In 2001, France became one of the few countries to require corporate social responsibility reporting through its Nouvelles Régulations Économiques #2001-420. However, initial compliance with the statute was low, a factor implying the law lacked normativity. In this exploratory study, we attempt to determine whether there is movement toward normativity by examining the change in CSR disclosure from 2004 in comparison to 2010 for a sample of 81 publicly traded French firms. We measure both the space and the quality of (...) CSR disclosures, including in the latter a measure based on informational quality attributes as discussed by the International Accounting Standards Board, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, and the Global Reporting Initiative. We find significant increases in the space allocated to CSR disclosure, as well as some evidence of increased quality; although the informational quality of the disclosures remains quite low and fewer firms are including negative performance information in their reports. Finally, we document that differences in disclosure space and quality in 2004 appeared to be associated with legitimacy-based variables and that those relations remain largely unchanged in 2010. As such, it appears that the NRE’s goals of increased transparency remain unmet. (shrink)

There are different groups in society who may be considered vulnerable, for example those experiencing mental or physical health issues, learning disabilities, prisoners or children. There are, however, other groups in society who may also be regarded as vulnerable, such as those who are bereaved. Vulnerability in relation to the bereaved occurs as a result of experiencing a normal life event, death or a loss. In this situation vulnerability may be transient and, depending upon the management of the bereavement, generally (...) temporary. Unlike the aforementioned groups, participants required for this type of research (bereavement, death and dying) are able to consent themselves into projects, and the capacity to do so is not an issue. Undertaking research with those who may be considered vulnerable into sensitive, emotive topics such as death and dying can create difficulties for the National Research Ethics Service (NRES), making it difficult to get approval for such studies. It appears that the ethical issues are concerned with not wishing to cause distress to participants when asked for research purposes to recollect what for some may have been emotionally challenging and traumatic events. The article offers a narrative, reflective account of the above from several perspectives: being employed as a contract researcher in a university; having experience of being an active member of a National Health Service Research Ethics Committee; and later assuming the role of full-time postgraduate (PhD) student requiring ethical approval to undertake research with what may be considered a vulnerable group involving a sensitive and emotive topic. Valuable insights from participants – their views on participation in an emotive research project and good practice in research having been explored via questionnaire – are highlighted and discussed. (shrink)

Background: Research Ethics Committees (RECs) or their equivalent review applications for prospective research with human participants. Reviewers use universally agreed principles i to make decisions about whether prospective health and social care research is ethical. Close attention to understanding how reviewers go about their decision-making work and consider principles in practice is limited. Objective: The study aimed to understand how reviewers made decisions in the contexts of meetings and to understand more about how reviewers approach their work. The purpose of (...) this article is to draw on data and findings and to show how reflective equilibrium as a theoretical frame can (1) deepen understanding of ethics review and (2) permit a reflexive examination of the habitual processes of review. Design and participants: Methods captured the day-to-day work of the RECs. Seventeen applications were heard during eight observations. There were 12 formal interviews with reviewers (n = 12) and with researchers (n = 8) which are not reported on in this article. Ethical considerations: Organisational permission for the study was given by the National Research Ethics Service (NRES) whose functions became part of the Health Research Authority (HRA) during the study. The study was given favourable opinion by the University of Salford's REC (Reference HSCR11/17). Findings: Data were analysed using constructed grounded theory resulting in eight themes which revealed attention to procedure and engagement with applications. Reflective equilibrium was used as a qualitative frame to interpret themes distilling them into three processes at work in review: emotion and intuition; imagination and creative thinking; and intuition and trust. Discussion: Reviewers went back and forth between universal principles and considered these in the contexts of each application using the above processes. Conclusions: Reflective equilibrium offers a coherent and grounded account of review work. Reflexivity in training for reviewers is essential for improving practices. The challenges reflexivity presents can be assisted by using reflective equilibrium as a tool to illuminate tacit review processes. (shrink)

Background As the UK’s main healthcare priority-setter, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has good reason to want to demonstrate that its decisions are morally justified. In doing so, it has tended to rely on the moral plausibility of its principle of cost-effectiveness and the assertion that it has adopted a fair procedure. But neither approach provides wholly satisfactory grounds for morally defending NICE’s decisions. In this study we adopt a complementary approach, based on the proposition that (...) a priority-setter's claim to moral justification can be assessed, in part, based on the coherence of its approach and that the reliability of any such claim is undermined by the presence of dissonance within its moral system. This study is the first to empirically assess the coherence of NICE’s formal approach and in doing so to generate evidence-based conclusions about the extent to which this approach is morally justified. Methods The study is grounded in the theory, methods and standards of empirical bioethics. Twenty NICE policy documents were coded to identify and classify the normative commitments contained within NICE technology appraisal policy as of 31 December 2021. Coherence was systematically assessed by attempting to bring these commitments into narrow reflective equilibrium (NRE) and by identifying sources of dissonance. Findings Much of NICE policy rests on coherent values that provide a strong foundation for morally justified decision-making. However, NICE’s formal approach also contains several instances of dissonance which undermine coherence and prevent NRE from being fully established. Dissonance arises primarily from four sources: i) NICE’s specification of the principle of cost-effectiveness; ii) its approach to prioritising the needs of particular groups; iii) its conception of reasonableness in the context of uncertainty, and iv) its concern for innovation as an independent value. Conclusion At the time of analysis, the level of coherence across NICE policy provides reason to question the extent to which its formal approach to technology appraisal is morally justified. Some thoughts are offered on why, given these findings, NICE has been able to maintain its legitimacy as a healthcare priority-setter and on what could be done to enhance coherence. (shrink)

Immigration restrictions close-off large portions of the earth to large proportions of the earth’s population. For those who regard the earth and its natural resources as belonging to mankind equally and in common, this is a morally impermissible state of affairs. This is because, if the earth and its resources belong to all equally, then the exclusion of anyone from any portion of the earth will be a violation of their natural ownership rights. A commitment to Natural Resource Egalitarianism (NRE) (...) is therefore held to entail a commitment to substantially more open, or even fully open borders. This paper does not seek to directly refute the claims of NRE, but rather seeks to demonstrate the failure of arguments from NRE, to establish the moral necessity of a general opening of borders. This paper addresses the two most prominent accounts of Open Borders NRE—Equal Division NRE and Egalitarian Ownership NRE—as well as a more recent attempt to advocate for open borders by combining these two positions into a so-called ‘Combined Model’. This paper argues that none of these three positions can plausibly and coherently account for the moral necessity of open borders. (shrink)

Ezek az írások a megértés és az értelmezés egymástól el nem választható lehetőségeit vizsgálják. Az elmélet próbája az alkalmazás, ennek során válik láthatóvá, hogy a művészetelméleti elgondolások mire és mennyire használhatók. A művekhez fűződő viszonyunk - akarjuk vagy sem -, nem állandó, ezért azok a műalkotások is, amelyeknek látszólag jó ismerői vagyunk, hirtelen meglepetéssel szolgálhatnak. Ám éppen az élteti a műértést, amikor a korábbi olvasatok repedései mentén valami olyasmi tör a felszínre, ami teljességgel váratlan.

In this book authors study neutrosophic super matrices. The concept of neutrosophy or indeterminacy happens to be one the powerful tools used in applications like FCMs and NCMs where the expert seeks for a neutral solution. Thus this concept has lots of applications in fuzzy neutrosophic models like NRE, NAM etc. These concepts will also find applications in image processing where the expert seeks for a neutral solution.

Certain examples involving negatively relevant evidence are trouble for reliabilists, since they show that reliability is not sufficient for justification. Two approaches for dealing with these examples within the reliabilist framework have been taken. Neither approach, however, can account for all cases involving nre. This I will argue. I will explain the two approaches briefly, then describe a counter example which calls for a difference approach. To handle the case I describe, one needs torequire that the agent's belief be ‘internally (...) acceptable’ as well as reliable.Many examples show that reliability is insufficient. Consider a modification of an example by Goldman, which he used to make a different point. Driving through the country, Andy looks to the right, sees a barn, and comes to believe that the object he sees is a barn. His belief, however, is not justified because he possesses nre, viz., his false, but justified, belief that the majority of bam-like objects in the area are barn facsimiles which, under the present visual circumstances, are almost indistinguishable from real barns. (shrink)

It is now typical for human subjects research to be regulated by review by an independent research ethics committee in most jurisdictions. However it is common for countries to opt to only compulsorily regulate medical research while leaving some or all non-medical research either unregulated or only regulated on a voluntary basis. In this paper I will argue, using regulation in the UK as an example, that it is difficult to justify this sharp distinction in practices. While I won’t come (...) to any definitive conclusions in this paper as to whether research ought to be regulated compulsorily I will suggest that we would be better to regulate all research, albeit perhaps with a lighter touch than the present UK system if we want to prevent some highly risky research avoiding appropriate regulation. I will examine several arguments to defend making such a distinction; that medical professionals have special moral duties, that medical research has a higher magnitude/frequency of risks and that regulating non-medical research constitutes the inappropriate imposition of the medical model onto non-medical research. Having critiqued these objections I will then discuss the advantages of harmonizing the regulation of research and conclude that there is not a good reason to treat medical and non-medical research as fundamentally different in kind. (shrink)