In this book, Professor Jeanine Grenberg defends the idea that Kant's virtue theory is best understood as a system of eudaemonism, indeed, as a distinctive form of eudaemonism that makes it preferable to other forms of it: a system of what she calls Deontological Eudaemonism. In Deontological Eudaemonism, one achieves happiness both rationally conceived and empirically conceived only via authentic commitment to and fulfilment of what is demanded of all rational beings: making persons as such one's end (...) in all things. To tell this story of Deontological Eudaemonism, Grenberg first defends the notion that Kant's deontological approach to ethics is simultaneously teleological. She then shows that the realization of an aptitude for the virtuous fulfilment of one's obligatory ends provides the solid basis for simultaneous realization of happiness, both rationally and empirically conceived. Along the way, she argues both that Kant's notion of happiness rationally conceived is essentially identical to Aristotle's conception of happiness as unimpeded activity, and that his notion of happiness empirically conceived is best realized via an unwavering commitment to the fulfilment of one's obligatory ends. (shrink)

Kant's ethics is traditionally categorized and defended as deontological. Recent scholarship has left this tradition, arguing variously that Kantians should leave deontology behind, or that Kant had a teleological ethics, or that the best Kantian position is a consequentialist one. In this dissertation, I articulate and defend a middle path between these interpretations and defenses. I argue that Kant's ethics is, and Kantian ethics ought to be, a value-based deontology. In Part One, I (...) argue that contrary to conventional discussion, deontology can be value-based. In Part Two, I interpret Kant's ethics as a value-based deontology, and I defend it as such, both against the traditional and more contemporary alternates. Finally, in Part Three, I defend Kantian value-based deontology from various attacks that might be posed against it. (shrink)

In his Metaphysics of Morals (particularly in the Doctrine of Virtue), but also in other late works, Kant extends and refines the content of his earlier works on ethics (Groundwork and Critique of Practical Reason) to a considerable extent. These revisions and extensions not only show the limitations of an exclusive interpretation of Kants ethics as a deontological ethics of principles. His thoughts are also relevant for a large number of questions of theoretical morality currently under (...) discussion. Thus, the distinction drawn in the Doctrine of Virtue between perfect and imperfect obligations informs the problem of the solvability of moral conflicts and the role of supererogatory actions. Kant goes further into the question of what it means to be a good person, what moral significance is contained in close human ties such as friendship, and what role is played by happiness and the so-called obligations towards oneself. The papers each discuss Kants central ideas in the context of his earlier writings, but also within the context of our contemporary ethical debates. Thus attention is drawn to the significance and possible extent of an ethics of virtue understood in the Kantian sense. (shrink)

This article expands on existing models of analyzing business ethics of monetization in video games using the concept of categorical imperatives, as posited by the philosopher Immanuel Kant. A model is advanced to analyze and evaluate the business logics of video game monetization using a Kantian framework, which falls in the deontological category of normative ethics. Using two categorical imperatives, existing models of game monetization are divided into ethical or unethical, and presented using the case example of (...) Star Wars: Battlefront II. This analysis aims to provide video game developers and businesses with ethical guidelines for game monetization which may also be profitable for them in the long term. Within the framework of video game monetization, a deontological analysis is relevant due to the fact that the game developer is engaged in a continuous role of making the game more playable/payable. This article applies Kantian business ethics to the context of a new sector, that of video game businesses, and thereby presents a broader ethical perspective to video game developers, which will help them monetize games in an ethical manner which is also profitable in the long run. (shrink)

One of the most controversial issues to emerge in recent studies of Fichte concerns the status of his normative ethics, i.e., his theory of what makes actions morally good or bad. Scholars are divided over Fichte’s view regarding the ‘final end’ of moral striving, since it appears this end can be either a specific goal permitting maximizing calculations (the consequentialist reading defended by Kosch 2015), or an indeterminate goal permitting only duty-based decisions (the deontological reading defended by Wood (...) 2016). While I think each interpretive position contains an element of truth, my aim in this paper is to defend a third alternative, according to which Fichte’s normative ethics presents us with a unique form of social perfectionism. (shrink)

Given his emphasis on deontological ethics, Kant is rarely regarded as a friend of prudence. For example, he is often interpreted as an opponent of so-called “historical faiths”. What typically goes unnoticed is that in explaining the legitimate role of historical faiths in the moral development of the human race, Kant appeals explicitly to their prudential status. A careful examination of Kant’s main references to prudence demonstrates that the prudential status of historical faith is the key to understanding (...) both its limitations and its real value. The wise person adopts some form of historical faith, because to abandon any and all prudential appeals to a faith-based vehicle for morality would render the goal of living a good life virtually impossible for embodied beings to achieve. (shrink)

Due to his theory of deontological ethic, Kant is regarded, in the history of philosophy, as one of the cornerstones of ethics, and it is said, as a rule, that he has an original theory of ethics in that he posited the idea of free and autonomous individual. However, when dug deeper into Kant‟s ethics, and also if it is ex-actly compared with theological ethic, it is clearly seen that all he has accomplished was to make (...) a copy of the theological ethic and to use such secular terms as reason, conscience, good will, moral law, categorical imperative, universalizability, summum bonum, ethico-civil state/universal religion of mere reason as a substitute for such key terms of religious ethics as God, prophet, for God‟s sake, the Golden Rule, Divine command, Heaven, Kingdom of God without modifying the wording, content and logic of theolog-ical ethics. So, the notion of a subject or reason which pretends to be God has no sign of originality. (shrink)

This chapter has two main sections. In the first section I briefly sketch Immanuel Kant’s moral theory as laid out in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). I explain Kant’s claim that morality must be grounded on what he calls a categorical imperative and examine his three formulations of this categorical imperative. In the second section I explain the distinction between “deontological” and “teleological” ethical theories. Kantian ethics is often presented as the paradigm example of a (...) deontological ethical theory, but I question whether Kant’s ethics should be understood as purely deontological. (shrink)

Kant is noted to have pioneered the deontological position when he argued in defence of reason and duty in moral decision-making. Kant’s use of reason in moral decision-making has made him an ethical rationalist. As moral agents, our theories must be based on rational cognition. This can be said to have dominated Western philosophy since the time of Plato. During Plato’s time, the tradition believed that one must know the object and possess the cognitive principles of practical reason. This (...) must be exercised by the will or rational capacity guided by the categorical imperative. It is only when this is accomplished that it can be said that an action is morally worthy or morally permissible. This paper argues that Kant’s reliance on reason rejects the essence of sympathy and empathy in any moral decision-making endeavour. To act justly there is the need to employ reason so that such action could be attractive as well. (shrink)

My main concern in this paper is to develop some ideas within the Kantian ethical tradition. More precisely, my aim is to develop an ethical perspective that is grounded upon the Kantian ideas of autonomy and ideal of the person (Kant’s notion of humanity) as fundamental starting points for a coherent account of Kant’s ethics in contrast to the deontological duty-based interpretation of his moral philosophy, then sketch, subsequently, some suggestions to show why this reading has more philosophical (...) import than what a deontological reading may provide. I take no issue for the time being however, as to whether or not the perspective I have in mind leads to either a Kantian orthodoxy or a revisionist direction in Kant scholarships. (shrink)

Kant formulated a secular argument against suicide’s permissibility based on what he regarded as the intrinsic value of humanity. In this paper, I first show that Kant’s moral framework entails that some types of suicide are morally permissible. Just as some homicides are morally permissible, according to Kant, so are suicides that are performed according to equivalent maxims. Intention, foreseeability, voluntariness, diminished responsibility, and mental capacity determine the moral characterization of the killing. I argue that a suicide taxonomy that differentiates (...) types of suicide according to morally relevant criteria is compatible with Kantian ethics; it establishes that even where we hold a robust deontological sanctity of life position, we are not obligated to preserve the lives of people whose future life only offers profound suffering, and helping them to die may be justifiable if doing so honors their dignity and autonomy. Nevertheless, homicide and suicide are only weakly morally symmetrical in that even if a given suicide is morally impermissible, we do not normally have the right to prevent it forcibly, though this may be altered by juridical laws under some circumstances. (shrink)

An epistemic deontology modelled on Kant’s ethics—in particular the humanity formula of the categorical imperative—is a promising alternative to epistemic consequentialism because it can forbid intuitively impermissible epistemic trade-offs which epistemic consequentialism seems doomed to permit and, most importantly, it can do so in a way that is not ad hoc.

This paper explores the relevance of Kant's categorical imperative to military ethics and the solution it suggests for improving the treatment of women in the military. The second formulation of the categorical imperative makes universal respect for humanity a moral requirement by asserting that one must always treat other people as means in themselves and never as merely means to an end. This principle is a promising guide for military ethics and can be reconciled with the acts (...) of violence required by war. This paper argues that it can also regulate soldiers? relations to each other and that it may contribute to reorienting military culture in a way that overcomes the biases against female military personnel. (shrink)

Kant's deontological ethical theory is explained in terms that introductory students can understand.

Kant’s moral philosophy is celebrated for its doctrines of the primacy of the good will, the categorical imperative, and the significance of autonomy. These themes are pursued in the section of the Critique of Practical Reason which Kant called the Analytic, as well as in less formal works such as The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. In his main work Kant added a Dialectic, which is less well studied but is still essential to understanding his whole project. The concept (...) of the Highest Good, summum bonum, the ultimate goal in life, incorporates both an objective and a subjective element. It pronounces on what we ought to want and how we ought to want it: it bears on our happiness and on our virtue. The aim in the Dialectic is to highlight the tension that can result from these twoelements, so that the need for a rapprochement between them becomes better appreciated. This tension remains in contemporary moral philosophy, with its diverse approaches of virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism. Kant’s stance regarding this dialectical tension needs to be understood, by Kant scholars and by moral philosophers. (shrink)

This article draws on the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant to explore whether a corporate ‘duty of beneficence’ to non-shareholders is consistent with the orthodox ‘shareholder theory’ of the firm. It examines the ethical framework of Milton Friedman’s argument and asks whether it necessarily rules out the well-being of non-shareholders as a corporate objective. The article examines Kant’s distinction between ‘duties of right’ and ‘duties of virtue’ (the latter including the duty of beneficence) and investigates their consistency with the shareholder (...) theory. The article concludes that it is possible within the ethical framework of shareholder theory for managers to pursue directly the happiness of non-shareholders. Furthermore, shareholders have a duty to hold management to account for the moral consequences of the firm’s activities on non-shareholding stakeholders. (shrink)

Kant’s turn to the subject has changed the epistemological conditions for theology. Four intellectual backgrounds of objections are examined: an Aristotelian and Thomistic teleological order of nature (1); Augustinianism based on original sin in which human agency is completely attributed to God’s grace (2); a Hegelian critique of the deontological conception of an “unconditional ought” which also puts Kant’s postulate of the existence of God into question (3); the combination in Radical Orthodoxy of a postmodern critique of the subject, (...) an Augustinian view of human nature, and a monistic understanding of the Trinity (4). Their different diagnoses why Kant’s work constitutes a cul-de-sac are contrasted with theological positions that welcome it as a watershed: its move from ontology to human subjectivity; from a biologically transmitted inescapable sin to a freedom for good and evil; from a strict reciprocity to an unlimited scope of ethics that is faced with the question of meaning; and from condemning the secular as “heretical” to defining it as the genuine space of the free human counterparts created by God, according to Duns Scotus’s late medieval theology which anticipates Kant’s concept of autonomy. The standard by which theologies are judged is how they do justice to the New Testament’s message of salvation by Jesus Christ. The Conclusion argues that Kant’s turn to freedom in its unconditionality and finitude has opened up a thought form in which the truth of the Gospel finds more adequate categories of understanding than in those of earlier eras. (shrink)

Beneficent clinical usage of placebos has been a problem for the application of Kant’s deontology in medical ethics, which, in its strictest form, rejects deception universally. Some defenders of deontology have countered this by arguing placebos can be used by a physician without necessarily being deceptive. In this paper we argue that such a manipulation of Kant’s absolutism is not credible, and therefore, that we should look beyond deontology in our consideration of placebo usage in clinical practice. We conclude (...) that Kant’s deontology cannot be made compatible with placebo use in clinical practice due to the primacy it affords to the principle of autonomy. (shrink)

Matthew Caswell - The Value of Humanity and Kant's Conception of Evil - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.4 635-663 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents The Value of Humanity and Kant's Conception of Evil Matthew Caswell Recent years have seen the development of a powerful reinterpretation of Kant's basic approach in ethical thought. Kant, it is argued, should not be read as defending the stark, metaphysics-laden formalism for which (...) his theory is so famous. Rather, the reinterpreters claim that the heart of Kantian practical philosophy is the absolute value of humanity, or human rational nature. Kant's ethics can thus be understood as a "theory of value," in which the singular value of our own end-setting capacity as rational agents is taken as supreme, or even as the source of all value. On this reading, morality is just acting in such a way that respects or promotes the value of humanity. Moreover, this value may be deduced through an immanent, regressive argument about the conditions of practical agency as such, according to which any adequate conception of ourselves as agents commits us, finally, to moral norms. The consequences of this approach to Kantian ethics for such central issues as the doctrine of transcendental freedom, ethical formalism, the meaning of Kantian deontology, and indeed the very picture of human moral life for which Kant's theory is meant to account are profound... (shrink)

이 글은 고통에 따른 자살이 칸트의 입장에서 정당화될 방안이 있는지에 관해서 탐구한다. 자살에 관한 칸트의 입장을 보다 느슨하게 해석하고자 하는 현대의 입장은, 주로 자율성의 큰 손실이 일어날 경우에 있어서 칸트의 입장이BR/자살을 허용할 수 있다고 주장한다. 그러나 여러 가지 방식의 안락사 허용에 대한 현대의 관행은 이와 같이 자율성에 근거해서가 아니라 주로 육체적 이유에 따라 안락사를 허용한다. 따라서 칸트의 입장에 대한 기존의 해석은 고통에 따른 안락사를 허용하는 현실의 관행을 충분히 반영하지 못한다는 문제가 있다. 이 글은 칸트 윤리학에서 고통에 근거한 자살의 허용 가능성을 (...) 탐구하기 위해 먼저 자살에 대한 칸트의 사례론을 면밀히 검토한다. 그 결과로 칸트에게서 자살이 직접적인 목적이 되는 행위는 결코 완전하게는 허용될 수 없고, 그리하여 고통을 회피하고자 수행하는 자살 역시 금지된다는 점을 먼저 확인한다. 다음으로는 칸트의 입장에서 고통에 따른 자살에 대한 완전한 정당화는 불가능하지만, 그가 받아 들였던 인간의 유한성으로부터의 간접적 정당화는 가능하다는 점을 살펴보고, 이로부터 매우 극단적인 고통이 주어지는 경우에 한하여 안락사가 허용될 수 있다는 귀결을 이끌어낸다. (shrink)

In the last five years, a number of U.S. companies have either moved their locus of incorporation to countries with more favorable tax laws, or announced such moves. Given this trend toward “inversions”, and the polemics that have accompanied it, we offer two ways in which the ethics of such a move can be evaluated. We provide multinational executives with two applications of ethics to inversion: Kant’s deontological theory and the consequentialist perspective of utilitarianism.

Kant’s deontology is often seen as a rival to virtue ethics. This chapter argues, however, that while there may be differences between Kant’s and Aristotle’s conceptions virtue (for instance, a virtuous person, in Kant’s view, may be destitute and unhappy, fail to cultivate certain emotions and sentiments, etc.), virtue is central to Kant’s ethics. The key problem is whether there is a Kantian account of virtue compatible with Kant’s view of free will. Kant held that having virtue means (...) having a will that is both good and stable. So to cultivate virtue means to cultivate a stable will. But the idea of character cultivation seems to run counter to Kant’s view of freedom, since for Kant, people are always free to choose how to act. This chapter puts forth a novel proposal for solving this problem, one which has to do with the limits on self-knowledge. (shrink)

In Oneself as Another, Paul Ricoeur proposes a new ethical theory that integrates Aristotle’s eudaemonist virtue ethical outlook with Immanuel Kant’s deontological ethics. The goal is ambitious, and recent discussions in anglophone philosophy have made its undertaking look to be founded on a confusion. The new argument goes that the ethical justification at work in the Aristotelian and Kantian traditions is of opposed kinds. Attempts to integrate them, as a result, are either incoherent, or, in the best case, (...) simply minor variations on one or another predominant ethical outlook. The essay grants the opposed kinds thesis and argues that despite its apparent impossibility, Ricoeur nevertheless does succeed in integrating two ethical approaches, including their different sources of justification, to produce a novel and thus ethically interesting theory. The essay closes, finally, with a reflection on how this method might be developed one step further to include an insight by Emmanuel Levinas on the look of the Other, and so make for an ethics of recognition. (shrink)

Kant’s moral philosophy usually considers two types of duties: negative duties that prohibit certain actions and positive duties commanding action. With that, Kant insists on deriving all morality from reason alone. Such is the Categorical Imperative that Kant lays at the basis of ethics. Yet while negative duties can be derived from the Categorical Imperative and thus from reason, the paper argues that this is not the case with positive duties. After answering a number of attempts to derive positive (...) duties from the Categorical Imperative, most notably those of Barbara Herman, it sketches an alternative approach to understanding the relationship between the universal moral law and specific moral contents. (shrink)

Hegel's Philosophy of Right presents a collection of new essays by leading international philosophers and Hegel scholars that analyze and explore Hegel's key contributions in the areas of ethics, politics, and the law. The most comprehensive collection on Hegel's Philosophy of Right available Features new essays by leading international Hegel interpreters divided in sections of ethics, politics, and law Presents significant new research on Hegel's Philosophy of Right that will set a new standard for future work on the (...) topic Introduction (Pages: 1-6) Thom Brooks Summary PDF References Request permissions Part I : Ethics CHAPTER 1 Consequentialism and Deontology in the Philosophy of Right (Pages: 7-42) Dean Moyar Summary PDF References Request permissions CHAPTER 2 The Empty Formalism Objection Revisited: §135R and Recent Kantian Responses (Pages: 43-72) Fabian Freyenhagen Summary PDF References Request permissions CHAPTER 3 On Hegel's Critique of Kant's Ethics: Beyond the Empty Formalism Objection (Pages: 73-99) Robert Stern Summary PDF References Request permissions Part II : Politics CHAPTER 4 Hegel and the Unified Theory of Punishment (Pages: 101-123) Thom Brooks Summary PDF References Request permissions CHAPTER 5 Hard Work: Hegel and the Meaning of the State in his Philosophy of Right (Pages: 124-142) Kimberly Hutchings Summary PDF References Request permissions Part II : Politics CHAPTER 6 Gender, the Family, and the Organic State in Hegel's Political Thought (Pages: 143-164) Alison Stone Summary PDF References Request permissions Part III : Law CHAPTER 7 Natural Law Internalism (Pages: 165-179) Thom Brooks Summary PDF References Request permissions CHAPTER 8 Hegel on the Relation between Law and Justice (Pages: 180-208) Alan Brudner Summary PDF References Request permissions. (shrink)

Teaching Kantian ethics is difficult, for “getting Kant right” extends to a wide field of concerns. This paper is aimed at instructors who wish to give interdisciplinary criticism of Kantian deontology by discussing exceptions naturalist critics take to Kant’s concept of “autonomy.” This concept can and should be supplanted by the notion of “emergent intelligence.” Surprising support for this project comes from the fictional exploits of Star Trek’s Captain Jean-Luc Picard. I conclude by indicating how the residual lessons from (...) this criticism of Kant should lead us back to an understanding of emergence within Kant’s own third Critique. (shrink)

The Upaniṣads do deal with moral problems, and one could find a systematic ethical stance in them, though the Upaniṣads are, for the most part, concerned with metaphysics where the Ultimate Reality is explored and mediated upon. For an Upaniṣadic seeker, metaphysics and ethics are inseparable. The present study makes an attempt to examine the ethical stance of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad and see whether it falls in the framework of any ethical theory. This study examines the Taittirīya Upaniṣad’s ethical (...) ideas focussing on the eleventh chapter of the Śikṣā-vallī (first section). The first part of the paper is an unearthing the moral precepts found in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, whereas the second part explores whether the ethic of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad is deontological. The study concludes with a submission. In this paper, the attempt is to position the moral precepts enunciated in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad in an ethical theory framework in the light of comparative philosophy. I argue that the moral precepts enunciated in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, though seemingly deontological, are for the maintenance of the social order, unlike in Kant’s ends in themselves; and the ethics of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad has overwhelming elements of consequentialism and virtue ethics. (shrink)

It is usually assumed in moral philosophy that a teleological approach, as exemplified by Aristotle's ethics of virtue, and a deontological approach, as heralded by Kant's ethics of duty, are incompatible; either the good or the right, to designate these two major traditions by their emblematic predicates. My purpose in this paper is to show that a theory of action, broadly understood, may provide the appropriate framework of thought within which justice can be done to both (...) the Aristotelian and Kantian, the teleological and deontological moments of morality. (shrink)

Dive into the moral philosophy at the heart of all four seasons of NBC’s The Good Place, guided by academic experts including the show’s philosophical consultants Pamela Hieronymi and Todd May, and featuring a foreword from creator and showrunner Michael Schur Explicitly dedicated to the philosophical concepts, questions, and fundamental ethical dilemmas at the heart of the thoughtful and ambitious NBC sitcom The Good Place Navigates the murky waters of moral philosophy in more conceptual depth to call into question what (...) Chidi’s ethics lessons—and the show—get right about learning to be a good person Features contributions from The Good Place’s philosophical consultants, Pamela Hieronymi and Todd May, and introduced by the show’s creator and showrunner Michael Schur Engages classic philosophical questions, including the clash between utilitarianism and deontological ethics in the “Trolley Problem,” Kant’s categorical imperative, Sartre’s nihilism, and T.M Scanlon's contractualism Explores themes such as death, love, moral heroism, free will, responsibility, artificial intelligence, fatalism, skepticism, virtue ethics, perception, and the nature of autonomy in the surreal heaven-like afterlife of the Good Place Led by Kimberly S. Engels, co-editor of Westworld and Philosophy. (shrink)

Using practical formalism a deontological ethical analysis of peer relations in organizations is developed. This analysis is composed of two types of duties derived from Kant's Categorical Imperative: negative duties to refrain from the use of peers and positive duties to provide help and assistance. The conditions under which these duties pertain are specified through the development of examples and conceptual distinctions. A number of implications are then discussed.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES: THOMAS ON OBLIGATION AS RATIONAL PERSUASION THOMAS s. HIBBS Thomas Aquinas College Santa Paula, California 'TIHE PROMINENCE of moral obligation in modern hies is l'ooted in an early modern claim, which reached uition in Kant, concerning the primacy of the right ov;er the good.1 Although Kant was not the first to make such a claim, his texts have had the most palpable influence on modern (...) moral discourse.2 Many contemporary moral philosophers, however, have!attempted to discredit the Kantian p11oject.3 In so doing, they often advance wlternative views 1 In his highly influential work, John Rawls comments on the importance of the g-0od and the right in contemporary moral philosophy, "The two main concepts of ethics are those of the right and the good.... The structure Df an ethical theory is... largely determined by how it defines and connects these two basic notions," A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 24. 2 There are numerous precursors of Kant, both in the nascent rationalism of early modern science and -0£ late scholasticism and in the project of the "rationalization" of human life characteristic of classical Protestant moral thought. It was Nietzsche, of course, who saw Kant as a most heinous example of secularized Christianity. On the "rationalization" of the moral life in Protestantism, see Max Weber, Die protestantisohe Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, in Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie, Volume l (TU.bingen: Mohr, 1920), pp. 17-206. Given the convergence of these discursive fields in early modern thought and society, one might be inclined to see Kant as providing the theoretical foundations for the common moral consciousness. a I am thinking -0f Philippa Foot, "Virtues and Vices," and "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives," in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 1-18, 157-173; Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) and " Ought and Moral Obligation," in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 293 ~94 THOMAS S. HIBBS characteristic of pre-modern moral philosophy, particularly of rthe 1 writings of Aristotle and Aquill!as. While consensus appears to have exnnerated Aristotle of the taint of Kantianism, the status of Tihomas's moral philosophy is still uncertain in the minds of many.4 Thomas's1 moral iphilosophy is, I believe, pre-modern. Throughout his writings he maintains the primaicy of the good ovier rthe right, the exact inverse of the Kantian position. By modern standards, Thomas's conception of obligation,seems impov;erished, almost naive. He devotes no independent treatise, or.for that matter no single quaestio, to the question of mom1l obligation. Francisco Suarez, one of Thomas's early modern oommenta.tors, found the latter's view to be muddled and unworkable. While Sua11ez criticizes Thomas's view, he fails to note that he 1and Thomas do not sha11e the same universe of discourse. What Suarez is after-a " theory of obligation "--is not extant in Thomas's texts. In fact, Suarez contributes to the deontological turn in the history of ethics. He pp. 114-123; Peter Geach, "Good and Evil," in Theories of Ethics, edited by Philippa Foot (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 64-73; Elizabeth Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy" in her Oolleoted Philosophical Papers. Volume 3, l!Jthios, Religion and Politios (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 26-42; Alasdair Macintyre, "Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought'," in Against the Self-Images of the Age (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978), pp. 109·129. While all are critical of Kant, none of these writers advocates a straightforward return to Aristotle or Thomas. Williams, in fact, is sceptical about the viability of Aristotelianism. This litany, moreover, of Kantian critics is not intended to give the impression that there is a consensus on the failure of Kant's project. There are formidable contemporary representatives of the Kantian school. See, for instance, William Frankena, Thinking About Morality (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980); Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1970); and Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: The University of Chicago... (shrink)

The paper presents an analysis and interpretation of axiology and ethics as seen by the writer and philosopher Ayn Rand. The author follows the assumption that, in a situation where indifference is observed with regard to values (cf. Simmel, Sloterdijk), a return of philosophical reasoning to the idea of objectivity of values could be worthwhile. Therefore, he examines a specific type of axiological objectivism that can be found in Rand’s work. In the present paper, the suggested comparison with Baden (...) neo-Kantism as well as phenomenological axiology serves to capture the specifics of Rand’s axiological approach. These lie in placing emphasis on such a relationship between facts and values in which values result from the facts of reality, as well as in the very understanding of the objectivity of values that Rand identifies with long-term life goals and identifies them as an objective necessity for an individual’s life. Following the analysis of Rand’s axiology, the author focuses on her understanding of ethics, which he places in contrast to Kant’s deontology, as well as morality, which he views through the prism of a business relationship based on the exchange of values. The aim of the paper is to, by means of an analysis and interpretation of Rand’s ideas, show that objective values can be understood as a necessary prerequisite for consequential ethics and an individual living a happy life without being anchored in transcendence or social consensus. (shrink)

Herdt's Putting On Virtue has two chief aims. The first is to champion the virtue tradition against Christian moral quietism and modern deontological ethics. The second is to facilitate reconciliation between Augustinian and Emersonian virtue. To accomplish these tasks Herdt constructs a counter-narrative to Schneewind's Invention of Autonomy, in which Luther's resignation and Kant's innovation are tragic consequences of “hyper-Augustinianism”—a competitive conception of divine and human agency, which leads to excessive suspicion of acquired virtue. This review argues (...) that Putting On Virtue succeeds in its first aim but leaves its second intriguingly uncompleted. Despite this deficiency, however, this essay also argues that Putting On Virtue makes plausible Herdt's audacious suggestion that Augustinian and Emersonian perfectionism may be reconciled by bringing acquired and infused virtue under a single term. (shrink)

In business ethics journals, Kant’s ethics is often portrayed as overly formalistic, devoid of substantial content, and without regard for the consequences of actions or questions of character. Hence, virtue ethicists ride happily to the rescue, offering to replace or complement Kant’s theory with their own. Before such efforts are undertaken, however, one should recognize that Kant himself wrote a “virtue theory” (Tugendlehre), wherein he discussed the questions of character as well as the teleological nature of human action. (...) Numerous Kant scholars argue that Kant already erected precisely the kind of integrative moral architecture that some of his modern interpreters (while aiming to supersede him) wish to construct. For business ethics, this divergence of scholarly opinion is of crucial importance. It shows first that the standard portrayals of Kant’s ethics in business ethics textbooks—as rigidly deontological, narrowly individualistic, and hence unsuitable for the specific demands of corporate agency—might have to be revised. Second, discussions in the business ethics literature on stakeholder-engagement and managerial decision-making likewise stand to gain from a more nuanced picture of Kant’s moral philosophy. Third, a reassessment of Kant’s ethics with regard to questions of personal character and moral sentiments might also lead to a more favorable view of the relevance of his ethics for managerial practice. Last, but not least, the many current attempts to reconcile Kant’s freedom-oriented philosophy with virtue theories stand to benefit considerably from a better understanding of how Kant himself conceived of one such synthesis between the formal and substantial aspects of morality. This, ultimately, could lead to an important overlapping consensus in the academic literature as to the role and relevance of virtuous conduct in business. (shrink)

Kant is gaining popularity in business ethics because the categorical imperative rules out actions such as deceptive advertising and exploitative working conditions, both of which treat people merely as means to an end. However, those who apply Kant in this way often hold businesses themselves morally accountable, and this conception of collective responsibility contradicts the kind of moral agency that underlies Kant's ethics. A business has neither inclinations nor the capacity to reason, so it lacks the conditions (...) necessary for constraint by the moral law. Instead, corporate policies ought to be understood as analogous to legal constraints. They may encourage or discourage certain actions, but they cannot determine a person's maxim - which for Kant is the focus of moral judgment. Because there is no collective intention apart from any intentions of the individual agents who act as members of the corporation, an organization itself has no moral obligations. This poses a dilemma: either apply the categorical imperative to the actions of particular businesspeople and surrender the notion of collective responsibility, or apply a different moral theory to the actions of businesses themselves. Given the diffusion of responsibility in a bureaucracy, the explanatory usefulness of collective responsibility may force business ethicists to abandon Kant's moral philosophy. (shrink)

Kant's Foundation of Ethics, translated by Leo Rauch, includes "What is Enlightenment?" and Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. These unabridged works, in contemporary English with oral interpretation, articulate the fundamental principles of Kant's ethical world view. Taken together, these works challenge all free people to think about the requirements for self-determination, both in our individual lives and in our public and private institutions.

Kant's concept of autonomy and the Kantian notion of autonomy are often conflated in bioethics. However, the contemporary Kantian notion has very little at all to do with Kant's original. In order to further bioethics discourse on autonomy, I critically distinguish the contemporary Kantian notion from Kant's original concept of moral autonomy. I then evaluate the practical relevance of both concepts of autonomy for use in bioethics. I argue that it is not appropriate to appeal to either (...) concept toward assessing which patients we ought to respect as autonomous. Finally, I sketch criteria for what I take to be a more promising concept of autonomy for patients. (shrink)

Kant's Foundation of Ethics, translated by Leo Rauch, includes "What is Enlightenment?" and Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. These unabridged works, in contemporary English with oral interpretation, articulate the fundamental principles of Kant's ethical world view. Taken together, these works challenge all free people to think about the requirements for self-determination, both in our individual lives and in our public and private institutions.

For some time now ethical debates have been fought on a field whose boundaries are the historical theories of Kant's deontology and Mill's utilitarianism. Recently, however, several have chosen to leave the battlefield entirely—to suggest, in various ways, that both of the major ethical theories share a common, flawed outlook. Thomas Nagel, for example, has argued that founding ethics on the sole ground of interpersonal obligations unnecessarily “fragments” human value. Such an account has the effect of pitting one (...) species of human value against other quite legitimate values. Or approaching the matter from quite another direction, Philippa Foot also holds that morality, as a system of interpersonal obligations, is too limiting. However, she proposes to counter the advancing forces of modern ethics by championing an Aristotelian doctrine of virtue. (shrink)

Rule-based ethical theories like Kant's appear to be promising for machine ethics because of the computational structure of their judgments. On one formalist interpretation of Kant's categorical imperative, for instance, a machine could place prospective actions into the traditional deontic categories (forbidden, permissible, obligatory) by a simple consistency test on the maxim of action. We might enhance this test by adding a declarative set of subsidiary maxims and other "buttressing" rules. The ethical judgment is then an outcome (...) of the consistency test. While this kind of test can generate results, it may be vacuous in the sense that it would do no more than forbid obviously contradictory maxims of action. It is also possible that the kind of inference in such a rule-based system may be non-monotonic. I discuss these challenges to a rule-based machine ethics, starting from the framework of Kantian ethics. (shrink)

Many philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition have held that the predominant modern western theories of ethics like Kant’s deontological theory and Mill’s Utilitarianism have failed to deliver as a “theory” of ethics. In other words, they are not successful as “decision procedures” whereby one can determine which action from a multitude of actions open before the agent would be right and therefore morally obligatory for him to do. In fact, the basic concepts of moral obligation, impartiality, and (...) objectivity of moral standards has been questioned and pitted against the “personal point of view” of the agent. It has been held that the “moral goods” have to be given up for the sake of the “personal goods.” Is this a systemic fault which is linked with the normative nature of ethics? Or, can we understand ethics in a manner where it can be objective and yet not have to give up on the plurality of moral and nonmoral goods? Can ethical theory in this sense function as an “action guide to moral practice”? These are some questions that will be taken up in the paper against the backdrop of the views of the critics of ethical theory. (shrink)

It has often been said that discourse ethics as developed by Jürgen Habermas can be understood as a dialogical continuation of the monological ethics developed by Immanuel Kant, as formulated in the categorical imperative in Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Like Kant’s categorical imperative, Habermas’ principle of universalization specifies a rule for impartial testing of norms for their moral worthiness. This article will substantiate that discourse ethics develops a dialogical version of the categorical imperative, and will (...) make this explicit. This is done by presenting a new interpretation of the Kantian ethics. Renewing the traditional understanding, four instead of two or three formulations of the categorical imperative are identified. Finally it is shown how this interpretation relates to Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics. This analysis shows that one must specify which formulation of the categorical imperative one is talking about when discussing it. (shrink)

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This is the first book-length study in any language to examine in detail and critically assess the second part of Kant's ethics- -an empirical, impure part, which determines how best to apply pure principles to the human situation. Drawing attention to Kant's under-explored impure ethics, this revealing investigation refutes the common and long-standing misperception that Kants ethics advocates empty formalism. Making detailed use of a variety of Kantian texts never before translated into English, author Robert (...) B. Louden reassesses the strengths and weaknesses of Kantian ethics as a whole, once the second part is re-admitted to its rightful place within Kant's practical philosophy. (shrink)