This essay looks at the relationship between formative aesthetics, language and the historical anticipation that begins with Antonio Gramsci's discussion of Kant's idea of noumenon. In Gramsci both education (as formazione) and aesthetics stem from a concern for power in terms of the hegemonic relations that are inherent to history as a political horizon. The title cites Gramci's suggestion that Kant's noumenon should be read as a proviso set apart by a ‘relative ignorance’ of reality [‘relativa ignoranza’ della realtà] to (...) be resolved by a future science. Yet far from another epistemological layering, a future science must also resolve those hegemonic relations of power that emerge from formation as a political act figured in the agonistic character of language as lingua and linguaggio. Further down the lane of our ‘relative ignorance’ we are confronted by a Post-Taylorist condition that precludes any false hopes of a reversal of society's educational, economic and political misfortunes. Yet, while Post-Taylorism confirms that this state of affairs is irreversible, a deeper inquiry into the aesthetic-agonistic character of formation could afford us answers that are in no way solutions but, because adept to struggle and are characteristically aesthetical, might provide an understanding of the logic of irreversibility. Because it remains conscious of its ‘relative ignorance’, this assumption offers a hopeful approach that comes to us sideways; thereby avoiding the predicament of what Lyotard and Thébaud regarded as a condition where ‘the prescriptive is derived from the descriptive’. (shrink)

Il presente contributo muove dalle osservazioni sul linguaggio che Nietzsche svolge in Umano, troppo umano, I, § 11, con lo scopo di riflettere sulla posizione anti-realista che Nietzsche sostiene in quell’aforisma e di evidenziare il ruolo che essa svolge nelle sue più tarde considerazioni relative alla cultura occidentale e alla sua antropologia. Come si avrà modo di mostrare, la critica nietzscheana al realismo del senso comune è in linea con alcune epistemologie pragmatiste sorte tra Otto- e Novecento. Questo elemento (...) di “attualità” non mina però l’originalità della riflessione di Nietzsche su quell’argomento. Piuttosto, è possibile sostenere che l’idea che il pensiero filosofico intervenga in una correzione dell’impegno metafisico proprio del senso comune sia lo strumento teoretico che permette a Nietzsche di operare sullo sviluppo della cultura e società europee. (shrink)

Si sostiene che esiste una basa sufficiente per attribuire intenzionalità alle creature prive di linguaggio.

Being experienced (Erfahrung) means living. Around these two concepts: experience and living, I created this paper, as an approach to a pretty sensitive field of study, the religious one.The place of truth here can be read between the lines, but this issue stays open and needs more profound study. There is still a question: what is thepriority in studying religious experience: living as an inner and outer manifestation of a person, the analysis of a psychological report between the human being (...) and the divine, the sacred, a research of a belief's truth or all these taken together.It is obvious that Truth stays in itself and its basis is in itself, and the report with the human is found through the act of living. (shrink)

In questa relazione suggerisco di considerare almeno la possibilità che nel Simposio Platone ci offre non una mera spiegazione della natura dell’amore, ma una spiegazione filosofica della natura del linguaggio (sull’amore). Nel Simposio Eros è una maschera di Socrate e Socrate una maschera del linguaggio. La storia di Diotima sulla nascita di Eros, figlio di Poros e Penia conferma questo punto: il linguaggio, come l’amore, non può possedere il suo oggetto come qualcosa di presente ma solo sempre (...) in una fragile bilancia tra presenza e assenza, tra oblio e memoria, tra conoscenza e ignoranza. Il linguaggio, come l’amore, è il demone della comunicazione. In questa relazione presento qualche prova, tratta dal dialogo, atta a supportare tale interpretazione. (shrink)

Drawing on Austin’s speech act theory, many influential scholars view hate speech in terms of speech acts, namely acts of subordination (MacKinnon 1987; Langton 1993, 2012, 2014; Hornsby and Langton 1998; McGowan 2003, 2004; Kukla and Lance 2009; Langton, Haslanger and Anderson 2012; Maitra 2012; Kukla 2014). Austin’s distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts offers a way to set apart speech that constitutes subordination, and speech that merely causes subordination. The aim of my paper is to address the main objection (...) to accounts of hate speech in terms of illocutionary speech acts, that is the Authority Problem. In particular I will claim that what is missing from previous proposals is attention to the broader social context in which ordinary instances of hate speech are embedded, and in particular, attention to the social status of both the speaker and the audience. While the social position of the speaker has been examined by several approaches, the social position of the audience has too often been neglected. I will show that not only must the speaker have a certain kind of standing or social position in order to perform speech acts of subordination, but also the audience must have a certain kind of standing or social position in order to either license or object to the speaker’s authority, and her acts of subordination. (shrink)