Given Plutarch’s fragmentary piece on Aristophanes and Menander, a piece of Table Talk on almost the same topic and various attacks on comic poets scattered through the Lives, one might believe that Plutarch is a staid, conservative and humourless author. But several other instances in his writings reveal a playful, facetious, witty and humorous Plutarch. This paper will focus on the Quaestiones Convivales, which bear ample witness to this aspect of Plutarch’s personality and authorial technique. It will examine the ways (...) in which he introduces and describes the various interlocutors, discuss certain comments with which he tries to ridicule his philosophical opponents, notably the Stoics and the Epicureans, try to distinguish the various manifestations of Plutarch’s humour and finally suggest that Plutarch’s stance and attitude towards playfulness, comic situations and laughter may ultimately be affected, at least in part, by his allegiance to Plato. (shrink)

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

I here examine the underlying order of Plutarch’s Isis and Osiris, following compositional cues the author uses to highlight its themes, in order to draw out distinctive features of Plutarch’s philosophical agenda. After placing the text in the context of Plutarch’s general themes and his other main Platonic-hermeneutical works, I follow the indications of key framing devices to bring to the surface his structuring concerns first with the erotic character of the cosmos, in which human eros is at home, and (...) second with the intentions of ancient lawgivers to civilize human communities, both of which he sees represented in the Isis myth. The text thus exemplifies both Plutarch’s recovery of the unity in Plato of metaphysics and political philosophy and his manner of achieving that recovery through a coordinated threefold hermeneutics of wisdom traditions and human and cosmic phenomena. (shrink)

Current scholarship all but unanimously depicts Plutarch as a straightforward Platonist. The Lives of Lycurgus and Numa in particular are regularly cited as evidence of Plutarch's adherence to Platonic political doctrines, because in both Lives Plutarch makes explicit reference to the 'best regime' of Plato's Republic. In this article, I question the consensus opinion through an examination of Plutarch's Lycurgus and Numa. I argue that far from unreflectively applying a Platonic paradigm, Plutarch develops a subtle critique of Plato's (...) best regime. Plutarch shows himself to be more sensitive to the political utility of honour and more wary of the benefits of 'philosopher-kings' than the Socrates of the Republic. I conclude by suggesting how the recognition of Plutarch's departure from Plato might influence one's general approach to the Parallel Lives. (shrink)

A Platonist philosopher and priest of Apollo at Delphi, Plutarch (ca. 45-120 CE) covers in his vast oeuvre of miscellaneous writings and biographies of great men virtually every aspect of ancient religion, Greek, Roman, Jewish, Egyptian, Persian. This collection of essays takes the reader on a hike through Plutarch's Religious Landscapes offering as a compass the philosopher's considerations on issues of philosophical theology, cult, ethics, politics, natural sciences, hermeneutics, atheism, and life after death. Plutarch provides a unique vantage point (...) to reconstruct and understand many of the interesting developments that were taking in the philosophical and religious world of the first centuries CE. (shrink)

Different translations of Plutarch's De Pythiae oraculis 404B reflect an interpretative difficulty not yet adequately thematized by exegetes. Plutarch's dialogues on the Delphic oracle describe two perspectives on mantic inspiration: possession prophecy, where the god takes over the prophetess as a passive apparatus, and stimulation prophecy, where the god incites the prophecy, but the prophetess delivers the oracle through her own faculties. Plutarch understands the Pythia at Delphi to exhibit stimulation prophecy, not possession. One of his metaphors for (...) inspiration comes from the theatre: the god ‘puts the oracle into the Pythia's mouth, like an actor speaking through the mask’ (De Pyth. or. 404B [Russell]). Some translators take the metaphor as describing possession prophecy (Goodwin), while others take it as stimulation prophecy (Babbitt)—in other words, it may describe the view Plutarch affirms or the view he rejects. This article assesses the two alternatives, concluding that the theatre metaphor describes possession prophecy. (shrink)

Plutarch was a brilliant Platonist, an erudite historian, a gifted author of highly polished literary dialogues, a priest of Apollo at Delphi, and a devoted politician in his hometown Chaeronea. He felt confident in the most technical and specialized discussions, yet was not afraid of rhetorical generalizations. In his voluminous oeuvre, he appears as a sharp polemicist and a loving father, an ardent pupil but also a kind, inspiring teacher, a sober historian and a teller of wondrous tales. In view (...) of all these different personae, erudite versatility is without any doubt a major characteristic of Plutarch’s works. A Versatile Gentleman is dedicated to Luc Van der Stockt, professor emeritus of Greek language and literature at KU Leuven and a truly versatile gentleman. The volume aims to do justice to his and Plutarch’s versatility by discussing the Chaeronean from many different angles. As such, it sheds new light on the coherence of, and the tensions in, Plutarch’s thinking and writing. (shrink)

While perhaps best known for his Lives, Plutarch also wrote philosophical dialogues that constitute a major intellectual legacy from the first century A.D. This collection presents two important short works from his writings in moral philosophy. They reveal Plutarch at his best--informative, sympathetic, rich in narrative--and are accompanied by an extensive commentary that situates Plutarch and his views on marriage in their historical context.

The paper argues that ancient dogmatic Platonists, beginning with Antiochus, reconstructed Plato’s ethics in different ways, as a result of their different emphasis on parts of Plato’s work and often argued with each other about what Plato’s ethics actually was. This situation, it is argued, is due to the existence of different strands of ethical views found in Plato’s work itself, such as, for instance, the Protagoras and the Gorgias versus the central books of the Republic and the Philebus on (...) the question of what eudaimonia consists in. The paper argues against the thesis of Julia Annas, outlined in her Platonic Ethics Old and New, that ancient dogmatic Platonists considered the argument of the Republic as being essentially the same with that of all Platonic dialogues and that they unanimously represented Plato’s ethical position as the view that virtue is sufficient for happiness. The testimonies regarding the ethics of Platonists like Antiochus, Plutarch, Numenius, Taurus, or Atticus rather suggest a picture of variance and tension about the reconstruction of Plato’s ethics. Antiochus, Plutarch, and Taurus, for instance, are guided by the theory of the partite soul and maintain that for Plato emotions should be balanced by reason, a view they also find in Aristotle, whereas Eudorus and Atticus appear to favor the elimination of all emotions. Alcinous and, more systematically, Plotinus tend to reconcile and synthesize into a system the different views found in Plato’s dialogues, which brings them to attribute to Plato a complex ethical doctrine. This synthesis corroborates the evidence examined in the paper in support of the view that ancient Platonists recognized diverse strands of ethics in Plato and, far from being unanimous about what Plato’s ethics was, varied significantly in their reconstruction of it. (shrink)

How to read Plutarch in the context of New Testament studies? Almost 50 years after the seminal project on the topic led by Hans Dieter Betz, this volume elevates once again the issue's priority. Bridging discourses is a fitting description both of the religio-philosophical spirit of Plutarch, the Platonist philosopher and priest of Apollo at Delphi, and the task of bringing his writings into fruitful dialogue with the writings of the New Testament, Hellenistic Judaism, and Early Christianity. Taken together, these (...) authors constitute the religious Platonism of the early imperial era. Contributions from the fields of New Testament, classics, philosophy, religious studies, and patristics explore various ways of how to establish these bridges. (shrink)

Plutarch of Chaeronea is one of the most influential and fascinating authors of antiquity. His Parallel Lives and Moralia are storehouses of challenging questions, valuable insights and interesting observations. Moreover, they contain a wealth of quotations from and references to earlier writers and traditions, and thus provide one of the richest gateways to the ancient world. This book introduces the reader to Plutarch's life and to the different facets of his variegated thinking and writing, such as his tremendous erudition, (...) his Platonism and (moral) philosophy, his interpretation of history and his view of God. Above all, Plutarch stands out as a particularly clever and subtle thinker, driven by a spirit of painstaking enquiry (zetesis) that shows authentic and impressive intellectual honesty and sincere love of the truth. In this respect, as in many others, he remains an inspiring model even for us today. (shrink)

Thanks to the work of Stephen Newmyer, Plutarch’s importance for modern philosophical debates concerning animal rationality and rights has been brought to the forefront. But Newmyer’s important scholarship overlooks Plutarch’s commitment to a range of rational functions that can be ascribed to animals of various sorts throughout the Moralia. Through an application of the ‘spectrum of animal rationality’ described in the treatise On Moral Virtue to the dialogues where his interlocutors explore the rational capacities of non-human animals (especially Whether Land (...) or Sea Animals are Smarter and Gryllus), this article argues that Plutarch’s commitment to a broad and inclusive sense of ‘reason’ conditions any positive account of animal rationality. Rather, any suggestions of the rational capacities of non-human animals are deeply implicated in Plutarch’s universal system of reason, which differentiates grades of rationality to animals based on natural difference – not unlike his contemporary Stoics. While modern proponents of animal rationality might find some of Plutarch’s ideas unpalatable, the upshot of this study is a fuller sense of Plutarch’s articulate and inclusive sense of reason, which is able to accommodate not only Platonist and Peripatetic notions, but also those of the Stoics and Epicureans, who are especially singled out in the humorous dialogue Gryllus. Thus, Plutarch’s ‘eclecticism’ can be explained as a deep commitment to a universal notion of ‘reason’, marked by a range of functions accessible to all animals – including his philosophical enemies. (shrink)

The idea that mythos and logos are incompatible, and that truth is a product of scientific and dialectical thinking, was certainly disproven by later Platonic philosophers. Deploying the works of Hesiod and Homer, Homeric Hymns and other such literature, they considered myth a valuable and significant augment to philosophical discourse. Plato’s denigration of myth gave his followers an incentive to read myth as allegory. The Stoics and first-century philosophers such as Philo, treated allegory as a legitimate interpretive strategy. The Middle (...) Platonists incorporated myth, for example, deifying the Monad and Dyad, as did 2nd century Platonists. Plutarch’s Isis and Osiris, for example, equates Isis and Osiris with form and matter: the god sows in matter logoi from himself. Porphyry’s allegorizing of Plato’s Cave of the Nymphs is another example. Plotinus is a strong influence on how the late Neoplatonists regarded myth. This paper argues that these philosophers’ use of allegory prepared the way for the Neoplatonists treatment of myth as inspired symbolism. Proclus and Syrianus, as reported by Hermias, did something more extreme by using mythology to construct inspired symbolic argument. Mythos becomes another type of logos, a vehicle for representing the invisible world of being, another kind of truth that can even serve a function in anagogic ascent. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to PorphyryR. M. DancyGeorge E. Karamanolis. Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Pp. x + 419. Cloth, $125.00.Coleridge wrote: “Every man is born an Aristotelian or a Platonist. I do not think it possible that anyone born an Aristotelian can become a Platonist; and I am sure that (...) no born Platonist can ever change into an Aristotelian. They are two classes of man, beside which it is next to impossible to conceive a third.”Ancient Platonists could not be counted on to accept this kind of dichotomy, and that is what Karamanolis’s book is about. (It may be usefully compared with Lloyd P. Gerson’s 2005 book, Aristotle and Other Platonists.) It covers Antiochus (second century BC), Plutarch [End Page 634] of Chaeronea, Numenius, Atticus, Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus, and Porphyry (third century AD). And it does so with incredible thoroughness, making it a tough read. The book began as a dissertation; it still has something of the air of one.The longest chapter is devoted to Porphyry, whom Karamanolis claims to be the first Platonist to write commentaries on books of Aristotle, and the first to adopt the view that Aristotle simply was in agreement with Plato—the founder of a tradition in scholarship to the effect that “Plato is named as the authority in metaphysics, and Aristotle in logic” (330). His concluding paragraph is this:It is this understanding of philosophizing which lies behind the formation of the Pla-tonist syllabus I described in the beginning of this book. This remains the situation until the Renaissance. When Renaissance humanists revive ancient philosophy, especially Platonism, as happened in Renaissance Florence, they re-establish this very model. Few other shifts in the history of Western philosophy are of such significance as the one which we, quite rightly, attribute to Porphyry.(330)The “Platonist syllabus” to which Karamanolis here adverts is perhaps summed up when he says that “from the third to the sixth century AD... Aristotle was appropriated by Platonists because they found his philosophy, if properly studied, a prerequisite for, and conducive to, an understanding of Plato’s thought” (4). More precisely, Karamanolis’s book is about Porphyry’s view and the background of its formation.Answering Karamanolis’s title question is not what is at stake; rather, he is concerned with how the Platonists listed above answered it. So we are not getting a history of the reading of Plato and Aristotle as agreeing or disagreeing from the very beginning. The early Academy and the skeptical Academy before Antiochus, for example, do not figure, except incidentally, in Karamanolis’s story (although there is a useful appendix on the early peripatetics). There is enough here to keep us busy without this.Dealing with any of Karamanolis’s Platonists is made more difficult by the nature of the material that remains: except for Plutarch and Plotinus, it is almost entirely fragmentary. So it is a question of interpreting not just the target authors, whose works we do not possess, but the sources we have for them, who have their own hobby-horses to ride, and hence are not always reliable. Karamanolis pays suitable attention to such details. But the back-and-forth discussion required can make it difficult to keep the larger picture in view.Karamanolis’s Platonists do not uniformly go for the agreement of Plato and Aristotle. As Karamanolis has it, Porphyry is the only one to swallow it whole: “... nowhere does Porphyry criticize Aristotle,” he concludes (322). This requires him to explain away what he regards as misunderstandings of the evidence (243–45 records some disagreements, and the Porphyry chapter throughout is dedicated to rebuttal). Karamanolis is at least prima facie convincing. At the opposite end of the spectrum are Atticus and Numenius, whose antipathy toward Aristotle is universal.For the rest, whether we are to say that Plato and Aristotle were in agreement obviously depends on what the agreement is to be about. There is, among Karamanolis’s Platonists, a good deal of interesting variation over that. Most of those who... (shrink)

In the first half of the first century BC the Academy of Athens broke up in disarray. From the wreckage of the semi-sceptical school there arose the new dogmatic philosophy of Antiochus, synthesized from Stoicism and Platonism, and the hardline Pyrrhonist scepticism of Aenesidemus. With his extensive knowledge of the ways in which Plato was read and invoked as an authority in late antiquity Dr Tarrant builds a most impressive reconstruction of Philo of Larissa's brand of Platonism and (...) of its arrival in Middle Platonism, particularly that of Plutarch, long after the Academy's institutional demise. Particularly valuable is his exploitation for this purpose of a text barely discussed since its publication 80 years ago - a commentary on Plato's Theaetetus whose unidentified author Dr Tarrant has cogently argued to be a follower of Philo. Among many other achievements, Dr Tarrant throws much light on the relation of Aenesideman scepticism to the Academy. (shrink)

In this paper I ask what it is that adds credibility to Crantor (d. 276/5 BC) as an authority on managing one’s grief, especially grief at the loss of children. At first sight the homoerotic ethos of the Academy in his time made it unlikely that high profile members would have concerned themselves with children of their own. The primary source used is Plutarch’s Consolation to Apollonius, where it is clear that immediate suppression of grief and other natural feelings is (...) not intended, nor must rationality always override them. Rather the consolation helps to produce a pause that allows reason to gradually bring such feelings down to a rational level. Texts associated with Crantor already idealize suspension of judgment at times of pressure, even if his partner Arcesilaus took this epokhê further. (shrink)

Although acknowledging both the style and terminology of the Seventh Letter to be genuinely Platonic in character, Edelstein is nevertheless convinced that "the whole concept of Plato the man and the philosopher proposed in the epistle is in contradiction with the spirit and the letter of Platonic teaching." In order to expose this "perversion" of true Platonism, he seeks to establish the spuriousness of the letter first on grounds of historical discrepancy, secondly on grounds of philosophical discrepancy with the (...) dialogues. A final section seeks to confirm these findings by setting the Seventh Letter in the context of the other letters—evidence against the genuineness of which Edelstein finds "overwhelming." Through an ingenious use of Plutarch's Life of Dion and carefully selected references from the dialogues, the first section seeks to persuade the reader that the author of the letter is confused about Plato's own youth and early manhood, about both the motivation and the accounts of the journeys to Sicily, about the content of any advice given to Dion and Dionysius, and finally about the portrayal of Dion, Dionysius, and Plato himself. Edelstein's own suggestion is that the letter was forged about twelve years after Plato's death by some unknown admirer who, wishing to reinterpret Plato's life more favorably, modelled his version on Timoleon of Corinth. From Edelstein's point of view, it is important to urge the spuriousness of the letter on historical grounds before coming to grips with the so-called philosophic digression since it is the letter's interpretation of Platonic philosophy and philosophic method that he wishes above all to reject. Drawing less heavily on the dialogues and more on his own sense of contradiction, Edelstein attempts to establish the unplatonic character of both the philosophical testing of Dionysius and the views on philosophical writing. The account of philosophic method as a "passing in turn from one to another [of the Four], up and down" is dismissed as evidently divergent from dialectic—although no serious attempt is made to analyze or compare the two. Finally, interpreting the doctrine of the Fifth as indication that for the author of the letter "the Ideas themselves are thoughts" and "as thoughts of the mind are as it were part and parcel of the mind," Edelstein moves to his conclusion: the forger of the Seventh Letter is a post-Platonic member of the Academy for whom the Ideas are only conceptually real. It is of course disappointing that "one must resign oneself to classifying him as a Platonist of sorts whose name and background are unknown."—R. D. (shrink)

To approach philosophy as a way of working on the self means to begin not with the experience it clarifies and the subject it discovers, but with the acts of self‐transformation it requires and the subjectivity it seeks to fashion. Commenting on the variety of spiritual exercises to be found in the ancient schools, Pierre Hadot remarks that: Some, like Plutarch’s ethismoi, designed to curb curiosity, anger or gossip, were only practices intended to ensure good moral habits. Others, particularly the (...) meditations of the Platonic tradition, demanded a high degree of mental concentration. Some, like the contemplation of nature as practiced in all philosophical schools, turned the soul toward the cosmos, while still others—rare and exceptional—led to a transfiguration of the personality, as in the experiences of Plotinus. We also saw that the emotional tone and notional content of these exercises varied widely from one philosophical school to another: from the mobilization of energy and consent to destiny of the Stoics, to the relaxation and detachment of the Epicureans, to the mental concentration and renunciation of the sensible world among the Platonists.1 While successfully applied to ancient philosophy,2 this approach has not been widely exploited in the history of philosophy more broadly. There is, however, at least one study of medieval metaphysics in these terms,3 and there are some important discussions of early modern Stoicism and Epicureanism.4 And a recent study of Hume shows the fruitfulness of the approach for Enlightenment philosophy.5 It is all the more surprising then that there seems to have been no serious attempt to approach Kant’s moral philosophy in this way. (shrink)

This collection of articles explores a broad range of issues relating to the development of Platonism. The volume takes in such figures as John Scotus Eriugena and Salomon ibn Gabirol, while bearing witness to an understanding and appreciation of the last head of the Platonic Academy, Damascius. The volume begins with a study of an aspect of Plato himself, his distinctly ironic way of making use of the ancient concept of the golden age and the history of a notion (...) that he bequeathed to his successors, the idea that the philosopher should develop something of an art or science of erotics. The volume continues on to explore areas such as the philosophical stature of Plato's nephew and successor, Speusippus, the functioning of Platonic dialogues within the intellectual life of the school, issues and figures within middle Platonism - notably Philo of Alexandria and Plutarch - various aspects of Plotinus' thought, evidence from Porphyry and Iamblichus and different aspects of the philosophy of Proclus. (shrink)

Socrates’ notorious “divine sign” (δαιμόνιον) was a challenge for the later philosophical (esp. Platonic) tradition. Different attempts at interpretation were made throughout late Antiquity. One interesting approach, discussed in this article, was the strategy of interpreting the phenomenon by means of Homeric material. In particular, Athena’s famous epiphany to Achilles at the beginning of Iliad Book 1 provides interesting opportunities in such a context, although other Homeric lines are occasionally used as well. This rich tradition, beginning with Plutarch’s De genio (...) Socratis, can also be found in authors such as Maximus of Tyre, Apuleius, Julian, and Hermias of Alexandria, and turns up again centuries later in Byzantine Homeric exegesis. (shrink)

This volume gathers an international team of renowned scholars in the fields of ancient greek philosophy, in order to explore the continuous but changing dialogue between Platonism and Aristotelianism from the early imperial age to the end of Antiquity. While most chapters concern Platonists (Philo, Plutarch, Plotinus, Syrianus, Proclus, Damascius, Philoponus), and their uses or criticism of Aristotle's doctrines, several chapters are also devoted to Peripatetic authors (Boethius and mostly Alexander of Aphrodisias) and their attitudes towards Plato's positions. Each (...) of the eleven chapters draws the attention to specific polemical contexts and philosophical problems which made Platonists and Aristotelians unite against common adversaries like the Stoics, or split up, not only in the fields of metaphysics and cosmology, but also in epistemology, psychology and ethics. (shrink)

Plutarch's essay de fortuna Romanorum has attracted divergent judgements. Ziegler dismissed it as ‘eine nicht weiter ernst zu nehmende rhetorische Stilübung’. By Flacelière it was hailed as ‘une ébauche de méditation sur le prodigieux destin de Rome’. It is time to consider the work afresh and to discover whether there is common ground between these two views. Rather than offering a general appreciation, my treatment will take the work chapter by chapter, considering points of interest as they arise. This (...) method will enable us to compare what Plutarch says on particular subjects and themes in de fort. Rom. with what he says or does not say about them elsewhere. We shall thus be able to see clearly that for the most part the ideas he presents in the essay correspond with his thoughts about the rôle of fortune expressed in more serious writing, and that, where there is no correspondence, this is attributable to the rhetorical background. I do not intend to address directly the frequently discussed but insoluble question of whether we have in de fort. Rom. only one of two original works, that is whether there was once a de virtute Romanorum which Plutarch composed or answered. De fort. Rom. itself in fact gives almost as much prominence to άρετή as to τúχη, and their competing roles will be carefully evaluated. Nor do I look at the dating of the work. (shrink)

Syrianus, originally from Alexandria, moved to Athens and became the head of the Academy there after the death of Plutarch of Athens. Syrianus attacked Aristotle in his commentary on Books 13 and 14 of the "Metaphysics", just as his pupil Proclus was to do later in his commentaries on Plato. This is because in "Metaphysics 13-14", Aristotle himself was being thoroughly polemical towards Platonism, in particular against the Academic doctrine of Form-numbers and the whole concept of separable number. In (...) reply, Syrianus gives an account of mathematical number and of geometrical entities, and of how all of these are processed in the mind, which was to influence Proclus and all subsequent Neoplatonists. (shrink)

From the 1st century BC onwards followers of Plato began to systematize Plato's thought. These attempts went in various directions and were subjected to all kinds of philosophical influences, especially Aristotelian, Stoic, and Pythagorean. The result was a broad variety of Platonisms without orthodoxy. That would only change with Plotinus. This volume, being the fruit of the collaboration among leading scholars in the field, addresses a number of aspects of this period of system building with substantial contributions on Antiochus and (...) Alcinous and their relation to Stoicism; on Pythagoreanising tendencies in Platonism; on Eudorus and the tradition of commentaries on Aristotle's Categories; on the creationism of the Jewish Platonist Philo of Alexandria; on Ammonius, the Egyptian teacher of Plutarch; on Plutarch's discussion of Socrates' guardian spirit. The contributions are in English, French, Italian and German. (shrink)

“Plutarch in ‘The True Intellectual System of the Universe’”. In The True Intellectual System of the Universe Ralph Cudworth uses a great deal of sources in order to reconstruct past doctrines. In this paper, I propose that we pay attention to the way he uses Plutarch of Chaeronea’s work. The hypothesis that guides this article sustains that Cudworth uses this work as a source of ancient thought despite not totally agreeing with his interpretation of Plato. This means that Plutarch’s work (...) has two levels of reading: on the one hand, its exposition as a source of other authors; and, on the other hand, the interpretation that Plutarch himself makes of his sources, especially, of Plato. This will allow me to draw some conclusions concerning Cudworth’s work as a historian of philosophy and his relationship with Platonic philosophy. (shrink)

This volume, the 36th year of published proceedings, contains five papers, four commentaries presented to the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy during the academic year 2019–20. Paper topics: On Platonism, how Plato's Cave preserves his political interest from Arendt's critique, and how Plutarch's Isis and Osiris uses a complex framing device to integrate Platonic metaphysics and politics. On Aristotle, that dialectic is a versatile techne for formal and informal discussion, and the role of practice to preserve the (...) voluntary nature of character despite its grounding in upbringing. Finally, using Aristotle to argue for the legitimacy of anger against transhumanist efforts, echoing Stoic concerns, against such emotions. The comments challenge or sustain the theses presented in the main papers. (shrink)

The locus classicus for Plutarch's own views on his methods is in the Alexander He has begun by asking for the indulgence of his readers if they do not find all the exploits of Alexander and Caesar recounted by the biographer or if they discover him not reporting some famous incident in detail (); and he goes on to compare his own search for evidence which will indicate the kind of soul, with the activity of the painter, who, in (...) order to create a likeness, concentrates on the eyes and pays little attention to the other parts. Commentators and critics have been right to take this as a key text for the purpose of understanding Plutarch's attitude towards his biographical work; nevertheless there are other passages in the Lives where we can at least glimpse his attitude to his subject, and we can only see the Alexander-remarks in correct perspective if we take these other passages into account. I propose therefore, starting with the Alexander, to see how far these critical remarks apply to Plutarch's theory and practice elsewhere in the Lives. (shrink)

This article focuses on the relationships between Themistocles and the lyric poets Simonides of Ceos and Timocreon of Rhodes in Plutarch's Life of Themistocles. It is argued that Plutarch expects the reader to connect explicit references to the poets and their works with stories located outside the narrative in the anecdotal biographic tradition. Through an implicit synkrisis with the protagonist, the poets' anecdotal personae create a narrative counterbalance that suggests a faultline in Themistocles' characterization that, in turn, reflects the (...) model of the "timocratic" man in Plato's Republic. (shrink)

Recasts Plutarch's Lives as a work of political philosophy emerging from the imperial encounter of Greece and Rome.

Marcus Cato, Sulla, Aemilius Paullus, Pompey, The Gracchi, Marius, Julius Caesar, Anthony 'I treat the narrative of the Lives as a kind of mirror...The experience is like nothing so much as spending time in their company and living with them: I receive and welcome each of them in turn as my guest.' In the eight lives of this collection Plutarch introduces the reader to the major figures and periods of classical Rome. He portrays virtues to be emulated and vices to (...) be avoided, but his purpose is also implicitly to educate and warn those in his own day who wielded power. In prose that is rich, elegant and sprinkled with learned references, he explores with an extraordinary degree of insight the interplay of character and political action. While drawing chiefly on historical sources, he brings to biography a natural story-teller's ear for a good anecdote. Throughout the ages Plutarch's Lives have been valued for their historical value and their charm. This new translation will introduce new generations to his urbane erudition. The most comprehensive selection available, it is accompanied by a lucid introduction, explanatory notes, bibliographies, maps and indexes. (shrink)

Lieve Van Hoof's welcome addition to the study of Plutarch's moral works focuses on a group of writings that discuss practical issues, ranging from coping with exile and curbing one's curiosity to proper nutrition and table manners. Van Hoof collectively refers to these treatises as "Plutarch's practical ethics," setting them apart from Plutarch's theoretical works, which discuss key philosophical concepts.Van Hoof begins by noting with regret the scholarly neglect of Plutarch's practical ethics. Historians of philosophy, who (...) usually read Plutarch's moral works as sourcebooks on academic philosophical theories, are frustrated when confronted with Plutarch's practical treatises, where references to academic .. (shrink)

In this three-part essay, I investigate Frege’s platonist and anti-creationist position in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik and to some extent also in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. In Sect. 1.1, I analyze his arithmetical and logical platonism in Grundgesetze. I argue that the reference-fixing strategy for value-range names—and indirectly also for numerical singular terms—that Frege pursues in Grundgesetze I gives rise to a conflict with the supposed mind- and language-independent existence of numbers and logical objects in general. In Sect. 1.2 and (...) 1.3, I discuss the non-creativity of Frege’s definitions in Grundgesetze and the case of what I call weakly creative definitions. In Part II of this essay, I first deal with Stolz’s and Dedekind’s (intended) creation of numbers. In what follows, I focus on Grundgesetze II, §146, where Frege considers a potential creationist charge in relation to the stipulation that he makes in Grundgesetze I, §3 with the purpose of partially fixing the references of value-range names. I place equal emphasis on the related twin stipulations that he makes in Grundgesetze I, §10. In §10, Frege identifies the truth-values with their unit classes in order to fix the references of value-range names (almost) completely. He does so in a piecemeal fashion. Although in Grundgesetze II, §146 Frege refers also to Grundgesetze I, §9 and §10 in this connection, he does not explain why he thinks that the transsortal identifications in §10 and also the stipulation that he makes in §9 regarding the value-range notation may give rise to a creationist charge in addition to or in connection with the stipulation in §3, and if so, how he would have responded to it. The two main issues that I discuss in Part II are: (a) Has Frege created value-ranges in general in Grundgesetze I, §3? (b) Has he created the unit classes of the True and the False in §10? In Part III, I discuss, inter alia, the question of whether in developing the whole wealth of objects and functions that arithmetic deals with from the primitive functions of Grundgesetze by applying the formation rules Frege creates special value-ranges and special functions. This procedure is fundamentally different from the reference-fixing strategy regarding value-range names that Frege pursues in Grundgesetze I, §3, §10–12. It is just another aspect of his anti-creationism. In Grundgesetze II, §147, Frege makes a concession to an imagined creationist opponent which might suggest that he was fully convinced neither of the defensibility of his anti-creationist position regarding the syntactic development of the subject matter of arithmetic nor of his actual defence in §146 of the non-creativity of the introduction of value-ranges via logical abstraction in Grundgesetze I, §3 and the twin stipulations in §10. I argue that not only in Grundgesetze II, §146 but also in Grundgesetze II, §147 Frege falls short of defending his anti-creationist position. I further argue that on the face of it his creationist rival gains the upper hand in the envisioned debate in more than one respect. (shrink)

The object of this article is to set forth certain evidence that emerges from a study of three of Plutarch's Lives, the Titus, the Paullus, and the Cato Maior, evidence which indicates that these Lives are based upon a definite type of biographical composition, and to suggest its possible origin and date. Since E. Meyer's article on the Cimon of Nepos and Plutarch, biographical sources have generally been assumed for the Greek Lives, and there has been a tendency to (...) make the same assumption for the Roman Lives also, without, however, setting forth the evidence that might justify it. Uxkull Gyllenband maintained that biographies of Greeks and Romans, the sources of Plutarch, were written in the second century b.c., but he gives no evidence for his contention, which is indeed refuted by the observations of Jacoby. Mühl argued with some force that Plutarch's source for the Marcellus was a biography. There is good reason to doubt his conclusion that Plutarch has used a biography of Poseidonius; but the arguments advanced by Klotz for the thesis that the source was the annalist Valerius Antias are still less convincing. Liedmeier postulates a biographical source for the Paullus, but without doing more than asserting the general improbability that Plutarch here used a multiplicity of sources. It seems therefore desirable to collect such evidence as there is of a biographical source in these three Roman Lives of the second century b.c., and it is with such an attempt rather than with a priori considerations that I am here concerned. (shrink)

This book, which transcends the boundaries between literature, social history, and philosophy, studies Plutarch's practical ethics, a group of twenty-odd texts ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Tenth-Century Arabic Interpretation of Plato's Cosmology MAJID FAKIIRY OF PLATO'STHIRTY-SIXDIALOG~Y~Sonly the Timaeus is devoted entirely to cosmological questions. The influence of this dialogue on the development of cosmological ideas in antiquity and the Middle Ages was very great. At a time when the knowledge of Greek philosophy and science in Western Europe had almost vanished, the Timaeus was the only Greek cosmological work to circulate freely in learned (...) circles. The translation and commentary of Chalcidius (c. 350) made the Timaeus available to Latin scholars, at least up to c. 53. But interest in the Timae~s was sustained for a long time before that. The lost commentary of Posidonius of Apamea (d. 51 B.C.), the De animae procreatione in Timeo of Plutarch (d. A.D. 125), the commentary of Proclus (d. 485), extant up to 44d,1 are the most important links in this continuous chain of Platonic cosmological exegesis in antiquity. In the Arabic tradition, the Timaeus had a decisive impact on the development of cosmological ideas also. Plutarch and Proclus were familiar names in the history of Platonic and post-Platonic thought, but I am not aware that the Stoic Posidonius, whom Zeller has described as ".the most universal mind that Greece had seen since the time of Aristotle," 2 was known to the Arabs, or that any mention of his commentary on the Timaeus is to be found in the Arabic sources. General interest in Platonism was an early feature of the philosophical wave which swept the Islamic learned world in the 8th century, and Zeller may be right in saying that it was the Platonic School of Athens which gave Muslim Neoplatonism its peculiar stamp. 3 One of the earliest translators of philosophical texts into Arabic, Yah.ia (b. al-Bit.riq) who flourished in the 2rid half of the 8th century, is credited with the translation of the Timaeus, later retranslated or revised by Hunain (b. Ish~q; d. 873) and Yahia (b. 'Adi and not, as Sarton has it, b. 'Ali; d. 974).~ In addition, the following Platonic dialogues appear to have been translated into Arabic: The Sophistes, the Parmenides, the Cratylus, the Euthydemus, the Republic, the Statesman, the Laws and the Crito. The determination of the actual translator of each work poses serious difficulties. In an autobiographical tract, Hunain simply reports that either he or his disciple Is~ (b. Yahia) translated these works for his patron Muhammad (b. Cf. A. E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plata's Timaeu~ (Oxford, 1928),pp. 34f., and George Sarton, History o] Science (Cambridge, Mass., 1959),I, 428f. Cf. E. Zeller,OutEnesof the History oSGreek Philosophy (N.Y., 1955),p. 268. sIbid., p. 329. ' Cf. al-Fihrist (Cairo, N~D.),p. 358. [15] 16 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Musa), the astrologer.~ Other writers corroborate or supplement this account. Thus Ibn al-Nadim (d. 997), ascribes to Hunain the interpretation (tarsi'r) of the Republic, to him and to Ibn 'Adi the translation of the Laws, and to his son Ish.iq the translation of the Sophistes, together with the commentary of Olympiodorus2 The Crito appears to have been translated also by Yahia (b. Adi), and extensive excerpts from it and the Phaedo are often quoted in the Arabic sources in connection with the trial and execution of Socrates. Another difficulty is raised by the fact that none of the Arabic versions of these dialogues which have come down to us, either as separate works or parts of general commentaries such as the Laws, the Timaeus and the Republic, are complete, so that the inference is inescapable that, as borne out by Hunain's own testimony, it was Galen's paraphrases or compendia of these works, or at any rate those which were translated into Arabic within the School of Hunain, that are actually referred to in our sources.7 It is not, however, with the general diffusion of Platonism in the Muslim world that I am primarily concerned here, but rather with the impact of Platonic cosmological theory as illustrated in the writings of Abu Bakr Muhammad (b. Zakariya al-Razi; d., c. 932), the Rhases of Latin authors, the greatest... (shrink)

Plato's account of the tripartite soul is a memorable feature of dialogues like the Republic, Phaedrus and Timaeus: it is one of his most famous and influential yet least understood theories. It presents human nature as both essentially multiple and diverse - and yet somehow also one - divided into a fully human 'rational' part, a lion-like 'spirited part' and an 'appetitive' part likened to a many-headed beast. How these parts interact, how exactly each shapes our agency and how they (...) are affected by phenomena like erôs and education is complicated and controversial. The essays in this book investigate how the theory evolves over the whole of Plato's work, including the Republic, Phaedrus and Timaeus, and how it was developed further by important Platonists such as Galen, Plutarch and Plotinus. They will be of interest to a wide audience in philosophy and classics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and ViceFrances B. TitchenerTim Duff. Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999. xx + 423 pp. Cloth, $95.This excellent book by an able scholar will set a new standard in Plutarch studies, particularly for scholars interested in historiography and moral philosophy. Here is Duff's aim in his own words: "This book is an attempt to explore two related aspects (...) of the ParallelLives: their moralizing purpose and the comparative [End Page 586] structure through which Plutarch's moralism is so often mediated. It will look at the ways in which the ParallelLives explore issues of right and wrong, good and evil; the ways in which they cause us to question or to understand our world" (1). Duff describes his book as "an attempt to read Plutarch's Lives not as mines for history but as an area of study in their own right, and one which throws light on the intellectual climate of Plutarch's own day. It is less concerned with the 'truth-status' of Plutarch's narrative, more with how that narrative is constructed and how it would have been read in its original context" (9). Duff succeeds brilliantly in both areas, Plutarch's moralism and his place in historiography.The book is divided into three parts. Part 1, entitled "The Moralizing Programme," presents a detailed reading of Plutarch's surviving programmatic statements (such as the question of "great natures"), examines how well he succeeds in his aim of improving the reader, and discusses his assumptions about human psychology. Part 2 uses case studies of specific pairs of biographies, a tried-and-true method for students of Plutarch, to examine the moral and literary program in practice. The pairs Duff selects are Pyrrhos-Marius,Phokion-CatoMinor,Lysander-Sulla, and Coriolanus-Alkibiades (Duff adheres to literal transliteration, not on a whim, but rather from a strong belief that "to Latinize the Greek would be a reversal of Plutarch's cultural programme, which functioned to Hellenize the Roman" [xii, Duff's emphasis]). There is a substantial discussion about the parallelism of the biographies and a plea for them to be read in pairs, as their author intended. Part 3 examines "two special circumstances," the comparisons or synkriseis and the cultural and political implications of Plutarch's program of writing in parallel.In his preface, Duff notes, "It is a pleasing coincidence, and one which Plutarch would have enjoyed (see Sertorius 1.1-8), that the last monograph to be written in English on Plutarch's Lives was by one of my predecessors at Reading (Wardman 1974)" (ix). Duff bases his comparison of his work with Wardman's on their common academic institution, but the comparison is actually much more apt. For years, Wardman's book Plutarch'sLives set an important standard in Plutarch studies. Scholars in the earlier part of the twentieth century studied Plutarch almost exclusively in terms of Quellenforschung. Most serious scholarship on the biographies began by rehearsing the argument about whether or not Plutarch had read Thucydides or was using a kind of handbook, and by necessity focused on rehabilitation of the biographer. Wardman's book took a big step forward in studying Plutarch for his own sake; Duff's is another such step forward. Duff is simultaneously thorough and methodical in his analysis of not only the daunting corpus of Plutarch's own work but also of the tremendous bibliography amassed during the past century, and yet his emphasis on synkrisis and its significance to studies of historiography (biography in particular) and of Plutarch's work moves these areas of study forward. With his careful attention and clear prose, Duff has relieved an entire generation of scholars from the tedium of rehearsing basic issues, such as whether or not Plutarch knew Latin (he did). [End Page 587] Duff's calm, organized, and clear-sighted work gracefully retires these nonproblems, and we can now hope that discussion will continue to move forward unencumbered. For scholars of Plutarch this relief is hard to exaggerate. Plutarch is a compelling and provocative author, something justly recognized by Duff in his concluding paragraph: "This book has emphasized throughout... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Plutarch's Ariadne in Chariton's Chaereas and CallirhoeEdmund P. CuevaChaereas and Callirhoe is the earliest extant Greek novel, and the only one of its genre to make extensive use of historiographical features.1 Later novelists include such features, but do not rely on them for background and structure as much as Chariton does. Accordingly, the reader of Chaereas and Callirhoe finds verifiable historical detail in the correctly assigned dates, accurately (...) related events, and realistically depicted places and figures of the novel.2The story, for example, takes place in the past, famous historical figures are included, and history has a tremendous effect on the behavior of the characters. In this way Chariton imitates the classical historians in technique, not for the purpose of masquerading as a professional historian, but rather, as Hägg suggests, to create the "effect of openly mixing fictitious characters and events with historical ones."3 This effect is partially created by the use of a historical source which deals with myth.4 [End Page 473]The introduction of the two youths in the beginning of the novel exemplifies the primary function of myth in Chariton: throughout the text the novelist assigns his leading characters analogues in the form of mythical or legendary beings.5 For example, Chaereas at different times becomes Achilles, Nireus, Hippolytus, and Alcibiades. Chariton assimilates Callirhoe to Aphrodite and Ariadne, and to a much lesser extent to Artemis, Helen, Medea, and the nymphs. Most often Chariton compares Callirhoe's loveliness to that of Aphrodite, as at the beginning of the novel: (1.1.2).Most importantly, Chariton likens Callirhoe to a sleeping Ariadne: (1.6.2). Homer (Od. 11.321–25) writes that Theseus took Ariadne from Crete to Athens but that he abandoned her on the Isle of Dia (Naxos), where she was killed by Artemis at the bidding of Dionysus. Hesiod (Theog. 947–49) relates that Dionysus took Ariadne as his wife and that Kronos made her immortal. Chariton's version in 1.6.2, therefore, loosely follows the narratives of Homer and Hesiod. The novelist introduces this myth after the heroine has been kicked into a coma by her husband, a fitting moment for the myth of Ariadne: she, like Callirhoe, suffered an injustice at the hands of someone she loved.6In the third book of the novel Chaereas attributes the disappearance of his wife to some divinity, and likens this to Dionysus' theft of Ariadne from Theseus (3.3.5). Unlike the version of the Ariadne myth found in 1.6.2, this one is slightly different. It becomes obvious that there is a specific source Chariton is using to draw upon for these various versions.I shall show that Chariton must have used Plutarch, or perhaps, though unlikely, Paeon, one of the imperial historian's sources. A narratological and verbal comparison of Plutarch's account of the adventures of Theseus and Ariadne, as found in his Theseus, and the Ariadne–like adventures of Callirhoe makes it clear that the novelist drew upon him. [End Page 474] This use of Plutarch, moreover, elucidates Chariton's attempt at historical veracity in dates, events, places, and figures.7Plutarch in Theseus associates Aphrodite with Ariadne (just as Chariton does), and supplies various accounts of the adventures of Ariadne and Theseus. These accounts are found in the works of other authors whom Plutarch names,8 and it is mainly on these stories that Chariton models his version of the Ariadne myth, especially at 3.3.5.The historian writes that Ariadne fell in love with Theseus when he arrived on the island of Crete. She gave him the clue which enabled Theseus, after killing the Minotaur, to exit the Labyrinth. The historian uses the accounts of Pherecydes ( fl. c. 550 B.C.), Demon (fl. c. 300 B.C.), Philochorus (b. 340 B.C.), and Cleidemus ( fl. c. 350 B.C.), all of whom give differing versions of the escape of Theseus, the death of the Minotaur, and of the love of Ariadne for Theseus. Cleidemus' account is of particular interest because he describes the escape of Daedalus from Crete and draws attention to the ship sent by Minos... (shrink)

Plutarch’s Gryllus is a parodic take on contemporary intellectual culture, offering a humorous portrait of elite perspectives regarding language and sophistic learning. The parodic effect stems from the figure of the talking pig, the dialogue’s protagonist, whose name, Gryllus (“Grunter”), signifies ineptness in speech and characterizes him as a mocking figure through puns with the names of an Egyptian dance form and a parodic painting style—connections not observed in definitive interpretations of the dialogue. Ultimately, in its engagement with rhetorical performance (...) and popular philosophical themes, the dialogue parodies reliance upon paideia as a form of empowerment. (shrink)

Plutarch's Timoleon has received little attention from scholars who in recent years have studied the sources of his Lives and sought to determine the methods which he followed in their composition. The reasons for this neglect are obvious: the Timoleon is a simple Life, contains few citations, and is universally and justifiably believed to be founded, together with the Timoleon of Cornelius Nepos, upon the tradition established by Timaeus. Scholars of the nineteenth century agreed in further concluding that both (...) authors derived their material directly and almost exclusively from Timaeus. This conclusion does not appear to have been challenged in spite of the well-known contention of Eduard Meyer, which has won considerable approval, that neither biographer was accustomed to use primary historical authorities, each relying mainly upon biographies of the Hellenistic period which have not survived. The validity of Meyer's theory as a general principle of source-criticism will not be expressly discussed in this paper. My purpose is rather to examine the Timoleon only, especially in relation to the Timoleon of Nepos, and to suggest a method of composition here adopted by Plutarch, who, I believe, based his Life upon a secondary biography and supplemented this from a primary historical authority. (shrink)