The present essay analyzes an eighteenth-century phase of the querelle des monstres and highlights two main points. 1) As the cases of Lémery and Winslow demonstrate, in the period when preformation was the dominant view, the dispute over the origin of monsters carried into the very field of preformation the contrast which had originally opposed it to the now defeated model of epigenesis, namely the alternative between mechanical genesis and pre-existence of the monstrous form itself. 2) One of the (...) most important episodes in the shift of teratology from a primarily theological or metaphysical issue to a purely natural one was due to Albrecht von Haller. Haller shifted the dispute from anatomy to embryology; and it is on an embryological base and not on metaphysics that he built his own demonstration of the original nature of the monster. He was furthermore the only scientist of authority who dealt with teratology from an epigenetic standpoint. His numerous changes of view in the field of embryology did in fact never affect his early adherence to the thesis of original monstrosity. (shrink)

Au début du XVIIIe siècle, une querelle éclate entre deux chimistes français à propos de la fabrication artificielle du fer. C’est en fait un conflit entre une interprétation mécaniste des processus chimiques et une approche plus traditionnelle, soupçonnée d’emprunter ses thèses à l’alchimie, mais qui sera pourtant à l’origine de la table des affinités qui sera adoptée par tous les chimistes jusqu’au début du XIXe siècle.

Locke and Leibniz deny that there are any such beings as ‘monsters’ (anomalies, natural curiosities, wonders, and marvels), for two very different reasons. For Locke, monsters are not ‘natural kinds’: the word ‘monster’ does not individuate any specific class of beings ‘out there’ in the natural world. Monsters depend on our subjective viewpoint. For Leibniz, there are no monsters because we are all parts of the Great Chain of Being. Everything that happens, happens for a reason, including a monstrous birth. (...) But what about materialism? Well, beginning with the anatomical interest into ‘monstrous births’ in the French Académie des Sciences in the first three decades of the eighteenth century, there is a shift away from ‘imaginationist’ claims such as those of Malebranche, that if a woman gives birth to a monstrous child it is a consequence of something she imagined. Anatomists such as Lemery and Winslow try to formulate a strictly mechanical explanation for such events, rejecting moral and metaphysical explanations. Picking up on this work, materialist thinkers like Diderot are compelled to reject the very idea of monsters. We are all material beings produced according to the same mechanisms or laws, some of us are more ‘successful’ products than others, i.e. some live longer than others. In his late Eléments de physiologie he says “L’homme est un effet commun, le monstre un effet rare.” Ultimately he arrives at a materialist version of Leibniz’s position: there are no monsters, we are all monsters in each other’s eyes, at one time or another. This conclusion is a pregnant one in light of twentieth century interest in the problem of ‘the normal and the pathological’ (Canguilhem), and the broader question of how materialism relates to the biological world. (shrink)

ArgumentHistorians have accorded a privileged status to the analytic ideal of elements as a distinctive marker of “modern” chemistry. Boyle’s and Lavoisier’s have been used to characterize their modernity, which has in turn justified their status as the founding fathers of modern chemistry. It has been difficult, however, to establish a viable connection between these two fathers or the genealogy of their definitions. I argue in this paper that French didactic tradition gave rise to the definition Boyle stated in the (...) Sceptical Chymist, or the analytic/philosophical ideal of elements. He did not endorse the definition he gave, but criticized its lack of analytic rigor and philosophical sophistication. His critique served as a negative heuristic, leading to Nicolas Lemery’s analytic ideal of “chemical principles” as distinct from “natural principles.” Lemery’s definition survived in French didactic tradition, as is evidenced in Macquer’s and Guyton’s textbooks which provided direct precedents for Lavoisier’s analytic ideal of “elements or principles.”. (shrink)

ArgumentThis article argues that during the seventeenth century chemistry achieved intellectual and institutional recognition, starting its transition from a practical art – subordinated to medicine – into an independent discipline. This process was by no means a smooth one, as it took place amidst polemics and conflicts lasting more than a century. It began when Andreas Libavius endeavored to turn chemistry into a teaching discipline, imposing method and order. Chemistry underwent harsh criticism from Descartes and the Cartesians, who reduced natural (...) phenomena to the mechanical affections of matter, leaving little room for chemistry as an independent discipline. Boyle rejected the chemical principles and promoted the fusion of chemistry with corpuscularianism. He did not reduce chemical phenomena to the mechanical affections of matter, but strived to promote chemistry as part of natural philosophy. Lemery gave strong impulse to the recognition of chemistry as a discipline in its own right by fostering a compromise of chemistry and mechanism. Lemery adopted the chemical principles, but did not see them as the ultimate ingredients of bodies. In order to promote chemistry, he distanced it from alchemy and pursued the reform of chemical terminology. (shrink)

The ArgumentThe relation between alchemy and early chemistry is still open to debate. How did what is now often dismissed as a pseudo-science contribute to the emerging science of chemistry, a subject that by the late eighteenth century, was often held up as a model for other sciences? Alchemy may have bequeathed to chemistry some processes and apparatus; more fundamental, however, was a transformation in mentality. It was in the seventeenth century that much of this transformation took place.A study that (...) was deeply anthropomorphic, making constant use of allegories and symbolism, and with a language rejoicing in mystery and concealment, gradually became depersonalized, much more objective, and more open. Poetic descriptions, a moral dimension, and a hierarchical view of matter all disappeared. Practical considerations required a concern for greater purity of materials, necessary for the successful replication of experiments. A study of the series of seventeenth-century French textbooks of chemistry from Beguin to Lemery reveals a growing desire for practical results and plain speaking. Robert Boyle was particularly influential in urging the necessity of plain language. The creation of a suitable language to denote and differentiate among different chemical species was a crucial step in the development of early chemistry, thus preparing the way for the systematic names introduced in the following century and the full organization of the science on rational lines. (shrink)

The ArgumentEtienn-François Geoffroy' Table des Rapports is generally regarded as a landmark in the evolution of chemistry during the eighteenth century. Issues have arisen among historians concerning the significance and originality of the Table that require fuller attention to the immediate context of chemical research in the Academie des sciences during the two decades that preceded its appearance. The present paper argues that, despite the transition from communal to individual research projects that marked the reorganization of the Academy in 1699, (...) chemists continued to pursue shared problems within a communal ethos. The interactions between Wilhelm Homberg, Etienne-François Geoffroy, and Louis Lemery were particularly prominent. The paper traces one example of this interaction, involving the sulfur principle and its influence on one entry in Geoffroy's Table. Further such studies are needed to elucidate the relation between the concepts of chemical composition and reactions implied in Geoffroy's table and the concepts embodied in the previous work of Geoffroy and his associates in the Academy. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je propose de reprendre la position de Fontenelle à l’endroit de la chimie. C’est une science qu’il connaît mal avant de devenir Secrétaire de l’Académie Royale des Sciences, et dont il doit, comme Secrétaire de l’institution, chercher une légitimité qu’il a contesté à titre personnel. Or la façon dont il rend compte des mémoires de chimie montre que Fontenelle accompagne l’évolution de cette science à partir de 1699, en se montrant ouvert à ce qu’elle propose de nouveauté. (...) Certes, il rejette ce qu’il identifie comme chimie ancienne, en coupant ainsi la chimie du début du 18e siècle de son histoire. Cette opération rhétorique ne doit pas tromper et ne signifie pas qu’il considère que la chimie qui se fait sous ses yeux n’est pas un savoir. Au contraire, il salue ce qui la met sur la voie de la science. Cela le conduit sans doute à insister sur tous les éléments mécanistes utilisés par certains chimistes. S’en tenir là reviendrait toutefois à manquer son importante réflexion sur les affinités à partir de 1718 : pour Fontenelle, elles donnent la « loi fondamentale » de la chimie. La recherche des affinités, en tant qu’elles sont distinctes de l’attraction newtonienne ou des anciennes sympathies occultes, instituent pour Fontenelle la chimie comme une science de plein droit, même si elle échappe à l’explication mécaniste. (shrink)