to be made an involuntary patient in an institution or hospital, in the community, or in one’s own home (Victoria 2003, s.6). One of the criteria is that the person is judged to be at risk of danger to themselves or others. Once made an involuntary patient, one looses the right to refuse medical treatment. At present, in various parts of the world, medical practitioners are being required to assess a person’s level of dangerousness with immediate consequences for that person’s liberty.From the point of view of a historian of the human sciences, these events propel psychiatry into a dialogue with its recent past. The project of Western psychiatry is usually characterized as a breaking down of the walls of the old asylum that contained the lunatic in its dark recesses, and the subsequent unveiling of the mental patient thanks to the rational, liberatory practices of medicine. But modern psychiatry has also been shaped by the coming into being of particular conceptions of mental illness that are not all its own making. This entailed the removal over time of the mental defective and the mental deficient, the moral imbecile, the epileptic, the alcoholic, the chronically insane, and so on, from spaces in which psychiatry would seek to define it object—populations that psychiatry would determine to be “not amenable to treatment.” If we were to see this shaping in a Foucauldian sense, we would also want to include earlier eighteenth- and nineteenth-century separations of the lunatic and the criminal (Foucault 1965, 1979). Moreover, we might want to insist that the marking out of the modern mental health patient is first and foremost an administrative act—an act of separation and management within a bounded population—which then serves as a condition of possibility for the emergence of knowledges in psychiatric medicine, with the latter following rather than preceding the arrangement of bodies in the asylum/hospital.The psychiatrist in public medicine may well be encouraged to shape a new mission according to the requirements of an administration concerned with managing dangerousness. A shift in the social vocation of the psychiatric expert has been observed over several decades, and may represent a profound departure from the traditions [End Page 69] of mental medicine (Castel 1991). Those “dirty words”—risk assessment—involve new strategies where face-to-face relations between carer and cared are displaced by an activity of calculating abstract factors deemed liable to produce risk—“a transition from the clinic of the subject to an ‘epidemiological’ clinic” (Castel 1991, 282). The broad contours of this shift sees the specialist medical carer take a back seat while the manager/ administrator assumes a more autonomous role of allocating individuals into various categories of risk. It is in this sense that the psychiatrist does not make a diagnosis as such, but rather contributes to a list of factors compiled to measure a level of riskiness. Risk assessment forms part of social surveillance that dispenses with the actual presence of the carer and the cared, and provides for a form of systematic predetection rather than treatment. As Castel (1991, 288) presents it,(t)here is, in fact, no longer a relation of immediacy with a subject because there is no longer a subject. What the new preventative policies primarily address is no longer individuals but factors, statistical correlations of heterogeneous elements. They deconstruct the concrete subject of intervention, and reconstruct a combination of factors liable to produce risk. Their primary aim is not to confront a concrete dangerous situation, but to anticipate... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Works, Pieces, and Objects PerformedPaul Thom (bio)IntroductionJames Hamilton has written a book on the philosophy of theater that is admirable for its analytic clarity and for the wide knowledge of theatrical practice that it brings to bear on philosophical questions. The book’s main thesis is that theatrical performances are not presentations or executions or completions of texts, but the meaning of this thesis is not completely clear. Hamilton (...) sometimes expresses the thesis specifically in relation to literary texts:what is of interest in this book is the fact that the history I have been tracing—including the history of these debates—has revealed theatrical performance to be a form of art in its own right, independent of literature. And it is the meaning and truth of that discovery that is the central, indeed the only, concern in this book.1... Theatrical performance is a practice independent of literature.2This is the thesis in its weak form. Sometimes, however, he voices it in a strong form, relating to a class of artworks wider than literary texts: “A performance is... never a performance of some other work.”3Hamilton’s thesis, in either its weak or its strong form, might be understood as a claim about theatrical performance as such, or it might be understood as a generalization about individual theatrical performances. To take it the first way would be to take it intensionally, as a claim about the nature of theatrical performance—a statement about what the very notion of theatrical performance implies and what it excludes. To take it the second way would be to take it extensionally, as a claim about each and every theatrical performance. Thus, the weak thesis—the thesis relating to literary texts—might be understood (intensionally) as stating that theatrical performance as such is an art form that is independent of literary texts. Or it [End Page 67] might be understood (extensionally) as stating that no individual theatrical performance qua artwork depends on a literary text. Similarly, the strong thesis—the thesis relating to artworks in general—might be understood (intensionally) as stating that theatrical performance as such is an art form independent of all artworks that are not theatrical performances. Or it might be understood (extensionally) as stating that no individual theatrical performance qua artwork depends on any artwork that is not itself a theatrical performance.In this article I outline a framework within which I argue that Hamilton’s thesis in either its weak or its strong form should be accepted as an intensional claim about either moral or ontological independence, but it should be rejected as an extensional claim. Then I will discuss a line of reasoning Hamilton uses in support of his thesis, and I will argue that it is invalid.A FrameworkSpectators at a performance are often able to distinguish, at least to some extent, between the performance and what is performed. This must be the case if spectators are ever to be in a position to comment, for example, on whether a particular routine, which is part of what has been performed, is the same routine as was performed on another occasion—or to comment on how well or badly the routine is being executed. The concept of “what is performed” is therefore an important one for the philosophy of the performing arts.It appears that Hamilton is using this concept when he talks about “the performed object.”4 He doesn’t give us an analysis of what exactly a performed object is, but it appears to be more general than what Paul Woodruff means by a “theater piece.” Woodruff defines a theater piece as a kind of theatrical event that may be repeated.5 (I take it that the definition doesn’t imply that all theater pieces are capable, practically speaking, of being repeated—for that would be false—but merely means that the notion of a theatrical event leaves open the possibility of repetition.) A theater piece is, presumably, a performed object, but a performed object need not be a theater piece if theater is defined (following Woodruff) in terms of human action that is worth watching. Some performances—many musical... (shrink)

Décrivant les grandes lignes de l’avant-projet de révision des lois de bioéthique de 1994, le Premier ministre de l’époque, Lionel Jospin, s’est exprimé en faveur de l’autorisation des recherches sur l’embryon humain. Il cherchait alors à devancer les objections possibles en opposant la recherche fondamentale à la réflexion philosophique et tentait de préciser la question suivante :..

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Object of French Studies GebrauchkunstRichard Klein (bio)If I may say something about the title—it points to the possibility that we are discussing the nature and future of French studies at the precise moment that France is about to disappear. There are those who believe that on January 1, 1999, when the euro becomes the common currency of the European Union, France will become a province of Germany. Effectively (...) real sovereignty will pass from Paris to Frankfurt.Already there are those at Cornell, for example, who think that we, in the French section, should seek to merge with the German department. I support the move (which isn’t going to happen), if only as a permanent reminder to avoid the fetishism of French. In today’s world, French is a question more than an answer to any question. French studies should be open even to the possibility that, these days, to speak French, it is becoming more and more necessary to speak German. The opposite has been true for a long time, as the French smugly know all too well—having for centuries lent their language of refinement and savoir-vivre to the Huns. The imminence of the conjuncture should remind us, too, that French studies is itself situated within the history of French—is transformed in its possibilities and embodiments by that history and by what is happening now, as we say, historically. Finally, the point here is to recall that the question of French studies has a history, that it is not merely being invented at this moment, but also reactivated as an object of discussion and debate.In fact, the current debate has been going on for some time. In 1993–94 the issue was addressed at two national conferences: a two-part symposium was organized by the Committee for the Future of French Studies at the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Wisconsin; another was held at New York University organized by the Association for French Cultural Studies and the Institute of French Studies. Summer institutes at Dartmouth and Northwestern have dealt with the issue. There is a large and growing bibliography. I cite some of the most prominent recent articles—to judge by how frequently they are cited in others I have read:—Emily Apter, “Comparative Exile: Competing Margins in the History of Comparative Literature.”—Lawrence Kritzman, “Identity Crises: France, Culture, and the Idea of the Nation.—Marie-Pierre Le Hir, “French Cultural Studies in the United States.”—Sandy Petrey, “French Studies/Cultural Studies: Reciprocal Invigoration or Mutual Destruction?”—Kristen Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture (often cited as the best example we have of what French studies might be).—Kristen Ross, “World Literature and Cultural Studies.”—Thomas Pavel, “Les études culturelles: Une nouvelle discipline?” Many questions have been raised in these articles about the possibility and necessity of doing French studies. There are those here who take it for granted that one can identify something French, can locate whatever it is that may be said to participate in a specifically French identity. Some, like Pavel, see French studies (and a fortiori so-called cultural [End Page 5] studies) as an excuse for doing n’importe quoi; it defies definition and merely authorizes more confusion and incoherence. Others, like Kritzman, have a more optimistic notion of how one could define French studies without abandoning some notion of the specificity and uniqueness, the irreducible identity of what is called French.Some critics, like Ross and Le Hir, tend to see French studies as inevitably serving to dissolve any particularism associated with French. What is called French culture has been irretrievably pluralized by the effects of decolonization, by the multiplication of francophonies and by their insertion into an Americanized system of globalization. Kids in suburbs of Paris and Cairo wear American baseball hats turned around and grow up eating McDonald’s. Where is the French in that? The object of French studies may be nothing but France’s assimilationist tendency to colonize others, to claim a universal mission, even as it is transformed by its own failed colonial history and by the very diversity it aims to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nonexistent Objects in Buddhist Philosophy: On Knowing What There Is Not by Zhihua YaoChong Fu (bio)Nonexistent Objects in Buddhist Philosophy: On Knowing What There Is Not. By Zhihua Yao. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020. Pp. 186. Hardcover £29.99, isbn 978-1-35-012148-5. Nonexistent Objects in Buddhist Philosophy: On Knowing What There Is Not, by Zhihua Yao, cogently strings together different Buddhist schools' varied philosophical approaches to the cognition (...) of nonexistent objects (asadālambanajñāna) or non-cognition (anupalabdhi). Non-being and the knowledge of non-being have long been central to nearly every philosophical tradition. Buddhist philosophy, in particular, invests extraordinary intellectual effort to deal with these topics, since non-being (asat/abhāva) occupies a central role in the Buddhist doctrine. Yao acutely reconstructs a brief history of this philosophical enterprise of Buddhism from the early sectarian period to the time when the so-called logico-epistemological school prevailed. The book consists of an introduction and eight chapters. These eight chapters are basically based on Yao's previously published articles. They are further arranged into two parts: (1) "Cognition of Nonexistent Objects: A Historical Development" and (2) "Epistemological Approaches to Nonexistence." The first part discusses how philosophers from the Mahāsāṃghika, the Dārṣṭāntika, and the Yogācāra analyze the cognition of nonexistent objects. The philosophical development concerning this particular topic is masterfully articulated by Yao. This mastery is best shown in his unveiling of Yogācāra's philosophical inheritance from its Abhidharma legacy. In addition, his reconstruction deepens our understanding of the intricate history of sectarian Buddhism in a broader sense. The second part centers on the philosophical issues of nonexistence raised by the Buddhist logico-epistemological school. Yao's translation, presentation, and comparison of these philosophical arguments is strikingly lucid and comprehensive. Overall, one salient contribution of this book is that it highlights the importance of Pāli and Chinese sources in studying the history of Buddhist philosophy, especially Indian Buddhist philosophy. In Part 1, Yao's reconstruction of sectarian Buddhist philosophies is heavily based on the Pāli text Kathāvatthu and the Chinese translations of Samayabhedoparacanacakra, Śāriputrābhidharma, Vijñānakāya, Mahāvibhāṣā, *Janakaparamopadeśa, and Nyāyānusāra, whose Sanskrit or Prakrit originals have long been lost. In part 2, in [End Page 1] addition to comprehensively assessing Sanskrit and Tibetan materials, Yao detects a much-hidden philosophical development from Īśvarasena to Dharmakīrti by relying on Chinese commentaries composed by Chinese and Korean monks in the Tang Dynasty. Chapter 1 is of the most importance in the book; in it, Yao traces "an early origin of the concept of the cognition of nonexistent objects among the Mahāsaṃghikas and some Vibhajyavādins under their influence" (p. 13). Yao sensitively points out that "the thesis that latent defilements (Pāli: anusaya/Skt: anuśaya) have no objects constitutes the first step toward the formation of the concept of the cognition of nonexistent objects" (p. 19). The next step, as Yao analyzes it, is the proposition of awareness (Pāli: ñāṇa/Skt: jñāna) without objects due to the Mahāsaṃghikas and its sub-schools. Yao's philosophical reconstruction is eloquent and perceptive, especially when he outlines a crucial conceptual transition from the awareness that is without objects (anālambanaṃ jñānam) to the awareness that has nonexistent objects as its objects (asadālambanajñāna). However, one of the main supporting materials that he believes mentions the awareness that has nonexistent objects as its objects -- a passage from the Śāriputrābhidharma -- might be found less supportive without a more detailed justification. This passage is concerned with the concept of wu jingjie zhi 無境界智:What is the awareness without objects (wu jingjie zhi 無境界智)? There is no awareness without objects. Or, the awareness that arises when conceptualizing the past and the future dharmas is called the awareness without objects.1《舍利弗阿毘曇論》卷 9〈4 智品〉：「云何無境界智？無無境界智。復次思惟過 去未來法智生，是名無境界智。」(CBETA 2022.Q4, T28, no. 1548, p. 593c16–18)。Yao chooses an alternative reading based solely on the Taisho Edition, which interpolates one more 境 in 無無境界智 as 無境無境界智. This reading might result in a wholly different meaning: "What is awareness without objects? Any awareness that... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Can The Psychopathologized Speak?Notes on Social Objectivity and Psychiatric ScienceAwais Aftab*, MD (bio)In "Exclusion of Psychopathologized Standpoints Due to Hermeneutical Ignorance Undermines Psychiatric Objectivity" (2022), Bennett Knox offers a compelling argument that failure of psychiatric community to engage with the "psychopathologized" in processes such as the revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) constitutes a form of epistemic injustice and threatens the social objectivity of (...) psychiatric science. I find myself in agreement with the central thesis and I am glad to see it articulated so well by Knox. While it is clear that the exclusion of psychopathologized standpoints in psychiatric science cannot be justified, there are issues that arise that require further clarification, and may generate disagreements, when we consider the complexities of how this inclusion is to take place, what requirements can be imposed on this process of inclusion, and the relationship between the DSM and psychiatric science broadly when it comes to social objectivity.The Methodological Objectivity of the DSM Does Not Exhaust the Methodological Objectivity of Psychiatric ScienceThe DSM is a nosological project within a particular historical context, operating with a certain set of assumptions (Aftab & Ryznar, 2021). The DSM has limitations in terms of what sorts of perspectives it can meaningfully incorporate, but the limitations of the DSM are not the limitations of psychiatric science. This is because psychiatric science is a pluralistic domain and includes many different methodologies and perspectives (Jerotic & Aftab, 2021). As one example, the DSM is poorly equipped to capture the phenomenology of psychiatric conditions. It is not something that it sets out to do. This, however, only becomes a serious problem if we adopt the attitude "if it's not in the DSM then it doesn't really count." Unfortunately, many in the psychiatric community have [End Page 267] adopted this sort of attitude, at least implicitly, resulting in a serious neglect of phenomenology (and various other perspectives, including those of the psychopathologized), leading Nancy Andreasen to bemoan the "death of phenomenology." (Andreasen, 2007) The DSM is methodologically limited by design; there are things that it will fail to do. The appropriate response is to acknowledge these inherent limitations. Other perspectives such as neurodiversity or Hearing Voices Movement also bring their own sets of assumptions and limitations. The DSM is simply one element, one perspective, one methodology in a scientific field that is capable of and ought to adopt a plurality of perspectives and methodologies. This is worth pointing out because Knox appears to assume that if it proves difficult or impossible for the DSM to include radically diverse perspectives, then "all the worse for psychiatry's objectivity." If it is impossible for the DSM, that does not mean that it is also impossible for psychiatric science.1In Determining What Counts as Inappropriate Exclusion, What Is the Role of Scientific Expertise?Longino herself brings up this question: "in determining what counts as inappropriate exclusion of dissenting perspectives, does it matter what kind of issue is involved? Are the duties of inclusion different when the question is, Should we be trying to learn about such and such, for example, atomic fission? than when it is, Is atomic fission a controllable or uncontrollable process?" (Longino, 2002, p. 133) The danger that needs to be averted here is that of trivializing expertise and placing experts on an equal footing with non-experts, a danger that is strikingly illustrated by our social response to the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic.Take an example from medicine. Individuals with lung cancer have a lot to offer when it comes to the treatment of lung cancer, including their experiences of care, and choice of, say, aggressive chemotherapy vs palliative comfort care, etc. but how much do they have to contribute on the matter of the histopathological classification of lung cancer? Consider the Hierarchical Taxonomy of Psychopathology (HiTOP) (Kotov et al., 2021). This quantitative nosological project has a very specific aim: to determine the patterns of covariation among psychiatric symptoms using statistical techniques such as factor analysis. This... (shrink)

Risk analysis and regulatory systems are usually evaluated according to utilitarian frameworks, as they are viewed to operate “objectively” by considering the health, environmental, and economic impacts of technological applications. Yet, the estimation of impacts during risk analysis and the decisions in regulatory review are affected by value choices of actors and stakeholders; attention to principles such as autonomy, justice, and integrity; and power relationships. In this article, case studies of biotechnology are used to illustrate how non-utilitarian principles are prominent (...) in risk analysis and regulatory review and to argue that these relationships should be carefully considered as we consider nanotechnology oversight systems for its products. We argue that there are not distinct separations between “science-based” review systems, in which evaluations of the consequences of technological products are primarily considered, and principles of integrity, justice, non-maleficence, and autonomy. It should further be expected that, given research into fair treatment during decision-making processes, attention to ethics will affect how citizens assess emerging technologies. Finally, a more holistic approach for evaluating oversight systems for the products of nanotechnology is suggested, one which does not draw a sharp distinction between risk analysis, regulation, and respect for non-utilitarian values. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Achieving Social and Cultural Educational Objectives through Art Historical Inquiry PracticesJacqueline Chanda (bio)Some overburdened art or generalist teachers may ask: "With all the things we have to know and do these days, why should we be interested in art history inquiry processes? What educational value is there in promoting the use of art history inquiry processes in teaching and learning?" The answer to the first question lies in art (...) history's relationship to the humanities and the visual arts. The humanities is the branch of learning concerned with human thought and relations. We turn to the humanities when we wish to understand the human condition, social and cultural values, and ourselves. But some might say that historical inquiry methods do the same thing. What distinguishes art historical inquiry from general historical inquiry is the focus on the visual arts. Visual arts are in the branch of learning that deal with the production and study of visual imagery and material objects. In the context of art history inquiry, visual imagery and material objects are the primary data used for the study of changes in ourselves; religious, social, and cultural values; and human conditions. Visual imagery is one of the universal ways that the human condition and social and cultural values of the past and present are expressed. It is one of the fundamental means by which humans communicate feelings, emotions, ideas, ideologies, etc.Art educators have acknowledged for a long time the importance of the study of images and visual elements in the lives of children and the field of art education. This is even more evident today as the discipline moves to embrace notions of "visual culture," which emphasize exploring and studying all the things that visibly shape our lives. The acknowledgment of art history as an inquiry process rather than simply the study of facts about past artworks developed in the discipline-based arts education (DBAE) [End Page 24] movement of the 1980s and 1990s.1 In spite of the recommendations that art history be explored as a discipline of inquiry, much of the art history investigations that take place in the classroom today focus on understanding the artist through his/her biography and understanding the work of art through analysis of style and formal description.2 While the artist biography brings to light the artist's intention and a formal description examines what one can see in the work and makes reference to aspects of style and formal elements, the two approaches do not provide enough information to generate meaning and speculate about what social and cultural elements may have caused the work of art to look the way it does or the effects it may have had at the time of its creation. Unfortunately, many educators are not aware of how to extend their investigations to uncover these levels of analysis.Erickson provides one definition of inquiry as describing, attributing (determining who created the work), reconstructing (determining what the object originally looked like), and interpreting the artwork.3 While these aspects are all a part of an art historical investigation, they do not go far enough into the practices utilized by art historians when exploring a work of art. Therefore, in the context of this article the phrase "art historical inquiry processes" refers to the use of authentic activities (asking questions, collecting and analyzing data, interpreting, speculating about cause or effect, and disseminating knowledge) and approaches that art historians use when studying works of art; this approach goes beyond what is clearly seen in visual imagery in order to reveal not only the denotative but also the connotative meanings that are relevant to the historical and cultural context of the artwork. These authentic activities incorporate approaches related to structural analysis (that is, contemporary analysis—iconography, iconology semiotics, feminism, etc.—that draws from literary reading skills to generate meaning) and explore, examine, and facilitate the drawing of conclusions about the significance and place of visual imagery and material objects in the societies from which they come.4 The purpose of this article is to discuss the value of studying visual images and material objects using authentic art history inquiry processes to uncover meanings, and by extension... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Sacredness of Nature: Response to Six Objections to Religious NaturalismDonald A. Crosby (bio)The poet Mary Oliver speaks as a kind of religious naturalist when she writes in her book of prose and poetry Winter Hours, “I would not be a poet without the natural world. Someone else could. But not me. For me, the door to the woods is the door to the temple. Under the trees, along (...) the pale slopes of sand, I walk in an ascendent relationship to rapture, and with words, I celebrate the rapture. I see, and dote upon, the manifest.”1 She speaks as a poet and not as a philosopher or religious scholar, but she does so as one who is ardently in touch with the sacredness of nature. Her vocation as a poet is testimony to this constant attunement. Her daily walks in the woods and by the sea are her portals of access to the temple of the natural world. Her every step makes contact with holy ground.Oliver’s poetic vocation shows itself to be in deep sympathy with all of the living and nonliving aspects of nature, and thus with the imminent ecological crisis of our time, when she reflects later in this same book, “The farthest star and the mud at our feet are a family; and there is no decency or sense of honoring one thing, or a few things, and then closing the list. The pine tree, the leopard, the Platte River, and ourselves—we are at risk together, or we are on our way to a sustainable world together. We are each other’s destiny.”2Poet, philosopher, religious scholar, ecologist, and perceptive human being are bound together in Mary Oliver’s alert responses to the sacredness of nature. She captures in both her poetic and prose writing the essential spirit and outlook of religious naturalism. I do not claim that she is a religious naturalist; that would be going beyond what I am capable of knowing. But she certainly sounds like one in many respects throughout the poetry and prose of this book.I want us to keep constantly in mind her spirit and outlook as we ponder the cogency, adequacy, and appeal of religious naturalism as a way of thinking and living religiously, for they are the ultimate tests of that adequacy. I want us to do so by considering objections of various sorts arguing that religious [End Page 24] naturalism fails to be sufficiently religious in the way of satisfying the deepest discernments, needs, hopes, and foundations of authentic religious faith. My plan for this essay is to present what I surmise to be some of the most substantive objections, and to reply to each of them in turn.I do so in defense of the thesis that religious naturalism—at least as I have come to interpret and understand it over many years—is a strong contender for having an honored place among the religions of the world. My personal conception of religious naturalism is of course only one of many, and other religious naturalists might have different kinds of response to at least some of these objections. But my responses indicate the capability of religious naturalism to take such objections seriously into account and to provide plausible answers to them.The objections I want to respond to in this essay are six in number. All of them, as will be seen, assume a kind of panpsychism or the primordiality of some kind of mind or spirit, a view I find unnecessary and tending strongly toward an untenable mind-matter dualism in my defense of religious naturalism. 3 The first one is that nature by itself has no overarching purpose or reason for being. The second is that if mind and spirit are emergent rather than primordial, then they are reducible to blind physical processes, meaning that religion is implausibly reduced to physics. The third objection is that nature is just a mass of meaningless facts, with no objective, dependable values of any kind, including religious values. The fourth objection is that with impersonal nature rather than a personal, loving, God as its focus, religious naturalism lacks essential divine... (shrink)

This article will address an overview of BioArt, biomedia and its practitioners, developed through a series of semi-structured, qualitative interviews and openended discussions with more than fifteen experts in the field. BioArt is approached from the perspective of scientific exploration, visual design in interactivity and installation, and social commentary and political activism. Of consequence is the fact that BioArt is relatively new, its nomenclature is without a codified definition, and bioartists have varied views on the parameters of its biomedia. Regardless, (...) BioArt has been escalating as a fecund medium with the potential for spawning visionary and critical practices and theories. In lieu of a slippery slope in which artists rely on freedom of expression in substantiating artworks, the burden of proof is placed on artists to be creative and objective in understanding what it means to tamper with biology and alter life forms. Issues of ethics have already affected artists' practices and venues for exhibition, and as BioArt continues to develop, research practice has become a necessary field of study. In addition, as biomedia evolve and emergent technologies partner with current biotechnologies, there is concern if the concept of BioArt is ambiguous in light of the fact that biotechnology is dovetailing nanotechnology, artificial general intelligence and cognitive science. Herein there is a need for practice-based scenarios for questioning constructive and destructive viewpoints about BioArt and, more particularly, concerning the future of life forms. (shrink)

El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo fundamental discutir críticamente algunas de la tesis principales del planteo hilpineano sobre los artefactos técnicos y establecer las limitaciones inherentes a su modelo de autoría. Con este propósito se reconstruyen, en primer término, los conceptos vertebradores de la posición de Hilpinen para luego indagar sus supuestos a través de un análisis de su aplicación al campo de producción contemporánea y al territorio de los bioartefactos. The principal aim of this paper is discuss Hilpinen's main (...) theses concerning technical artifacts and to indicate some limitations to his model of authorship. We first reconstruct the essential arguments of Hilpinen's perspective then we explore its assumptions through an analysis of its application to the realms of contemporary production and bio-artifacts. (shrink)

While the contemporary biomimicry movement is associated primarily with the idea of taking Nature as model for technological innovation, it also contains a normative or ethical principle—Nature as measure—that may be treated in relative isolation from the better known principle of Nature as model. Drawing on discussions of the principle of Nature as measure put forward by Benyus and Jackson, while at the same time situating these discussions in relation to contemporary debates in the philosophy of biomimicry : 364–387, 2011; (...) Dicks in Philos Technol, doi: 10.1007/s13347-015-0210-2, 2015; Blok and Gremmen in J Agric Environ Ethics 29:203–217, 2016), the aim of this paper is to explore the relation between the principle of Nature as measure and environmental ethics. This leads to the argument that mainstream formulations of environmental ethics share the common trait of seeing our ethical relation to Nature as primarily involving duties to protect, preserve, or conserve various values in Nature, and that, in doing so, they problematically either overlook or dismiss as anthropocentric the possibility that Nature may provide measures, understood in terms of ecological standards, against which our own practices, or at least some of them, may be judged—a way of thinking I call “biomimetic ethics”. The practical consequences of this argument are significant. Whereas mainstream environmental ethics has been applied above all to such issues as wilderness preservation, natural resource management, and animal rights and welfare, biomimetic ethics is applicable rather to the question of how we produce, use, and consume things, and, as such, may potentially provide the basic ethical framework required to underpin the transition to a circular, bio-based, solar economy. (shrink)

One of the most intriguing bio-objects in the emerging field of regenerative medicine is umbilical cord blood. Employed in existing haematological therapies, but also loaded with potentialities for future uses, cord blood has been lately the focus of a regulatory debate which confronts public and private forms of biobanking. This article explores the political and anthropological side of this debate, describing the ways in which different health practices related to the umbilical cord (and to its symbolic sibling, the placenta) (...) have been involved in processes of societal production and reproduction. Through the use of ethnological and historical data, and their comparison with current practices, I contend that the technical manipulation of cords and placentas goes much longer into the past than what a first glance suggests, and that these two objects can be understood as biological spaces in which forms of social belonging and versions of the societal bond are at play. The current conflict between public and private cord blood banks is therefore interpreted as part of a longer history of bodily practices, and as reflecting recent mutations in the biopolitical constitution of advanced liberal societies. (shrink)

Recombinant DNA technology is an essential area of life engineering. The main aim of research in this field is to experimentally explore the possibilities of repairing damaged human DNA, healing or enhancing future human bodies. Based on ethnographic research in a Czech biochemical laboratory, the article explores biotechnological corporealities and their specific ontology through dealings with bio-objects, the bodywork of scientists. Using the complementary concepts of utopia and heterotopia, the text addresses the situation of bodies and bio-objects in (...) a laboratory. Embodied utopias are analyzed as material semiotic phenomena that are embodied by scientists in their visions and emotions and that are related to potential bodies and to future, not-yet-actualized embodiments. As a counterpart to this, the text explores embodied heterotopias, which are always the other spaces, like biotechnological bio-objects that are simulated in computers or stored in special solutions. (shrink)

Human/animal relations are potentially controversial and biotechnologically produced animals and animal-like creatures – bio-objects such as transgenics, clones, cybrids and other hybrids – have often created lively political debate since they challenge established social and moral norms. Ethical issues regarding the human/animal relations in biotechnological developments have at times been widely debated in many European countries and beyond. However, the general trend is a move away from parliamentary and public debate towards institutionalized ethics and technified expert panels. We explore (...) by using the conceptual lens of bio-objectification what effects such a move can be said to have. (shrink)

The ancient aesthetics of yijing has played a crucial role in traditional Chinese philosophy, literature and art since the eighth century CE. Defined variously by early and contemporary writers, yijing links an artist's emotional domain to objects in the world. This article conceptualises yijing as an ecological aesthetics and distinguishes it from an environmental aesthetics. In particular, two aspects of yijing render it an eco-aesthetics: subject–object correspondence (or ‘engagement'); and empathic identification with the environment (or ‘bio-empathy'). Three brief case (...) studies from urban planning, environmental conservation and the creative arts demonstrate the contemporary importance of yijing to ecological issues. (shrink)

This article advances some considerations on the current production of hegemonic effects, starting with some problems posed by the work of one of the most influential writers in cultural studies – the American Palestinian critic Edward Said. Said's commentary on the coverage of Islam in the US media in the late 1970s allows for some challenging considerations on how hegemonic strategies directed at the formation of publics and public opinion are increasingly integrated within a global noopolitics of communication whose understanding (...) of the public is not derived from the notion of civil society but from the biopolitical element of the population – and the bio-racist segmentation that constitutes it. As outlined in Michel Foucault's analysis of liberal and neoliberal governmentality, such understanding of the public locates the latter straight within a new dispositif of power which is biopolitical and noopolitical at the same time, that is, which addresses itself at the same time to the biological, economic and spiritual life of the population. Such understanding involves a reconsideration of the constitution of publics and public opinion in times of netwars and information warfare as both subjects and objects of power/knowledge. In as much as such noopolitics affects what Maurizio Lazzarato calls a second bios, the life of the brain, it has the potential to give expression to the virtual power of immaterial events of subjectification which materialize in the bodies which actualize them and the possible, shared worlds that they are capable of producing. (shrink)

A little bit more than twenty years ago, the attention of bioethics community was attracted by the discovery of the work of Fritz Jahr (1895-1953), a theologian and teacher from Halle (Germany), who had conceived both the term and the discipline of bioethics (Bio-Ethik, 1926) by broadening Kant’s categorical imperative onto animals and plants. Today, dozens of papers deal with Jahr’s bioethics ideas, but his work related to other topics remains almost unknown. In the present paper, we address Jahr’s article (...) from 1930, devoted to education ("Gesinnungsdiktatur oder Gedenkfreiheit? Gedanken über eine liberale Gestaltung des Gesinnungsunterrichts" [Dictatorship of worldview or freedom of thought? Considerations on the liberal structuring of teaching of attitudes]). In the article, published in Die neue Erziehung, Jahr advocates a set of ten quite progressive and free-minded principles, including objectivity, pluriperspectivism (verschiedene Gesinnungseinstellungen), tollerant dialogue, autonomy, rationalism, liberalism, and democratization of education system and of the development of worldview at school. We devote particular attention to the comparison of Jahr’s ideas to the doctrine of Pietism and August Hermann Francke, who established the Foundation in which Jahr spent a significant part of his life, first as a student, and later as a teacher. (shrink)

In the context of 1960s research on biological membranes, scientists stumbled upon a curiously coloured material substance, which became called the “purple membrane.” Interactions with the material as well as chemical analyses led to the conclusion that the microbial membrane contained a photoactive molecule similar to rhodopsin, the light receptor of animals’ retinae. Until 1975, the find led to the formation of novel objects in science, and subsequently to the development of a field in the molecular life sciences that (...) comprised biophysics, bioenergetics as well as membrane and structural biology. Furthermore, the purple membrane and bacteriorhodopsin, as the photoactive membrane transport protein was baptized, inspired attempts at hybrid bio-optical engineering throughout the 1980s. A central motif of the research field was the identification of a functional biological structure, such as a membrane, with a reactive material substance that could be easily prepared and manipulated. Building on this premise, early purple membrane research will be taken as a case in point to understand the appearance and transformation of objects in science through work with material substances. Here, the role played by a perceptible material and its spontaneous change of colour, or reactivity, casts a different light on objects and experimental practices in the late twentieth century molecular life sciences. With respect to the impact of chemical working and thinking, the purple membrane and rhodopsins represent an influential domain straddling the life and chemical sciences as well as bio- and material technologies, which has received only little historical and philosophical attention. Re-drawing the boundary between the living and the non-enlivened, these researches explain and model organismic activity through the reactivity of macromolecular structures, and thus palpable material substances. (shrink)

Rationale, aims and objectives : Evidence-based medicine (EBM) claims to be based on 'evidence', rather than 'intuition'. However, EBM's fundamental distinction between quantitative 'evidence' and qualitative 'intuition' is not self-evident. The meaning of 'evidence' is unclear and no studies of quality exist to demonstrate the superiority of EBM in health care settings. This paper argues that, despite itself, EBM holds out only the illusion of conclusive scientific rigour for clinical decision making, and that EBM ultimately is unable to fulfil its (...) own structural criteria for 'evidence'. Methods : Our deconstructive analysis of EBM draws on the work of the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida. Deconstruction works in the name of justice to lay bare, to expose what has been hidden from view. In plain language, we deconstruct EBM's paradigm of 'evidence', the randomized controlled trial (RCT), to demonstrate that there cannot be incontrovertible evidence for EBM as such. We argue that EBM therefore 'auto-deconstructs' its own paradigm, and that medical practitioners, policymakers and patients alike ought to be aware of this failure within EBM itself. Results : EBM's strict distinction between admissible evidence (based on RCTs) and other supposedly inadmissible evidence is not itself based on evidence, but rather, on intuition. In other words, according to EBM's own logic, there can be no 'evidentiary' basis for its distinction between admissible and inadmissible evidence. Ultimately, to uphold this fundamental distinction, EBM must seek recourse in (bio)political ideology and an epistemology akin to faith. (shrink)

Juraj Politeo bio je preteča Einsteina svojim doprinosom mijenjanju znanstvenog pojma, zakona i znanstvenog predmeta. Albin Nađ također je sudjelovao u izmjeni shvaćanja znanstvenog pojma, zakona i znanstvenog predmeta. Oba naša mislioca odlikovala su se istančanim razmatranjima o relativnosti, posebno Nađ o relativnosti prostora. Pokušat će se pokazati da se ovi naši mislioci mogu uključiti u tom smislu u liniju: Mach, Hertz, Duhem, Poincaré, koja se završava s Einsteinom i kvantnom teorijom. U tom pravcu članak ukazuje na to da su (...) naši mislioci prethodnici Einsteina i da dijele njegov »san«.Juraj Politeo was a precursor of Einstein because of his contribution to the reassessmentof scientific concepts, laws, and the objects of scientific study.AlbinNađ alsocontributed a reassessmentof scientific concepts, laws, and the objecets of scientific study.Bothof our thinkers gained merit with their detailed reflectionsabout relativity,and Nađ especiallyin considering the relativityof space. These text attempts to demonstrate that these twoofour thinkers are,in this sense, part of a line that includes Mach, Hertz, Duhem, Poincaré,andends with Einstein and quantum theory.In this way the article shows that our thinkers areprecursorsof Einstein and even sharehis “dream”. (shrink)

The paper discusses inappropriate (futile) treatment by analyzing the casuistics of palliative patients in the terminal stage of illness who are hospitalized at the Department of Internal Medicine and Geriatrics of the Faculty hospital with policlinic (FNsP). Our research applies the principles of palliative care in the context of bioethics. The existing clinical conditions of healthcare in Slovakia are characteristic of making a taboo of the issues of inappropriate treatment of palliative patients. Inductive-deductive and normative clinical bioethics methods of palliative (...) care and ethical strategy are applied for defining issues found in inappropriate hemodialysis treatment. An algorithm of hemodialysis treatment requires the definition of those lege artis criteria which, in the context of a patient’s autonomy and his/her decision, precondition the avoidance of the situation in which hemodialysis treatment is inappropriate (futile). Futile treatment in a terminal condition is ethically inappropriate medical treatment that extends the suffering of patients and their relatives. Its definition is determined by the relevant legislation and the methods of bioethics. An active palliative strategy is aimed at managing the process of incurable diseases in the patient’s bio-psycho-socio-spiritual continuity in the process of special bioethics. The global bioethical objective of general bioethics for palliative care is based on the paradigm of social harmony and solidarity in the context of an authentic modus of the patient’s existence as a constitutive principle for the phenomenon of the patient’s being to finite being (death). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Anorexia and the MacCAT-T Test for Mental Competence:Validity, Value, and EmotionLouis C. Charland (bio)Keywordsmental competence, decisional capacity, anorexia, value, emotionValidity of the MacCAT-THow does one scientifically verify a psychometric instrument designed to assess the mental competence of medical patients who are asked to consent to medical treatment? Aside from satisfying technical requirements like statistical reliability, results yielded by such a test must conform to at least some accepted pretheoretical (...) desiderata; for example, determinations of competence, as measured by the test, must capture a minimal core of accepted basic intuitions about what competence means and what a theory of competence is supposed to do. The concepts of "face validity" and "content validity" are both important here. Face validity "indicates that an instrument appears to test what it is supposed to and that it is a plausible method for doing so" (Portney and Watkins 2000, 82). Content validity "means that the test contains all the elements that reflect the variable being studied" (Portney and Watkins 2000, 83). An adequate instrument for measuring mental competence must at minimum satisfy both of these requirements.What Tan and her colleagues (2006) have shown is that the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool—Treatment (MacCAT-T) test for mental competence may not be an empirically valid measure of mental competence for some cases of anorexia. The data they report show that "competence," as measured by the MacCAT-T, does not conform sufficiently well with what is wanted of a clinical medical theory of competence. More specifically, the MacCAT-T is deficient in both face and content validity. This result is extremely significant; previous challenges to the validity of the MacCAT-T have often been largely theoretical in nature. My own objection that the MacCAT is inadequate because it omits the influence of emotion is based on a combination of empirical theory (Charland 1998a) and philosophical argument (Charland 1998b). However, it is entirely theoretical in nature. So is my argument that in ignoring emotion the MacCAT misses a crucial contributing ingredient in competence, namely, value (Charland 2001, see especially 136 note 2). Tan's study provides valuable empirical evidence for the second of these challenges, which deals more specifically with value. On the one hand, the study clearly demonstrates that patients sometimes do [End Page 283] base their treatment decisions on reasons derived from values. And on the other hand, it also nicely illustrates the centrality of values—"utilities" or "preferences"—in the decision-making process generally; a basic assumption of standard decision theory for which, paradoxically, there appears to be no satisfactory counterpart in the MacCAT-T model of reasoning and decision making.Thus, values figure among the reasons that patients actually use in reasoning when they weigh the risks and benefits of proposed treatment options. The MacCAT-T must be amended to incorporate this fact if it is to be a satisfactory clinical medical tool. Without such a correction, the concept of mental competence it measures is empirically invalid. At the root of the problem is a clash of intuitions. Tan's data provide convincing evidence that some of the patients who are deemed to be mentally competent by MacCAT-T standards should not in fact be considered competent. Note that the language in which this clash is expressed—"should not in fact"—involves a combination of descriptive and prescriptive elements, reminding us that the concept of competence is dual in nature: it is both prescriptive and descriptive (Freedman 1981). These problems underscore the need for greater clarity about what pretheoretically we want a clinical theory and test of competence to capture. It is of course reasonable to say that such a test must be consistent with major tenets of the relevant case law (Appelbaum 1998). But a legally valid concept of competence of this sort is too thin and arbitrary a foundation on which to build a clinical medical theory of competence. An empirically valid theory and test of the latter sort must incorporate the role of values if it is be truly helpful in medical practice.Value and the MacCAT-TI agree with Tan and her colleagues that some notion of "pathological value" needs to be... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Some More Reflections on Emotions, Thoughts, and TherapyDemian Whiting (bio)Keywordsdepression, pedophilia, phenomenology, noncognitive, treatmentThe primary objective of my paper was to show that where a person's representations of the world are eliciting the wrong emotions then treatment of those problems in emotion cannot be about treating the eliciting representations. And it is worth clarifying two points about my claim here. First, although I take my claim to apply to (...) cases where accurate representations are eliciting the wrong emotions, the same point does, I believe, just as well apply to cases where distorted representations are eliciting the wrong emotion. So, for instance, even if the pedophile mistakenly took an adult to be a child and was aroused by that perception, I think that we would still want to claim that there is here—in addition to a possible disturbance in cognition—a problem in emotion. This is because representations of young children should not elicit feelings of sexual arousal, however distorted those representations may themselves be. Second, it is important to emphasize that the kinds of cases that I have in mind are not cases where a person's emotions contradict the thoughts that the person has about the world. The pedophile's arousal at the thought of young children does not contradict any thoughts that the pedophile has about children. Neither does the person who has a propensity to feel anxious have any thoughts that contradict his anxiety. In fact, I believe that emotions cannot contradict our thoughts, because that would require emotion to have the representational character of thought, and emotions being affective states, or types of feelings, do not have that character of thought. Problems in emotion then have to be described in other ways, such as in terms of an emotion's violation of a moral norm or in terms of an emotion's likely adverse effects on the person's behavior or rationality, and certainly it was in these other ways that I intended the cases that I described to be taken.Now, there are to be found in my paper three ways in which someone may reply to my argument (although only two of these ways take the form of actual responses in the paper). To begin with, it might be claimed that amending problems in emotion must be about altering cognitions, as emotions themselves consist of cognitions. I describe in a note to my paper a number of reasons why I think we should reject cognitive accounts of emotions. I also state in the introduction that a purely affective (and, thereby, noncognitive) account of emotion successfully describes the phenomenology, or experience [End Page 255], of emotion. And I would also want to (therefore) resist David Pugmire's suggestion that sometimes a "person's portrayal of an emotionally charged situation is actually prefigured in their emotion"—if by that Pugmire means that emotions sometimes consist of such thoughts. "Black thoughts" may be "despair's footholds," but I would argue that this means nothing more than the fact that such thoughts often act as a nonconstitutive cause of depression. Finally, I should remark that I do not intend my claim that to evaluate oneself negatively may just consist in feeling low about oneself to be a concession to the cognitive theorist of emotion. This is because the purpose of that claim is not to (confusingly) suggest that our cognitive evaluations may consist of noncognitive emotions, but rather to suggest that it is a mistake to think of our evaluations as being cognitive in nature. According to the noncognitivist project in meta-ethics our evaluations are properly seen as being expressions of our noncognitive attitudes.The second way of responding to my argument is to concede that emotions are noncognitive in nature, but to argue that each particular emotion is triggered by its own special kind of thought (e.g., fear might be thought to be necessarily triggered by perceived dangers, anger by perceived slights). On the face of it, however, the claim that our emotions are necessarily triggered by certain kinds of thoughts looks simply false. Our own observation of how emotions originate, together with the empirical studies that I... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"'Twas Nature Gnaw'd Them to This Resolution":Byron's Poetry and Mimetic DesireIan Dennis (bio)1. IntroductionWe all know Lord Byron, I presume. Know him as a paradigmatic object of cultural desire, as the quintessentially romantic individualist whose haughtily transgressive rejection of his society turned him into one of its most compelling models and objects, the endlessly provocative rival of a multitude of young men to follow—and they are still following—all (...) to differing degrees blind to or writhing in the anxieties of his influence. I myself belong to that somewhat smaller group that actually reads his poetry.Having passed through the little deification of celebrity, Byron was on something of a downslope of fame, and knew it, before he put the matter past all doubt by dying almost-young for liberty in Greece in 1824. Perhaps not surprisingly, given all this, he developed into something of an expert on desire. Almost alone among the major Romantics, he came to understand this most basic force in human experience not only as mediated and mimetic but as increasingly a function of a new kind of market whose commanding value was apparent autonomy from the market. It is not too hard to see how he figured this out. Those whom Byron defied adored him; those whose petty gratifications he evaded in spectacular suffering emulated him; those to whose desires he declared himself indifferent desired him—as few have ever been desired. For all his very real faults he was an intelligent man and an observant one. He reflected on what had happened to him.2. Reading Byron's Poetry for Nature and DesireIn his earlier poetry the natural scene, at least in Byron's privileged experiences of it, acts as an ally against other people. It is a source of his difference from and thus his indifference to the rest of us—an apparent replacement for, rather than object of, mediated desire. [End Page 115]Almost the first words of the preface to his fame-making Childe Harold's Pilgrimage (1812) tell us that the poem was "written, for the most part, amidst the scenes which it attempts to describe" and a coy disquisition on the identity of the Childe—who is and is not Byron—follows close on the heels of a spate of place-name dropping. They are sexy places, too, hard to get to, exotic, naturally beautiful, and dangerous. Soon the note of human pollution is of course sounded—man "mars" the beauties of Cintra that the hero is experiencing (1980–1993, 1.15)1—reminding us of the prototypical alliance between the alienated Romantic solitary and the unspoiled, or spoiled natural world, alike menaced by sociality, by the Other. This alliance is powerfully reinforced by an identification with the bovine victim of the Cadiz bull-ring, vivid sacrifice at the center of—in the young poet's chilling phrase—"the silent circle's peopled walls" (1.75). Does man scapegoat nature? There could hardly be a handier metaphor. And the Childe makes common cause.Mainly, though, "Dear Nature" is the particular solace of her "never-wean'd" favorite son, the one who never "pollutes her path," he who, as he rather complacently notes, "mark'd her when none other hath" (2.27). Byron does at least make good on such a claim by going to Albania, a wild, inaccessible place which he, with some justification, boasts "all admire, but many dread to view" (2.43). He writes some stirring descriptive poetry, leavened with occasional homilies on the smallness and nastiness of man and the grandeur and beauty of nature, sentiments that would not sound out of character on the lips of young backpacking, development-deploring kindred spirits of a later age. Again, it is to be remembered that the first besmirchment of the natural world to be complained of is not material, but social, in particular by the Romantic rebel's own society—not chemicals and chainsaws but the poisonous presence of overly familiar people and practices. The language of protest remains much the same after the products of industrial economic activity are added to the score, and indeed a good part of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Fact Value Dichotomy in Demarcating DisorderPatricia A. Ross (bio)Keywordsdemarcation, values, ontology, epistemologyHaving read numerous articles on the concept of mental disorder, I find it useful to approach new articles on the topic by first sketching out the conceptual framework within which each author places the problem. The goal in doing this is not merely to be able to compare ideas within a remarkably diverse discussion, but also to (...) be able to uncover any presuppositions that underlie the account, as well as assumptions necessary for the argument, which may or may not be warranted. By approaching each new offering in this way, I often find that the solutions proposed depend a great deal on these undisclosed features, and that such presuppositions and assumptions are often questionable, at best, and are sometimes simply unwarranted. Brülde's discussion of mental disorder and values provides a useful example of this method.To determine how we should draw the line between disorder and nondisorder (henceforth, I refer to this as demarcation), Brülde claims that we need to address four questions. We need to determine (1) the extent to which demarcation depends on values and the extent to which it is descriptive, (2) the kinds of values we need to make use of (aesthetic, moral, pragmatic), (3) whether there is an implicit reference to some specific evaluative standard, and (4) whether the value judgments used to demarcate are ontological or epistemological. In putting forth these questions, Brülde identifies what he takes to be the generally agreed upon claim that there are two components necessary for demarcation: a factual component and an evaluative component. These components are distinct from each other and both are necessary—the demarcation cannot be made "by objective means alone," nor is it purely evaluative. Thus, demarcation necessarily involves a distinct value component, and the answers to Brülde's four questions are intended to shed light on how values are involved in determining the evaluative component of demarcation.Working under the assumption that they are distinct, Brülde sets aside discussion of the factual component to focus on the value component. He also tables the first of his four questions (the extent to which demarcation depends on values and the extent to which it is descriptive), citing an over-abundance of literature on the matter. Having thus framed the problem, Brülde turns his full attention to questions two through four, ultimately providing us with the answer that the values needed to demarcate disorders from nondisorders are of several types; mental disorder is both implicitly and explicitly an evaluative term, as well as value laden in both the ontological and epistemic senses. This [End Page 107] framing of the problem provides us with insight into the underlying presuppositions and assumptions that lead to Brülde's conclusion.The first aspect of this framework to consider is the division of demarcation into two distinct components, and the setting aside of the factual component as distinct from, and inconsequential to, the questions concerning values. By proceeding in this way, Brülde's argument rests on the presupposition that we can, and want, to consider the value component in isolation from the factual component. This presupposition raises a number of questions. Is there nothing about the factual component that may help us in our consideration of the value component, or vice versa? Does the factual component confine what we can say or know about the value component in any way. Overall, some justification is needed for accepting that there are two distinct and independent components, as well as for believing that the factual component can be disregarded in this way.Brülde also makes the (explicit) assumption that there is some internal state or process underlying all mental disorders about which we have or will gain factual knowledge that is objective. Implicit in this is the further assumption that this knowledge (regarding internal states or processes) will be all there is to say, scientifically, about the disorder—that is, knowledge concerning internal states and processes are what will comprise the "factual component." But if we can have sociological facts and psychological facts (and I think it is... (shrink)