In this paper, I use Jonathan Haidt’s theory to explore an affective disposition that I call “indolent sympathy”. I argue that this disposition prevents a considerable group of human beings from showing solidarity with the millions of people who find themselves in conditions of poverty or extreme poverty. To demonstrate this, I will first present two dissimilar cases that show the type of affective disposition that I wish to submit to the reader’s consideration. Secondly, I will discuss the main characteristics (...) of this affective disposition. Thirdly, I will discuss the social intuitionist model, highlighting the aspects that will help me to account for indolent sympathy. Finally, I will read indolent sympathy in the light of Haidt’s theory and explain one of its most important features: brutality. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna of the Ratnamālāvadāna presents six key aspects of the development of Buddhist thought from the Pāli canon to the Sarvāstivāda tradition: childlessness, the arrival of a fetus through the propitiation of gods, presence of heretics, the impact of Buddha’s intervention and a child bodhisattva, soteriological elements of the story’s didactics, and the Buddha’s peculiar smile. These six key aspects were chosen to reflect and explore the content of Sarvāstivādin society and teachings concerning (...) its source narratives of the Kusīdāvadāna of Avadānaśataka and the Pāli canon. This helps us to understand the composition of Sarvāstivāda doctrine as recounted in the Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna, which varies from its source the Kusīdāvadāna of Avadānaśataka. It also aids in the identification of the avadāna and avadānamālā forms of Sarvāstivāda, as well as the impact of the Pāli canon and Brahmanical thought on them. The Kusīdāvadāna of Avadānaśataka, which is the source of the Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna and the Pāli canon, will be utilized to examine the six aspects of the societal and doctrinal development of the Buddhist thought of Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna. The final portion is the very first annotated translation of Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna based on Takahata’s 1954 original version. (shrink)

Chauncey Wright (1830–1874) was one of the first American philosophers to explore the implications of Charles Darwin's work in evolutionary biology. Wright became a strong supporter of the idea of natural selection and a strong critic of the anti-selectionist and teleological arguments of St. George Jackson Mivart and Herbert Spencer, and he laid the groundwork for the field that is today called evolutionary epistemology. As the mentor of the original Cambridge "Metaphysical Club" (William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Oliver Wendell (...) Holmes, Jr.), Wright was also instrumental in the development of the American school of Pragmatism. Although his analytical brilliance was widely acknowledged, he never became professionally successful, and he died in 1874 in his 45th year. (shrink)

Are the small and indolent cancers found in abundance in cancer screening normal variations, risk factors, or disease? Naturalists in philosophy of medicine turn to pathophysiological findings to decide such questions objectively. To understand the role of pathophysiological findings in disease definition, we must understand how they mislead in diagnostic reasoning. Participants on all sides of the definition of disease debate attempt to secure objectivity via reductionism. These reductivist routes to objectivity are inconsistent with the Bayesian nature of clinical reasoning; (...) when they appeal to the sciences, they are inconsistent with what philosophy of biology tells us about its natural kinds. Proposals that we narrow the scope of our claims in the disease definition debates are useful, but paradigms can still distort our reasoning in particular cases, even when we are self-conscious about their status. (shrink)

Current practices of identifying and treating small indolent thyroid cancers constitute an important but in some ways unusual form of overdiagnosis. Overdiagnosis refers to diagnoses that generally harm rather than benefit patients, primarily because the diagnosed condition is not a harmful form of disease. Patients who are overdiagnosed with thyroid cancer are harmed by the psycho-social impact of a cancer diagnosis, as well as treatment interventions such partial or total thyroidectomy, lifelong thyroid replacement hormone, monitoring, surgical complications and other side (...) effects. These harms seem to outweigh any putative benefit of knowing about a cancer that would not have caused problems if left undiscovered. In addition to harms to patients, thyroid cancer overdiagnosis leads to significant opportunity costs at a societal level, due to costs of diagnosis and treatment. Unlike many other overdiagnosed cancers, accurate risk stratification is possible with thyroid cancer. At the individual patient level, use of this risk information might support informed choice and/or shared decision-making, as mandated by clinical ethics frameworks. And this approach might, to some extent, help to reduce rates of diagnosis and intervention. In practice, however, it is unlikely to stem the rising incidence and associated harms and costs of overdiagnosed thyroid cancer, especially in situations where health professionals have conflicts of interest. We argue in this article that thyroid cancer overdiagnosis may be usefully understood as a public health problem, and that some public health approaches will be readily justifiable and are more likely to be effective in minimising its harms. (shrink)

Pedro Abelardo apresenta na sua obra uma teoria da virtude de natureza, à primeira vista, aristotélica. Ao que parece, essa concepção também contém diferentes elementos estoicos, que não se opõem necessariamente à visão do Estagirita. Todavia, o essencial da interpretação da Escola do Pórtico acerca da virtude difere da explicação dada por Aristóteles. No presente estudo, pretendemos examinar, primeiro, a índole da virtude como habitus na obra de lógica de Abelardo. Nesse caso, não há dúvida de que predomina a influência (...) aristotélica. Em seguida, indicamos outras particularidades da virtude encontradas, desta vez, em tratados éticos e teológicos do nosso protagonista, as quais se revelam antes de caráter estoico. Em suma, projetamos identificar as diferentes fontes antigas e os principais intermediários latinos usados por Abelardo para elaborar a sua própria teoria da virtude. Trata-se de deixar clara a influência filosófica dominante em Abelardo sobre essa questão da virtude, já que este lógico não pode harmonizar teses substancialmente inconciliáveis. Peter Abelard in his work presents a theory of virtue, which is, at first sight, of Aristotelian nature. It seems that this view also contains different Stoic elements, but they are not necessarily opposed to Stagirite's vision. However, the essentials of the Stoa School about virtue differ from the explanation given by Aristotle. In this paper, we intend to examine, first, the nature of virtue as habitus in Abelard's work on logic. In this case, there is no doubt that Aristotle's influence on this topic predominates. Next, we specify other features related to virtue found, this time, in ethical and theological treatises of our protagonist that appear to be basically Stoic. In short, we want to identify the different ancient sources and the main Latin mediators used by Abelard to elaborate his own theory of virtue. In other words, we would like to shed light on the predominant philosophical authority on Abelard's theory of virtue since this logician cannot harmonize theses that are fundamentally irreconcilable. (shrink)

Ana Escoto (El Salvador, 1984) es economista y doctora en Estudios de Población, radicada en la ciudad de México, donde se dedica a la investigación y la docencia. No obstante, su alma se encamina a la narrativa breve y a la poesía. Perteneció en 2006-2007 al taller literario La Casa del Escritor, dirigido por Rafael Menjívar Ochoa. En narrativa ha publicado el libro de cuentos cortos “Menguantes y Otras Creaturas” (Dirección de Publicaciones e Impresos, 2008), así como ha contribuido con (...) la antología “Memorias de la Casa – Narrativa” (Índole Editores, 2012), y con el proyecto de narrativa erótica “Cuerpos” (FyG Editores, 2015). También formó parte del proyecto bilingüe “Vanishing Points/Puntos de fuga” (Kalina, 2017) y ha participado en la antología internacional seleccionada por María Farazdel [Palitachi], “Voces de América Latina – Fictio – III” (Media Isla, 2016). Algunos de sus poemas han sido publicados en antologías en El Salvador como “Nuevas Voces Femeninas en El Salvador” (Universidad de El Salvador, 2009), “Memorias de la Casa – Poesía” (Índole Editores, 2010) y “Voces del Extremo” (2006) en Huelva, España, también está indizada en el “Segundo índice antológico de la poesía salvadoreña” (Vladimir Amaya, Índole Editores, 2014). En esta ocasión, la Revista Ístmica comparte dos cuentos de la autoría de Ana Escoto con nuestro público lector. (shrink)

Mi problema es como reconciliar una fundamentación racional de instituciones democráticas, que en nuestras sociedades tienden a ser de índole liberal, con la creciente complejidad demográfica de las sociedades contemporáneas. Mi punto de vista es que esta fundamentación debería ser deliberativa y discursiva, es decir, debería garantizar una participación reflexiva de todos los ciudadanos en el diseño y sostenimiento de sus instituciones públicas. Ahora bien, ¿cómo alcanzar este ideal en sociedades cuyas complejidades dificultan la coordinación de intereses y la participación (...) discursiva, lo que vuelve a sus ciudadanos dispuestos a sacrificar sus libertades para rendirlas a un poder político despótico y totalitario? Palabras claves: instituciones democráticas y sociedades complejas; democracia deliberativa. The constitution of democratic citizenship and the problem of the foundation of knowledge in complex societiesMy problem is how to reconcile a rational foundation of democratic institutions, which in our societies tend to be of a liberal nature, with the increasing demographic complexity of contemporary societies. My contention is that this rational and liberal foundation ought to be deliberative and discursive, that is to say, it must guarantee a reflective participation of all citizens in the design and maintenance of their public institutions. However, how could this ideal be achieved within societies with such complexities that make coordination of interests and discursive participation difficult, thus making their citizens willing to sacrifice their liberties, in order to surrender them to a despotic or totalitarian political power? Keywords: Democratic institutions and complex societies; Deliberative democracy. (shrink)

Resumen: Entre 1842 y 1870, la narrativa chilena presenta un paulatino proceso de desarrollo que oscila entre la novela -cuando no el cuento- y el folletín. Lastarria califica su cuento “El mendigo” como “novela histórica”. A su vez, Alberto Blest Gana luego de publicar folletines en diversos periódicos de la época toma nítida distancia de ese tipo de “novela popular cuando en 1862 reflexiona acerca de la novela propiamente tal y al declarar -en 1864- que solo pretende ser un novelista (...) al estilo de Balzac. No obstante, el folletín de filiación europea presentará -hacia 1870- una precisa fórmula como es la denominada “novela indiana” que critica Zorobabel Rodríguez. Por lo mismo, proponemos que en las instancias fundacionales de la narrativa nacional se anticipa la tendencia de recurrir al folletín poniendo de relieve el motivo del amor imposible que no puede superar obstáculos de diversa índole, sean ellos sentimentales, estamentales, políticos o historiográficos. Nuestra hipótesis es que en el curso de la novela chilena liberal, de sello romántico sentimental, esta estructura modélica no es ajena a la narrativa nacional, hecho que permite dar curso a la narración -entre otros- de acontecimientos propios de la conquista, la independencia y la República.: Between 1842 and 1870, the Chilean narrative presents a gradual development process that oscillates between the novel -if not the short story- and the folletin. Lastarria describes his story “El mendigo” as an “historical novel”. At the same time, Alberto Blest Gana wins after publishing brochures in various newspapers of the time, he takes a clear distance from that type of "popular novel” when in 1862 he reflects on the novel itself and in declaring -in 1864- that it only pretends to be a Balzac-style novelist. However, the European affiliation booklet will present -by 1870- a precise formula such as the so-called “Indian novel” criticized by Zorobabel Rodríguez. For the same reason, we propose that in the foundational instances of the national narrative the tendency to resort to the newsletter is anticipated, highlighting the reason for impossible love that cannot overcome obstacles of various kinds, whether they are sentimental, social class, political or historiographic. Our hypothesis is that in the course of the liberal Chilean novel, with a sentimental romantic stamp, this model structure is no stranger to the national narrative, a fact that allows the narration -among others- of events of the conquest, independence and the Republic. (shrink)

The secondary vascular tissues (xylem and phloem) of woody plants originate from a vascular cambium and develop as radially oriented files of cells. The secondary phloem is composed of three or four cell types, which are organised into characteristic recurrent cellular sequences within the radial cell files of this tissue. There is a gradient of auxin (indole acetic acid) across both the cambium and the immediately postmitotic cells within the xylem and phloem domains, and it is believed that this morphogen, (...) probably in concert with other morphogenic factors, is closely associated with the determination and differentiation of the different cells types in each tissue. A hypothesis is developed that, in conjunction with the positional values conferred by the graded radial distribution of morphogen, cell divisions at particular positions within the cambium are sufficient to determine not only each of the phloem cell types but also their recurrent pattern of differentiation within each radial cell file. BioEssays 27: 533–541, 2005. © 2005 Wiley periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Este número de Análisis Filosófico, como el anterior, presenta trabajos elaborados en homenaje a Eugenio Bulygin, la mayoría de los cuales fueron presentados en el Seminario organizado por la Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico en octubre de 2012. Habida cuenta que en ese material se discuten tópicos de las más diversa índole, se ha optado por incluirlos en los dos números siguiendo el orden alfabético de sus autores.

RESUMEN Este artículo se ocupa de la doctrina del reconocimiento que Hobbes dejó claramente insinuada a lo largo de sus escritos políticos. Para ello, aborda la exposición sistemática del canon de "leyes naturales" que elaborara Hobbes en obras como Elementos de Derecho Natural y Político, Tratado sobre el Ciudadano y Leviatán. Nuestra tesis de fondo es que la exposición de estas leyes, llamadas también por Hobbes "leyes morales", lleva al autor a postular la idea de que la "igualdad natural" de (...) los hombres, por la cual entiende la igualdad de derechos, no ya la igualdad de poder, solo se ve asegurada en la medida en que los individuos se reconozcan intersubjetivamente como portadores de los mismos derechos que, en tanto que hombres, les pertenecen. La tesis señalada pretende evidenciar que, contrario a lo que expone la lectura tradicional de Hobbes, que se concentra en la índole absolutista del poder, Hobbes remonta la posibilidad misma de la vida civil y política, no ya a mediación del Estado absoluto y su poder coercitivo, sino al reconocimiento intersubjetivo de los derechos, el cual obtiene su fuerza normativa de la conciencia moral de cada hombre. Este artículo se propone mostrar que con su postulado Hobbes logra esbozar una protomoral del reconocimiento que repercutiría en el discurso filosófico de la modernidad. Este propósito es uno con el de mostrar las dificultades, las tensiones y los límites del planteamiento hobbesiano. ABSTRACT This paper deals with the doctrine of recognition that Hobbes clearly implied throughout his political writings. To this end, it deals with the systematic exposition of the canon of "natural laws" that Hobbes elaborated in works such as Elements of Natural and Political Law, Treatise on the Citizen and the Leviathan. Our underlying thesis is that the exposition of these laws, also called "moral laws" by Hobbes, leads the author to postulate the idea that the "natural equality" of men, by which he understands equality of rights, not equality of power, is only assured to the extent that individuals are intersubjectively recognized as bearers of the same rights that, as men, belong to them. This thesis seeks to show that, contrary to the traditional reading of Hobbes, which concentrates on the absolutist nature of power, Hobbes traces the very possibility ofcivil and political life, not to the mediation of the absolute State and its coercive power, but to the intersubjective recognition of rights, which obtains its normative force from the moral conscience of each man. The present article intends to show that with its postulate, Hobbes manages to outline a protomoral of recognition, which would not remain without repercussion in the philosophical discourse of modernity. This purpose is one with the one to show the difficulties, the tensions and the limits of the Hobbesian approach. (shrink)

Según una historia estándar, devenida habitual especialmente por influencia del pensamiento heideggeriano, la filosofía occidental se encuentra atrapada en la trampa de la metafísica. La trampa de la metafísica centra la crítica a la metafísica en torno a la tesis según la cual el esencialismo y una concepción de la verdad condicionada por él determinan qué significa “ser” o “existencia”. Detrás de la realidad se supone un fundamento que bajo la forma de un “trasmundo” (Hinterwelt) produce una manifestación cuasi-causal, a (...) saber: el “mundo” (Welt), el cual se deja con ello concebir como la aparición del ser que se ha retraído en sí mismo. La diferencia entre ser y apariencia mantiene al pensamiento metafísico atrapado, en la medida en que éste no es capaz de reconocer esa diferencia misma como una apariencia. En Siete ensayos sobre la muerte de la metafísica, Héctor Ferreiro ofrece frente a esta historia estándar una convincente contrahistoria. Esta contrahistoria tiene su punto de partida en Hegel, quien intenta, de modo opuesto a la lectura propuesta por Heidegger, superar a la metafísica con sus propios medios y sepultarla a partir de su propia dinámica interna. Precisamente a esta superación está dedicado el debate y discusión de Hegel con el argumento ontológico. Como Kant, Hegel ve en el argumento ontológico uno de los centros operacionales de la metafísica clásica. La cuestión es, pues, cómo abordar el argumento ontológico del modo correcto desde un punto de vista crítico a la metafísica. La estrategia que ofrece Hegel consiste, como lo expone Ferreiro, en desenmascarar la distinción misma entre el ser y la apariencia producida por él como una operación de tipo conceptual. Según Hegel, la metafísica ha sido desde siempre el intento por desarrollar una teoría de la totalidad. Pero una teoría de la totalidad que coloca al ser de un lado y a su aparición del otro lado de un límite no advierte su propia operación, dado que el trazado de un límite pertenece él mismo a la teoría de la totalidad. De lo que se trata, pues, es de examinar los trazados de límite constitutivos de la metafísica para reconocerlos como productos de la reflexión y no como hechos dados que el pensamiento tan sólo debe reflejar. El movimiento de autosuperación de la metafísica que culmina en la discusión de Kant y Hegel con el argumento ontológico pertenece ya, sin embargo, a la tradición de la metafísica. Como lo muestra Ferreiro, la metafísica está a más tardar a partir de la distinción medieval entre esencia y existencia en proceso de superarse a sí misma, pues ya Tomás de Aquino logra reconocer en dicha distinción la verdadera fuente de la producción del mundo. Tomás persiste aún, sin embargo, en una concepción sustancialista, en la medida en que considera a la distinción entre esencia y existencia como un hecho in-dependiente de la teoría y del sujeto. Sin embargo, esa distinción es una operación conceptual y no un objeto que se encuentra en el mundo. En esta medida, la tesis de la distinción de razón entre ambas categorías se presenta como un indicador de la reflexión de la metafísica sobre sí misma. Ferreiro demuestra que el célebre comienzo de la Cien-cia de la Lógica de Hegel significa precisamente una profundización y radicalización de esa autorreflexión. Ahora bien, a ojos de Hegel el ser del comienzo de la Lógica es en sí mismo como tal el resultado del argumento ontológico; en su formulación clásica, sin embargo, el argumento ontológico sólo aspira a probar que hay algo (Dios), pero el argumento mismo no es como tal capaz de determinar ulteriormente ese algo –esto constituye justamente la tarea de la ontología en el sentido de Hegel, es decir, la tarea de la Lógica. Así, lo que podría denominarse en Hegel una “metafísica” es expresamente una crítica a la metafísica tradicional. En efecto, la ontología que Hegel propone en modo alguno significa una recaída en la metafísica anterior a Kant; por el contrario, en la filosofía de Hegel metafísica y crítica a la metafísica se vinculan íntimamente y con ello se cierra un círculo que se había abierto en la metafísica teológica de la Edad Media: precisamente que este movimiento estaba contenido ya programáticamente en la ontología de la distinción entre esencia y existencia es algo que Ferreiro analiza en forma clara y meticulosa. En cuanto disciplina, la ontología está hoy nuevamente en el centro de la atención de la reflexión filosófica a nivel mundial. Siete ensayos sobre la muerte de la metafísica no sólo ofrece en este respecto un análisis de índole histórica; es también una importante contribución teórica al actual retorno a la ontología. (shrink)

Edith Stein no concibe la pedagogía sin tener en cuenta sus fundamentos antropológicos y éticos. Su anhelo por ver encarnada a la filosofía en su realidad personal la llevó a dedicarse fecundamente a la educación en el ámbito católico, del cual ya era parte activa. De la antropología integral de Edith Stein se desprende como consecuencia una pedagogía de la misma índole. Stein considera como misión de la educación llevar al hombre al desarrollo integral de las potencias del entendimiento, afecto (...) (Gemüt) y voluntad, fortaleciendo a cada una del modo en que le corresponde, sobre la base de una educación del cuerpo. Denomina «formación» (Bildung) al «proceso o trabajo mediante el cual la disposición anímica se configura en orden a una imagen formada», que debe realizarse en la naturaleza dada. Stein hace hincapié en que la educación se debe ejercer sin perder de vista que el ser humano, a medida que va madurando, despierta a la libertad espiritual para ganar autonomía; gracias a su libre voluntad puede él mismo trabajar en su formación, puede ejercer libremente sus fuerzas, puede abrirse a los influjos educativos o cerrarse a ellos. Así, sobre la base de la naturaleza y de la libertad humanas, el objetivo de una sana tarea educativa consiste en llevar al individuo a su pleno desarrollo personal. (shrink)

En el siglo XVII la monja concepcionista sor María Jesús de Ágreda y el monarca español Felipe IV iniciaron una correspondencia epistolar en la que trataron cuestiones filosóficas y políticas de diversa índole. Este artículo analiza la aplicación que llevaron a cabo de los conceptos filosóficos de “guerra justa” y “razón de Estado” con el fin de salvaguardar una monarquía católica ya en declive.

O presente artigo tem como objetivo apresentar os elementos constitutivos da arquitetura literária de Saramago. Através do método epistemologia do romance em diálogo com o materialismo-dialético, abordaremos cinco conceitos: o Iluminismo, de Immanuel Kant; o Contemporâneo, de Giorgio Agamben; a Teoria Crítica, que decorre de Karl Marx e da Escola de Frankfurt; o Ensaio, de Theodor Adorno e o Narrador, pensado pelo Walter Benjamin. A relevância deste estudo está na suma importância de afirmar em tese o posicionamento de teórico crítico (...) do autor José Saramago, tendo em vista as afinidades estruturais do narrador saramaguiano com uma linguagem de índole marxista, política, ética e filosófica. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Edmund Burke and His Critics: The Case of Mary WollstonecraftJames ConniffA number of interesting questions concerning the development of English political thought in the French Revolutionary period remain matters of controversy. In this essay I propose to consider two of them: why did the Whigs split on the Revolution, and why and how did some of the disaffected Whigs reconcile with Edmund Burke. Various answers have been suggested. The (...) currently dominant position was first articulated some years ago when J. G. A. Pocock suggested that the revolutionary debate was largely a struggle between Whig ancient constitutionalists, Burke among them, and a republican alliance of disciples of Harrington and Machiavelli. 1 In his Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism Isaac Kramnick disagreed, arguing that the late eighteenth-century radicals should be seen as Lockeans pursuing “a new Liberal ideal, a society of achievement, a social order of competitive individualism in which social mobility was possible and the rightful reward for ingenious people of talent and hard work” was economic success crowned by wealth. 2 In his view English society was then characterized by a struggle in which the middle class, led by religious Dissenters, was rising to challenge the domination of the existing economic and political elite. For Kramnick such figures as Joseph Priestley, Thomas Paine, and Richard Price were advocates for this class, and their political theories represented its ideology. 3 According to Kramnick, these writers were intent on creating a practical science which could be used to promote the happiness of mankind through reform of the political system. Intent on rewarding merit, the radicals advocated the virtues of commercial civilization and [End Page 299] opposed the lazy indolence of both rich and poor. 4 Other scholars have followed Kramnick’s lead and sought to expand the reach of his thesis. In a recent biography of Paine, Jack Fruchtman treated Paine as a civic humanist, a radical critic of English society, and a defender of commercial republics. 5 Similarly, Joyce Appleby and Drew McCoy have employed republicanism to explain American politics in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. 6It seems to me that the focus on the radical Whig’s critique of Edmund Burke is indeed a good place to start. In the preface to the English edition of The Rights of Man Paine maintained that “from the part Mr. Burke took in the American Revolution, it was natural that I should consider him a friend to mankind... but no sooner did he see the old prejudices wearing away, than he immediately began sowing the seeds of a new inveteracy, as if he were afraid that England and France would cease to be enemies.” 7 In Paine’s view Burke and his allies among the Old Whigs were simply hypocrites. They supported reform, he said, only when it benefitted themselves. Intent on their own self-interest, they could never admit that, “it is to a nation that the right of forming or reforming, generating or regenerating constitutions and governments belong;... those subjects... are always before a country as a matter of right....” 8 Yet as James Boulton has suggested, Paine actually spoke for only a relatively small segment of Burke’s critics. 9 Other more moderate Whigs like Philip Francis and James Mackintosh disagreed with Paine while also rejecting Burke’s violent rhetoric and what they perceived as his opposition to all reform. Over the course of the controversy these moderates maintained contact with Burke, argued respectfully with him, and often continued to work with him on other issues. Moreover, Burke and at least some of his critics shared a common commitment to progress achieved by gradual reform within a context of social stability. Where they differed most was in two areas of subordinate theoretical concern. First, within the common framework of progress, they debated matters of detail, timing, and pace. Second, they disagreed on a number of specific issues which involved such concepts as human nature, equality, the degree of flexibility within the social system, and the value of education, associated with progress. It is, I believe, the disagreement on these subordinate issues which [End Page 300] explains the Whig split. Their limited reconciliation followed in turn... (shrink)

Nineteenth-century psychiatrists ascribed to a model of health that was predicated on the existence of objective and strictly defined laws of nature. The allegedly “natural” rules governing the production of consumption of food, however, were structured by a set of distinctively bourgeois moral values that demonized over-indulgence and intemperance, encouraged self-discipline and productivity, and treated gentility as an index of social worth. Accordingly, the asylum acted not only as a therapeutic instrument but also as a moral machine that was designed (...) to remake lazy, indolent transgressors into useful, “decorous” citizens. Because the theory and mechanics underlying this machine seemed straightforward and self-evident to psychiatrists, they were confounded when the asylum failed to translate its ideals into reality. While psychiatrists tended to blame this failure on the intractable immorality and weakness of individual patients, particularly paupers and immigrants, a review of the various meanings and uses of food in the hospital reveals the fault lines that ran through the asylum’s ideological structure. (shrink)

A contribution to the sixth installment of the Common Knowledge symposium “Apology for Quietism,” this article explores the possibilities for quietist narrative. Since quietism suggests resistance or condescension to telos, suspense, will, and the kinds of spirituality, politics, and ways of being associated with them, it seems unlikely that a narrative would be written or read by a practitioner of “ideal indifference” or by anyone averse on principle to initiative. But Gilbert White's text of 1789, The Natural History and Antiquities (...) of Selborne comes as close to being a quietist narrative as is conceivable. Describing the environment of a single English parish, White's text places stillness on exhibit as an indication of commitment to an ethics of self-unregarding attentiveness. But the stillness of Selborne, King argues, is a conspicuous stillness—a practice of being still in face of the natural world. As an Anglican minister, White explicitly demonstrates the arguments of eighteenth-century natural theology. Having stilled his will to interfere, he can observe the activity of God's creations; and White does so in order to understand God better. Thus, White's desisting or withdrawal is in no way based in defeatism, indolence, or aimlessness. Moreover, King argues, White aims to produce stillness as a formal quality of his text and, through it, to produce a like stillness and attentiveness in the reader. Quietist narrative is meant to help the reader still his or her acquisitiveness and develop instead observational capabilities, a capacity simply to admire (or stand apart, in awe), and, above all, patience. To the extent that it fosters in us a principled “do nothing” stance with respect to our natural ecology, King concludes, quietism of Gilbert White's kind may represent the most radical of environmental politics. (shrink)

Nuestra intención en este artículo es exponer la concepción berkeleyana entorno al tan debatido problema de la filosofía de la modernidad que concierne a la relación, conocimiento y exterioridad. Éste constituye, en efecto, núcleo esencial de las filosofías de autores tan representativos de la época como Locke, Hume, Condillac y el propio Berkeley, entre otros. No obstante, la singularidad del planteamiento berkeleyano al respecto es tal, que bien merece por nuestra parte una reflexión antenta y por separado. Además, la influencia (...) que su aportación peculiar ejerció sobre determinados filósofos, como, por ejemplo, Condillac y Kant, y a través de ellos sobre buena parte de la filosofía posterior fue de tal índole, que sin el cabal conocimiento de ella no podría entenderse la relevancia y significación del idealismo gnoseológico en sus diferentes tipos y modalidades. En una primera sección, meramente introductoria, acometemos la exposición de la metafísica de Berkeley, destacándose sobre todo su teoría del inmaterialismo ; con ello se pretende subrayar en principio el carácter peculiar que forzosamente habrá de presentar su concepción de lo externo. El tratamiento de ésta constituye propiamente el contenido de la segunda sección, en la que, además de la identificación entre contenido sensible y realidad y de la apelación a la instancia divina como garante último de ésta, se destaca el papel preponderante que desempeña el sentido del tacto en el proceso de aprehensión de la exterioridad. (shrink)

La cuestión de la justicia global en el ámbito de la bioética no es una cuestión baladí, en ella nos jugamos la dignidad a escala planetaria y la dignidad de todos y cada uno de los seres humanos en particular. El paradigma para pensar el mundo ya no es la confrontación Este-Oeste, ni incluso Norte-Sur. Los problemas, con sus posibilidades y limitaciones en la forma de abordarlos, tienen dimensiones globales. Urge una rearticulación de los discursos parcelados y compartimentados pues, desde (...) ellos, resulta extremadamente difícil seguir abordando las cuestiones que afectan a la vida descontextualizándolas del entorno global. En la misma medida tampoco se puede pensar apropiadamente la justicia sin las condiciones práctico-materiales concretas que, a nivel vital, vienen determinadas por el factum de lo global. Ni se puede abordar una ética de la vida y para la vida sin atender a referencias globales y criterios de justicia. Todo ello plantea un nuevo esquema en el que la tríada vida-globalidad-justicia ha de ser abordada también desde la Bioética Teológica. O, lo que es lo mismo, la Teología Moral no puede prescindir hoy de esa triple conexión emergente so pena de que traicione su propio estatuto de servicio. La intención de fondo en todo ello no es sino estimular la búsqueda, el diálogo y la cooperación de los bioeticistas, tanto de índole secular como teológica, en la tarea ineludiblemente humana de cuidar la fragilidad vital en todas sus dimensiones. Francisco J. Alarcos Martínez, nacido en 1963 en Cúllar (Granada), terminó los estudios de Teología en la Facultad de Teología de Granada (1986). Licenciado en Teología moral (1999) por la U. P. Comillas (Madrid), con premio extraordinario, realiza el Máster en Bioética en la misma Universidad. Se doctoró en la Facultad de Teología de Granada (2004) en la cual es profesor de Bioética y secretario de la Cátedra Andaluza de Bioética, dependiente de la misma Facultad. Además, es director del Centro de Estudios Teológico-Pastorales de Guadix (Granada) y profesor de moral en el mismo. Interviene también como profesor invitado en diversos Máster, así como en cursos monográficos sobre Bioética. Entre sus publicaciones se encuentran: Para vivir la ética en la vida pública (2000), Bioética y pastoral de la salud (2002), Co-autor de 10 palabras clave en humanizar la salud (2002), Ed. de La moral cristiana como propuesta. Homenaje al profesor Eduardo López Azpitarte (2004). Su dedicación académica la compagina con la praxis pastoral como presbítero secular en la diócesis de Guadix-Baza. (shrink)

Se fundamenta una concepción sistémica de las contradicciones a tener en cuenta en la investigación educativa, en la que se incluyen las de esencia lógico formal y las de índole dialéctica . Se trabajó con métodos propios del nivel teórico del conocimiento para sistematizar información proveniente de la bibliografía consultada y de las experiencias en la formación de doctores en Pedagogía registradas por el autor. Se ofrecen pautas metodológicas básicas para valorar las contradicciones develadas al comunicar los resultados científicos. A (...) systemic conception of the contradictions to keep in mind in the educational investigations is presented. In this general understanding the contradiction type logical - formal and of dialectical nature are included. Methods of the theoretical level of the knowledge were utilized to systematize information coming from the consulted bibliography and of experiences in Ph. D. in Pedagogy tuition, registered by the author. Some basic methodological rules are offered to value the devalued contradictions when communicating the scientific results. (shrink)

Los conflictos de interés, al distribuir recursos en salud, necesitan ser esclarecidos y normados por el principio de justicia, que puede especificarse en términos de equidad, utilidad y ver por los más vulnerables. De esta manera, se propicia que el distribuidor de recursos, en los asuntos distributivos, priorice el interés público sobre los de otra índole, evitando situaciones en las que se favorece la parcialidad en la implantación de políticas distributivas o en la elección entre pacientes que han de recibir (...) un recurso escaso, sobre todo en países como México, en los que impera una gran injusticia social concretada en varias determinantes sociales de la salud. Este artículo pretende ofrecer principios esclarecedores en materia de justicia sobre asuntos distributivos en la salud. (shrink)

Uno studio filosofico sull’etica è sempre di grande attualità. E in questo «dappertutto vi circola la passione per la verità e per il bene» (dalla Presentazione di Carmelo Vigna). Mai come oggi si parla di salute e di benessere, probabilmente perché si percepisce la mancanza di entrambi. In Occidente è così. L’etica si affaccia alla riflessione umana rivestita con i panni di un’etica filosofica, prima ancora che ulteriormente aggettivata, essendo una terminologia che rimanda, come è risaputo, ad Aristotele. Con «etica» (...) si intende oggi quel confine oltre cui non si può più andare, discutere, transigere, indagare: per questo – e correttamente – si parla rispettivamente di «confini etici», «indole etica » o non, «bioetica», «decisione etica», «comportamento etico» e così via. In qualche modo con «etica» si intende ciò che si impone ancor più della scienza o della decisione democratica. L’«etica» pone in questione il baluardo sollevato proprio da queste ultime due. Sanando la questione. Il modo, talvolta, sfugge, diventando, così, ambito proprio della filosofia e della sua visione interale. Questa è esattamente l’etica filosofica. Questo libro affronta temi di grande importanza e fascinosi, quali il bene, il male, la bontà, la crudeltà, la ragione, il sentimento, il «senso morale», la coscienza, la responsabilità, la Stato e la nazione. (shrink)

Nel contesto della discussione medievale sulla scientificità della teologia, uno dei temi particolarmente studiati dall’epistemologia teologica è quello della qualità speculativa o pratica della teologia. Su questo aspetto, la tradizione francescana ha sviluppato la tendenza ad assegnare alla teologia un carattere, se non assolutamente pratico, quantomeno intermedio tra speculativo e pratico, ma certamente caratterizzato da un’indole affettiva. L’iniziatore di questa specificazione pratica dell’abito teologico quale «scientia movens affectionem ad bonitatem» può essere certamente identificato in Alessandro di Hales. Il mio intento (...) consiste qui nel documentare tale attribuzione in una delle sue forme, accostando i testi di uno tra i più autorevoli maestri francescani del xiv secolo: Pietro Aureolo. Ne sarà esaminata la proposta studiando i passaggi relativi al tema rintracciabili nello Scriptum e nella Reportatio. In the Medieval debate on the scientificity of Theology, one of the themes particularly studied by theological Epistemology is its speculative or practical quality. On this issue the Franciscan Tradition has developed an aptitude to give Theology a character, if not absolutely practical, at least intermediate between speculative and practical, but certainly marked by an affective peculiarity. Of course the author who started this practical specification of the theological habit as «scientia movens affectionem ad bonitatem» can be identified as Alexander of Hales. My purpose here is to document a model of this attribution approaching some texts of one of the most influential Franciscan Masters of the Fourteenth Century: Pietro Aureolo. I am going to examine his proposal by studying excerpts related to the theme in the Scriptum and Reportatio. (shrink)

We think of the Enlightenment as an era dominated by ideas of progress, production, and industry--not an era that favored the lax and indolent individual. But was the Enlightenment only about the unceasing improvement of self and society? The Pursuit of Laziness examines moral, political, and economic treatises of the period, and reveals that crucial eighteenth-century texts did find value in idleness and nonproductivity. Fleshing out Enlightenment thinking in the works of Denis Diderot, Joseph Joubert, Pierre de Marivaux, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, (...) and Jean-Siméon Chardin, this book explores idleness in all its guises, and illustrates that laziness existed, not as a vice of the wretched, but as an exemplar of modernity and a resistance to beliefs about virtue and utility. Whether in the dawdlings of Marivaux's journalist who delayed and procrastinated or in the subjects of Chardin's paintings who delighted in suspended, playful time, Pierre Saint-Amand shows how eighteenth-century works provided a strong argument for laziness. Rousseau abandoned his previous defense of labor to pursue reverie and botanical walks, Diderot emphasized a parasitic strategy of resisting work in order to liberate time, and Joubert's little-known posthumous Notebooks radically opposed the central philosophy of the Enlightenment in a quest to infinitely postpone work. Unsettling the stubborn view of the eighteenth century as an age of frenetic industriousness and labor, The Pursuit of Laziness plumbs the texts and images of the time and uncovers deliberate yearnings for slowness and recreation. Some images inside the book are unavailable due to digital copyright restrictions. (shrink)

Desde la aparición, en 1927, de su obra central Ser y tiempo, Martin Heidegger ha sido y sigue siendo considerado por amplios sectores de opinión como el filósofo más importante del siglo XX. Frente a esta sobrevaloración del filósofo de los Bosques Negros, Heleno Saña procede, en su documentadísimo libro, a una crítica de la filosofía heideggeriana, intentando demostrar que está basada en una tergiversación e instrumentalización sistemáticas de la terminología y los conceptos esenciales de la filosofía clásica. El resultado (...) final de sus ejercicios hermenéuticos y sus continuos malabarismos lingüísticos, es un irracionalismo de índole claramente nihilista, por su culto implícito y explícito a la muerte. En este sentido es altamente significativo que a la biografía y a la filosofía heideggerianas pertenezcan su adhesión al nacionalsocialismo y la glorificación de Alemania como la “raza de los señores” por excelencia, tema al que Heleno Saña dedica la debida atención. Uno de los signos distintivos de este ensayo es el de la claridad con que expone sus tesis, de manera que el libro no está pensado solo para eruditos, sino para todas las personas interesadas en ampliar sus conocimientos culturales y filosóficos. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como objetivo analizar la evolución histórica y cultural de Europa y Asia como términos políticos en la Grecia clásica. Para ello, abordaremos fuentes de diversa índole como Esquilo, Heródoto, el escrito hipocrático Aires, aguas y lugares y el orador Isócrates. Partiremos de la equiparación inicial entre Europa y Asia hasta alcanzar la propuesta de Isócrates de considerar a Filipo como un líder europeo.

El principal objetivo del presente ensayo es analizar los conceptos y praxis del Mundo Mapuche y del País Mapuche las cuales, es posible argüir, constituyen la síntesis de la demanda y propuesta de parte significativa del movimiento mapuche autonomista. Síntesis que conlleva una modificación cualitativa en la estructuración de los marcos cognitivos del movimiento, lo que ha significado la articulación embrionaria de una visión mapuche de la realidad que trascendería la dimensión social y política del movimiento para instalarse como elemento (...) de índole más estructural, que ya no sólo enfrenta crecientemente a dos identidades distintas, sino que, también, a dos proyectos de sociedad, a dos países, a dos pueblos encapsulados en un mismo territorio geográfico, pero culturalmente diferenciados. La aproximación al sujeto de estudio se realizará a través de la aplicación de algunos elementos de las teorías de los movimientos sociales, específicamente los marcos cognitivos, y además, desde el concepto de memoria colectiva. (shrink)

1Preface: Malthus the Utilitarian vs. Malthus the Christian moral thinker. The chapter aims at reconstructing the deadlocks of Malthus scholarship concerning his relationship to utilitarianism. It argues that Bonar created out of nothing the myth of Malthus’s ‘Utilitarianism’, which carried, in turn, a pseudo-problem concerning Malthus’s lack of consistency with his own alleged Utilitarianism; besides it argues that such misinterpretation was hard to die and still persists in Hollander’s reading of Malthus’s work. ● -/- 2 Eighteenth-century Anglican ethics. The chapter (...) gives an overview of eighteenth-century Anglican ethics, noticing how the Cambridge tradition gave special weight to natural theology as opposed to positive or revealed theology and how two Cambridge fellows, John Gay and Thomas Brown worked out a kind of a rational-choice account of the origins of natural laws, where a law-giver God chooses among a number of possible sets of laws on the basis of a maximizing criterion, happiness for his creatures. ● -/- 3 Malthus’s meta-ethics. The chapter reconstructs the two ethical chapters of the second Essay. It argues that Malthus’s ethics is not dependent on Paley’s, but is derived from Cumberland, Butler, Gay, Brown. Besides, it argues that theodicy takes a new place in the 1803 Essays and ethics becomes a key to theodicy. The new solution is that, once it has been proved that passions can be mastered and that a world where passions are under control would be a comparatively happy place, a society where moral restraint prevailed would make the middling ranks more numerous, reduce dependence, and preserve liberty. ● -/- 4 Malthus’s early normative ethics: a morality of freedom. The chapter reconstructs young Malthus’s views on the foundations of ethics, proving his adhesion to voluntarist consequentialism. Then it reconstructs his treatment of political issues, whence a clear stance emerges in favour of traditional Whig concerns, such as political freedom, personal independence and dignity. Finally, it gives a fresh look at the theological argument in the two well-known final chapters, locating it in the context of consequentialism, voluntarism, and quasi-Leibnizian theodicy. ● -/- 5 Malthus’s intermediate normative ethics: a morality of prudence. Malthus’s normative ethics focuses on two main ‘natural’ virtues, benevolence and chastity, and three artificial virtues. These include love for equality and love for liberty. A special place is granted to another virtue, prudence, which is the link between natural and artificial virtues. This special virtue also provides an invisible link between the private and the public domains, in that it contributes to combine self-love with general happiness. This is granted by the unintended results mechanism, or “the happiness of the whole is to be the result of the happiness of individuals, and to begin first with them. No cooperation is required”. ● -/- 6 Malthus’s mature normative ethics: a morality of humanity. The chapter describes reactions by Evangelicals, such as Gisborne, Sumner, and Chalmers, to Malthus’s theory and Malthus’s transformation of his own system in order to pave objections. This amounts to incorporating The Evangelicals’ ideas into his own system. The friendly controversy with his Evangelical fellow-travellers yielded several important changes in 1806, 1817, and 1826 editions of the second Essay in the formulation of Malthusian ethics, in the adoption of moral improvement instead of happiness as the variable to be maximised, in the adoption of generalized education as the main weapon in the war on poverty. ● -/- 7 Malthus’s applied ethics. The chapter reconstructs Malthus’s treatment of a few issues in ‘applied ethics’, sexual morality, public morality, poverty, and besides, war and slavery. On the first issue, he argues the duty to marry only at a time when one is ready to carry the burden of six children as a moral duty imposed by prudence and rejects birth control because of its alleged effect of encouraging ‘indolence’. On the second issue, he defends a peculiar kind of Whiggism as anti-Machiavellian politics centred on rights, equality, and dignity. On the third issue, his final approach is a kind of Institutional approach to poverty, making room for generalized basic education, free markets for labour and allowing for a subsidiary role for private beneficence. The goal to be aimed at is bringing about circumstances which tend to elevate the character of the lower classes of society and offer them a chance of being respectable, virtuous and happy. ● -/- 8 Conclusions: strengthening the theological foundation. Malthus’s criteria for policy appraisal were not utilitarian ones. His normative ethics and his politics were sharply different from Bentham’s. Utility is just one element in Malthus’s ethics, going with laws of nature and rights, and ironically, far from being a Benthamite insertion, is the most markedly theological element in Malthus’s system of ideas. ● -/- . (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXIV, Number 2, November 1998, pp. 335-354 "An Unaccountable Pleasure": Hume on Tragedy and the Passions ALEX NEILL Hume begins his essay "Of Tragedy" with a description of what he calls "a singular phaenomenon": It seems an unaccountable pleasure, which the spectators of a well-written tragedy receive from sorrow, terror, anxiety, and other passions, that are in themselves disagreeable and uneasy. The more they are touched (...) and affected, the more are they delighted with the spectacle; and as soon as the uneasy passions cease to operate, the piece is at an end.... They are pleased in proportion as they are afflicted, and never are so happy as when they employ tears, sobs, and cries to give vent to their sorrow, and relieve their heart, swoln with the tenderest sympathy and compassion. The few critics who have had some tincture of philosophy, have remarked this singular phaenomenon, and have endeavoured to account for it.1 The account of the audience's experience of tragedy that Hume goes on to offer in "Of Tragedy" has been the target of criticism since the essay was published. My purpose in what follows is to show that some of what may appear to be the most damaging of that criticism is based on a misinterpretation of the thesis that Hume develops in the essay. I shall not attempt to argue that Hume's thesis is persuasive; indeed, I believe and have argued Alex Neill is at the Department of Philosophy, University of Southampton, Hants Sl 7 IBJ ENGLAND. 336 Alex Neill elsewhere that it is not.2 My project here is almost entirely interpretive: it is an attempt to get clear about what Hume's thesis concerning our experience of tragedy really is. To that end, it should be noted that the apparently "unaccountable" pleasure Hume describes at the beginning of "Of Tragedy" is something that he has remarked on before. In Book I of the Treatise, he notes that in matters of religion men take a pleasure in being terrify'd, and that no preachers are so popular, as those who excite the most dismal and gloomy passions. In the common affairs of life, where we feel and are penetrated with the solidity of the subject, nothing can be more disagreeable than fear and terror; and 'tis only in dramatic performances and in religious discourses, that they ever give pleasure? The phenomenon that Hume finds so remarkable in these passages from "Of Tragedy" and the Treatise is thus, at a minimum, that in certain circumstances, such as when we are at the theatre, we may find agreeable the experience of "the most dismal and gloomy passions." The explanation he gives of this phenomenon in the Treatise is as follows: In these latter cases the imagination reposes itself indolently on the idea; and the passion, being soften'd by the want of belief in the subject, has no more than the agreeable effect of enlivening the mind, and fixing the attention. (T 115) Hume's explanation of how the experience of "uneasy" passions can be enjoyed when we are in church and at the theatre thus has two components. First, because we do not believe the stories we are told in church4 and at the theatre, the uneasy passions we experience are not so very uneasy; as he puts it later in the Treatise, in such circumstances the passion in question "lies not with that weight upon us: It feels less firm and solid" (T 631). Second, a weakly disagreeable passion of this sort agreeably "enlivens" the mind and "fixes" (or as he says later, "rouzes") our attention. By the time he wrote "Of Tragedy," however, Hume had come to regard this explanation of his "singular phaenomenon" as inadequate. With regard to the idea that the passions, even if "uneasy," have the pleasurable effect of "enlivening" the mind (an idea which in "Of Tragedy" he attributes to Dubos), Hume objects that having one's mind "enlivened," one's attention "fixed" or "rouzed," need not be pleasurable: "the same object of distress, which pleases in a tragedy, were it really set before us, would give the most unfeigned uneasiness; though it... (shrink)

Hace ya varias décadas que Latinoamérica salió del colonialismo “centroeuropeo”, como lo llama Dussell; sin embargo, se mantiene una actitud de “colonialidad”, entendida como un proceso amplio de control hegemónico de imposición de conocimientos, prácticas y formas culturales en todos los campos de la vida social, al tiempo que se desprecian y desdeñan los valores autóctonos, los conocimientos ancestrales y populares que Boaventura de Sousa Santos denomina con la metáfora de “Las epistemologías del sur”; es decir, aquellas epistemologías de quienes (...) no han tenido voz ni voto en las decisiones trascendentales de la vida social, económica, política y cultural, como los desposeídos, los marginados de la sociedad, campesinos, indígenas, afrodescendientes, homosexuales, entre otros. Los responsables de esta actitud colonialista, no solamente han sido los gobiernos que, mediante convenios y tratados bilaterales y multilaterales con las potencias hegemónicas, financian proyectos de diversa índole e imponen sus criterios e intereses en los distintos campos de la economía, la política y la educación. Pero también la misma educación ha tenido su responsabilidad en este proceso. El conocimiento impartido en las universidades es hegemónico y colonizador, que llega de Europa y Norte América. Por esta razón, la ciencia y el conocimiento que se producen en estas regiones, debe construirse para su validez, con las epistemologías y las metodologías de estas potencias; mientras que los conocimientos culturales, populares y ancestrales, se consideran obstáculos epistemológicos que no pueden convivir e interactuar con la epistemología de la ciencia clásica. Es por esto que la Universidad también tiene que “decolonizar” sus saberes, para alcanzar un espacio transcultural que incluya todos aquellos conocimientos y cosmovisiones populares y tradicionales para que puedan ser tenidos como pares, en un diálogo de saberes dentro de los procesos de formación y aprendizaje. (shrink)

The philosophy of Schelling has for too long been lost in the shadows of Fichte and Hegel. While one might dispute Martin Heidegger’s judgment that Schelling was actually the most creative and far-reaching thinker of German Idealism, it betrays both ignorance and intellectual indolence to simply deny his importance. Schelling was not only a significant co-author of “Hegelian” idealism, he was also its first and perhaps most penetrating critic. He outlived Hegel by over 20 years and, as Manfred Frank (...) demonstrates in one of the following essays, developed the arguments against Hegel that were subsequently taken up by Feuerbach, Marx, and Kierkegaard. (shrink)

The merchant's toil, the sage's indolence,The monk's humility, the hero's pride,All, all alike, find Reason on their side.Hume's moral philosophy is often interpreted as an example of a naturalistic approach to ethics. J.L. Mackie, for instance, writes that in Hume the questions of moral philosophy are answered ‘in sociological and psychological terms, by constructing and defending a causal hypothesis.’ Similarly, Páll S. Árdal claims that Hume ‘is concerned with an attempt to discover those psychological laws that explain human emotions (...) and the behaviour of people in society.’ I argue in this essay that if Hume is read in this way as developing a general explanatory theory of moral sentiments, he faces an inescapable dilemma. Section I presents the dilemma. In sections II and ill, I argue why for Hume — interpreted as a proponent of general psychological laws — there is no way out of this dilemma. (shrink)

El Barrio Inglés de Bella Vista es uno de los parajes más enigmáticos de la ciudad de Huelva. El turista que desee pasar una jornada agradable en el suroeste de España, hará bien en privarse de una mañana de playa para transitar sus calles. La experiencia tiene un halo de exotismo. En medio de una provincia repleta de templos católicos y bloques de pisos, el paseante se verá rodeado de diáfanas hileras de casas victorianas, escoltadas por otros edificios curiosos, como (...) una capilla presbiteriana de bella factura y un cementerio protestante. Tan bucólico enclave enseguida le generará preguntas de índole histórica. ¿Cómo llegó hasta aquí esta Inglaterra en miniatura? Si les consulta a los guías turísticos, estos le compartirán un relato convenientemente amable: todo comenzó con la _Rio Tinto Company Limited_, una empresa que adquirió las minas de cobre de Rio Tinto en 1873 y que construyó el lugar con miras a que le sirviese de morada a sus técnicos y trabajadores. El visitante abandonará el paraje con la impresión de que deja tras de sí la huella patrimonial de una historia de progreso compartido, de crecimiento económico y de modernización sociocultural. Lo que no sabe es que el Barrio Inglés de Bella Vista es el testimonio de un pasado mucho más complejo y mucho menos amable de lo que es perceptible en la inmediatez de su paisaje. Tal pasado oculta una relación desigual de subordinación comercial, financiera y geoestratégica. Una relación que puso a la Monarquía española parcialmente a merced de los intereses británicos. El libro _Britain’s Informal Empire in Spain, 1830–1950_, de Nicholas Sharman, nos descubre con asombrosa clarividencia y sistematicidad, las claves de este fenómeno. (shrink)

El siguiente ensayo tiene como objetivo delimitar los argumentos bases que dan origen a la teoría política conocida como atomismo. Para ello será necesario hacer un análisis de sus orígenes en las proposiciones del contrato social, así como de las razones por las cuales se considera al individuo como autosuficiente, para luego ver cómo esto mismo les da un fundamento a los derechos de esta índole. Ello nos demostrará la importancia de replantear estos argumentos, si es que hacen posible la (...) convivencia entre otros, y cómo es que un sistema que requiera de mayor cooperación es contrario al atomismo político. Finalmente, se verán las implicaciones contradictorias y los elementos que juegan en contra de formar parte de este pensamiento, sobre todo en su forma radical. (shrink)