In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.4 (2003) 347-352 [Access article in PDF] Idem, Ipse, and Loss of the Self Gerrit Glas The case histories of Dr. Wells and the comments on them require first of all more conceptual clarity. In this article I will first introduce, with Paul Ricoeur, a distinction between idem identity and ipse identity. Then, I will discuss the merits and pitfalls of applying narrative (...) theory to pathologies of the self. Behind the discussion on the breakdown of narrative unity, deep questions loom, most notably about conceivability and meaning of the notion of breakdown of self-relatedness as such; and about the moral basis for clinical action given the lack of a self to treat. These questions amount to the acknowledgment of a normative component in the concept of self and personhood, which can not be accounted for by idem identity solely. Individual and Structural Identity Let us begin with identity. When I identify a tree, at least two aspects, are implied in the act of identification. The first aspect concerns the recognition of the tree as member of a certain class (or family) of living things. In the tree we recognize certain features, or aspects, that are typical for this particular class (or family) of trees. This recognition is based on similarity or sameness. The second aspect in the act of identification consists of the recognition of the tree as this individual tree. We are dealing here with a basic, rather mysterious capacity: the capacity to distinguish one individual entity from the other; or: the capacity to know individuals.Both aspects, the recognition of similarity and of individuality, are interwoven in everyday acts of identification. So, we discern the specific features of a particular tree against the background of an overall (or general) image of trees. At the same time we recognize these general features given our capacity to distinguish one tree from the other. There are, accordingly, two sides in the concept of identity: structural identity and individual identity. Individual identity refers to the uniqueness of a thing and structural identity to the properties a thing shares with others things.This distinction can be applied to human beings, but only in a certain way and to a certain extent. So, John is a human being, and as a human being he has both distinctive and general features. However with regard to John himself, that is, the particular person I aim at when I speak about John, the picture is slightly different. Individuality and similarity (universality) refer here to one and the same person. The uniqueness of John is now commonly referred to as numerical identity. There is only one singular John. Even if there were a John with the same birth date, fingerprint and DNA profile, this would be another John, John 2 so to say. This uniqueness is sometimes articulated in terms of the position John 1 and John 2 occupy in the space-time continuum. Because John 1 and John 2 cannot occupy the same spatiotemporal position, [End Page 347] they must be separate, two distinct entities. This is of course a limited view on uniqueness of persons; so, we will have to say more about this in a moment.The structural (or general) characteristics of John, the John-ness of John so to say, is commonly called qualitative identity. Qualitative identity consists of the sum of all those enduring properties which could serve as criterion to distinguish John from other persons in the world. Qualitative identity, however, does not completely coincide with structural identity, mentioned earlier. This is obvious from the fact that the John-ness of John refers to those structural (enduring, general) properties for which only this particular John qualifies, whereas the human being-ness of John refers to the properties John shares with all other human beings. So, in those cases in which the structural dimension of identity refers to only one entity, for instance in the case of the John-ness of John, the emphasis is not on intersubject similarity but on intrasubject similarity. This intrasubject similarity refers to continuity in time and to... (shrink)

In his Questions I, qq. 35-36 Sent. Robert Kilwardby asks whether divine understanding (intelligere) is the same as the divine speaking (dicere), as Anselm says in Monologion, ch. 63, just as for us mental speaking (mentis locutio) is the same as the thinker's examination (inspectio cogitantis) or mental seeing (videre in mente). His answer is that neither for us nor for God is the equation correct, because understanding lacks an essential characteristic of speech, i.e. referentiality, and because speaking is active (...) and understanding passive, which is reflected in the meanings (impositiones) and grammatical functions (modi significandi) of the corresponding expressions. Kilwardby does concede in his discussion of the speech of angels in II Sent. q. 56 that when inner speech does occur, and remains internal, it amounts to thought, though with the additional element of referentiality. I suggest that Kilwardby is unwilling accept Augustine's theory that thought is inner speech, as Anselm does, because it would require him to reject Aristotelian-style philosophical psychology. (shrink)

This article intends to argue that Francisco de Vitoria’s conception of the Spanish Conquest of America is based upon notions that stem from various sources of the 14th and 15th Century. One of his most important source is the Opus septipertitum de contractibus, written by the German theologian Conradus Summenhart, whom Vitoria quotes frequently. By comparing both thinkers it can be shown that Vitoria’s basic terminology concerning rights and dominion is in greatly indebted to Summenhart’s account.

Jean-Louis Guereña, spécialiste de l’histoire culturelle et sociale de l’Espagne contemporaine, est le maître d’œuvre de l’ouvrage collectif La sexualidad en la España contemporánea (1800-1950) qui évoque l’histoire de la sexualité dans l’Espagne du début du xixe siècle à la première moitié du xxe siècle. Dans son introduction, l’historien revient sur l’idée que l’activité sexuelle est au cœur de toute activité humaine et que, de ce fait, la sexualité est un objet d’histoire (p. 11). Son insi...

The tendency towards an increasing integration of the informational web into our daily physical world (in particular in so-called Ambient Intelligent technologies which combine ideas derived from the field of Ubiquitous Computing, Intelligent User Interfaces and Ubiquitous Communication) is likely to make the development of successful profiling and personalization algorithms, like the ones currently used by internet companies such as Amazon , even more important than it is today. I argue that the way in which we experience ourselves necessarily goes (...) through a moment of technical mediation. Because of this algorithmic profiling that thrives on continuous reconfiguration of identification should not be understood as a supplementary process which maps a pre-established identity that exists independently from the profiling practice. In order to clarify how the experience of one’s identity can become affected by such machine-profiling a theoretical exploration of identity is made (including Agamben’s understanding of an apparatus , Ricoeur’s distinction between idem - and ipse -identity, and Stiegler’s notion of a conjunctive–disjunctive relationship towards retentional apparatuses ). Although it is clear that no specific predictions about the impact of Ambient Intelligent technologies can be made without taking more particulars into account, the theoretical concepts are used to describe three general scenarios about the way wherein the experience of identity might become affected. To conclude, I argue that the experience of one’s identity may affect whether the cases of unwarranted discrimination resulting from ubiquitous differentiations and identifications within an Ambient Intelligent environment, will become a matter of societal concern. (shrink)

The tendency towards an increasing integration of the informational web into our daily physical world (in particular in so-called Ambient Intelligent technologies which combine ideas derived from the field of Ubiquitous Computing, Intelligent User Interfaces and Ubiquitous Communication) is likely to make the development of successful profiling and personalization algorithms, like the ones currently used by internet companies such as Amazon, even more important than it is today. I argue that the way in which we experience ourselves necessarily goes through (...) a moment of technical mediation. Because of this algorithmic profiling that thrives on continuous reconfiguration of identification should not be understood as a supplementary process which maps a pre-established identity that exists independently from the profiling practice. In order to clarify how the experience of one’s identity can become affected by such machine-profiling a theoretical exploration of identity is made (including Agamben’s understanding of an apparatus, Ricoeur’s distinction between idem- and ipse-identity, and Stiegler’s notion of a conjunctive–disjunctive relationship towards retentional apparatuses). Although it is clear that no specific predictions about the impact of Ambient Intelligent technologies can be made without taking more particulars into account, the theoretical concepts are used to describe three general scenarios about the way wherein the experience of identity might become affected. To conclude, I argue that the experience of one’s identity may affect whether the cases of unwarranted discrimination resulting from ubiquitous differentiations and identifications within an Ambient Intelligent environment, will become a matter of societal concern. (shrink)

quod idem [sc. the invalidity of Clodius’ legislation] tu, Lentule, uidisti in ea lege quam de me tulisti. nam non est ita latum ut mihi Romam uenire liceret, sed ut uenirem; non enim uoluisti id quod licebat ferre ut liceret, sed me ita esse in re publica magis ut arcessitus imperio populi Romani uiderer quam administrandam ciuitatem restitutus.

dixerit hoc idem Epicurus, semper beatum esse sapientem … quem quidem, cum summis doloribus conficiatur, ait dicturum: ‘quam suaue est! quam nihil curo!’ non pugnem cum homine, cur tantum †habeat† in natura boni …This text, containing Cicero's oft-repeated canard, is deeply problematic. Both Reynolds and Moreschini resort to daggers here. Madvig's abeat for habeat has failed to convince, since Cicero appears to use abeo metaphorically without specifying the place of origin or destination of movement within a narrowly circumscribed semantic (...) field which does not encompass our passage. C.F.W. Müller, on the other hand, offered aberret, which can appear without such specification in the sense ‘be deceived’ or the like. Editors evidently hesitate, however, because of the difficulty of explaining the corruption. Perhaps one might rather consider the merits of haereat. haereo can mean ‘be stuck in difficulties’, but the usage is uncommon enough that it could easily have been a stumbling block for an inattentive scribe. Moreover, in some scripts where r is written with somewhat elongated hasta and an arc curving down, it can be easily confused with b; and once haebeat appeared, the ‘correction’ to habeat was all but inevitable. (shrink)

How does microbiota research impact our understanding of biological individuality? We summarize the interdisciplinary summer school on "Microbiota, Symbiosis and Individuality: Conceptual and Philosophical Issues" (July 2019), which was supported by a European Research Council starting grant project "Immunity, DEvelopment, and the Microbiota" (IDEM). The summer school centered around interdisciplinary group work on four facets of microbiota research: holobionts, individuality, causation, and human health. The conceptual discussion of cutting-edge empirical research provided new insights into microbiota and highlights the value (...) of incorporating into meetings experts from other disciplines, such as philosophy and history of science. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in finding stronger means of securitising identity against the various risks presented by the mobile globalised world. Biometric technology has featured quite prominently on the policy and security agenda of many countries. It is being promoted as the solution du jour for protecting and managing the uniqueness of identity in order to combat identity theft and fraud, crime and terrorism, illegal work and employment, and to efficiently govern various domains and services (...) including asylum, immigration and social welfare. In this paper, I shall interrogate the ways in which biometrics is about the uniqueness of identity and what kind of identity biometrics is concerned with. I argue that in posing such questions at the outset, we can start delimiting the distinctive bioethical stakes of biometrics beyond the all-too-familiar concerns of privacy, data protection and the like. I take cue mostly from Cavarero’s Arendt-inspired distinction between the “what” and the “who” elements of a person, and from Ricoeur’s distinction between the “idem” and “ipse” versions of identity. By engaging with these philosophical distinctions and concepts, and with particular reference to the example of asylum policy, I seek to examine and emphasise an important ethical issue pertaining to the practice of biometric identification. This issue relates mainly to the paradigmatic shift from the biographical story (which for so long has been the means by which an asylum application is assessed) to bio-digital samples (that are now the basis for managing and controlling the identities of asylum applicants). The purging of identity from its narrative dimension lies at the core of biometric technology’s overzealous aspiration to accuracy, precision and objectivity, and raises one of the most pressing bioethical questions vis-à-vis the realm of identification. (shrink)

La pena natural es una situación paradójica que se puede presentar cuando el autor de un delito, al cometerlo o a causa de éste, ha sufrido un daño igual o mayor al que padecería si el juez de la causa le aplicara la pena estatal prevista para tal conducta. Se da con frecuencia al juzgar ciertos accidentes viales, cuando el acusado ya carga el peso de ser quien, por imprudencia, mató a su pareja o familiar cercano, por ejemplo. Pero ¿en (...) qué situaciones y cómo cabe recurrir a la pena natural? En esta investigación, Manuel Serrano explora las diversas aristas y posturas en pugna que atraviesan este tema, donde se cruzan cuestiones como la idea de la “culpa compensada”, la prohibición de aplicar castigo doble por un mismo hecho (non bis in idem) y la clemencia judicial. El autor desmonta la estructura conceptual de la pena natural, estudia jurisprudencia argentina y recorre producciones teóricas de juristas que se han preocupado por este asunto complejo, profundo y poco abordado del derecho penal. (shrink)

El artículo analiza hasta que punto puede equipararse la labor del traductor con la de realizar una interpretación de los textos sobre los que trabaja. Utilizaremos para ello instrumental tanto de la tradición de la filosofía hermenéutica (especialmente Hans-Georg Gadamer) como de la inspirada en la obra de Ludwig Wittgenstein. La conclusión intenta mostrar las fuertes diferencias que existen entre traducir e interpretar, y con ello entender mejor qué quiere decir realmente la idea de "universalidad hermenéutica" que funda la citada (...) tradición de filosofía ídem. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics ALFRED R. MELE COM~rNTATORS ON THr Nicomachean Ethics (NE) have long been laboring under the influence of a serious misunderstanding of one of the key terms in Aristotle's moral philosophy and theory of action. This term is prohairesis (choice), the importance of which is indicated by Aristotle's assertions that choice is the proximate efficient cause of action (NE 6. 1139a31--32) and (...) that in which "the essential elements of virtue and character" lie (NE 8. x163a2'~-23). The accepted view is that Aristotle employs two importantly different notions of choice in the NE, one on which the term refers exclusively to means or things which are pros (toward, related to)' ends and another on which it does not have this reference? This "two notion" interpretation is motivated by the following three considerations: i. Aristotle's good or virtuous agent is said (NE 2. 11o5a28-33, cf. NE 6. 1144ax8-2o ) to choose actions for their own sakes; but, according to the This paper is derived in part from a chapter of my doctoral dissertation, which was submitted to the University of Michigan in January of 1979. 1 would like to express my gratitttde to the chairman of my dissertation committee, Nicholas P. White, for his comments and criticisms on the relevant sections during the preparation of my dissertation and to theJHP's anonymous reviewers for their helpful criticisms and queries. ' It has often been pointed out that things which are pros an end are not necessarily "means," in the ordinary sense of the word. E.g., constituents of an end are pros the end, but they are not means to it. See, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics, Book 6, trans. Leonard H. G. Greenwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19o9), pp. 46-47, 53ff.: and John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 1o-22. ' Among the many proponents of this "two notion" interpretation are William D. Ross and Donald J. Allan. See Ross, Aristotle, 5th ed. (London: Methuen, t953), p. 2oo. See Allan, The Philosophy of Aristotle, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 197o), p. 132; idem, "Aristotle 's Account of the Origin of Moral Principles," Xlth International Congress of Philosophy 12 (1953):124; idem, "The Practical Syllogism," in Autour d'Aristote, Studies for A. Mansion (Louvain : Publications Universitaires, 1955). Richard Sorabji, in "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 l t973-74]:t t6), says that he has noticed sixteen commentators who take this view. [4o5] 406 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY so-called formal account of prohairesis (NE 3. 2-3, 6. 2), the object of choice is what has been decided upon by deliberation (bouleuais), and what is decided upon by deliberation is a "means" to an end. 2. Aristotle says that choice is "closely bound up with virtue" and "discriminates characters better than actions do" (1 1t lb5; cf. t i lob3t, 1117a 5, 1163a22, 1t64bi); but commentators argue that these claims about choice are false unless choice is "of ends." 3. Though Aristotle holds that the impetuous akrat~s (incontinent agent) does not deliberate (e.g., t 152a 18-19), he says that the akrat~s' choice is good (1152ax5--17; cf. l l51a5-- 7, 29--32); and this appears to contradict his position in Book 3 that the object of choice is what is decided upon by deliberation, s In this paper I shall show that only one (philosophically significant) notion ofprohairesis is employed in the NE, namely, the notion developed in the "formal account" of deliberation and choice (3- 2-3, 6. 2), according to which choice is specifically of things which are pros ends. This point has several interesting applications. For example, it makes it easier to find in Aristotle (as I shall briefly explain) a comprehensive theory of practical reasoning or inference rather than several unconnected accounts of what practical inference is like in different types of cases; and it is helpful in clarifying what is involved in the evaluation of character on Aristotle's view (see Sec. ~). However, though I do think that the main point to be made... (shrink)

It is now widely accepted that philosophers should be historically self-conscious. But what does this mean in practice? How does historical consciousness change the way we philosophize? To answer this question, I examine two philosophers who put historical consciousness at the heart of their projects: Richard Rorty and Paul Ricoeur. Rorty and Ricoeur both argue that historical consciousness leads us to see philosophy as fragmented. It leads us to view our thinking from multiple perspectives at once, perspectives that are often (...) in considerable tension. But Rorty and Ricoeur reach radically different conclusions about how we should respond to this fragmentation. Their disagreement, I argue, is closely connected to their views of identity. Rorty and Ricoeur have different understandings of what it means for something to be unified, and thus different ideas about what it would take for our perspectives on ourselves to be brought together. My argument for this claim has four parts. First, I try to identify the problems that historical consciousness raises for philosophy, and explain why the most common response to them is unsatisfactory. Second, I discuss Rorty's claim that historical consciousness ought to make us ironists about our philosophical views, and to abandon truth as a goal of inquiry. Third, I contrast Rorty's position with Ricoeur's. Ricoeur argues that we can be historically self-aware and still see philosophy as a rational enterprise that aims at truth. I argue that Ricoeur's optimism on this point is rooted in his view of identity, and specifically in his distinction between idem- and ipse-identity. Finally, I ask what all of this shows about the options available to historically minded philosophers today. (shrink)

Pour décrire les moyens dont dispose l�individu pour se constituer en personne (partagée entre l�identité du caractère, l�idem, et le soi plus personnel et moral de l�ipse), Paul Ric�ur, dans Soi-même comme un autre (Paris, Seuil 1990), emprunte aux linguistes deux ensembles conceptuels : les références identifiantes (noms propres) et les actes d�autodésignation du je. Mais, par ce double biais, la pragmatique linguistique conduirait, selon lui, à une impasse, éludant finalement la question du qui? C�est oublier que, dans l�énonciation, (...) le je lui-même acquiert une certaine épaisseur sémantique. Une poésie mimétique d�action comme la poésie lyrique grecque montre le rôle que peut jouer dans la constitution du moi une identité énonciative collective, qui inscrit d�emblée la dialectique entre l�idem et l�ipse dans le rapport avec les autres, sans référence ni métaphysique ni théologique. (shrink)

This article indicates a reflective paradigm generally ignored in feminist research regarding the sex/gender debate, as presented in the work of Judith Butler ( Gender Trouble ). First, I address the fact that Butler’s philosophy is inscribed in the hermeneutical tradition of suspicion. Second, I put into relief the implicitly Platonic concept of mimesis , which is central to the anticipated subversion of gender, but uncriticized by Butler and others who follow her line of thought. Third, since Butler’s feminism can’t (...) ward off dualism, nor consider idem and ipse identity , I emphasize Paul Ricoeur ’s concept of triple mimesis and narrative identity, which allows us to depart from dichotomies and hierarchies. Following the path of Ricoeur and Françoise Heritier, I finally defend a feminist hermeneutical point of view, which is differentialist and universal. (shrink)

Este trabajo ejemplifica brevemente los rasgos del nihilismo mediante la escena del loco descrita por Nietzsche en La Gaya Ciencia. Analiza la crisis de la personalidad histórica de los pueblos derivada del proceso de globalización, apoyándose en los tres niveles de la civilización distinguidos por Ricoeur en Tareas del Educador Político. Pone de manifiesto la interacción de innovación y tradición en la identidad de los individuos, las instituciones y los pueblos a partir de los conceptos ricoeurianos de identidad ídem e (...) ipse, desarrollados en Soi Meme comme en Autre. Procede, finalmente, al análisis de la identidad de la Universidad de Chile, e inspirándose en los conceptos antes expuestos y en procesos hermenéuticos presentes en la obra de filósofos tales como Kant y Habermas, aborda la posibilidad de una hermenéutica de los valores que han definido históricamente esa identidad, como contribución a la celebración del bicentenario de la instauración originaria de nuestra institucionalidad democrática. This work briefly exemplifies the characteristics of nihilism with the scene of the madman described by Nietzsche in The Gay Science. Supported by the three levels within civilization distinguished by Ricoeur in Tareas del Educador Político, analyzes the crisis of the historic personality of nations, derived from the globalization process. Starting from the concepts of idem and ipse identities, developed by Ricoeur in Soi Meme comme un Autre, the work shows the interaction of innovation and tradition in the identity of individuals, institutions and nations. Finally it examines the identity of the University of Chile and inspired by the concepts before mentioned and by the hermeneutic processes present in the work of philosophers such as Kant and Habermas, examines de possibility of a hermeneutic of the values that have historically defined that identity. (shrink)

Mifologizirovannoe soznanie i totalitarizm -- O globalʹnom. Ontologicheskiĭ tragizm bytii︠a︡, ili Razmyshlenii︠a︡ malit︠s︡irista -- Razmyshlenii︠a︡ postoronnego -- Tolerantnostʹ v Rossii : vozmozhnostʹ i nevozmozhnostʹ -- Sudʹby liberalizma v Rossii : razmyshlenni︠a︡ profana -- Obyknovennyĭ russkiĭ fashizm -- "Vsë deĭstvitelʹnoe razumno" -- Intolerantnostʹ : repressivnoe soznanie i repressivnye praktiki -- Iskli︠u︡chennye navsegda -- Novyĭ mir? Razmyshlenii︠a︡ profana -- Dva lit︠s︡a ėkonomicheskoĭ svobody -- Ultra pessimo, ili Homo sapiens kak strashnai︠a︡ oshibka prirody -- Vlastʹ kak obʺekt/subʺekt prestupleniĭ -- Intellektualʹnai︠a︡ antimobilʹnostʹ sovremennykh rossiĭskikh (...) obshchestvovedov -- Chto denʹ gri︠a︡dushchiĭ nam gotovit? -- Kapitalizm ili sot︠s︡ializm? Oba khuzhe! -- Chelovecheskoe, slishkom chelovecheskoe -- O glavnykh protivorechnii︠a︡kh i glavnykh problemakh obshchestva postmoderna -- Pravda, odna tolʹko pravda, nichego, krome pravdy! -- Nemnogo ob Apokalipsise -- Gde my? Kuda idem? Where are we? Where are we going? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Empire Writes Back, With A VengeanceDenis DuttonOne of the more uplifting aspects of the turn toward theory in recent years has been the growth of postcolonial cultural studies. Postcolonial studies are in actuality constituted by counterdiscoursive, decolonizing practices which acknowledge the recognition of minority discourses, deconstructing hegemonic texts and imperialist metanarratives, opposing unduly overprivileging Western canonical paradigms of “literature,” and—well, you know what I mean. As Benita Parry (...) so lucidly explains, “The labor of producing a counter-discourse displacing imperialism’s dominative system of knowledge rests with those engaged in developing a critique from outside its cultural hegemony.” And what an awesome labor it is. The noted postcolonial theorist Georg M. Gugelberger sums things up by saying (I’m not inventing this) “postcolonialism can be conceptualized as the last bulwark against an encroaching total capitalism.”But what of the struggling masses of oppressed peoples whose interests and cultural sensitivities are so caringly looked after by practitioners of postcolonial studies? How do they feel about the fact that the only thing standing between them and “total capitalism” is resistance being mounted in a comparative literature department in Idaho, or someplace? This is a question seldom asked, let alone answered. Fortunately, new light has been thrown on the matter with the arrival of a booklet at this journal. Indian History from Above and Below, by Rukun Advani, is published by Ram Advani, probably a member of the family, in Lucknow. It is dedicated to “all Bengali intellectuals and those whose dollar salaries rise in proportion with obscurity and jargon.” Advani notes in his preface that although Bengali intellectuals talk torrents in their native tongue, when they [End Page 198] disseminate their thoughts abroad, they translate into a “clogged, colonial, unfluid flow,” with footnotes such as: “Derrida; ibid.; see my recent essay on the modes and moods of Foucault in JPS, III.iii, 3–333; on Lacan, see Lacan, On Lacan; Barthes, how many times a day do you have one in summer; idem., do you really?; differentiated peasantry; undifferentiated peasantry; for a feminist, though partially anthropologized, hermeneutic-critical discourse on the post-colonial subversive dimensions of the undifferentiated middle peasant in Midnapore district in June 1959, see the provocative controversy between Ranajit da and Amiya da in Gayatri di, ed., Gendered, Gendered, O Most Gendered: Epistemology and the Male Menopause in Bengal between June 1959 and July 1959 (Oxford University Press, forty years later).”The first of the booklet’s two essays, “Indian History from Below: a Swiftian Consideration,” discusses a neglected but “important arena of subaltern existence, namely the history of belching, wind-breaking and defecation.” Just to name these three functions posits “a bourgeois hierarchy of disgust with what Marx, in one of his most decisively Derridesque reflections, termed ‘The Asiatic Commode of Production.’” Beginning with the Foucauldian notion of “the peasant’s overdetermined relative autonomy from the olfactory,” Advani describes “the Barthesian notion of the impossibility of critical transcendence by the historian into either the symbiotic acculturation of the pastness, and indeed the presentness, of the present-subject, or indeed the even greater epistemological and hermeneutic problems posed by attempting a recreation of the ontological presuppositions of the peasant.” Much of this is elaborated in the classic essay by Professor Lavatri Lavatory Spewhack, “The Post-Colonial Lavatory and Its Radical Implications for Nomenclaturing Among Gendered and Subalternized Third World Expatriate-Marxist-Feminists in the First and Second Worlds: A Derivative Discourse Decoded.”The debt that Rukun Advani owes to Professor Spewhack is clear from the sheer number of his references to books and articles by her. These include, on the subject of toileting, Master Disgusted, Native Disgusting: a Perspective on Peasants from 250,000 Dollars per Annum, “On the Symbolic Hegemony of Subsection Numbers in a Gendered and Subalternized Post-Colonial Context: A Derivative Discourse Decoded” (in The Phenomenology of Praxis and the Praxis of Phenomenology in a Postmodern Residential Colony), “The Violence of Steam and the Episteme of Violence: Foucault’s Views on Hot Air Balloons” (in Obscurata), and even parts of her autobiography: The Larger than Life of Lavatri Lavatory [End Page 199] Spewhack (chapter titled “My Collected Phonecalls and Faxes”). While some... (shrink)

The article contains an exposition of the moral philosophy of J. P. Sartre as well as a trial of its evaluation. The author presents the social basis and main theses of Sartre’s.philosophical system and stresses the questions of social conditioning, real contents, and functions of the situational ethics of Sartre. According to the author, the situational ethics of Sartre, being an expression of feelings of intellectuals, middle-class, and students in the period of violent changes in our civilization, simply describes a (...) certain type of man, peculiar to these conditions and this time. Therefore, this type cannot be considered a definite universal construction of a human subject. Pessimism, characteristic for the existentialism, as an expression of.certain social and political conditions, can be easily surmounted, provided that a possibility of definite social transformations can be demonstrated. This gives evidence of a positive alternative which proposes development of social democracy, elimination of the remnants of worship of the individual, as well as a more and more full realization of social humanism, that are limiting the experiments of existentialism. Together with an increasing conviction of a possibility to surmount and to abolish the capitalistic alienation and together with the development of socialist democracy, when marxist thinking comprises more and more effectively all aspects of human fates, the social basis of existentialism and its influence are losing ground. On the other hand, whatever might be said about arbitrariness and subjectivism of many theses of existentialism, it has raised many essential questions of particular importance in our time. These are: 1) subjective aspect of human freedom in situations of a choice of an action; 2) responsibility of an individual to himself, other people, and history; 3) contradiction between general systems of valuation and norms and of a definite situation in which a choice is taken; 4) danger of a non-authentic apparent communication; 5) danger of a lost of personality in conditions of consumptionist civilisation; 6) necessity of responsibility and engagement; 7) necessity of forbearance, tolerance and respecting the subjective world of other persons; 8) existence of conflict situations. According to the author, a resolution of the above problems, which are important for a modern man, can be done only basing on marxism which should be conceived in a creative way. It is necessary, however, to reject arbitrary assumptions of the existentialist metaphysics, ethical formalism, and, above all, ahistorical conception of freedom. The opinions of Sartre that the, good a priori cannot exist, that everybody should determine his own existence, and that in each situation he should maintain his creative attitude and moral alertness, are in a certain sense and within certain limits right and productive. However, depriving people of a possibility to build any system of values and norms of a super-subjective character is a risky thing and may lead to moral relativity and nihilism. The social function of the existentialism is also a double one. On the one hand, existentialism, which demonstrates a super-historical and unchangeable character of the drama of human existence, in some way confirms and justifies the social system submitted to critic. On the other hand, as it states a moral and idealistic outsidership, bareness, and loneliness of a human individual in a modern bourgeois 1society, existentialism presents an important ethical indictment directed to the capitalistic society and indirectly shows a necessity to create such relations which would remove the tragic gap between individual and society. This is the reason of a peculiar paradox that for same people the existentialism is a point of departure from the files of the revolutionary movement, and for others a point which leads into marxism – cum duo faciunt idem, non est idem. (shrink)

Paul Ricoeurin perustelut narratiivisuuden mukaan tuomiseksi persoonallista identiteettiä koskevaan keskusteluun voi jakaa seuraaviksi väitteiksi, joita jatkossa tarkastelemme lähemmin:1) Idemin ja ipsen erottamatta jättäminen häiritsee persoonallisesta identiteetistä käytävää keskustelua; silloin sekoitetaan keskenään 'kuka?' ja 'mikä?' -kysymykset (1.1.-1.3.). 2) Näiden erottaminen tuo esiin sen, että ipse-identiteetti on sisäisesti aporeettinen eli sisältää ratkeamattomalta vaikuttavan toisaalta-toisaalta -asetelman. Yhtäältä se on päällekkäinen idem-identiteetin kanssa ja toisaalta on idem-identiteetin kanssa vastakkainen. Aporeettisuus juontuu ristiriidasta ihmisen kulttuurisen toisen luonnon ja vapaan tahdon välillä (luku 2.). 3) (...) Produktiivinen ratkaisu ipse-identiteettiä koskevaan aporeettisuuteen on identiteetin välittyminen tekstien ja erityisesti kertomusten kautta: narratiivinen identiteetti (luvut 3.-4.). (shrink)

La notion d’identité narrative place la possibilité de l’identité à soi (ou identité-idem) avec celle du changement. Mais a-t-on besoin d’une médiation « dialectique », comme la désigne Ricœur, entre identité et changement? Seulement si l’identité est supposée exclure le changement. Or, tel n’est pas le cas de l’identité au sens le plus fondamental du terme, l’identité numérique. La seconde difficulté tient à ce que Ricœur paraît souvent rabattre l’une sur l’autre les notions d’histoire et de narration. Nous sommes (...) des êtres historiques, cela n’est guère discutable, mais est-ce à dire que notre identité dépend de la narration que nous faisons de notre histoire? Enfin, la troisième aporie réside dans la place primordiale accordée par Ricœur à la fiction dans sa détermination de l’identité narrative. Or il n’est pas du tout évident que les personnages de fiction jouissent d’une identité véritable en un quelconque sens. Des théoriciens contemporains de la référence, tels Saul Kripke ou David Kaplan, ont au contraire insisté sur le fait que les personnages romanesques ne possédaient qu’une apparence d’identité. Comment dès lors faire de ce semblant d’identité, qui se réduit à un faisceau de caractéristiques plus ou moins stables, le modèle pour penser nos identités réelles. (shrink)

Individual identity and the multiplicity of cultural factors that “influence” the individual obviously raise the question of who we are as persons. But it is equally obvious that such individual reality is temporal, thereby constituting individual history. The latter seems to be like a Heraclitean flux where change is the only constant. In other words, since we never cease to change—even imperceptibly—shouldn’t we conclude that we never remain identical to ourselves in such a process of becoming? To use a concept (...) put forward by Ricœur, Idem-Identity, as stable and substantial sameness, appears to be an illusion, as we are the history of our actions and experiences, a history that continues to shape... (shrink)

The following article investigates the hybridity of narrative identity. It explores how idem-identity and the ipse-identity interrelate through time and otherness and illustrates the process of self’s reflexive re-cognition via others. It posits that narrative identity encompasses both private and public dimensions, requiring a co-authorship that integrates collective identities. This article argues for an ethical dimension to this identity, emphasizing the reciprocal movement between self and other. It introduces the concept of followability, which involves reconstructing narratives in a resonance (...) relationship, fostering narrative hospitality and mutual transformation. The study concludes by proposing an eschatological perspective as a horizon for followability, enhancing narrative refiguration through future-oriented imagination. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Discussions AGOSTINO NIFO'S EARLY VIEWS ON IMMORTALITY Various historians of Renaissance philosophy have taken some notice of the prolific author and important philosopher of the late 15th and early 16th centuries, Agostino Nifo (1470-1538), x but no one has yet studied his writings in a methodical and exhaustive fashion. 2 He not only published philosophical works in logic, physics, psychology and metaphysics, but he also authored treatises (...) on humanist topics? Recent scholars have tended to concentrate their attention on his psychological doctrines, no doubt because he was one of the major opponents of Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525) during the immortality controversy.4 Nifo published his De Immortalitate Animae in 1518 as a reply to the De lmmortalitate Ardmae, On the year of Nifo)s birth, see Bruno Nardi, Saggi sull'aristotelismo padovano dal secolo xav al xvl ('Florence, 1958), p. 284, n. 8. There is contemporary evidence that he died on January 18, 1538. See Bartolommeo Capasso, "Le cronache de li antiqui ri del regno di Napoli di D. Gaspare Fuscolill0," Archivio storico per le province napoletane, I (1876), p. 538. The standard bio-bibliography still remains Pasquale Tuozzi, "Agostino Nifo 9 le sue opere," Atti e memorie della R. Accademia di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti in Padova, Nuova scrie, XX (Padua, 1904), pp. 63-86. But see also Giuseppr Tommasino, Tra umanisti e filosoft (Maddaloni, 1921), Porte I, pp. 123-147; and Edward P. Mahoney, "A Note on Agostino Nifo," Philological Quarterly (forthcoming). z See Franeeseo Fiorentino, Pietro Pomponazzi; Studi storici su la scuola bolognese e padovana del secolo xvI (Florence, 1868); Carlo Giacon, La seconda scolastica: 1 grandi commentatori di San Tommaso (Milan, 1944); Etienne Gilson, "L'affaire de l'immortalit6 de l'fime ~t Venise at* d6but du xvIe si~ele," in Umanesirno europeo e uraanesimo veneziano, ed. Vittore Branea (Florence, 1963), pp. 31-61; Miehele Giorgiantonio, "Un nostro filosofo dimentieato dcl '400 (Luea Prassicio e Agostino Nifo)," Sophia, XVI (1948), pp. 212-214 and 303-312; Bruno Nardi, Saggi sulraristotelismo padovano dal secolo x]v al xvI (Florence, 1958); idem, Sigieri di Brabante nel pensiero del Rinascimento Italiano (Rome, 1945); Giovanni di NapoH, L'immortalitd delranima nel Rinascimento ('Turin, 1963); John Herman Randall, Jr., The School of Padua and the Emergence of Modern Science (Padua, 1961); Wilhelm Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit, I (Stuttgart, 1964); Eugenio Garin, La cultura [ilosofica del Rinascimento Italiano (Florence, 1961); idem, Storia della filosofia italiana, II (Turin, 1966). See Nifo's De Armorum Literarumque Comparatione Commentariolus (Naples, 1526); De Pulchro et Amore (Rome, 1531); De Re Aulica (Naples, 1534); and Prima Pars Opusculorum (Venice, 1535). The second of these works has been studied by Jules Houdoy, La beaut~ des femmes dans la litt#rature et darts rart du xII" au xvIe si~cle; Analyse du livre de A. Niphus du Beau et de l'amour (Paris, 1876). 4 For recent discussion of the immortality controversy, see Etienne Gilson, "Autour de Pomponazzi, ProbMmatique de l'immortalit~ de l'~me en Italic au d~but du xvIe si~.cle," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litt~raire du moyen dge, Ann6e 1961, pp. 163-179; Giovanni di Napoli, op. cit., especially pp. 227-338; Paul Oskar Kristeller, Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance (Stanford, 1964), pp. 72-90; Bruno Nardi, Studi su Pietro Pomponazzi (Florence, 1965); Martin Pine, "Pomponazzi and the Problem of 'Double Truth'," Journal ot the History of Ideas, XXIX (1968), pp. 163-176; Harold Shulsky, "Paduan Epistemology and the Doctrine of the One Mind," lournal of the History of Philosophy, VI (1968), pp. 341-361. [451] 452 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (1516) of Pomponazzi, who had argued that personal immortality cannot be philosophically demonstrated, s But while these scholars correctly point out that Nifo abandoned an Averroist interpretation of Aristotle concerning the unity of the intellect and the immortality of the soul for the position which they assume to be Thomistic, they are not precise as to just when Nile made the shift.6 They have not observed that in his first two printed works, namely, the commentary on Averroes' Destructio Destructionum (1497) and the early commentary on the De Anima (1503), Nifo explicitly accepts Averroes as the... (shrink)

What is the relationship of “strong evaluation” and self-identity? What exactly is personal identity? Does identity consist of interpretations or facts? Do strong evaluations have a constitutive role in identity-formation? If there is no given individual essence or true self waiting to be found, but identity is dialogically construed in self-interpretation, then can identities be criticized at all, when there is no pre-given true self, which would serve as the basis of criticism? I follow Charles Taylor in defending an interpretational (...) and evaluational conception of self-identity, but I hope to be more precise in distinguishing several meanings of “identity” and correspondingly several different roles that strong evaluation has for identity in different senses. Further, I try to show that identities are criticizable despite the lack of pre-given essences. I will first differentiate between various meanings of identity: idem-identity, ipse-identity, collective identity and species identity (4.1). Then I take a closer look at ipse-identity in four different meanings: practical identity, biographical identity, qualitative identity and “singularity” (4.2). This survey tries to capture the most important meanings of the concept, but the concept of identity is used in philosophy, social psychology and human sciences in so many different ways that a comprehensive survey is probably impossible. However, this survey may help to sort out what sense of identity is relevant for strong evaluation, or for what “identities” strong evaluations are crucial. Having distinguished these several meanings, I turn to the formation of identity in self-interpretations. Charles Taylor has been (wrongly) accused of presupposing a pre-political identity that persons or groups are supposed to have, and for which they want recognition. That would overlook the way in which identities are constituted dialogically, and in interpretations. I will defend the view that personal identity is a matter of self-interpretation, and collective identity is a matter of collective selfinterpretations. While dialogues and recognition by others plays a crucial role in the formation of one’s identity, the views of others are not directly constitutive of a person’s identity, unless the contents are known or accepted by the person herself. Being a person or a self is an active business. Having a self in a fullfledged sense means having a conception of oneself, and having conceptions is an active business. People don’t have beliefs like things have properties. As Sellars (1963) has stressed, the relation of two mental episodes has to be normative if it is to count as knowledge; it cannot be merely causal. And as the “transcendental tradition” from Kant onwards has stressed, being a subject is not merely a matter of having mental contents (which could possibly be caused by the world) but being aware of the reality, taking the mental contents to be about the world.144 In addition to normativity and intentionality, the activity of self-defining is one aspect of the spontaneous activity of the subject. One’s self-identity does not rest simply on having features, but on one’s activity, on identification with some actual or possible features. In this sense, everyone’s identity is self-made. The point in saying this is not to overlook the cultural and social mediations that are intertwined in this self-definition, but to stress the fact that one’s identity is not a matter of natural features. Self-identity is a tentative result of an ongoing process of self-interpretation. Depending on the precise meaning of self-identity, strong evaluation has a more or less central role (4.3). In the last section I ask whether identities can be criticized, or whether (in the absence of pre-given true selves) self-interpretations are the ultimate “court of appeal” not only in the sense of what constitutes identity, but also in questions about their ethical and existential worth, or coherence, or authenticity or epistemic adequacy. I hope to show that self-interpretations stand open for criticism in these respects, even though self-interpretations are directly constitutive of one’s identity (4.4). (shrink)

L'importance de l'herméneutique pour Ricoeur nous a fait sous estimer le rôle de la phénoménologie dans sa pensée. Une lecture attentive de son œuvre montre qu'au contraire, lorsqu'il s'agit de l'imagination, Ricoeur défend une perspective proprement phénoménologique. Celle-ci, esquissée par Ricoeur dans sa traduction française des Idem I, met en avant la capacité de neutralisation de l'imagination et se révèlera indispensable à sa philosophie de la volonté des années 1950-1960. Mais c'est dans les années 1970 que Ricoeur va développer (...) une ontologie sociale, que Luz Ascarate met en dialogue avec la nouvelle génération de la Théorie critique, autour du concept d'utopie. Cette ontologie est fondée sur une phénoménologie de l'imagination approfondie dans des textes encore inédits. Dans ces textes, Ricoeur montre que l'imagination est d'autant plus chargée d'implications ontologiques qu'elle est neutralisante et éloignée de la réalité empirique. Grâce au pouvoir ontologique de l'imagination pour la constitution de l'espace social, l'utopie peut constituer de nouvelles réalités sociales. (shrink)

Dans L’Homme faillible, Ricœur découvre, au cœur de l’homme, une faille. À cause d’elle, l’homme est fragile: il est fragile médiation de lui-même et du monde, médiation à faire et à refaire, au risque permanent de se défaire. C’est ainsi que l’homme fragile est aussi faillible. Dans Soi-même comme un autre, Ricœur revient sur cette faille qui passe au cœur de soi, entre l’idem et l’ipse, livrant accès à l’alter. Cette image, la faille, guide Ricœur dans chacun de ces (...) deux textes: elle nous donne accès à leur continuité mais aussi à l’écart qui les sépare. D’autre part, si cette image a inspiré l’œuvre de Ricœur, elle donne aussi de la critiquer: relisant la Symbolique du mal, nous mettrons en lumière une dimension de l’homme peu explorée par Ricœur et que notre actualité nous pousse à retrouver: le corps et le geste. (shrink)

Los elementos básicos sobre los que se asienta esta contribución son; Por un lado, el reconocimiento de las características básicas de los instrumentos de soft law y la apreciación de su desnaturalización. Y, por otro lado, el análisis del fenómeno expansivo del Derecho penal y su vinculación con la globalización y la sociedad del riesgo. Su análisis conjunto me permitirán determinar la efectiva incidencia del soft law en la expansión del Derecho penal, a la luz de lo sucedido en el (...) caso del autoblanqueo de capitales, que aunado a la tipificación de las conductas de utilizar y poseer, y siendo considerado como delito previo el fraude fiscal genera importantes quiebras en uno de los principios más básicos y elementales del Derecho penal del Estado de Derecho, esto es, el principio non bis in idem. (shrink)

Inhalt: O. Poggeler: Vorwort - Publikationen des Hegel-Archivs (Bochum) - Publications du Centre de Recherche et de Documentation sur Hegel et sur Marx (Poitiers) - G. Planty-Bonjour: In memoriam Claude Bruaire - Die Lehren der Geschichte: J. D'Hondt: Les lecons hegeliennes de l'histoire - N. Waszek: Weltgeschichte und Zeitgeschehen. Hegels Lekture des Globe - B. Bourgeois: Hegel et la deraison dans l'histoire - D. Souche-Dagues: La 'fierte' de l'Esprit - Dialektische Logik und Geschichtsmetaphysik: O. Poggeler: Geschichte, Philosophie und Logik bei (...) Hegel - K. Dusing: Dialektik und Geschichtsmetaphysik in Hegels Konzeption philosophiegeschichtlicher Entwicklung - G. Schmidt: Kausalitat oder Substantialitat? - Geschichte der Philosophie und logische Kategorien: M. Riedel: Erster und anderer Anfang. Hegels Bestimmung des Ursprungs und Grundes der griechischen Philosophie - B. Tuschling: Necessarium est idem simul esse et non esse. Zu Hegels Revision der Grundlagen von Logik und Metaphysik - Entwicklung, Geschichte der Philosophie und Evolution: P. Garniron: Hegels Geschichte der Philosophie der Moderne. Eine Untersuchung auf der Grundlage verschiedener Berliner Nachschriften - H.-Ch. Lucas: Kontinuitat, Einheit und das Neue. Uberlegungen zu Hegel und Thomas S. Kuhn - W. Bonsiepen: Der Zusammenhang von Naturrevolution und geschichtlicher Entwicklung in Hegels Berliner System - Anhang: Abkurzungen und Siglen - Literaturverzeichnis: H.-Ch. Lucas und N. Waszek. - Personenverzeichnis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE BARTH LEGACY: NEW ATHANASIUS OR ORIGEN REDIVIVUS? :A RESPONSE TO T. F. TORRANCE RICHARD A. MULLER Fuller Theological Semma1·y Pasadena, California I I N A SERIES of papers, essays, and introductions reaching back some twenty years, T. F. Torrance has provided an interpretation of the place arnd of the importance of Karl Barth not only in the theological debates of the twentieth cent- -bury but also and more (...) importantly in the who1e of the history of doctrine. According to Torrance, Barth is not only the greatest theologian since Schleiermacher and the most important thinker of our own times, he is also the greatest theologian since Athanasius, the heir of the Reformers, and the thinker on whose insights our theological future must rest.1 In these essays by Torrance, the characterization of Barthian thought as "neo1 Cf. Karl Barth, Theology and Church: Shorter Writings, 1920-1928, trans. Louise Pettibone Smith, with an introduction (1962) by T. F. Torrance (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 7, 9-10; T. F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction (London: SCJ'vf, 1965), pp. 99, 103-105, 111-115; idem, ReaUty and Evangelical Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1982),,pp. 14-15; idem, Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984), pp. vii-x, 279-283; idem, "The Legacy of Karl Barth (1886· 1986)," in Scottish Journal of Theology, 39 (1986): 289-308 and "Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy," in 39 (1986): 461-482. The latter two essays draw together themes from the earlier words..Although the term "Latin heresy" does not seem to have been used by Torrance in any of his previous writings, it does represent a continuation of the attack on medieval and postReformation theology :first presented in his introduction to The School of Faith: The Oatechisms of the Reformed Ohi1rch (N.Y.: Harper, 1959), pp. lxx-lxxix, and elaborated in Space, Time and IncM'nation (London: Oxford, 1969). 673 674 RICHARD A, MULLER orthodox" takes on a new meaning. Barth himself rejected the term, just as (we might guess) Calvin or Chemnitz would have!'ejected any claim that their great dogmatic projects were the proper basis for a new orthodoxy in the sixteenth century. Both Calvin and Chemnitz stood for right teaching, for ortho-doxy, but neither would have presented their own views-no matter how correct they believed their exegesis and interpretation to be-as a final ground for the establishment of future theological formulations. Both in the Reformation aind in the twentieth century, it has been the next generation, the generation of the students of the great teaicher, that has moved definitely from the system of the teaicher to the establishment of a new orthodoxy. And in all fairness to the Protestant orthodox of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we must l'ecognize that they neither exalted the theology of the Reformation to the status of a new orthodoxy (ovcer against the faith of the church throughout the centuries) nor identified any single theological system, whether that of Calvin or that of Chemnitz or of a later, more fully "orthodox" and "scholastic" thinker like Polanus or Gerhard, as an exhaustive statement of theological Ol1thodoxy for the chmch.2 In the writings of Torrance, we encounter this second-generation sense of orthodoxy but, I believe, without the caution characteristic of the Protestant orthodox of the seventeenth century. In the following essay, I propose to examine the origin and the subsequent trajectory of Torrance's views on Barth's relationship to the tradition, with attention to his view of Barth's patristic roots and of Barth's position over against the western theological mind. In the concluding sections of the essay, I will try to provide a corrective to Torrance's approach to the history of 1Christian doctrine and, on the basis of that correc-. tive, an alternative view of the lega1cy of Karl Barth. Torrance's pronouncements concerning the role of Barth in 2 Cf. Richard A. Muller, " Scholasticism Protestant and Catholic: Francis Turretin on the Object and Principles of Theology," in Ohuroh Historv, 55 ( 1986) ; 19::!-205, THE BARTH LEGACY 675 the history of Christian doctrine and, therefore, in its future development a11e based on an... (shrink)

Original: José Ortega y Gasset, „No ser hombre de partido”, w: idem, Obras completas, t. IV, 306–313. The consent for the translation and its publication was expressed by the heirs of Ortega, represented by Andreas Ortega Klein The essay „No ser hombre de partido” by José Ortega y Gasset was published for the first time in the Argentinian magazine La Nación. It has been divided into two parts. The first was published on May 15, 1930. The second was June (...) 3, 1930. The subject of reflection is the problem of “partisanism,” which is considered from two perspectives — metaphysical and social. The first one makes “partisanism” a manifestation of compensation, falsification of one’s being and lack of acceptance for one’s own vocation. The second one indicates that “partisanism” is a historical phenomenon, the beginning of which is the nineteenth century. Then, for the first time, society is understood as a permanent and eternal struggle. This requires as a consequence the constitution of fighting groups, called parties. Ortega, on the other hand, wants to overcome both versions of “partisanism.” Therefore, it is on the side of the authenticity of our individual life and independent of the party, ideas, feelings and values. (shrink)

The essay compares Ricœur’s and Levinas’s conceptions of the constitution of conscience in the sense of German Gewissen. Beginning with Ricœur’s basic distinction between “identity-idem” and “identity-ipse” it shows the proper place of conscience in his conception. For Ricœur conscience is a finite category of otherness as related to the self, i.e. its most interior, intrinsic otherness. For Levinas, on the other hand, conscience – the other in the same – is an initiatory category, which is described in terms (...) of absolute passivity, persecution and substitution. In conclusion Ricœur´s critique of Levinas’ category of “the Other” is examined on the background of Levinas’ conception of subjectivity as a vocation for Good. (shrink)