McDonough Hall, Room 508, 600 New Jersey Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20001, USA; Email: gostin{at}law.georgetown.edu ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> Abstract As a consequence of rapid globalization, the need for a coherent system of global health law and governance has never been greater. This article explores the health hazards posed by contemporary globalization on human health and the consequent urgent need for global health law to facilitate effective multilateral cooperation in advancing the health of populations (...) equitably. It sets forth the first definition of the emerging field of "global health law." After explicating the central features identified in the definition, the article examines the "grand challenges" to reaching the full potential of global health law to advance human health in just and effective ways. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In this paper, I use an example from the history of philosophy to show how independently defining each side of a pair of contrary predicates is apt to lead to contradiction. In the Euthyphro, piety is defined as that which is loved by some of the gods while impiety is defined as that which is hated by some of the gods. Socrates points out that since the gods harbor contrary sentiments, some things are both pious and impious. But “pious” and (...) “impious” are contrary predicates; they cannot simultaneously characterize the same thing. Euthyphro changes his definition, but the problem of recognizing emotional ambivalence is only side-stepped. I go on to show how contemporary philosophers run into a similar problem. According to Prinz, something is good if and only if we harbor positive sentiments towards it and bad if and only if we harbor negative sentiments towards it. Thus, if we are ambivalent towards something (if we harbor both positive and negative sentiments towards it), then it is both good and bad. Like “pious” and “impious”, “good” and “bad” are contraries. Next, according to the fitting-attitude theory first elaborated by Brentano and favored by contemporary meta-ethicists like Blackburn, Brandt, Ewing, Garcia, Gibbard, McDowell, and Wiggins, something is good if and only if it is a fitting (appropriate) object of approbation, and something is bad if and only if it is a fitting (appropriate) object of disapprobation. I argue that moral ambivalence is sometimes appropriate, i.e., that the correct response to some things is to both love and hate them. Hence, according to the fitting-attitudes theory, some things are both good and bad. I conclude by discussing a variety of ways in which the problem of ambivalence may be solved, suggesting that attitudes of approbation and disapprobation be further individuated by the reasons for them. (shrink)

Analyzes the development of art during the past decade paying special attention to the works of Mondrian, Arp, Newman, and Dubuffet.

In de Ronde and Massri it was argued against the orthodox definition of quantum entanglement in terms of pure and separable states. In this paper we attempt to discuss how the logos categorical approach to quantum mechanics is able to provide an objective formal account of the notion of entanglement—completely independent of both purity and separability—in terms of the potential coding of intensive relations and effective relations. We will show how our novel redefinition allows us to provide an anschaulich (...) content to the notion of entanglement, erasing in this way the “spookiness” still present within its orthodox understanding in terms of space-time separated collapse particles. (shrink)

The discovery that the universe is fine-tuned for life ? a discovery to which the phrase ?the anthropic principle? is often applied ? has prompted much extra-cosmic speculation by philosophers, theologians, and theoretical physicists. Such speculation is referred to as extra-cosmic because an inference is made to the existence either of one unobservable entity that is distinct from the cosmos and any of its parts (God) or of many such entities (multiple universes). In this article a case is mounted for (...) the sceptical position that cosmic fine-tuning does not support an inference to anything extra-cosmic. To that end three definitions of ?fine-tuned for life? are proposed: the ?slight difference? definition, the (unconditional) probability definition, and John Leslie?s conditional probability definition. These three definitions are the only ones suggested by the relevant literature on fine-tuning and the anthropic principle. Since on none of them do claims of fine-tuning warrant an inference to something extracosmic, it is concluded that there is no definition of ?fine-tuned for life? serving this function. (shrink)

This is an invited target article commenting on a paper by Blackie and Jayawickreme on post-traumatic growth.

This article works toward a more meaningful answer to the question, What is a corporate issue? The article builds from existing literature in business strategy, public policy, and business and society. It synthesizes and integrates this literature and then expands the major points. The result is a reformulated definition of the corporate issue construct that enhances theory building and research activities in the area of issues management.

Since the publication of Hartry Field’s influential paper “Tarski’s Theory of Truth” there has been an ongoing discussion about the philosophical import of Tarski’s definition. Most of the arguments have aimed to play down that import, starting with that of Field himself. He interpreted Tarski as trying to provide a physicalistic reduction of semantic concepts like truth, and concluded that Tarski had partially failed. Robert Stalnaker and Scott Soames claimed then that Field should have obtained a stronger conclusion, namely (...) that Tarski’s failure in his allegedly intended physicalistic reduction was total. From another front, Hilary Putnam argued for an even more sweeping thesis: “[a]s a philosophical account of truth, Tarski’s theory fails as badly as it is possible for an account to fail.” Scott Soames followed suit also on this count, endorsing Putnam’s argument in section iii of the aforementioned paper; and John Etchemendy used a very similar argument to contend that “a Tarskian definition of truth [...] cannot possibly illuminate the semantic properties of the object language.” The paper argues that these contentions are based on several misunderstandings about the nature of a definition like Tarski’s. Regarding the Putnam-Soames-Etchemendy argument, we must apply a distinction Frege found natural to draw—and is natural to draw anyway—between what he called “constructive” definitions, definitions properly so called, which are mere stipulations, and what he described as “analytic” definitions, definitions which aim to make explicit the meaning of a term already in use. Regarding the Field-Soames-Stalnaker criticism, the paper contends that the true aims of a Tarskian truth definition are perfectly well fulfilled without Field’s amendments. (shrink)

How should the metaphysical hypothesis of materialism be formulated? What strategies look promising for defending this hypothesis? How good are the prospects for its successful defense, especially in light of the infamous “hard problem” of phenomenal consciousness? I will say something about each of these questions.

While there are numerous doubts, controversies and lack of consensus on alternative definitions of human death, it is argued that it is more ethical to allow people to choose either cessation of cardio-respiratory function or loss of entire brain function as the definition of death based on their own views. This paper presents the law of organ transplantation in Japan, which allows people to decide whether brain death can be used to determine their death in agreement with their family. (...) Arguably, Japan could become a unique example of individual choice in the definition of death if the law is revised to allow individuals choose definition of death independently of their family. It suggests that such an approach is one of the reasonable policy options a country can adopt for legislation on issues related to the definition of death. (shrink)

"Distributed in the U.S.A. by Barnes & Noble, inc." Bibliography: p. [251]-257.

Decades of empirical and theoretical research has produced an extensive literature on the ethical judgments construct. Given its importance to understanding people’s ethical choices, future research should explore the psychological processes that produce ethical judgments. In this paper, the authors discuss two steps needed to advance this effort. First, they note that the business ethics literature lacks a single, generally accepted definition of ethical judgments. After reviewing several extant definitions, the authors offer a definition of the construct and (...) discuss its advantages. Second, future ethical judgment research would benefit from greater integration between theories of ethical decision making and theories of social cognition. Drawing upon the Hunt–Vitell ( Journal of Macromarketing 6 (Spring), 5–15, 1986 ; In: N. C. Smith and J. A. Quelch (eds.), Ethics in Marketing . Irwin, Homewood, IL, pp. 775–784, 1992 ) model and the heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 39 (November), 752–766, 1980 ), the authors present a brief research agenda intended to stimulate research on the psychological processes behind ethical judgments. (shrink)

Some of our beliefs are institutional; that is, beliefs whose content is to a large extent shaped by institutions, such as beliefs about intellectual property, trade policy, or traffic rules. In this chapter, we propose a novel account of institutional beliefs, as we call them. In particular, we argue that institutional beliefs are primarily attributable to social entities, such as groups or collectives, and only secondarily to individual agents. This is because institutional beliefs respond to specific problems that, in principle, (...) only collectives face. However, existing methodology in behavioural science primarily relies on eliciting beliefs through individual choice data, which presents challenges for empirically modelling our proposed concept of institutional beliefs. To address this challenge, we propose to speak of institutional beliefs attributable to individual agents as ‘qua beliefs’. That is, institutional beliefs attributable to individual agents acting qua members of certain institutionally shaped groups. Within this framework, individuals’ qua actions occur in a shared realm of problems that can only be addressed through collective efforts. The relationship between individuals and their groups can be rendered tractable under formalised conditions. Under these conditions, choice data collected from individuals need not obstruct the elicitation of institutional beliefs for empirical study at both the collective and the individual level. We refer to these conditions as “IS conditions”, which are developed based on the synthesis between an interpretationist understanding of mental states and standard models of revealed preference theory as used in experimental economics. For an illustration of how this approach can be operationalised experimentally, we direct our readers to chapter 10 of this volume, where an experimental study applied our account of institutional beliefs. (shrink)

Positive economic models aim to provide truthful explanations of significant economic phenomena. While the notion of ‘preferences’ figures prominently in micro-economic models, it suffers from a remarkable lack of conceptual clarity and rigor. After distinguishing narrow homo economicus models from broader ones and rehearsing the criticisms both have met, I go into the most promising attempt to date at addressing them, developed by Hausman. However, his definition of preferences as ‘total comparative evaluations’, I argue, plays into the general disregard (...) that economists have for human psychology. My alternative definition of preferences as ‘overall comparative evaluations’ – and hence as one of the many factors that influence people’s behavior – allows for more adequate causal explanations of people’s dutiful, committed, and norm-guided actions. Against Hausman but in agreement with Sen, it also allows for counterpreferential choice. (shrink)

In just a century, the Pentecostal movement has become a numerical force in world Christianity and the largest movement in Protestantism. But there are many different movements recognised by scholars as ‘Pentecostalism’, and there is absolutely no uniformity among these movements. There is no single form of Pentecostalism, nor are there clear theological criteria by which it can be defined. Researchers wonder whether it is even possible to speak of global Pentecostalism as a single phenomenon. It is similarly impossible to (...) define what Pentecostalism is without understanding how the movement originated. Until recently, the historiography of the movement has been based on North American history, but recent research has increased the complexity of defining Pentecostalism. This paper examines the following scholarly approaches to defining Pentecostalism: phenomenological, historical, sociological, theological, and global perspective approaches. These approaches do not exclude each other, but are interdependent and complementary. As a result, it is shown that through the ‘global perspective’ approach Pentecostalism can be defined as a global network movement. From the historical and theological approaches, it is revealed that Pentecostalism cannot be seen as a movement with a clear beginning in the USA or elsewhere, nor as a movement based on one particular theology. It is a movement in constant flux, whose followers' spirituality is expressed in a constant search for an “experience of the Spirit” and spiritual gifts. It is a movement that took several years and several different formative ideas and events to emerge, a movement that from its inception has had a global character. It is therefore best thought of as an early 20th century Protestant global networking movement with an emphasis on the ‘experience of the Spirit’ and the application of spiritual gifts. (shrink)

This paper considers what function—if any—colocation of bodies may have in the Stoic theory of blending (κρᾶσις), by examining (1) whether colocation is part of the definition of what blending is; and (2) whether colocation is posited by the Stoics as a requirement necessary for the definition to be satisfied. I reconstruct the standard, Chrysippean definition of blending, and I show that the answer to (1) is ‘no’; further, I argue that the evidence gives no reason to (...) affirm (2). Thus, it appears that colocation does not have a central function in the Stoic theory of blending. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to explain Aristotle’s definition of the vegetative part of the soul in the De anima from a methodological point of view. I discuss Aristotle’s conception of the soul and his conception of “parts of the soul” before I turn to his definition of the vegetative part of the soul in De anima II 4. I argue that the definition of the vegetative capacity is deliberately abstract so as to cover its various (...) activities under one common heading. I also argue that the De anima deliberately avoids a positive and determinate description of the activity of the soul that is properly responsible for the vegetative functions, and that Aristotle offers such a positive and determinate description in his works dedicated to the actions and affections “common to body and soul”. (shrink)