Charles Péguy (1873–1914) was a French religious poet, philosophical essayist, publisher, social activist, Dreyfusard, and Catholic convert. There has recently been a renewed recognition of Péguy in France as a thinker of unique significance, a reconsideration inspired in large part by Gilles Deleuze’s Différence et répétition, which ranked him with Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. In the English-speaking world, however, access to Péguy has been hindered by a scarcity of translations of his work. This first complete translation of (...) one of his most important prose works, with accompanying interpretive introduction and notes, will introduce English-speaking readers to a new voice, which speaks in a powerful and original way to a modern West in a condition of cultural and spiritual crisis. The immediate circumstance of the writing of this last prose essay, unfinished at the time of Péguy’s early death, was the placing of Henri Bergson’s philosophical works on the Catholic Index, and Péguy’s undertaking to defend his former teacher from his critics, both Catholic and secular. But the subject of Bergson is also a springboard for the exploration of the perennial themes—philosophical, theological, and literary—most central to Péguy’s thought. (shrink)

SummaryThe literary criticism of the 1940s and contemporary theological criticism of the Second Vatican Council (1962) have presented Charles Péguy as an exemplary figure of the ‘word inhabited’ in the twentieth century. Charles Péguy himself never said nor wrote that he was a prophet. It seems, however, that this term with which literary criticism had tagged him is the most effective in capturing the sense of his work, in which a new poetic mode, a new political (...) position, and a new theological knowledge of God go together to interrogate people from God's lofty perspective—which is the definition of prophetism. The prophet, a man whose word is ‘inhabited’, is indeed a man who speaks God, not a man who speaks about God. Péguy seems to have written with that vision in mind, both to make an appeal to people of his time and to testify to the sense of being alive in the world. In this respect, Péguy's work seems to be the perfect material with which to analyse Christian-inspired prophetism in the secularised world of the beginning of the twentieth century. (shrink)

This article sheds new light on Bruno Latour’s sociology of science and technology by looking at his early study of the French writer, philosopher and editor Charles Péguy (1873–1914). In the early 1970s, Latour engaged in a comparative study of Péguy’s Clio and the four gospels of the New Testament. His 1973 contribution to a Péguy colloquium (published in 1977) offers rich insights into his interest in questions of time, history, tradition and translation. Inspired by Gilles (...) Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, Latour reads Clio as spelling out and illustrating the following argument: ‘Repetition is a machine to produce differences with identity’. However, in contrast to Deleuze’s work (together with Félix Guattari) on the materiality of machines, or assemblages [agencements], Latour emphasizes the semiotic aspects of the repetition/difference process. As in Péguy, the main model for this process is the Roman Catholic tradition of religious events. The article argues that it is this reading of Péguy and Latour’s early interest in biblical exegesis that inspired much of Latour’s later work. In Laboratory Life (Latour and Woolgar, 1979) and The Pasteurization of France (1988) in particular, problems of exegesis and tradition provide important stimuli for the analysis of scientific texts. In this context, Latour gradually transforms the question of tradition into the problem of reference. In a first step, he shifts the event that is transmitted and translated from the temporal dimension (i.e. the past) to the spatial (i.e. from one part of the laboratory to another). It is only in a second step that Latour resituates scientific events in time. As facts they are ‘constructed’ but nevertheless ‘irreducible’. They result, according to Latour, from the tradition of the future. As a consequence, the Latourian approach to science distances itself from the materialism of Deleuze and other innovative theoreticians. (shrink)

Los cristianos y la teología leen la encarnación de Cristo como adviento e irrupción de Dios en la historia de los hombres. Tomando ocasión de la lectura de Booz endormi de Victor Hugo, Charles Péguy presenta lo que él considera el único reconocimiento del acontecimiento de la encarnación por parte de un pagano. Esta lectura que al mismo tiempo es una presentación de un aspecto del pensamiento de Péguy sobre la encarnación, muestra a esta como una producción (...) que también se refiere al hombre y para cuyo reconocimiento se necesitaría un método teológico que Péguy define como bergsoniano. De este modo, Péguy ofrece interrogaciones y un camino interesante para el pensamiento teológico y de la fe cristiana para volver a reflexionar sobre la verdadera humanidad del hebreo Jesús y sobre el significado que el hombre representa para el mismo Dios hecho carne. (shrink)

Title: Colère de Péguy Publisher: Hachette ISBN: 2010127439 Author: Jean-Michel Rey Title: Charles Péguy Publisher: Gallimard ISBN: 2070111148 Author: Oeuvres en Prose Complètes.

« Ma seconde maxime était d’être le plus ferme et le plus résolu en mes actions que je pourrais, et de ne suivre pas moins constamment les opinions les plus douteuses, lorsque je m’y serais une fois déterminé, que si elles eussent été très assurées. Imitant en ceci les voyageurs qui, se trouvant égarés en quelque forêt, ne doivent pas errer en tournoyant, tantôt d’un côté, tantôt d’un autre, ni encore moins s’arrêter en une place, mais marcher toujours le plus (...) droit qu’ils peuvent vers un mêm.. (shrink)

When Charles Péguy asserted boldly “c’est une renaissance catholique qui se fait par moi”, he was speaking as one ahead of his time. As others caught up, and following a prolonged period of sterility, the first stirrings of renewal began to be felt. A “Catholic renaissance” was emerging. Enlivened by the original work of a brilliant generation of philosophers, a surprising fermentation began in theology, philosophy, literature, and history. In the rich flowering of Catholic theology that followed, the (...) leading French Dominicans and Jesuits of Le Saulchoir and Lyon-Fourvière respectively played a dominant role, but the movement also embraced Belgium and Germany. The objectives of the present paper are, first, to exhibit those philosophers, notably Blondel and Maritain, who were concerned to prioritise the person in society, what became known as ‘personalism’, and will consider their profound impact on the ressourcement generation. Secondly, it attempts to provide an account of how French “Catholic philosophy” at mid-century shaped theology and profoundly influenced the course of church history in the intervening period. Thirdly, it considers again Jean Daniélou’s innovative contribution to philosophy and culture. (shrink)

We may paraphrase Charles Péguy by noting that the philosophical classics are new every morning and nothing is as old as today’s latest philosophical fad. Even fads are not without their value, however, if some new approach or method is introduced and shown to be really contributory to “progress in clarification” in either historical understanding or in the pursuit of new knowledge. In any case, the great enduring philosophical views present a continual challenge to be updated in the (...) light of new knowledge. We know much more now about individuals, classes, relations, predication, identity, and the like, than was known in the days of Peirce and Bradley. It may be helpful to examine the views of these writers on these topics, especially as concerns continuous relations, in the light of what we now know. The result will be not only an updating but to some extent a defense and rational reconstruction of some views which have long been in disrepute among writers who pride themselves upon logical clarity. (shrink)

Ce cours inédit fut professé par Bergson depuis la chaire d'" Histoire de la philosophie grecque et latine " du Collège de France lors de l'année universitaire 1901-1902. Faisant suite au cours sur l'Idée de cause, le cours sur l'Idée de temps a ceci de remarquable que Bergson aborde de façon directe, donc sans le détour par l'exposition et la résolution de problématiques autres, ce qui semble la thématique centrale de sa pensée. Un autre point remarquable de ce cours est (...) la réflexion sur la négation qui donnera naissance, dans L'Evolution créatrice, à l'analyse de l'idée de Néant. La publication de ce premier cours de Bergson vient clore la publication inédite des cours de Bergson au Collège de France, édités à partir des prises de notes d'un proche et des transcriptions commandées par Charles Péguy. (shrink)

Kierkegaard’s ideal supports a radical form of “deep diversity,” to use Charles Taylor’s expression. It is radical because it embraces not only irreducible conceptions of the good but also incompatible ones. This is due to its paradoxical nature, which arises from its affirmation of both monism and pluralism, the One and the Many, together. It does so in at least three ways. First, in terms of the structure of the self, Kierkegaard describes his ideal as both unified (the “positive (...) third”) and plural (a “negative unity”). Second, he affirms a process which brings together unity, as implied by the linear notion of “stages”, with plurality, in the form of “spheres of existence” (aesthetic, ethical, and religious). And third, the culmination of the process implies that we should embrace both a unified dialectic (“Religiousness A”) alongside the plural remnants of the ethical/aesthetic, that is, both the infinity of the former and the finitudes of the latter. Unsurprisingly, while Kierkegaard describes those who are able to exemplify his ideal in practice as “always joyful,” he also considers the ideal to be “extremely hard, the hardest task of all.” This is why those such as Hubert L. Dreyfus are wrong to claim that it provides an experience of bliss; on the contrary, those who realize it “are always in danger.” As I shall show, one form this danger takes is that it threatens to dirty the hands of those who manage to uphold Kierkegaard’s ideal. Moreover, it does so in ways that, I claim, tend to be missed by Kierkegaard himself. Nevertheless, the danger is also essential to the creativity of his approach, and I conclude by pointing out how this creativity makes it capable of tackling one of the profoundest challenges in contemporary ethics: that arising from what just war theorists call a “supreme emergency.”. (shrink)

A rich literature in public health has demonstrated that health is strongly influenced by a host of environmental factors that can vary according to social, economic, geographic, cultural or physical contexts. Bioethicists should, we argue, recognize this and – where appropriate – work to integrate environmental concerns into their field of study and their ethical deliberations. In this article, we present an argument grounded in scientific research at the molecular level that will be familiar to – and so hopefully more (...) persuasive for – the biomedically-inclined in the bioethics community. Specifically, we argue that the relatively new field of molecular epigenetics provides novel information that should serve as additional justification for expanding the scope of bioethics to include environmental and public health concerns. We begin by presenting two distinct visions of bioethics: the individualistic and rights-oriented and the communitarian and responsibility-oriented. We follow with a description of biochemical characteristics distinguishing epigenetics from genetics, in order to emphasize the very close relationship that exists between the environment and gene expression. This then leads to a discussion of the importance of the environment in determining individual and population health, which, we argue, should shift bioethics towards a Potterian view that promotes a communitarian-based sense of responsibility for the environment, in order to fully account for justice considerations and improve public health. (shrink)

CHARLES DUPRAS | : L’épigénétique est un champ d’études qui s’intéresse aux modifications biochimiques et aux changements dans la structure tridimensionnelle de l’ADN ayant pour effet de contraindre ou de faciliter la lecture et l’expression des gènes. Au cours des dix dernières années, l’épigénétique a attiré l’attention d’un nombre croissant de chercheurs en sciences sociales, puisqu’elle semble venir confirmer, cette fois sur le plan moléculaire, le rôle déterminant de l’environnement développemental des personnes dans la configuration de leur individualité biologique (...) et dans la programmation de leur santé future. Cet article se penche sur les implications épistémologiques potentielles de l’épigénétique. Nous distinguons et décrivons trois perspectives socio-anthropologiques complémentaires, adoptées par différents auteurs, sur le rapprochement des concepts de « nature » et de « culture » par l’épigénétique : la socialisation du biologique, la biologisation du social et la superposition nature-culture. | : Epigenetics is a field of study that focuses on biochemical modifications and changes in the tridimensional structure of DNA that have the effect of constraining or facilitating the reading and expression of genes. Over the last ten years, epigenetics has captured the attention of several social scientists since it appears to confirm, this time at the molecular level, the determining role of the developing environment of people in configurating their biological individuality and programming their future health. This article discusses the potential epistemological implications of epigenetics. It distinguishes and describes three complementary socio-anthropological perspectives, taken by different authors, on the rapprochement of the concepts “nature” and “nurture” by epigenetics: the socialization of the biological, the biologization of the social, and the superimposition nature-nurture. (shrink)

The question is: how does the thought of Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein lead to such different postfoundationalist views as those of Charles Taylor and Richard Rorty? I consider how the "phenomenology of everyday life" in Heidegger and Wittgenstein shows (1) that understanding is dependent on a social background of meanings, and (2) that the sense of reality embodied in our actions is prestructured by language. This picture of everydayness is holistic, antidualistic and nonfoundationalist. I conclude by focusing the (...) debate between Taylor and Rorty, suggesting that Taylor's reading of our current philosophical situation is more viable. (shrink)