Based on the "Guide to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990", this volume reviews the regulation of assisted conception including complex moral issues such as abortion, embryo research and cloning.

The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008: a missed opportunity?Amel AlghraniCorrespondence to Dr Amel Alghrani, Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation, Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, School of Law, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL; [email protected] 16 September 2009 Accepted 24 September 2009 Regulating reproduction is no easy feat. In the past three decades we have witnessed a reproductive revolution and great strides have been made to alleviate the effects of infertility. Reproductive advances such as in-vitro (...) fertilisation , sex selection, reproductive cloning and embryo selection for the purpose of creating “saviour siblings” have all emerged as part of a rapid and ever-changing branch of medicine, each promising to upset the status quo and transform human reproduction.Following much activity in this area, the lengthy process of updating the legislation is now complete. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 received Royal Assent on 13 November 2008. The majority of the HFE Act 2008’s amendments will come into force in October of this year, with the exception of the provisions pertaining to parenthood, which commenced in April 2009. Welcoming Royal Assent, Professor Lisa Jardine, Chair of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, stated:“This is a momentous day for the HFEA and for those with fertility problems. The regulatory system that has served us so well has been renewed. Parliament has provided a clear framework for the future and a solid base on which to regulate 21st century practice within 21st century law.”1However, as scientific endeavours into developments such as artificial gametes, womb transplantation and ectogenesis continue apace, it could be argued that Jardine was perhaps overly optimistic about the achievements of the new legislation. The HFE Act 2008 is an amending statute, and as Jackson 2 notes “much of the regulatory architecture” in the 1990 legislation “remains intact”. In retaining the architecture of the 1990 legislation, and merely amending or adding certain provisions, has the government missed an ideal opportunity to consider how to equip the regulatory framework for the next phase/era of assisted reproduction?The next …. (shrink)

This article briefly reviews the various papers contained in this volume. They were originally presented at a research workshop held at Keele University in the UK in February 2003. It is suggested that the different papers raise a series of related legal, social and ethical issues and can be collectively seen to demonstrate the fact that policy formation in relation to reproductive matters is highly contested. It is concluded that ethical policy formation in this area needs to be based on (...) actual evidence of harm rather than assumed harm and that this therefore entails more empirical research into reproductive matters. (shrink)

Of all the changes to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 that were introduced in 2008 by legislation of the same name, foremost to excite media attention and popular controversy was the amendment of the so-called welfare clause. This clause forms part of the licensing conditions which must be met by any clinic before offering those treatment services covered by the legislation. The 2008 Act deleted the statutory requirement that clinicians consider the need for a father of any (...) potential child before offering a woman treatment, substituting for it a requirement that clinicians must henceforth consider the child’s need for “supportive parenting”. In this paper, we first briefly recall the history of the introduction of s 13(5) in the 1990 Act, before going on to track discussion of its amendment through the lengthy reform process that preceded the introduction of the 2008 Act. We then discuss the meaning of the phrase “supportive parenting” with reference to guidance regarding its interpretation offered by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. While the changes to s 13(5) have been represented as suggesting a major change in the law, we suggest that the reworded section does not represent a significant break from the previous law as it had been interpreted in practice. This raises the question of why it was that an amendment that is likely to make very little difference to clinical practice tended to excite such attention (and with such polarising force). To this end, we locate debates regarding s 13(5) within a broader context of popular anxieties regarding the use of reproductive technologies and, specifically, what they mean for the position of men within the family. (shrink)

The Human Embryology Collection at the Centre of Anatomy Göttingen, created between 1942 and 1970, represents a unique interrelation of histological sectional series of human embryos and large-format physical models open to the public based on them. The collection was established long after the heyday of human embryology. It is also remarkable in another aspect: while usually models within the discipline are considered research objects, Göttingen embryologist Erich Blechschmidt (1904–1992) based his understanding on a pedagogical impetus. The (...) article highlights the distinctive and unconventional features of Blechschmidt’s undertaking against its disciplinary background. My focus lies on the two practices that are central to human embryology—collecting and modelling—, as well as the derived collection stocks. The special tension between individuality and universality that already characterized the process of their creation is also reflected in the later use of the collection. This tension allowed Blechschmidt to utilize the models in embryological research and anatomical teaching as well as in the broad social debate on abortion and the ethical status of human embryos. (shrink)

This note suggests that, viewed from a feminist perspective, the reforms contained in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 represent a missed opportunity to re-think the appropriate model of regulation to govern fertility treatment and embryology research in the UK. It argues that reform of the legislation was driven largely by the government’s desire to avoid re-igniting controversies over the legal status of the embryo and abortion and to maintain Britain’s position at the forefront of embryo research and (...) related biotechnologies. It also highlights the importance of media debates, which were highly selective, to the reform process, and suggests that in order to inject feminist values into the process of legislative reform, feminists need to become more media savvy. In the short term, it suggests that there is little prospect of a radical re-thinking of the appropriate ethico-legal response to the wide variety of family forms that reproductive technologies potentially enable, much less of considering our ethical obligations to the new forms of embryos that are now permitted by the 2008 Act. In the meantime, however, it argues that these issues provide productive opportunities for feminist legal theorists to address questions that have been erased or obscured in the course of the 2008 reforms. (shrink)

The Department of Health's Review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 is a comprehensive public consultation on the regulation of the storage and use of gametes and embryos for fertility treatment and research in the UK. The consultation considers a range of issues, including the model and scope of regulation and proposals for a single body, the Regulatory Authority for Tissue and Embryos, to replace both the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority and the Human Tissue (...) Authority by April 2008. The Department of Health published its report on the consultation in March 2006, and this is discussed here in relation to both the support and criticisms of the model and scope of the current and proposed regulatory frameworks, particularly with regard to policy decision-making by bodies such as HFEA and RATE. (shrink)

Over the last several decades many abortion advocates have attempted to spread confusion and doubt concerning the beginnings of human life. A particularly cynical strategy has involved invoking the authority historical thinkers, especially Doctors of the Church, to support the claim that (at least) early abortion does not constitute homicide because the early embryo is not yet fully human. Anyone familiar with context of these historical thinkers should realize that their specific judgments regarding abortion are now obsolete in (...) virtue of their primitive scientific understanding of embryology. In what follows, I summarize the Aristotelian embryology that explains why these historical thinkers held the views that they did. I then explore how we should best understand their broader ethical views in light of our vastly superior contemporary knowledge of human embryology. Unsurprisingly, it turns out that if we apply the contemporary empirical findings of embryology the very same metaphysical and ethical principles informing the thinking of the historical figures supports the prolife position. (shrink)

The cliché of the clergymen or the religious scholars battling against modern science oversimplifies the history of the encounter between modern science and religion, especially in the case of non-Western societies. Many religious scholars, Muslim and Christian, not only did not oppose modern science but used it instrumentally to propagate their religions. Marwa Elshakry, in her brilliant study of Darwin's opinions among the Arab World, concentrates more on Arab Christians and Sunni Muslims rather than on Shiite Muslims. Muḥammad-Riḍā Iṣfahānī, a (...) Shiite clergyman educated in Islamic theology in Najaf, composed A Critique of Darwin's Philosophy in 1912 as a review of the theory of evolution. However, even before the publication of this book, controversy concerning this topic had been raging in the Arab World for decades. Under the influence of Muslim scholars (Sunni and Shiite) to reconcile modern science with Islam, Iṣfahānī did his best to gather knowledge of modern biology. He applied his self-taught knowledge of modern biology to find new solutions to the difficulties of establishing a dialogue between Islam and modern science. Thanks to the rationalism of his premodern scientific education, Iṣfahānī was more sympathetic towards science than many of his Arab counterparts and able to deeply engage in these debates. Iṣfahānī believed that the theory of evolution in nonhumans did not contradict Islamic discourse nor experimental and rational facts. Nevertheless, he denied the theory of human evolution as a nonscientific hypothesis. He justified his opinion through a detailed refutation of Darwin's heuristic evidence for human evolution in the first chapter of Descent of Man, such as the similarities between anatomy, embryology, and vestigial organs in humans and other animals. He also referred to other Western evolutionists of his time, such as Alfred Russel Wallace and Rudolf Virchow, who also rejected human evolution, and added some other scientific refutations of his own. Undoubtedly, Iṣfahānī's final aim was to demonstrate the possibility of reconciliation between religion in general, and Islam in particular, with modern science. This article provides a detailed consideration of Iṣfahānī's opinions, identifying his Arabic sources and comparing them to the original non-Arabic sources. I also examine the scientific details of Iṣfahānī's achievements and the roots of his misunderstandings. (shrink)

Formulating sound and acceptable embryo research policy remains challenging especially in a pluralistic world. This challenge has acquired a new dimension of complexity with the advent of so-called embryo models, which are derived from stem cells. In this article, we present a normative strategy to facilitate the process of sound policy-making in the field of human embryology. This strategy involves seeking neutral agreements on higher level theories and doctrines as well as seeking agreements on the level of concrete policy (...) proposals. We call this strategy: going high and low. By going high and low, the plurality of reasonable moral and epistemic convictions of stakeholders involved in the domain of human embryology is respected while the process of policy-making in this area is improved. (shrink)

When fertility centers dispose of embryos, how should this be done? Current regulatory guidelines by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority state that, when terminating the development of human embryos, a clinic should act with sensitivity, taking account of the embryo’s “special status” and respecting the interests of the gamete providers and recipients. As yet, it is unclear as to how and to what extent this achieved within fertility clinics in the UK. Resultantly, this paper examines the largely (...) undocumented domain of embryo disposal practice. By undertaking an empirical study into policy and procedure and noting divergence in clinic practice, it then comments on the ethical implications of these protocols for patients and practitioners. Specifically, this paper argues for a more holistic approach to embryo disposal. An approach that effectively meets the requirements of the lab, is respectful of the “special status” of the human embryo, and, perhaps most importantly, reflects the multifaceted needs of the patient. (shrink)

The chapter provides a response to Patrick Toner, “Critical Study of Fabrizio Amerini’s Aquinas on the Beginning and End of Human Life,” Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 2, 211–28. The chapter corrects two misrepresentations in Toner’s review. First, it proves that, given Aquinas’ assumptions on substantial form and human soul, Aquinas could not give up his preference for delayed hominization of the embryo even if he were acquainted with contemporary embryology. Aquinas takes as the starting point of his (...) embryology Aristotle’s characterization of the human soul as the act of an organic physical body having life potentially, and this characterization leads him to the conviction that the human soul can enter into the human body only after the principal vital organs are formed. Second, the chapter corrects Toner’s unusual interpretation of the clause “organic” in the Aristotelian characterization of the human soul, by specifying the different senses of potentiality in Aquinas’ embryology. The chapter reaffirms the core idea that establishing when the hominization of the human embryo begins is not decisive for rejecting abortion. The chapter suggests relating the question of abortion to the identity or continuity of the human embryo rather than to the beginning of hominization. (shrink)

This article analyzes local algorithmic practices resulting from the increased use of time-lapse (TL) imaging in fertility treatment. The data produced by TL technologies are expected to help professionals pick the best embryo for implantation. The emergence of TL has been characterized by promissory discourses of deeper embryo knowledge and expanded selection standardization, despite professionals having no conclusive evidence that TL improves pregnancy rates. Our research explores the use of TL tools in embryology labs. We pay special attention to standardization (...) efforts and knowledge-creation facilitated through TL and its incorporated algorithms. Using ethnographic data from five UK clinical sites, we argue that knowledge generated through TL is contingent upon complex human–machine interactions that produce local uncertainties. Thus, algorithms do not simply add medical knowledge. Rather, they rearrange professional practice and expertise. Firstly, we show how TL changes lab routines and training needs. Secondly, we show that the human input TL requires renders the algorithm itself an uncertain and situated practice. This, in turn, raises professional questions about the algorithm’s authority in embryo selection. The article demonstrates the embedded nature of algorithmic knowledge production, thus pointing to the need for STS scholarship to further explore the locality of algorithms and AI. (shrink)

Aristotle is traditionally read as dividing animal souls into three parts, while dividing human souls into four parts (a rational part, with theoretical and pr...

Though better recognized for its immediate endeavors in human embryo research, the Carnegie Department of Embryology also employed a breeding colony of rhesus macaques for the purposes of studying human reproduction. This essay follows the course of the first enterprise in maintaining a primate colony for laboratory research and the overlapping scientific, social, and political circumstances that tolerated and cultivated the colony’s continued operation from 1925 until 1971. Despite a new-found priority for reproductive sciences in the United States, (...) by the early 1920s an unfertilized human ovum had not yet been seen and even the timing of ovulation remained unresolved. Progress would require an organized research approach that could extend beyond the limitations of working with scant and inherently restrictive human subjects or with common lab mammals like mice. In response, the Department of Embryology, under the Carnegie Institution of Washington, instituted a novel methodology using a particular primate species as a surrogate in studying normal human reproductive physiology. Over more than 40 years the monkey colony followed an unpremeditated trajectory that would contribute fundamentally to discoveries in human reproduction, early embryo development, reliable birth control methods, and to the establishment of the rhesus macaque as a common model organism. (shrink)

In a poem setting forth the way things are in nature, it is fitting for Lucretius to address, among many other phenomena, human conception and embryonic determination. With an eye toward ethics, Lucretius demonstrates how sexual reproduction at the seminal level can be explained by Epicurean atomism. In this paper, I am concerned with the biological ‘how’ of conception as explained inDe Rerum Natura(=DRN) but also with the ethical ‘therefore’ for Lucretius’ readership and (over)estimations of male autonomy. For modern (...) audiences with a basic grasp of procreation that includes sperm supplied by a male and egg supplied by a female, encountering Lucretius’ verses on women contributing semen (semina) to the process of conception can be surprising (4.1209–62). The idea of female semen may give us pause as we calibrate it with our understanding of eggs and ovulation, but Lucretius, in his time, was not advancing some novel theory. Wading into established debates on male-only or joint male-female semen production and gendered insemination (that is, who produces semen and whose semen is active at conception), Lucretius sides with those promulgating mutuality for both questions (for example Democritus [DK 24 A13]) and rejects Aristotle's representative exclusivist claim of male activity vs female passivity (τὸ ἄρρεν ἐστὶν ὡς κινοῦν καὶ ποιοῦν, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ὡς παθητικόν,Gen. an.729a28–30; cf. 726a30–6). That is to say, a sexually mature female, like her male counterpart, emits semen that has determining potency in the formation of a human embryo (Lucr. 4.1209–62). Although the discharge and activity of female semen is the focus of this paper, my investigation is not aQuellenforschungor historical survey of Greco-Roman ideas about women's contributions to insemination and fertility, since others have treated these matters extensively. I concentrate rather on how Lucretius employs the concept of female semen in terms of his poetics in Book 4 and what I see as an ethical argument against the domineering nature of Roman masculinity. The problem of female semen, from the point of view of Lucretius’ Roman male audience, is that it is potentially costly to men because it rivals and threatens their status from the physiological to the discursive level. Iain Lonie broaches the same issue from Greek perspectives. (shrink)

Human embryonic moral status in the embryo debate in the Indian religious school of thoughts is a challenging issue. The paper tries to figure out whether ontological status implies moral status of embryo. Consciousness is an important determinant of animation of human embryo. In this paper an attempt had been made to understand the concept of man and soul in the Hindu philosophical thought. In the process we would also make a critical review of embryology in the Hindu (...) philosophical thought. The study would adopt a conceptual elucidation of morality. The paper made an elaborative study of Puruṣa as found in the Saṃkhya Philosophy and the study of consciousness and animation would try to resolve the related question, when does life begin to have that value? Embryo-protectionist regards embryos as a potential person. The Gita says the human person is individual self-called āttmā, whose nature is of pure consciousness, Brahman/Puruṣa. Consciousness constitutes the essentiality of individual Self. Human embryo developments are elaborately studied in the Yajñavalkya Smṛti, Garbha Upaniṣad, and Suśruta Saṃhitā. The self that remain latent in the embryo gets impetus with the association of consciousness until then it cannot be a human personality. In Hinduism sanctity of life gets combined with autonomy and self-determination. The sanctity of life applies both to the fetus as well as to the overall welfare of the society. The embryo being in an interim stage and the soul not being destroyed upon body annihilation, it may be claimed that since destruction or annihilation of the physical form does not destroy the soul, beneficial embryo research should thus not be abhorrent. The Hindu ethics as examined here precludes the consideration of the situation at hand, and causing the least harm and work according to one’s dharma. (shrink)

When Did I Begin? investigates the theoretical, moral, and biological issues surrounding the debate over the beginning of human life. With the continuing controversy over the use of in vitro fertilization techniques and experimentation with human embryos, these issues have been forced into the arena of public debate. Following a detailed analysis of the history of the question, Reverend Ford argues that a human individual could not begin before definitive individuation occurs with the appearance of the primitive (...) streak about two weeks after fertilization. This, he argues, is when it becomes finally known whether one or more human individuals are to form from a single egg. Thus, he questions the idea that the fertilized egg itself could be regarded as the beginning of the development of the human individual. The author also differs sharply, however, from those who would delay the beginning of the human person until the brain is formed, or until birth or the onset of conscious states. (shrink)

As elsewhere, the ethical debate on embryonic stem cell research in Central Europe, especially Germany and Switzerland, involves controversy over the status of the human embryo. There is a distinctive Kantian flavor to the standard arguments however, and we show how they often embody a set of misunderstandings and argumentative shortcuts we term "embryological Kantianism." We also undertake a broader analysis of three arguments typically presented in this debate, especially in official position papers, namely the identity, continuity, and potentiality (...) arguments. It turns out that these arguments do not support the strong, quasi-personal status accorded to the embryos in these official opinions. (shrink)

A common object found within medical museums is the developmental series: an arrangement of embryos depicting the transformation of an unremarkable blob into an anatomically organized and recognizable organism. The developmental series depicts a normative process, one where bodies emerge in reliable sequential stages to reveal anatomically perfect beings. Yet a century before the developmental series would become a visual model of embryological development, the very process of development itself was discerned through the comparative study of preserved human fetuses—specifically, (...) those deemed “monstrous” or characterized as “malformations.” This article examines how anatomically diverse fetal bodies were reformulated from singular curiosities into alternative developmental pathways whose characteristics testified to the laws of nature and to the primordial, physical relationship between humans and other species. In early nineteenth century Amsterdam, the father-son team of physicians Gerard and Willem Vrolik built up an internationally renowned anatomical museum famous especially for Willem’s collection of fetal malformations. Physical preparations of fetal malformations play a central role in Willem’s monumental handbook on developmental embryology: comparing human embryos against one another and the embryos of other species, Willem plots out a sequence of embryological development in which a body’s form marks its place within the ever-unfolding natural order. In conversation with the literature on model organisms, this article explores how the “monstrous” gets standardized and, in doing so, contributes to the scientific production of a normative physiological process. (shrink)

The article rejects various attempts to negate the subjectivity of human embryo, formulated among others in the Polish debate entitled 'Stem cells - life for life?' and organised by the Ministry of Scientific Research and Information Technology in 2003 and 2004. The Author thinks that the proposal to treat a human embryo as a deceased donor of organs, is wrong both in the field of embryology and philosophical anthropology. It is also wrong to question the subjectivity of (...) class='Hi'>human embryo using various criteria of growth (developed nervous system, brain, consciousness, participation in the life of society and looking after one's own interests). For these criteria do not define humanity but describe human being in various phases of expressions of his/her human nature. That is why it is not acceptable to make the right to life conditional on the stage and degree of the actualization of humanity. Furthermore, one cannot justify the deprivation of the subjectivity of human embryo because of medical progress and the so-called good of humankind. The acceleration of progress cannot be done at the cost of life of some group of human beings. (shrink)

_Becoming Human_ argues that human identity was articulated and extended across a wide range of textual, visual, and artifactual assemblages from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries. J. Allan Mitchell shows how the formation of the child expresses a manifold and mutable style of being. To be human is to learn to dwell among a welter of things. A searching and provocative historical inquiry into human becoming, the book presents a set of idiosyncratic essays on embryology and (...) infancy, play and games, and manners, meals, and other messes. While it makes significant contributions to medieval scholarship on the body, family, and material culture, _Becoming Human_ theorizes anew what might be called a medieval ecological imaginary. Mitchell examines a broad array of phenomenal objects—including medical diagrams, toy knights, tableware, conduct texts, dream visions, and scientific instruments—and in the process reanimates distinctly medieval ontologies. In addressing the emergence of the human in the later Middle Ages, Mitchell identifies areas where humanity remains at risk. In illuminating the past, he shines fresh light on our present. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas describes embryological development as a succession of vital principles, souls, or substantial forms of which the last places the developing being in its own species. In the case of human beings this form is the rational soul. Aquinas' well-known commitment to the view that there is only one substantial form for each composite and that a substantial form directly informs prime matter leads to the conclusion that the succession of soul kinds is non-cumulative. The problem is that (...) this view seems to entail discontinuity in the process of generation. Aquinas argues for the continuity of a conceived being by appealing to the teleological argument at the core of Aristotle's embryogenesis theory: according to Aristotle, embryonic development is a gradual actualization of the form of the species, potentially present in the embryo from the outset. Aquinas denies such a gradualist account due to his metaphysical commitments , arguing instead that the .. (shrink)

From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, new anatomical investigations of the brain and the nervous system, together with a renewed interest in comparative anatomy, allowed doctors and philosophers to ground their theories on sense perception, the emergence of human intelligence, and the soul/body relationship in modern science. They investigated the anatomical structures and the physiological processes underlying the rise, differentiation, and articulation of human cognitive activities, and looked for the “anatomical roots” of the specificity of human (...) intelligence when compared to other forms of animal sensibility. This edited volume focuses on medical and philosophical debates on human intelligence and animal perception in the early modern age, providing fresh insights into the influence of medical discourse on the rise of modern philosophical anthropology. Contributions from distinguished historians of philosophy and medicine focus on sixteenth-century zoological, psychological, and embryological discourses on man; the impact of mechanism and comparative anatomy on philosophical conceptions of body and soul; and the key status of sensibility in the medical and philosophical enlightenment. (shrink)

The Chief Medical Officer of Health of the United Kingdom has recommended that the 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act should be amended to allow cloning in humans for research purposes only. He also recommended that: “The transfer of an embryo created by cell nuclear replacement into the uterus of a woman (so called ‘reproductive cloning’) should remain a criminal offence” (recommendation 7, Ref. 1). This recommendation implies that nuclear replacement and cloning are the same. They are not. Nuclear (...) transfer constitutes reproductive cloning only when the individual created is genetically identical to the nuclear donor. In this paper, we describe a possible future use of nuclear transfer for the treatment of infertile individuals. The treatment yields an individual that receives approximately equal genetic contributions from each parent. We use this example to illustrate how semantic confusion might lead to plausibly moral and justifiable treatments being legally banned. In doing so, we hope to encourage a more accurate and informed use of language in science, law and politics, so that legislation is properly informed by science and achieves what it intends. BioEssays 23:359–364, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

This article notes differences in legislation in Germany and Great Britain regarding human embryo research and looks for an explanation in their divergent intellectual traditions. Whereas the German Stem Cell Act invokes an anthropological concept of human dignity to ground its ban on using embryos for research, there is no definition of what it means to be human in either the British Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act or in the advisory Warnock-Report. After studying the differences and (...) providing some philosophical background, the essay distinguishes two notions that are significant for understanding human dignity. It then proposes from a theological point of view a basic understanding within a relational anthropology, and comes to the conclusion that because of continuity in development and their relational constitution, humans embryos should be accepted as human from the moment of conception. (shrink)

About one in forty babies is born with a recognisable congenital anomaly at birth. Rapid progress is being made in recognising the genetic contribution to these defects. From over 2000 likely single gene malformation syndromes in humans the gene has been isolated or mapped in about 10%. Despite the availability of animal models, the study of malformations in humans continues to reveal novel genes and unpredicted functions for known genes. The importance of the study of clinical malformations to the understanding (...) of embryological development in humans and other organisms is discussed and reviewed. (shrink)

The momentum of advances in biology is evident in the history of patents on life forms. As we proceed forward with greater understanding and technological control of developmental biology there will be many new and challenging dilemmas related to patenting of human parts and partial trajectories of human development. These dilemmas are already evident in the current conflict over the moral status of the early human embryo. In this essay, recent evidence from embryological studies is considered and (...) the unbroken continuity of organismal development initiated at fertilization is asserted as clear and reasonable grounds for moral standing. Within this frame of analysis, it is proposed that through a technique of Altered Nuclear Transfer, non-organismal entities might be created from which embryonic stem cells could be morally procured. Criteria for patenting of such non-organismal entities are considered. (shrink)

Would Aquinas hold the view that a patient in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) is something other than a human being? Some recent interpreters have argued for this position. I contend that this reading is grounded in a false symmetry between the three stages of Aquinas’s embryology and the (alleged) three-stage process of death. Instead, I show that there are textual grounds for rejecting the view that the absence of higher brain activity in a patient would lead Aquinas to (...) say that the patient no longer has a rational soul. On my reading of Aquinas, the patient in PVS has a rational soul and is unequivocally a human being. (shrink)

Reproductive cloning has thrown up new scientific possibilities, ethical conundrums, and legal challenges. An initial question, considered by the English courts in 2003, was whether the technique presently available, that of cell nucleus replacement, falls outside the provisions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. If it does, the creation and use, including use in research protocols, of human embryos would be unregulated, disclosing a need to consider remedial legislation. The resolution by the courts of this legal (...) question dramatically engages them in a resolution of fundamental ethical dilemmas, and discloses the possibilities and limitation of negotiating science policy through the processes of litigation. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the question of when human life begins from a neo-Aristotelian perspective. In my view, the basic principles of Aristotle’s metaphysics inform an account of human life (and the human person) that offers the best available explanation of the available phenomena. This account – the substance account of the human person – can fully incorporate the contemporary findings of empirical embryology, while also recognizing the essential uniqueness of rational human nature.

This paper presents a detailed reconstruction of Theophrastus’ account of human ontogeny, which is built around Aristotle’s notoriously difficult claim in Generation of Animals II 3 that “νοῦς alone enters from without.” I argue that this account (which is known to us via quotes from Theophrastus’ de Anima II and On Motion I) provides a viable alternative to the traditional trilemma between naturalist traducianism, creationism, and pre-existence, as well as offering an attractive but so far unappreciated interpretation of Aristotle’s (...) account of human ontogeny. More specifically, I argue that the extant evidence poses a challenge to the two dominant interpretations of “νοῦς from without” in the last decades: a dialectical one, according to which Aristotle ultimately rejects this claim, and a naturalizing one (often inspired by Alexander of Aphrodisias) that obliterates the essential difference between νοῦς and the other parts of the soul. (shrink)

In contemporary discussions of abortion, both sides argue well-worn positions, particularly concerning the question, When does human life begin? Though often invoked by the Catholic Church for support, Thomas Aquinas in fact held that human life begins after conception, not at the moment of union. But his overall thinking on questions of how humans come into being, and cease to be, is more subtle than either side in this polarized debate imagines. Fabrizio Amerini--an internationally renowned scholar of medieval (...) philosophy--does justice to Aquinas's views on these controversial issues. Some pro-life proponents hold that Aquinas's position is simply due to faulty biological knowledge, and if he knew what we know today about embryology, he would agree that human life begins at conception. Others argue that nothing Aquinas could learn from modern biology would have changed his mind. Amerini follows the twists and turns of Aquinas's thinking to reach a nuanced and detailed solution in the final chapters that will unsettle familiar assumptions and arguments. Systematically examining all the pertinent texts and placing each in historical context, Amerini provides an accurate reconstruction of Aquinas's account of the beginning and end of human life and assesses its bioethical implications for today. This major contribution is available to an English-speaking audience through translation by Mark Henninger, himself a noted scholar of medieval philosophy. (shrink)

In a recent article published in the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, David DeGrazia criticized the two pivotal assumptions that underlie President Bush’s policy on funding stem cell research. Those assumptions are that we originate as single-cell zygotes at the time of conception and that we have full moral status as soon as we originate.In this paper, I would like to concentrate on the first of those assumptions and show in light of recent findings in embryological development that DeGrazia’s (...) criticisms have to be rejected. I shall save my discussion of DeGrazia’s critique of the second assumption for a later article that can take into account DeGrazia’s further elaboration of his position. (shrink)

Today, human pluripotent stem cell technologies find widespread application across biomedical research, as models for early human development, as platforms for functional human genomics, as tools for the study of disease, drug screening and toxicology, and as a renewable source of cellular therapeutics for a range of intractable diseases. The foundations of this human pluripotent stem cell revolution rest on advances in a wide range of disciplines, including cancer biology, assisted reproduction, cell culture and organoid technology, (...) somatic cell nuclear transfer, primate embryology, single‐cell biology, and gene editing. This review surveys the slow emergence of the study of human pluripotency and the exponential growth of the field during the past several decades. (shrink)

Forms, Souls, and Embryos allows readers coming from different backgrounds to appreciate the depth and originality with which the Neoplatonists engaged with and responded to a number of philosophical questions central to human reproduction, including: What is the causal explanation of the embryo's formation? How and to what extent are Platonic Forms involved? In what sense is a fetus 'alive,' and when does it become a human being? Where does the embryo's soul come from, and how is it (...) connected to its body? This is the first full-length study in English of this fascinating subject, and is a must-read for anyone interested in Neoplatonism or the history of medicine and embryology. (shrink)

In addressing bioethical issues at the beginning of human life, such as abortion, in vitro fertilization, and embryonic stem cell research, one primary concern regards establishing when a developing human embryo or fetus can be considered a person. Thomas Aquinas argues that an embryo or fetus is not a human person until its body is informed by a rational soul. Aquinas's explicit account of human embryogenesis has been generally rejected by contemporary scholars due to its dependence (...) upon medieval biological data, which has been far surpassed by current scientific research. A number of scholars, however, have attempted to combine Aquinas's basic metaphysical account of human nature with current embryological data to develop a contemporary Thomistic account of a human person's beginning. In this article, I discuss two recent interpretations in which it is argued that a human person does not begin to exist until a fetus has developed a functioning cerebral cortex. (shrink)

In Aristotle’s writings regarding the biology of embryology, especially in the Generation of Animals, he contends that the mother’s menstrual fluids provide the material for the generation of the offspring, and the father’s form determines its formation as a member of that species (e.g. human). The katamenia (menstrual fluids) of the mother are said to be potentially all the body parts of the offspring, though actually none of them. So, the fluids are potentially the offspring. But are they a (...) first potentiality or second potentiality (first actuality) of a human, in the terminology of De Anima II? In this paper I will argue that katamenia are a first potentiality of a human. My first argument is that katamenia do not have the potential for human activities such as thinking, but rather the potential of becoming something having the potential for those activities. I answer the objection that katamenia are not even a first potentiality, by appealing to an important text contending that for any x whose source of becoming is external, x is potentially y if nothing in x with respect to matter needs to be changed in order for an external principle to make x into y. Keywords: Aristotle, katamenia, potentiality, actuality, Generation of Animals. (shrink)

Moral status ascribes equal obligations and rights to individuals on the basis of membership in a protected group. Substance change is an event that results in the origin or cessation of individuals who may be members of groups with equal moral status. In this paper, two substance changes that affect the moral status of human embryos are identified. The first substance change begins with fertilization and ends with the formation of the blastocyst, a biological individual with moral status comparable (...) to that ascribed to human organs. The second substance change begins at implantation and ends late in embryological development with the formation of the human body, an organism with moral status as a human being. The bioethical implications of each substance change are explored. The Two Substance Change theory is contrasted with continuity theories, which recognize no substance change in embryological development and with fertilization-only substance change theories. (shrink)

The complex activity of the human brain makes it difficult to get a big picture of how the brain works and functions as the mind. We examine pertinent studies, as well as evolutionary and embryologic evidence to support our theoretical model consisting of separate but interactive layers of human neural activity. The most basic layer involves default mode network (DMN)activity and cardiorespiratory oscillations. We propose that these oscillations support other neural activity and cognitive processes. The second layer involves (...) limbic system activity accompanied by corresponding changes in cardiorespiratory oscillations. The third layer consists of corticothalamic processing and involves higher cortical functions including awareness, cognition,and consciousness. These layers interact to form the complex neural activity of the human brain. Examining the origins and relationships of various neural and physiologic oscillations may provide better understanding of human neurophysiology and consciousness. (shrink)