Apoiado em teorias antropológicas e sociológicas, categorias conceituais e densa etnografia, e numa perspectiva comparativa e intercultural, o objetivo principal do artigo é discutir o processo de mudança religiosa que está em curso na Terra Indígena Sororó (Suruí-Aikewara), no Pará. Com a introdução do protestantismo pentecostal, e utilizando a sua cosmologia animista anterior, a maioria das aldeias, em fase de conversão evangélica, incorpora, ressignifica e cria novas expressões do sagrado. De uma disputa real e simbólica, entre o Pastor e (...) o Pajé, surgiu a categoria êmica de 'índio-crente' e um tipo ideal, no sentido weberiano, que estamos denominando de ‘pentecostalismo indígena'. Com uma lógica comparativa e complementar, discute-se também a etnografia feita com a pajé cunhã-karaí, da etnia Kaingang, em Santa Catarina. Nesses dois contextos indígenas, não ocorre uma ruptura com as cosmologias originais, mas sim uma lógica de correspondência, coabitação de contrários, estratégias de acumulação de diferenciadas lógicas de pensamento, de categorias simbólicas e práticas religiosas. Mesmo constituindo-se como paradigmas distintos, os dois modelos – xamanismo-indígena e cristianismo-pentecostal - estão imbricados numa teia de relações mágico-religiosas, materializadas num evidente hibridismo religioso, numa nova religiosidade sincrética e, na lógica lévi-straussiana, com eficácia de cura, real e/ou simbólica. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende abordar a atualidade de Santo Agostinho a partir de uma perspectiva teológico-pastoral. O pensamento e a espiritualidade de Santo Agostinho (354-430) sobreviveram na cultura ocidental como uma das contribuições mais vigorosas do Cristianismo e sua experiência de vida, bem como seu legado espiritual, filosófico e teológico trazem profundas intuições na busca de resposta às grandes questões dos homens e mulheres de todos os tempos. Sua conversão é um “evento hermenêutico” que se constitui como chave de (...) leitura para a compreensão de sua vida e sua obra. Sua teologia foi-se construindo na sua experiência de pastor por mais de quarenta anos em Hipona (na atual Argélia), Norte da áfrica. Destaca-se aí sua contribuição como “pacificista”, com uma prática que foi tematizada tanto em suas obras formais como nas suas pregações e correspondência. A recente descoberta de novas cartas e sermões de Santo Agostinho revela um lado pouco conhecido do “ Doctor Gratiae ”. O aspecto político de seu pensamento, uma das abordagens mais atuais da pesquisa sobre suas obras, permite-nos uma aproximação ao tema da Campanha da Fraternidade de 2009, “ Fraternidade e Segurança Pública ”, lançada pela Conferência Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil (CNBB). (shrink)

We live in an era of unprecedented interconnectivity and challenges that require global mindsets and creative approaches. While research on global identification has increased in recent years, the question of whether it can facilitate creativity remains largely unexplored. Moreover, despite the evidence linking multicultural experiences and global identities, migrant populations have been overly underrepresented in this area of research. We examine the association between global culture identification and creativity in the Alternate Uses Test, across two different samples residing in Spain: (...) a host national and majorly student sample and a culturally diverse immigrant sample. Additionally, we test the predictive value of ethnic identification and host culture identification. Regression analyses reveal that global culture identification positively predicts creativity among host national participants, and host culture identification predicts creativity among immigrant participants. Our results suggest that developing a cultural identity that transcends the one acquired through enculturation has the potential of facilitating creative behavior. (shrink)

Chapter 1 First Person Access to Mental States. Mind Science and Subjective Qualities -/- Abstract. The philosophy of mind as we know it today starts with Ryle. What defines and at the same time differentiates it from the previous tradition of study on mind is the persuasion that any rigorous approach to mental phenomena must conform to the criteria of scientificity applied by the natural sciences, i.e. its investigations and results must be intersubjectively and publicly controllable. In Ryle’s view, philosophy (...) of mind needs to adopt an antimentalist stance to achieve this aim. Antimentalism not only definitively rejects the idea that mind is a substance separated from the body, it also denies that mental phenomena radically differ from physical phenomena by virtue of several unique features. Most problematically, mental phenomena have a conscious character (mental states are related to specific qualitative feelings) and are accessible only to the first-person (only the subject knows directly what s/he is experiencing inside his/her mind). Ryle takes a strong stance on antimentalism going so far as to maintain that an approach to mind which aims to meet the criteria of scientificity set by the natural sciences must avoid any reference to internal, unobservable mental states. In his view (which is considered a specifically philosophical version of psychological behaviorism and also addresses questions put forward in psychological research), mental states can be redescribed in terms of behavioral dispositions. In this chapter, we address the historical roots of the antimentalist view and analyze its relation to the later tradition of research on mind. We show that, compared to the antimentalist stance, functionalism and cognitivism take a step back when they maintain that direct reference to mental states is necessary since mental states cause and therefore explain human behavior. This step backwards is often interpreted as a return to mentalism. However, this is only partially true. Indeed, we suggest that these later traditions retain one important element of Ryle’s antimentalism, i.e. the idea that mental states must be uniquely identified using external and publicly observable criteria, while excluding any reference to introspection and those qualitative dimensions of a mental state, which are accessible only to the first-person. According to the perspective we put forward, this epistemological stance has continued to influence contemporary research on mind and current philosophical and psychological theories which both tend to exclude the subjective qualities of human experience from their accounts of how the mind works. The issue we raise here is whether this is legitimate or whether subjective qualities do play a role with respect to the way our mind works. The conclusion of this chapter anticipates the argument the book makes in in favor of this latter position, starting from a particular angle, i.e. the problem of how we categorize concepts related to our internal states. -/- Chapter 2 The Misleading Aspects of the Mind/Computer Analogy. The Grounding Problem and the Thorny Issue of Propriosensitive Information -/- Abstract. After the crisis of behaviorism, cognitivism and functionalism became the predominant models in the field of psychology and of philosophy, respectively. Their success is mainly due to the new key they use for interpreting mental processes: the mind/computer analogy. On the basis of this analogy, mental operations are seen as cognitive processes based on computations, i.e. on manipulations of abstract symbols which are in turn understood as informational unities (representations). This chapter identifies two main problems with this model. The first is how these symbols can relate to and communicate with perception and thus allow us to identify and classify what we perceive through the senses. Here we limit ourselves to presenting this issue in relation to the classical symbol grounding problem originally put forward by Harnad on the basis of Searle’s Chinese room argument. An attempt to address the problem raised here will be made in chap. 3. The second point we discuss in relation to the mind/computer analogy concerns the idea of information it fosters. Indeed, following this analogy, information is something available in the external world which can be captured by the senses and transmitted to the central system without being influenced or modified by the procedures of transmission. This perspective does not take into account that – unlike computers – in living beings information is acquired by means of the body. As Ulric Neisser has already pointed out, the body is itself an informational source that provides us with additional sensory experience that influences (modifies or complements) the information extracted from the external world by the senses. To develop this line of analysis and to determine exactly what information is provided by the body and how this might influence cognition, we examine Sherrington’s and Gibson’s positions. Moving on from their views, we qualify bodily information in terms of ‘proprioception’. We use ‘proprioception’ in a broad sense to describe any kind of experience we have of our internal states (including postural information as well as sensations related to the general state of the body and its parts). Following Damasio’s and Craig’s studies, we further elaborate this position, arguing that living beings are equipped with an internal propriosensitive monitoring system which maps all the changes that constantly occur in our body and that give us perceptual (‘proprioceptive’ or propriosensitive) information about what happens inside us. Moreover, relying on Goldie’s and Ratcliffe’s view, we show that emotional information can also be considered as a form of ‘proprioception’ which contributes to determining everything we perceive. This analysis leads us to the second main thesis of this book: ‘proprioception’ is a form of internal perception and it is an essential component of the sensory information we can access and use for all cognitive purposes. -/- Chapter 3 Semantic Competence from the Inside: Conceptual Architecture and Composition -/- Abstract. Concepts are essential constituents of thought: they are the instruments we use to categorize our experience, i.e. to classify things and group them together in homogeneous sets. Here we define concepts as the internal mental information (representations) that allows us, among other things, to master words in natural language. By analyzing the way in which individuals master word meanings we explore a number of hypotheses regarding the nature of concepts. Following Diego Marconi’s research, we differentiate between two kind of abilities that underpin lexical competence – so-called ‘referential’ and ‘inferential competence’ – and we suggest that, in order to support these abilities, concepts must also include two corresponding kinds of information, i.e. inferential and referential information. We point out that the most widely used and acknowledged theories of concepts do not make this distinction, instead broadly characterizing the information used for categorization in terms of propositionally described feature lists. However, we show that while feature lists can explain inferential competence, they do not account for referential competence. To address the issue of referential competence we examine Ray Jackendoff’s hypothesis that to account for the possibility of linking perceptual and conceptual information we need to assume the existence of a (visual) representation that encodes the geometric and topological properties of objects and bridges the gap between the percept and the concept. Furthermore, we analyze the extension of this work by Jesse Prinz who introduced the notion of a proxytype, a perceptual representation of a class of objects that incorporates structural and parametric information related to their appearance. However, as we point out, proxytypes can only explain the relationship between perception and concepts with respect to instances that can be perceived through the senses and that belong to the same class by virtue of their physical similarity. We suggest that this notion be extended to include larger conceptual classes. To accomplish this, we further develop Mark Johnson, George Lakoff and Jean Mandler’s idea of a schematic image and argue that conceptual representations include a perceptual schema. Perceptual schemata are non-linguistic, structured experiential gestalts (patterns or maps) that make use of information taken from all sensory modalities, including body perception. They accomplish a quasi-conceptual function: they allow us to recognize and to classify different instances. In this work, we hypothesize that perceptual schemata are an essential component of concepts, but not identical to them. Instead, we suggest that concepts include both perceptual and propositional information with perceptual schemata providing the ‘perceptual core concept’ that grounds related propositional information. -/- Chapter 4 In the Beginning There Were Categories. The Bodily Origin of Prelinguistic Categorical Organization: The Example of Folkbiological Taxonomies -/- Abstract. Studies of categorization in psychology and the cognitive sciences have made use of the notions of ‘category’ and ‘concept’ without precisely defining what is meant by either; in fact, often these terms have been used as synonyms, making it difficult to address specific issues related to conceptual development. This chapter begins by discussing the definitions of, as well as the distinctions between, ‘categories’ and ‘concepts’ in the classical philosophical tradition (Aristotle, Kant and Husserl). We introduce our view of categories with reference to Husserl. Categorization is defined as the way in which our experience is originally (pre-linguistically) organized in a passive and fully unconscious manner on the basis of universal structuring principles. Conceptualization is explained as a later process in which the earlier categorical macro-classes are further subdivided into more specific and detailed sets; this later process also relies on linguistic learning and exposure to culture. On the basis of Ray Jackendoff, Jean Mandler, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s work, we hypothesize that categorization is a two-step process that begins with the formation of homogeneous sets of entities partitioned into regions that describe the ontological boundaries of the objects that humans perceive (categories) and continues at a later stage with the development of more specific classifications (concepts). In this chapter, we mainly address three related issues: Why should we assume that there is categorical organization which precedes the development of a conceptual system? How do categories and concepts relate to each other? Shall we hypothesize that categories are innate or that they are formed before concepts on the basis of information and organizational structure available at a very early developmental stage? We show that categorical partitions are necessary for categorization and, following Mandler, that the general categories we form at an early age do not match our adult superordinate concepts. As for the third issue, we argue that there might be no need to assume that categories are innately present in the human mind, since their formation can be explained – at least in certain cases – by basic mechanisms that work on body (propriosensitive) information. This hypothesis will not be discussed in general, but in relation to a particularly relevant example of categorical partition, i.e. the folk-biological dichotomy between ANIMATE/INANIMATE. This is compared with other dichotomies that derive from it, but are not directly categorical such as LIVING/NON-LIVING and BIOLOGICAL/NON-BIOLOGICAL. -/- Chapter 5 Internal States: From Headache to Anger. Conceptualization and Semantic Mastery -/- Abstract. Here we ask if we can also apply the distinction between referential and inferential competence we introduced in Chapter 3 to words that do not refer to things that are perceived using the external senses, especially to words/concepts that denote bodily experiences (such as pain, thirst, hunger, etc.) or emotions. We introduce and discuss the hypothesis that – even though such words/concepts do not refer to intersubjectively identifiable entities in the external world – they do have a kind of referent that can be accessed via direct perception, more specifically ‘proprioception’, as we have defined it in terms of all propriosensitive information we can consciously access. In the first part of the chapter, we specifically consider terms denoting bodily experiences such as ‘pain’ or ‘hunger’ and argue that their referents are identified and classified from a first-personal point of view on the basis of four main characteristics: their specific intensity, their localization in the body, their co-occurrence with other signals and above all their specific qualitative sensations. Emotions are addressed in the second part of the chapter. We suggest that there is a continuity between bodily experiences and emotions. In particular, we argue for a perceptual theory of emotions in line with that proposed by James and Lange at the end of the 19th century and developed more recently by authors such as Damasio (see also chap. 2§5, §6). The hypothesis we put forward is that the referential information that supports the categorization of emotions and therefore also our mastery of terms referring to emotions consists in the perception (i.e. the ‘proprioception’) of those bodily states and changes in bodily states which constitute our emotional experience. In the context of this discussion we examine some objections to this line of reasoning that arise from a cognitivist perspective and following authors such as Oatley, Johnson-Laird and Frijda, we distinguish between basic emotions that can be identified and classified solely on the basis on how they feel and complex emotions whose identification and classification additionally depends on cognitive factors. To describe how emotions are identified and classified on the basis of how they feel, we rely on Marcel and Lambie’s distinction between an ‘emotion state’ and an ‘emotion experience’. Both notions indicate kinds of feelings that we consciously experience. However, they describe first-order and second order emotion awareness respectively. The emotion state is the feeling we have of the bodily states and changes that occur when we are experiencing an emotion, while the emotion experience is the fully developed and integrated emotion we both experience and are, with reflection, aware of experiencing. On the basis of this differentiation, we also show that the same characteristics that aid in the identification and classification of bodily experiences (specific qualitative sensations; somatic localization; specific intensity; presence/absence of specific concomitant sensations) can also be used for the identification and classification of emotions – at least basic emotions. In the last two sections of the chapter we present some clinical evidence on the semantic competence of people who suffer from Alexithymia and Autism Spectrum Disorder which supports the conclusions of our preceding analyses. -/- Chapter 6 The ‘Proprioceptive’ Component of Abstract Concepts -/- Abstract. In this chapter, we address the issue of whether the mastery of abstract words requires only inferential knowledge and thus, if the concepts that support the mastery of abstract words include only linguistic information. We start by differentiating the notions of ‘abstract’ and ‘general’ which are often erroneously confused. We then identify a strict definition of abstract, as contrasted with ‘concrete’, that applies to words or concepts whose referent cannot be experienced by the senses. We argue that abstract words/concepts would be better described as theoretical, because they are usually conceived as structured sets of inferential knowledge expressed linguistically; that is, as small theories. Pointing out parallels with Carnap’s analysis of this issue in philosophy of science, we hypothesize that words/concepts denoting non-observable entities are not all ‘equally theoretical’, because their link to sensory experience can be stronger or weaker. We revive the distinction, inspired by Quine, between theoretical and intertheoretical concepts/words. This distinction relies on the fact that the former – unlike the latter – retains a strong, although indirect, connection with perception. In Quine’s discussion, perception is understood uniquely in terms of observability, i.e. of external sensory experience. Here we argue, however, that bodily, ‘proprioceptive’ (i.e. propriosensitive) experience can also serve to referentially ground theoretical (i.e. abstract) concepts/words. We frame this issue using the example of the theoretical concept ‘freedom’ and Lakoff’s hypothesis that this concept is developed on the basis of bodily information. We contrast this with the example of ‘democracy’ which more closely resembles an intertheoretical concept/word. Furthermore, we show that one of the classical views put forward in psycholinguistic research to explain how abstract concepts are mentally represented – i.e. Paivio’s Dual Coding Theory – points in the same direction as our analysis. The same is true of Barsalou’s work suggesting that we use internal information to understand at least some abstract words. To sustain this position, we put forward two lines of evidence: the first comes from psycholinguistic studies while the second examines deficits of semantic competence exhibited by people with Autism Spectrum Disorder. On the basis of our analysis, we put forward a classification that distinguishes between different kinds of concreteness and different degrees of abstraction: concepts/words referring to body experiences and basic emotions are described as analogous to concrete concepts/words because they are grounded in perceptual (i.e. propriosensitive) experience, while abstract concepts/words are considered more or less abstract depending on whether they are intratheoretical (and rely entirely on inferential information) or theoretical (and are partially grounded in perceptual – or more often in propriosensitive perceptual – information). In the last section of the chapter we consider two scales that have been used in psycholinguistic research to measure the degree of concreteness vs. abstractness of words and we show that – used conjointly – they can provide a measure of the internal vs. external grounding of specific words. (shrink)

A menudo las fronteras académicas que nos definen y nos separan como investigadores, también delimitan nuestros trabajos hasta el punto de desconectarlos de manera acrítica de las realidades culturales que, por motivos múltiples y no siempre explícitos, nos proponemos estudiar, analizar, transformar, etc. Sabemos que las universidades, como el resto de instituciones sociales, han participado históricamente en el mantenimiento de las fronteras que construimos interesadamente los seres humanos al relacionarnos como tales, tanto a escala individual como colectiva: económicas, políticas, académicas, (...) familiares, personales, etc…. (shrink)

This paper offers an analysis of the analogies between the physical and the political body during the Sixteenth and the Seventeenth centuries. Focusing on a meaningful pattern of medical, legal and political treatises, this study aims to outline the deep roots of an organic image of the human society widespread until the Englightenment and the crisis of the Old Regime.

This study evaluates the comprehension of generalized conversational implicatures (GCI) in children with and without autism spectrum disorder (ASD), using a GCI test constructed based on the Levinson model, which distinguishes between three types of implicatures: type Q (or scalar: “what is not referred to does not occur”); type I (“by default, it is not necessary to say what can be assumed”); and type M (“if someone is expressing something in a not very simple or marked way, it is because (...) s/he is describing a situation that is not very typical, frequent, or prototypical”). In addition to the ASD group ( n = 22), two comparison groups were utilized: a group matched on chronological age with the ASD group, but with a higher linguistic age (TCD group, n = 22), and a group matched on linguistic age with the ASD group, but with a lower chronological age (TLD group, n = 22). In all cases, linguistic age was assessed with the Peabody test. The performance of the three groups on the GCI test was compared (overall and on each type of implicature), and performance on the three types of implicature was compared within each group. The ASD group obtained worse performance than the other two groups, both overall and for each implicature type, without also obtaining differences in performance on the three implicature types. The TCD group obtained better performance than the TLD group on overall performance, but not on each implicature type, and both groups obtained lower performance on the type M heuristics than on the type I. Based on these results, the children with ASD in our study presented limitations in the comprehension of the three types of GCI, but it was not possible to obtain evidence for an inferential continuum of the three types of GCI. However, in the two typical development groups, this evidence was obtained, leading us to propose an inferential continuum model based on the different levels of dependence on the context of each of the three types of implicatures, with type M implicatures being more contextually dependent. (shrink)

International criminal law (ICL) is an achievement, but at the same time a challenge to the traditional conception of the principle of legality (_lex praevia_, _scripta_, and _stricta_ – Sect. 1). International criminal tribunals have often based conviction for international crimes on unwritten norms the existence and scope of which they have failed to substantiate. In so doing, they have evaded the objection that they were applying _ex post facto_ criminal laws. This approach, the relaxation of the concept of law (...) by including norms whose existence is doubtful, has apparently served to maintain a concept of strict legality, but it is unsatisfying (Sect. 2). In my opinion, the strict principle of legality that has linked its absolute validity to the positivity of law is not the correct premise. It makes sense to state that positivity and validity do not necessarily go hand in hand (Sect. 3). Applied to ICL, this means that it is neither necessary nor convincing to “conceal” supra-positive law as positive law, as some decisions of the international criminal tribunals do. For this reason, I consider that Radbruch’s formula, consisting in admitting that there are supra-positive limits which positive law must respect in order to be valid, is well-founded (Sect. 4). The path taken by this significant philosopher of law is methodologically convincing, and it squarely faces the problem of the value of positive law. Nevertheless, if we admit Radbruch’s formula and thereby the limited value of positive law (if we claim that the validity of the law depends on it respecting supra-positive minimums of justice), we must also face the problem of the definition of supra-positive values, the epistemological difficulties of having access to them (Sect. 5), and the question of the scope and enforceability of supra-positive law (Sect. 6). In summary, this article aims to explain why Radbruch’s formula offers a convincing conceptual basis for international criminal legality and, in doing so, aims to contribute to the discussion about the foundations of ICL. (shrink)

Este artículo busca realizar una contribución específica a la agenda global de “inclusión educativa” a partir de la recuperación y discusión de distintas problematizaciones realizadas en la academia argentina en diálogo con aportes de la filosofía (política), la historiografía y la sociología de la educación. Luego de repasar algunas definiciones postuladas en el discurso académico y político global y de esbozar algunas coordenadas contextuales que sitúan las problematizaciones argentinas proponemos centrar la discusión en torno a tres ejes: 1) la crítica (...) etimológica o radical al concepto de “inclusión educativa”; 2) algunos principios y dilemas de justicia implicados en la agenda de reforma; y 3) las (im)posibilidades de la forma escolar ante el mandato inclusivo. Finalmente sugerimos la importancia de continuar avanzado en problematizaciones alternativas que habiliten la producción de políticas y sistemas educativos más justos. (shrink)

El artículo analiza cualitativamente la relación entre infancia y violencia en el contexto de la guerra civil en El Salvador (1980-1992). La reflexión es vehiculada por el examen de la película Voces inocentes (2004), como una obra socialmente producida y como una representación de la realidad histórica de índole prospectiva. El trabajo destaca el mérito del filme al visibilizar y denunciar la responsabilidad de los sustentadores primarios de la violencia ‒aún hoy impune‒ hacia la infancia salvadoreña, cuyas secuelas psicosociales constituyeron, (...) a la postre, un entorno sociohistórico centroamericano signado por una debacle humanitaria que comenzó hace cuatro décadas, en un tránsito infausto “de la locura a la esperanza”. Para ello, he empleado el marco teórico conceptual sobre la violencia desarrollado por el jesuita vasco-salvadoreño, Ignacio Ellacuría, según el cual, las violencias resultantes solo pueden ser valoradas a partir de la crítica inicial a la violencia originaria de carácter estructural. (shrink)

The reference to a novum sidus in Quintus Curtius’ book 10, commonly applied to the comet seen at the end of Nero’s reign, could be related to Claudius as well. Both Claudius and Caligula were named “star”, and they sought to appear as the beginners of a new cycle in the history of Rome. Claudius’ ludi saeculares allegedly meant the starting point of a new time for Rome. Other facets of Claudius’ censorship, as the enlargement of the pomerium or the (...) Emperor’s assumption of the title pater patriae, could be interpreted in a similar sense. Likewise, Caligula’s death may have been understood as the end of a period in the history of Rome. Thus, Curtius’ “new star” could be applied to Claudius, and not necessarily to Vespasian. (shrink)

Histories of ocean science have emphasized the ways that state-sponsored deep-sea expeditions ushered in a new age of oceanic understanding during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This essay, on the other hand, examines the ways that shallow waters played host to less formal but nevertheless important efforts to create oceanic natural knowledge, often centuries earlier. By documenting the legends and experiences of people who worked on and lived by the ocean—divers, sailors, and fishermen, among others—and corroborating their stories (...) with firsthand observation, seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century natural historians built a nascent science of the sea. In its close focus on “sea beans” and “barnacle geese,” subjects of wide conjecture and earnest curiosity, the essay shows how shallow waters welcomed new actors onto the scientific stage and decentered the geographies of knowledge production, thereby advancing contemporary knowledge of oceanic circulation as well as the taxonomies and ecologies of coastal creatures. (shrink)

This article discusses the imbrication of racialising and sexualising scientific practices of gender testing and verification in elite athletics competition, and their intersection with social politics, using as a theoretical frame the feminist, anti-racist work of Hortense Spillers (2003), Judith Butler (1990, 1993a, 1993b, 2004) and Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000), among others. It traces the practice of sex-gender testing of ‘women’ at sanctioned International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) and International Olympic Committee (IOC) track and field competitions in order to contextualise (...) South African middle-distance runner Caster Semenya’s experiences at the 2009 Berlin World Championships and the subsequent spectacularisation of her body through the discursive practices of representation. (shrink)

L'oeuvre Teologías deicidas, de Horacio Bojorge, a le mérite de faire un bilan critique de la pensée de J.L. Segundo appuyée sur une documentation aussi large que choisie. En ce qui concerne l'Informe critique de ses écrits plus importants, sa méthode et son contenu, elle rend largement actuelle la littérature critique relative au théologien uruguayen. Mais, en Teorema, où on cherche argumenta probantia d'un prétendu rationalisme de J.L. Segundo, il devient difficile de la suivre car elle offre en plusieurs points (...) importants une idée insuffisante de la systématique et de la théologie fondamentale. L'Auteur est un exégète compétent, mais son information dépend de quelques prémisses insuffisamment fondées. Ses réflexions au sujet de la pensée de J.L. Segundo peuvent aider à voir plus clairement certains aspects encore confus du débat, et pour cela il peut être utile de le suivre sur plus d'un point. Mais, son insinuation, ou sa suspicion, au titre d'un jugement de fond au sujet de Segundo, sont excessives. Ses erreurs peuvent être de nature logique, philosophique et théologique, mais cela ne l'autorise pas à la considération de sa pensée comme hérétique formaliter. En plus, sa critique s'appuie sur des conclusions difficilement démontrables, par exemple que l'Apologétique, ou théologie fondamentale, ne soit pas théologie ou que J.L. Segundo durcisse autour d'un paradigme de subordination de la foi à la raison critique. Il semble plus probable. (shrink)

Our analysis starts with a definition of emotions and how they work. We illustrate our discussion with examples, primarily related to anger. We devote special attention to the feelings that characterize our emotional experience, relying on ‘alexithymia’, a clinical condition, to argue for a perceptual theory of emotion in which emotional feelings are the means by which we identify and recognize our emotions. Finally, we consider the role of valence in the mechanism of the emotions, i.e. the way in which (...) emotions are generated, lead to the motivation to end/modify a situation that is perceived as negative or to prolong/reiterate a situation that is perceived as positive, and produce behaviours congruent with this motivation. Here we show that because emotions have multiple and ambiguous valences, one cannot rely on valence to determine, in abstraction, what motivation and behaviour a given emotion will trigger. (shrink)

This study analyzes the meaning of the first article of faith: In the biblical message the unique and true God appears as the ultimate principle of all realities, as the object of the religious sense of all people, as the 'deus ignotus', creator of the universe and provident father of the human race, who, as the 'deus revelatus' manifests himself as the God of Israel, Lord of the covenant and Father of Jesus . Taking into account the Gospel message on (...) the all-powerful God as loving Father, the article studies the theological tradition of the Church, the symbol of whose faith begins with the words: Credo in unum Deum Patrem omnipotentem. God the Father emerges, in the affirmation of Denys of Rome, in the Symbol of the Apostles, in the faith of Nicea and in other documents of Church tradition, as the absolute and infinite reality, transcendant and personal, 'ingenitus aeternus', Principle without principle of the intrinsic divine life and of the history of salvation. The Church language, denying gnostic dualism, identifies the creator God of the old covenant with the merciful Father of the new salvific dispensation. Against patripatian Sabellianism the tradition affirms the distinction between the 'Pater ingenitus' and the only begotten Son. In order to overcome the challenges of modernity and the loss of consciousness regarding the difference between Creator and creature, the Councils of Vatican I and II remain faithful to the 'regula fide. (shrink)