The topic of our discussion is extremely complex by virtue of the diversity of problems it covers, their contradictions, and their many layers. An objective analysis is complicated by the fact that we are "by origin from there," that we were all drawn into the process, and that it is difficult, if not impossible, for us to distance ourselves from this fact. Being involved in what happened is, on the one hand, a positive factor: it gives access to occurring events (...) through a knowledge of facts and details that is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain for an investigator of the events many years later. But such involvement not only discloses the truth, it also creates the illusion that one possesses the truth, because a participant in events often makes his personal beliefs about them the basis of theoretical generalizations. A participant and a witness are very different categories in terms of their objective relation to actual facts. (shrink)

an anarchist critique of Bolshevism, drawing on Walter Benjamin. The translation and commentary published as "Theories of Justice, Profane and Prophetic: Gershom Scholem on the Bolshevik Revolution" in Gershom Scholem: In memoriam, Vol. 2, Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought, 21, 2007.

The Communist Manifesto—rhetorical masterpiece of proletarian revolution—was published 69 years before the Bolshevik Revolution and had a complex reception history that implicated America and Russia in the long interval between. But once the Revolution shook the world, the Manifesto became indissolubly tied to it, forged together as constitutive moments of some supratemporal revolutionary dynamic. Its subsequent and further reception in America bore the marks of Bolshevik contagion, negatively in many quarters, positively in the early American communist movement. As various communist (...) parties morphed and multiplied in the 1910s and 1920s, they announced themselves in manifestoes—communist manifestoes that in form and content followed and kept centrally in view the original of 1848. This essay explores the symbioses and synergies between the Manifesto, its Anglophone reception in America, and the Bolshevik contagion that spread into an emergent medium, namely, the manifestoes of American communist parties that heralded the revolution in Russia, a century ago. (shrink)

The study of the processes and methods through which elements of Hegelian philosophy and aesthetics have been appropriated and adjusted to the needs of Marxist–Leninist criticism is essential for understanding Bolshevik–Marxist aesthetics in the process of its consolidation into an official doctrine in Soviet Russia. By looking at the career of the Bolshevik Commissar of Enlightenment, Anatoly Lunačarskij, it is possible to discern the extent to which the process was forged by the unsanctioned presence of Goethe and Hegel. The article (...) traces their important contributions in the causes of sustaining revolutionary romanticism and its eventual overcoming in favor of the rationality and solemnity of socialist realism. (shrink)

In this essay I will argue for the existence of a Bolshevik Center, which coordinated the activities of the Bolsheviks in the Russian Social Democratic Party. This Bolshevik Center was dissolved in an intra-Bolshevik factional dispute on the eve of Lenin''s writing hisMaterialism and Empirio-Criticism. The source of the conflict in the Bolshevik Center related to disagreements over Lenin''s tactics following the 1905 revolution. The leader of the anti-Lenin opposition was Bogdanov. But the struggle over tactics could not be (...) contained in the political sphere; it spilled over to the philosophical. Lenin''sMaterialism and Empirio-Criticism was written as a refutation of Bogdanov''s philosophical thought in an attempt to drive him out of the Party. This essay will trace the events which led to the dissolution of the Bolshevik Center.In order to be able to follow the tactical debates a definition of terms to be used throughout this paper would be helpful. In terms of the strategic problems facing the Bolsheviks, as well as members of the Russian Social-Democratic Party (RSDP), in their attitude to theDuma, the word Boycott will refer to those who argued that the Bolsheviks should not participate in theDuma in any capacity. TheBoycottists maintained that the Bolsheviks should not even participate in the elections to theDuma. The wordUltimatism refers to those among the Bolsheviks who wished to participate in the ThirdDuma, but who favored the total obedience of the Russian Social-Democrats who might be elected to theDuma to the Central Committee of the Party.Ultimatism refers to the control and hegemony of the Central Committee over any social-democratic delegates who might win elections to the Third Duma.Otzovism means removing. TheOtzovists were those among the Bolsheviks, who advocated the removal of any social-democratic delegate in the ThirdDuma who disobeyed the directives of the Party Central Committee. Ultimatism andOtzovism concerned questions of Party authority. The Otzovist recommended the expulsion of any delegate in the Duma who abrogated the authority of the Party organs.Boycottism did not deal with questions of Party authority as such, but rather was fundamentally a tactical question: participation or non-participation in theDuma, e.g. parliamentarism vs revolution. (shrink)

At the turn of the twentieth century, Jews were mostly blamed for small-scale and local conspiracies, but during and after the First World War global antisemitic theories started to emerge. In 1917, even before the Communist revolution, rumours spread around Russia that there was a close connection between the Bolshevist movement and Jews. Fear of Communism was prevalent in Finnish society, especially after the Civil War in the spring of 1918. This article focuses on one of the main manifestations of (...) this fear, the development and spread of the Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy theory in the Finnish press after the Russian Revolution. The main sources for this article are Finnish newspapers and magazines published between 1917 and 1920. The goal is to describe how and whence the idea of a Jewish-Bolshevist conspiracy spread to Finland, and how new antisemitic ideas were connected to the millennia-old hatred of Jews. (shrink)

The study examines the original work An Attempt to Get Lenin Back on His Feet (Berlin, 1974) by Rudi Dutschke, the well-known German political philosopher and leader of the youth movement in 1968, as well as the influence of the famous Hungarian philosopher György Lukács on the ideas of Dutschke. Dutschke revealed the reasons for the impossibility of socialist ideals being feasible in the 20th century, despite the heroic attempts of the Bolsheviks and Western radical socialists to realize them. (...) The revolution occurred in a country of semi-Asian stagnating capitalism and was not supported by the European anti-capitalist revolution. As a result, after the victory of the Bolsheviks in Russia, the social system was revived with the dominance of the state bureaucracy (the fused party-state apparatus) over society. There were no universal forms of social movement (Verkehr), which led to the fact that socialism became local, up to the danger of its abolition. At the same time, according to Dutschke, it is precisely an equal alliance between the progressive intelligentsia and the working masses that can open up new ways for the transition from a society of necessity to a society of freedom, provided that the intelligentsia renounces leaderism (which was the mistake the Bolsheviks fell into). Therefore, the figure of György Lukács is most important for Dutschke since studying his creative path makes it possible to realize the basic principles of such an equal union. The study shows that the creative path of Lukács before he entered the Comintern as one of the leaders of the section of the Hungarian Communists is characterized by the desire to find a way to solve the fundamental dilemma of the revolutionary, as he believed: either, like the Bolsheviks, strive for an uncompromising victory and the implementation of their program at the cost of violence; or to make compromises with the social democratic and even bourgeois parties, at the same time being in danger of defeat and the impossibility of implementing their ideas, primarily because the socialist intellectuals fail to establish strong ties with the working masses, and the latter may not be thoroughly imbued with anti-capitalist consciousness. Thus, Lukács can survey a spokesperson for the views of the intelligentsia, and through the criticism of these views, it will be possible to comprehend how educated people can better understand the actual needs and interests of the working people in order to pursue policies that would be more in line with them and learn how to lead the masses indeed. (shrink)

ERIC JACOBSON, Theories of Justice, Profane and Prophetic: Scholem on the Bolshevik Revolution. with commentary drawn from Walter Benjamin's Critique of Violence) in: Gershom Scholem. In Memoriam, Vol. II. Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought, No. 21, ed. Joseph Dan, Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2007, 59-75.

This 1991 book is a critical study of the philosophical culture of the USSR, and the first substantial treatment of a Soviet philosopher's work by a Western author. The book identifies a tradition within Soviet Marxism that has produced significant theories of the nature of the self and human activity, of the origins of value and meaning, and of the relation of thought and language. The tradition is presented through the work of Evald Ilyenkov, the man who did most to (...) rejuvenate Soviet philosophy after its suppression under Stalin. Professor Bakhurst sets Ilyenkov's contribution against the background of the bitter debates that divided Soviet philosophers in the 1920s, of Vygotsky's 'socio-historical psychology', of the controversies over Lenin's legacy, and of the philosophy of Stalinism. He traces Ilyenkov's tense relationship with the Soviet philosophical establishment and his passionate polemics with Soviet opponents. This book offers a unique insight into the world of Soviet philosophy, the place of politics within it, and its prospects in the age of glasnost and perestroika. (shrink)

The article devoted to the analysis of theoretical and conceptual developments of the Russian Social Democrats in the emigrant period. The authors note that the concept of democratic socialism, which began to be formed in 1917, was considerably amended and deepened when the Mensheviks created a new party program developed in 1922-1924. The significance of this program of the RSDLP is practically not evaluated in the science literature. In the analysis of Soviet historiography, the authors of the article outlined the (...) lack of attention to the projects of the Mensheviks in emigration, as the researchers insisted on the collapse of the RSDLP in post-October period. Some of modern researchers are highly skeptical about the intellectual developments of the Russian Social Democrats after the events of October 1917. However, the authors identified a number of innovative elements in the projects of the Mensheviks in this time. The new party program is an original stage in the formation of the concept of post-revolutionary development of Russia. In the course of the inner-party discussion, the differences in assessing the degree of Russia’s readiness for socialist transformation, as well as the Bolshevik experiment with various internal political trends, were sharply denoted. The article analyzes the positions of representatives of the official Mensheviks and the right wing of the party. The authors acknowledge the significant transformation of the political attitudes of the Mensheviks, pointing to some delusional and utopian nature of a number of program theses. (shrink)

The Lukács Circle in Szeged, a spontaneous, unofficial organization of young Hungarian scholars and philosophy teachers, characteristically represented Georg Lukács' influence on young Hungarian intelligentsia in the period of late socialism. In this paper, the author recalls and critically analyses the intellectual milieu and motives that led a considerable part of young Hungarian intelligentsia of that time to make a cult of Lukács' philosophy. The key to the analysis is the ambiguous character of the political feelings and philosophical orientation of (...) many young people in the period of late socialism and the paradoxical non-bourgeois bourgeois character of Lukács' philosophy. Lukács' young followers were dissatisfied with the political conditions of real socialism and with official Marxism. However, they considered themselves Marxists and were convinced by the anti-capitalist, romantic idea of democratic socialism. In the eyes of his young followers, Lukács was a genuine philosopher whose teaching was interwoven by his wide-ranging bourgeois middle-class education, promising both a real philosophical alternative to official Marxism and a high-level philosophical foundation for a non-capitalist but democratic future human history. The author argues that Lukács' philosophy did not satisfy these expectations. In his political philosophy, the philosopher could not move away from the mythological idea concerning the leading role of the communist party and therefore could not elaborate a genuine philosophical foundation for the idea of democratic socialism. Despite the superiority of his philosophy, his methodology and approach to the history of philosophy failed to provide a real philosophical alternative to the Bolshevik tradition of Marxism. (shrink)

The article re-examines the key debates concerning the relationship between the Russian factory-committee movement and the Bolshevik Party and Soviet state in 1917‐18. It does so with reference to a four-volume collection of documents in Russian on the history of the factory-committees in 1917/18 which first began to be published in 1927 and completed publication in 2002. Rather than the traditional totalitarian view of a movement which was cynically manipulated and dominated by an authoritarian party, what emerges is a much (...) more complex and dynamic relationship. The article in particular argues that the so-called bureaucratisation of the factory-committee movement after the October Revolution emerged out of the practical dilemmas faced by the committees in the economic chaos of 1917/18 and the factory-committee leaders’ own desires to promote a rational, planned alternative to that chaos. (shrink)

After the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, an attitude spread inside Marxist movements and parties, according to which every mass movement of the subaltern classes was celebrated as an ascetic redemption of the “last” and of the “poor” men, while every prosaic and “bourgeois” demand for a development of the productive forces was ignored, in a sort of messianic wait for a bourgeois society's palingenesis. Antonio Gramsci was reluctant towards this tendency. He was interested instead in building and defending the new (...) revolutionary State, being aware of the arduous and contradictory process of construction of the new social order. Hence it springs the concern of Italian historical materialism in phenomena such as Americanism and Fordism and towards the industrial production’s techniques of organization. A concern shared by Gramsci with Lenin, according to whom the revolutionary State needs to assimilate every scientific achievement as a useful tool to ensure the development of the Soviet country and to overcome a generalized misery and a backwardness that endangered its survival. (shrink)

This is the first comprehensive exploration of ancient and modern tyranny in the history of political thought. Waller R. Newell argues that modern tyranny and statecraft differ fundamentally from the classical understanding. Newell demonstrates a historical shift in emphasis from the classical thinkers' stress on the virtuous character of rulers and the need for civic education to the modern emphasis on impersonal institutions and cold-blooded political method. By diagnosing the varieties of tyranny from erotic voluptuaries like Nero, the steely determination (...) of reforming conquerors like Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar and modernizing despots such as Napoleon and Ataturk to the collectivist revolutions of the Jacobins, Bolsheviks, Nazis and Khmer Rouge, Newell shows how tyranny is every bit as dangerous to free democratic societies today as it was in the past. (shrink)

The decriminalisation of homosexuality was a measure originally adopted by the bourgeois revolutions, which was abandoned by the bourgeois parties as the rise of the labour movement led the bourgeoisie to seek a compromise with landlords, clergy and monarchy in different countries. The demand to decriminalise homosexuality was therefore taken over by the Marxist workers’ parties, such as the Social-Democratic Party of Germany before the First World War and the Bolshevik Party in Russia after the Revolution of October 1917. This (...) article outlines the cooperation between the Scientific-Humanitarian Committee led by Magnus Hirschfeld and Social Democracy to decriminalise homosexuality by removing Paragraph 175 of the German Penal Code before the First World War. It also describes the decriminalisation of homosexuality in Russia under Lenin, with the adoption of the first Soviet Penal Code in June 1922, and Magnus Hirschfeld’s relations with prominent figures of the early Soviet government such as N.A. Semashko, the first People’s Commissar of Public Health, and Anatoly Lunacharsky, the first People’s Commissar for Education. Those ties ceased with the Nazis’ rise to power in January 1933, which resulted in the destruction of the institutions created by Hirschfeld, such as the Institute for Sexual Science and the World League for Sexual Reform, while in the Soviet Union itself Stalin recriminalised homosexuality in March 1934, shortly before Hirschfeld’s death, linking homosexuality and fascism. (shrink)

Book synopsis: In this combative major new work, philosophical sharpshooter Slavoj Zizek looks for the kernel of truth in the totalitarian politics of the past. Examining Heidegger's seduction by fascism and Foucault's flirtation with the Iranian Revolution, he suggests that these were the 'right steps in the wrong direction.' On the revolutionary terror of Robespierre, Mao and the bolsheviks, Zizek argues that while these struggles ended in historic failure and horror, there was a valuable core of idealism lost beneath (...) the bloodshed. A redemptive vision has been obscured by the soft, decentralized politics of the liberal-democratic consensus. Faced with the coming ecological crisis, Zizekk argues the case for revolutionary terror and the dictatorship of the proletariat. A return to past ideals is needed despite the risks. In the words of Samuel Beckett: 'Try again. Fail again. Fail better.'. (shrink)

This book presents a comprehensive study of the influence of Immanuel Kant’s Critical Philosophy in the Russian Empire, spanning the period from the late 19th century to the Bolshevik Revolution. It systematically details the reception bestowed on Kant’s ideas during his lifetime and up to and through the era of the First World War. The book traces the tensions arising in the early 19th century between the imported German scholars, who were often bristling with the latest philosophical developments in their (...) homeland, and the more conservative Russian professors and administrators. The book goes on to examine the frequently neglected criticism of Kant in the theological institutions throughout the Russian Empire as well as the last remaining, though virtually unknown, embers of Kantianism during the reign of Nicholas I. With the political activities of many young radicals during the subsequent decades having been amply studied, this book focuses on their largely ignored attempts to grapple with Kant’s transcendental idealism. It also presents a complete account of the resurgence of interest in Kant in the last two decades of that century, and the growing attempts to graft a transcendental idealism onto popular social and political movements. The book draws attention to the young and budding Russian neo-Kantian movement that mirrored developments in Germany before being overtaken by political events. (shrink)

Sergi Eisenstein's Potemkin provides a powerful example of how a film can present a revolutionary and socialist political perspective and ideology. A thoroughly modernist film, Potemkin is highly innovative in form and is often taken as a model of editing; it has regularly appeared on many lists of the greatest films of all time and since its release in 1925 has been a major critical success. Formally, the film embodies Eisenstein’s theory of montage, that the juxtaposition of images can generate (...) meanings and on the level of ideology, the film serves as effective propaganda for the Bolsheviks. (shrink)

The author debates with the concept of the Soviet ideological turn as a simple means of pre-war mobilization. The paper argues that in the 1930’s the Bolsheviks refused to «national nihilism» and mouved to the national Great Russian position. First – within the «Soviet patriotism», then – according to the Russian historical grand-narrative. This transition was caused by the need to involve in the process of modernization as wide population as possible, especially those who were not too inspired heroism (...) «new era». The choice of historical figures and events of the past was dictated by the need to strengthen one-man rule of Stalin. Historians and artists, formed in the 1930's, took the leading role in science and in the creative unions in 1960-70's, which allowed the Soviet establishment to prevent the radical rejection of Stalin's legacy, to curtail the timid attempts to rethink the historical grand-narrative and to form among the so-called "Russian party". (shrink)

This book overviews how different special sciences could be applied in everyday life. The book was published as part of a nonfiction agricultural series written and edited in part by Nikolai Borodin (1861-1937). In the pre-revolutionary period, Borodin and fellow scholar B. Bakhmetiev visted the USA to obtain a loan and ensure the execution of order for supply of military and agricultural equipment. During the Civil War Borodin joined the White movement and Kolchak's government which sent him to the United (...) States to purchase the agricultural machinery and equipment for educational institutions in Sberia. When the Bolsheviks won the war, Borodin remained abroad. (shrink)

Marxian class theory has been unable to account for the most significant historical developments of the 20th century. The rise of fascism not only belied the hopes put in the revolutionary proletariat, it also brought into the center of the political stage those social strata which the class theory had relegated to, at best, secondary supporting roles. The triumph of the Bolshevik, revolution and the institutionalization and expansion of Soviet socialism has not only failed to issue into the anticipated free, (...) classless society, but has led to the creation of a new system of stratification and domination which is simply unthinkable within the classical Marxian framework. Late or advanced capitalism continues advancing in spite of all its crises and contradictions. (shrink)

The years in which Piłsudski headed the Polish state marked his “golden age” in Polish history, a period considered as the least controversial in his career despite the failure of his federation concept and troubles with Polish national leaders in the west, especially Upper Silesia. Piłsudski’s achievements in those years are numerous and important, they include among others: the definition of Poland’s borders after military victories over the Ukrainian, Bolshevik and Lithuanian armies and in result of insurgencies in Wielkopolska and (...) Silesia, the securement of international recognition for Poland, the construction of parliamentary democracy and local government, the promotion of a national service ethos through schools, the church, the armed forces and the media. (shrink)

: Undoubtedly, in the formation of history, relations between religious structures and political powers, which are shaped within certain principles, have an important place. The course of these relations determines the strength and domain of both sides. This form of relationship, in some cases, evolves in favor of political power, and sometimes manifests itself as a political direction of religious interests. It is possible to see politics as a direction of religion or to use it in the direction of its (...) own interests in the politics that the Soviet Union has implemented since the Second World War. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union, which has embraced the ideology of official atheism and struggled against religious beliefs, did not stop using religion/church for conjuration in its own interests. In this context, The Soviet leader Stalin has almost reconstructed the Russian Orthodox Church, which he had been trying to destroy since the early years of the Second World War. Even, Moscow has made serious attempts to make Patriarchate the pioneer of the Orthodox world. In this article, we aim to emphasize Stalin’s church politics and reasons. We will also stress the reasons behind the Council of the Orthodox Churches, which Stalin sought to achieve through the Moscow Patriarchate in 1947. Finally, we will touch on the policy of the Fener Greek Patriarch against these developments. Summary: Throughout history, politics of states have been under the influence of religion. Likewise, religions have directed political authority in the direction of their own interests. Sometimes a religion takes the state under its influence; sometimes under a state takes a religion under the influence and they try to use the other one in the interests of itself. Concepts that define religion-state relations have emerged under the influence of experiences experienced over time. Secularism is at the head of the concepts that determine religion-state relations today. What secularism is and how it is practiced is much debated in the scientific circles. Despite all these struggles, however, no binding definition has been reached for all political issues. Certainly, the subjective structure of states plays an important role in regulating religion-state relations. The political ideology adopted by this political structure and the world view varies. Sometimes political structures with official atheist ideology can break the principle of secularism. While these ideologies are ungodly in their nature, they benefit from political interests. As an example, it is possible to show the Soviet Union with an atheist ideology. Because the Soviet regime used religion in the direction of political interests between 1943-1948. The Russian Orthodox Church, which was very active and competent during the reign of Tsarist Russia, lost its power with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. The Soviet regime has made the Russian Orthodox Church an illegal institution. The struggle against the church by the regime continued until the Second World War. With the Second World War, Stalin's church politics changed. There is no doubt that this political change has become more than one reason. The first is that the state has entered into a war. Stalin did not want to continue the struggle with religion while the war was going on. Another reason for pushing Stalin for a policy change towards the Church is the anti-Soviet propaganda carried out by the Germans. As a matter of fact, the Germans defined themselves as the savior of the Russian people. It was also alleged that Germany was waging a war against the Soviets in order to free Russian people from communism. Even brochures were taken from the airplanes in this frame. The Germans aimed to break the resistance of the Russian people with this method. Stalin acted to ward off this propaganda of the Germans. Stalin therefore had to keep an eye on church politics and stopped the oppression against the church. In this framework, opportunities were provided for the Russian Orthodox Church. For example, have been approved to organize rites in churches. The priests are encouraged to strengthen hand the people. Also closed churches have been reopened by Stalin. In this way the German propaganda has been wasted. The Second World War ended with the victory of the Soviet Union. Stalin, however, continued to use the church after the war was over. So why did Stalin continue to support the church as an atheist? What were the reasons for pushing Stalin into this policy? Stalin's post-war church policy has multiple causes. The most important of these is spreading the Soviet influence over the entire Balkans and Middle East geography through the Russian Orthodox Church. Undoubtedly this is related to the long-term policies of the Soviets. Because the war has changed all the balances in the world. This has given new opportunities to the Soviets. At the beginning of these, the Orthodox world comes to the Soviet influence. It seems that the steps towards this have been started to be started from 1945. In this context, the Russian Orthodox Church found important activities. For example, the Moscow Patriarch has established relations with other Orthodox Churches. Jerusalem, Athens, Cyprus, Antakya churches were visited. In the end, an attempt was made to collect the Orthodox Council. The struggle of the Western and Eastern bloc emerged after the Second World War divided the Orthodox world into two camps. In this process, the Greek, Cyprus and Jerusalem Orthodox churches under the leadership of the Fener Patriarchate were under American influence. The Serbian, Bulgarian and Antiochian Orthodox Churches under the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate were under Soviet influence. For these reasons, the Soviet regime, which has been fighting for the Church since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, has given up its position. It is understood from this historical fact that a regime adopting irreligion as an official ideology uses religion in its own interests as needed. This indicates that secularism is relative. This study will try to show how the Soviet Union uses the Russian Orthodox Church in its own interests despite the atheism ideology. (shrink)

The theoretical debate in linguistics during the past half-century bears an uncanny parallel to the politics of the (now defunct) Communist Bloc. The parallels are not so much in the revolutionary nature of Chomsky's ideas as in the Bolshevik manner of his takeover of linguistics (Koerner 1994) and in the Trotskyist (“permanent revolution”) flavor of the subsequent development of the doctrine of Transformational Generative Grammar (TGG) (Townsend & Bever 2001, pp. 37–40). By those standards, Jackendoff is quite a party faithful (...) (a Khrushchev or a Dubcek, rather than a Solzhenitsyn or a Sakharov) who questions some of the components of the dogma, yet stops far short of repudiating it. (shrink)

ArgumentJacob Lestschinsky emerged as the leading social scientist in pre-1917 circles of Yiddishist Marxist nationalists, most notably the Territorialists, who sought to create Jewish statehood outside Palestine. Lestschinsky played a central role in Jewish institutions formed in Ukraine in 1918–1920. A convinced anti-Bolshevik, he lived in Germany, then in Poland, America, and eventually in Israel. He combined two careers: a popular Yiddish journalist and an influential scholar. He conducted demographic and statistical studies under the auspices of the Yiddish Scientific Institute (...) whose headquarters were in Vilna until the beginning of World War II and were later moved to New York. Lestschinsky was one of the fathers of YIVO and was associated with the organization until the 1950s. In January 1945, during a YIVO conference in New York, he was the first to estimate the number of Holocaust victims as six million. This article analyzes Lestschinsky's theoretical outlook and its transformation under the influence of the vicissitudes of Jewish life. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom has it that there is — or at least there ought to be — a correspondence between theoretical and political positions. But the very labelling of it as conventional wisdom already betrays its falsity. Sure enough, any careful examination of the record readily reveals that this correspondence hardly ever obtains. No such parallel can be drawn for the Hegelians who split into Right and Left wings with qualitatively different positions, e.g., the German Young Hegelians and the British neo-Hegelians (...) at the end of the last century. Nor is that true for Marxists who bifurcated into Social Democrats and Bolsheviks, or for the existentialists who produced Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, as well as Kierkegaard and Marcel. (shrink)

For virtually all the major schools of Western opinion, the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, between 1989 and 1991, represents a triumph of Western values, ideas, and institutions. If, for triumphal conservatives, the events of late 1989 encompassed an endorsement of “democratic capitalism” that augured “the end of history,” for liberal and social democrats they could be understood as the repudiation by the peoples of the former Soviet bloc of Marxism-Leninism in all (...) its varieties, and the reemergence of a humanist socialism that was free of Bolshevik deformation. The structure of political and economic institutions appropriate to the transition from post-Communism in the Soviet bloc to genuine civil society was, accordingly, modeled on Western exemplars—the example of Anglo-American democratic capitalism, of Swedish social democracy, or of the German social market economy— or on various modish Western academic conceptions, long abandoned in the Soviet and post-Soviet worlds, such as market socialism. No prominent school of thought in the West doubted that the dissolution of Communist power was part of a process of Westernization in which contemporary Western ideas and institutions could and would successfully be exported to the former Communist societies. None questioned the idea that, somewhere in the repertoire of Western theory and practice, there was a model for conducting the transition from the bankrupt institutions of socialist central planning, incorporated into the structure of a totalitarian state, to market institutions and a liberal democratic state. Least of all did anyone question the desirability, or the possibility, of reconstituting economic and political institutions on Western models, in most parts of the former Soviet bloc. (shrink)