En prétendant jeter sur la folie alias la psychose de nouvelles lumières, l’analyse existentielle (Daseinsanalyse) se heurte à une objection méthodologique fondamentale : à quelle condition la phénoménologie est-elle en mesure de de pénétrer dans le monde de la folie? En d’autres termes, si l’on reconnaît « le gouffre d’incompréhension mutuelle » qui sépare les psychotiques et ceux qui ne le sont pas, ne faut-il pas renoncer à la voie husserlienne d’exploration de la folie, fondée sur la réflexion transcendantale? Mais (...) dans ce cas, en quel sens une phénoménologie des psychoses est-elle encore possible? (shrink)

Crespi & Badcock (C&B) have presented a novel view that the influence of genomic imprinting causes diametrically opposite disorders: namely, psychoses and autism. I propose an extended hypothesis that while genomic imprinting is likely to have an influence on the pathogenesis of psychoses and autism, it might contribute to phenomenological antithesis between as well as within these disorders.

Dans la psychose, les données cliniques montrent que dès l'apparition des premiers troubles aigus, une difficulté caractéristique se manifeste au niveau de l'attribution de la responsabilité causale des actions. Les patients se sentent poussés à agir par les autres tout en ayant aussi le sentiment de contrôler l'action d'autrui. Cette difficulté va souvent de pair chez les schizophrènes avec une modification du sentiment d'identité personnelle. Parmi les symptômes de l'autisme, on trouve des difficultés de contrôle de l'action, une réduction des (...) centres d'intérêts, des stéréotypies comportementales et une difficulté à comprendre les événements d'ordre mental. Des résultats expérimentaux récents permettent d'orienter la réflexion théorique sur l'origine fonctionnelle commune de ces perturbations. Ils indiquent l'importance du suivi de l'action dans l'acquisition par l'enfant d'une " théorie de l'esprit ", c'est-à-dire des connaissances nécessaires à l'interprétation de ses propres états mentaux et de ceux d'autrui. Dans le cas de l'adulte, un mauvais suivi de l'action pourrait porter atteinte à la capacité de reconnaître ses propres intentions d'agir, et modifier ainsi le sens de sa propre identité. Subjectivité et conscience d'agir rassemble des travaux de clinique psychiatrique (Henri Grivois), de psychologie du développement (James Russell), de neuroscience cognitive (Marc Jeannerod, Pierre Fourneret) et de philosophie de l'esprit (John Campbell, Pascal Engel, Elisabeth Pacherie, Joëlle Proust). Le point commun est d'élucider le rôle qui revient aux fonctions exécutives dans la compréhension de soi-même et d'autrui. L'ouvrage s'adresse aux étudiants, aux enseignants et aux chercheurs en psychologie, en neuroscience et en philosophie, mais aussi aux psychiatres et aux cliniciens, ainsi qu'à tous ceux qui s'intéressent aux progrès de la psychopathologie cognitive. (shrink)

: Cet article a pour objectif de montrer l'importance du rythme comme socle thérapeutique dans la prise en charge de la psychose infantile. Le rythme sera abordé selon deux points de vue : D'une part, comme élément communicationnel originaire entre l'enfant et la mère. Il permet les premières associations de sens et par là, des mises en forme initiales du contact avec l'altérité. Les continuités et discontinuités dans le contact avec l'extérieur peuvent devenir, grâce à - Psychanalyse et psychothérapie – (...) Nouvel article. (shrink)

L'identité n'est plus reçue comme une question : elle est devenue la passion moderne, et c'est surtout ainsi qu'elle nous affecte, individuellement ou en masses. C'est pourquoi nous pouvons en proposer ici une clinique : pour l'analyser, en donner les éléments, et aussi restituer les conditions de ce qui serait là, pour chacun, la possibilité d'une interrogation singulière. Cet ouvrage prend son départ dans les faits de la psychose, où la passion de l'identité livre le plus purement ses principes et (...) ce qui la cause, avant d'en venir à la névrose contemporaine, et aux diverses manières dont elle méconnaît ses difficultés - et parfois ses impasses - dans les problématiques identitaires. Parmi ces difficultés, il examine en particulier celles que posent, dans les modalités de consommation et d'échange, le statut du père ou la place d'une femme. En même temps qu'une analyse clinique, ce livre propose au lecteur étudiant, praticien, ou simplement curieux, un abord de l'identité dont il puisse faire une question, au lieu des réponses de plus en plus désorientées, passionnelles et donc automatiques, que nous renvoie notre actualité. (shrink)

The approach adopted by Posner & Raichle in this book, with its strong emphasis on the cognitive level of description, is ideally suited to the study of psychotic illnesses. However, their discussion of depression and schizophrenia is based on a very small number of studies and involves ad hoc arguments derived largely from neuroanatomy. Their conclusions are almost certainly wrong.

In his previous book, La philosophie et les experiences naturelles, A. De Waelhens claims that great philosophers in the past have not only been in dialogue with their predecessors but also that each great philosopher benefited from a confrontation with a non-philosophical experience. This previous book forms the theoretical justification for the present one. Here the author studies the problem of psychosis, with the hope and the intention of contributing to the further development of philosophy. Insofar as philosophy is fascinated (...) with the obligation "Learn to know yourself" or the search for an answer for the question "Who am I," insofar so claims the author, contemporary philosophy cannot afford to bypass psychoanalysis. The book has six chapters and a conclusion, but could easily be divided in three parts. The first part is a survey of the general approach to psychosis and schizophrenia by a selected group of European psychiatrists. The author indicates the crucial shortcomings of each approach and shows how there is among them a gradual turning away from a physiological interpretation of schizophrenia and psychosis towards a psychological one. In Part II, the author uses mainly the theory of Lacan and his disciples to present a coherent theory of psychosis. The crucial concepts are 1) the Oedipus-complex, 2) the mirror stage, 3) the foreclosure of a reference to the father. The Oedipus-complex is well known from Freud’s works although it receives here a more structural interpretation. The mirror stage refers to the events around 6-8 months when the child has to appropriate himself as a unified body, not just a collection of partial elements. This task can be noticed easily when one observes the attitude of the child towards the mirror. Hence the name. In order to perform this task successfully the child needs the support of the mother. The function of the mother is still more important for the third problem: a reference to the father. A healthy development of the child requires that the mother is capable of recognizing and of acknowledging the part played by the father in the creation of the child. This is done in our culture by giving the child the name of the father. Mothers of psychotics often are emotionally unable to tolerate that. They want to situate their child exclusively in relation to themselves: they foreclose any reference to the father. Psychosis is therefore related to the foreclosure of the name-of-the-father. These three crucial concepts allow the author to explain the crucial symptoms of schizophrenia, and to compare it with paranoia and paraphrenia. The third part of the book is a philosophical discussion of the problem of psychosis. The author offers the continental philosophical tradition as a better intellectual framework to study psychosis than the physical framework that Freud used in his Project for a Scientific Psychology and that he never completely abandoned. In the conclusion A. De Waelhens summarizes the direct philosophical consequences of the study of psychosis, the most fascinating being that one has to recognize the priority of language in the constitution of the subject, and that there is a meaningful relation between the way I relate to myself, the things and other people. Two improvements could be made in the book. The first is pedagogical: i.e., a critical bibliography of the crucial works of Lacan and his school and of the phenomenological tradition would have been very helpful for any reader not familiar with one of the two streams of thought. A second improvement would be the inclusion in Chapter One of a discussion of the development which has taken place in the U.S.A. in the explanation of schizophrenia. It is parallel with the development in Europe. A useful reference is E. G. Mishler and N. E. Walker: "Family Interaction Processes and Schizophrenia: A Review of Current Theories," in International Journal of Psychiatry, July 1966, Vol. 2, Number 4. Although the book is difficult, it is very insightful and provocative and it certainly merits translation.—W. V. E. (shrink)

RésuméL’article se propose d’interroger la philosophie de la psychiatrie à partir du registre de la quotidienneté, et des questions que les bouleversements de cette dimension de l’expérience dans les psychoses sont susceptibles d’adresser à une phénoménologie du quotidien. Si cette dernière représente une jonction entre clinique et philosophie, elle questionne les articulations entre conditions transcendantales de l’expérience, construction d’une forme concrète de l’ordinaire, et incarnation d’une valeur sociale et anthropologique normative. La quotidienneté ouvre ainsi à une réflexion réciproque entre (...) philosophie et psychiatrie, sous ses aspects à la fois clinique, épistémologique et éthique. (shrink)

What we call "neurosis" is psychosis about specific facts, but not about the logical instruments used to judge relations between facts. What we call "psychosis" is psychosis about both facts and the aforementioned logical instruments.

In agreement with Behrendt & Young (B&Y), we considered the role of perception disturbances in schizophrenia in our first clinical approaches, using the Bender test with schizophrenic patients. Following this, we reproduced nuclear symptoms of schizophrenia in animal models, showing that perceptual disturbances, acquisition disturbances, and decrease in affective levels can be induced by glutamatergic blockade within the nucleus accumbens septi. Our results link the proposed corticostriatal dysfunction with the thalamocortical disturbances underlying perceptual problems reviewed by B&Y.

Neuroses are secondary mental illnesses, it being their purpose to contain psychoses.

The fundamental and unevitable risk of schizophrenia and paranoia reveals to us that the ego is not originally given ; the ego, that unifies the psyche and gives it a personal character (my psyche), is not from the very beginning necessarily present in my psyche. The ego has to be constituted; and in some extreme cases (i.e. schizophrenia and paranoia ) this process of constitution may radically fail : the ego might not have come about. This constitution cannot be thought (...) as a selfconstitution : it is the effect of the Other. I am constituted by the Other ; I receive my personal being from the Other and not from myself. The fundamental processes of the primary repression ('Urverdrängung'), the mirror phase, identification and idealisation, and finally the discourse of the Other are interpreted by De Waelhens against the back-ground of this primordial, — clinical — evidence. The philosophical interpretation of these fundamental structures of our being induces us to understand the ego from the very beginning as separated from itself by the Other, — the Other in me. The different facets of this original splitting and its consequences for our conception of the ego and his relation with the Other are worked out in this study. (shrink)

A prevailing issue in clinical research is the duty clinicians have to treat or prevent the progression of disease during a study that they are conducting. While all clinical researchers have a duty of care for the patients who participate in clinical research, intervening at the onset or progression of disease may skew results and have a negative impact on the scientific validity of a study. Extreme examples of failures to intervene can be found in the Tuskegee syphilis study and (...) in an attempt to determine if cervical smears were an accurate predictor of cancer, which was uncovered by the Cartwright Inquiry. However, the issue arises in all research where delay in intervention can cause harm. A current study in Singapore is investigating the significance of an ‘ultra-high risk’ state that may constitute the prodromal phase of psychosis. This project called ‘The Longitudinal Youth at Risk Study’ is potentially contentious because it is recruiting young people who are identified as being ‘at risk’ of developing psychosis. In this paper, the decision to offer treatment to all participants as well as a fast track for those who are assessed to have developed serious mental illness into treatment is discussed. It is argued that this approach is ethically justified because of the duty of care that is owed to research participants, and suggests that the principle of equipoise may be used to guide intervention decisions in other clinical research protocols. (shrink)

Traumatisierte Menschen haben mit vorübergehenden oder anhaltenden Symbolisierungsschwierigkeiten zu kämpfen. Diese treten entweder in psychisch eingekapselter, umgrenzter Form in Erscheinung oder als psychische Funktionsabläufe, die sich in umfassenderer Weise auf die Lebensprojekte, politischen Einstellungen und kulturellen Normvorstellungen der Person auswirken, und zeigen sich in ihrer Körper-Welt-Beziehung, ihrer Individuum-Gruppen-Beziehung und/oder ihrer Individuum-Diskurs-Beziehung. Die Schwierigkeiten können in imaginativen und symbolischen Funktionsmodi auftreten. Gravierende Störungen der Symbolisierung lassen sich aus psychoanalytischer Sicht beschreiben als Begleiterscheinungen der paranoid-schizoiden und der autistisch-berührenden Position (Ogden), als Evakuierung (...) von Beta-Elementen in den Körper (Bion), als Verwerfung (Lacan) und als Urverdrängung (Freud). Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt einige psychoanalytisch fundierte semiotische Überlegungen vor, die dem Forschungsfeld Trauma und Psychose entstammen. Anhand von Fallbeispielen werden der Zusammenbruch der Symbolisierung, Fixierungen auf den nichtsymbolischen Modus der psychischen Repräsentation und die Re-Symbolisierung erläutert, die sich dank der kreativen transformativen Intervention des Analytikers vollzieht. (shrink)

Explanation of logic of psychoses: schizophrenia and bi-polar, with empirical confirmation - e.g. IQ decreases the likelihood of psychosis, and bi-polar is more likely than schizophrenia... MA thesis in 1998 (Comenius University), Presented at Art exhibition "From Animation", London, Holland Park (W8 6LU), Conferences in Santorini, Daejon, Adelaide 2016.

- Comment une autre langue se crée dans la langue, de telle manière que le langage tout entier tende vers sa limite ou son propre " dehors "? - Comment la possibilité de la psychose et la réalité du délire s'inscrivent dans ce parcours? - Comment le dehors du langage est fait de visions et d'auditions non-langagières, mais que seul le langage rend possibles? - Pourquoi les écrivains sont dès lors, à travers les mots, des coloristes et des musiciens?

This chapter offers an overview of the phenomenological approach to delusions, emphasizing what Karl Jaspers called the "true delusions" of schizophrenia. Phenomenological psychopathology focuses on the experience of delusions and the delusional world. Several features of this approach are surveyed, including emphasis on formal qualities of subjective life and questioning of standard assumptions about delusions as erroneous belief. The altered modalities of world-oriented and self-oriented experience that precede and ground delusions in schizophrenia, especially the experiences of revelation that Klaus Conrad (...) termed the outer and inner apophany, are then discussed. The chapter first considers the famous "delusional mood", then the role of ipseity-disturbance. In both cases it is explained how delusions can develop out of these distinctive alterations of perception and feeling. The classic question of the understandability or comprehensibility of schizophrenic delusion, together with the related issues of wish-fulfillment and rationalizing motives are then considered. The chapter addresses the crucial but neglected issue of the felt reality-status of delusions or the delusional world, discussing derealization, "double bookkeeping", and "double exposure". The chapter concludes by discussing delusions typically found in paranoid and affective psychoses, and monothematic delusions found in certain organic conditions. (shrink)