As mounting evidence highlights the human-driven extinction of avian species, reconnecting people with nature—particularly these feathered creatures—has become essential for engaging the public in conservation and the preservation of avian biodiversity. Paradoxically, heightened awareness of the benefits birds bring has fueled the rise of aviary bird-keeping for entertainment in Vietnam. This paper seeks to unravel the absurdity of bird keepers who claim to love nature and support conservation while engaging in practices that exploit and commodify birds for human interests. By (...) contrasting the values generated by birds in aviaries with those in their natural habitats, it underscores the role of an eco-deficit culture—or, more fundamentally, humanity's insatiable greed—in fostering this absurd form of "nature love.". (shrink)

In this article, I make an attempt to define terms such as: tragedy, absurdity, and paradox as conceived of by the German essayist Walter Hilsbecher. This is a task which is both difficult and interesting, mainly because of the fact that concepts from within speculative philosophy are relatively rarely subject to scrupulous definitions. The reason for this state of affairs lies in the difficulty to capture the meaning of these concepts within a rigid framework. These problems also appear in Hilsbecher’s (...) 1972 work titled Tragizm, absurd, paradoks [Tragedy, Absurd, Paradox]. The philosophy of the absurd – the methodological separation of which I propose – has the absurd for its central concept, but it is a concept which eludes sharp definitions, too. This article aims to reconstruct Hilsbecher’s vocabulary of concepts crucial to the philosophy of absurdity in reference to the tradition of contemporary speculative philosophy. By locating the German writer’s thought in the context of other authors working in a similar thematic and stylistic context, I will outline this specific strand of philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Life Before the Fall A Short Pre‐History of the Absurd Camus's Absurd Problematic One Giant Leap Back, One Small Step Forward: the Problem of Meaning Camus's Existential Phenomenology Camus's Sisyphean Ethics The Myth of Sisyphus notes further reading.

A l'énigme proposée par l'expérience de la vie, il y a deux réponses possibles : "tout est absurde" ou "c'est un mystère".... Jean Guitton constate : "Pour chacun, absurde et mystère sont les deux pôles inverses entre lesquels oscille la pensée humaine. Quand chacun s'examine en profondeur, il écoute cette double voix. Mais, l'oscillation étant rejetée, pour moi l'absurdité de l'absurde me conduit vers le mystère.".

At times, weird stories such as the Pizzagate spread surprisingly quickly and widely. In this paper I analyze the mental attitudes of those who seem to take those absurdities seriously: I argue that those stories are often imagined rather than genuinely believed. Then I make room for the claim that often these imaginings are used to support group ideologies. My main contribution is to explain how that support actually happens by showing that motivated cognition can employ imagination as a seemingly (...) rational tool to reinforce and protect ideologies. (shrink)

Ce livre que je présente à nouveau aujourd'hui, dans une édition qui évoque publiquement ses origines, n'a pas une histoire comme les autres. Jamais il n'aurait vu le jour sans une étonnante rencontre avec François Mitterrand, dans la Creuse, au début des années quatre-vingt, qui fut suivie d'autres entretiens. Une rencontre sur le ton de la confession, inhabituelle et directe, une conversation surprenante. Une sorte de dialogue contemporain entre celui qui penche vers l'absurde et celui qui croit au mystère. Ensemble, (...) nous reprenions l'éternel débat sur le sens de la vie et la destinée de l'homme. Mais, tous deux, nous mettions Dieu au centre de nos réflexions. J'ai pris conscience du mystère Mitterrand, des secrets de cet homme obsédé par la mort, l'au-delà, les fins dernières, la vie éternelle. Ce texte n'a pas vieilli, garde sa saveur de testament spirituel et dévoile une part de la personnalité de mon visiteur. Fruit du dialogue entre un philosophe et un politique, cet ouvrage reparaît donc plus d'un an après la mort de ce président qui continue d'habiter la mémoire des Français. A un moment où les Français eux-mêmes se posent des questions sur l'avenir et la religion. Puissent-ils trouver des réponses dans ce que j'ai dit au premier d'entre eux : François Mitterrand. (shrink)

L'emploi du raisonnement par l'absurde a été source de contestations au cours de l'histoire des sciences. L'auteur en propose une définition, puis montre comment un tel raisonnement indirect peut se retourner en un raisonnement direct qui lui soit logiquement équivalent, ce dont Aristote avait pressenti la possibilité...

Книга обращена ко всем интересующимся современной философской проблематикой, методами и приемами мышления человека.

Coming Back to the Absurd is a celebration of the enduring significance and impact of Albert Camus's first philosophical essay The Myth of Sisyphus. This collection of essays, from some of the world's leading Camus scholars, examines Camus's unique contribution to philosophy through The Myth since its publication.

Nikk Effingham and Huw Price argue that in certain cases of Newcomb problems involving time travel and foreknowledge, being given information about the future makes it rational to choose as an evidential decision theorist would choose. Although the cases they consider have some intuitive pull, and so appear to aid in answering the question of what it is rational to do, we argue that their respective positions are not compelling. Newcomb problems are structured such that whichever way one chooses, one (...) might be led by one’s preferred decision theory to miss out on some riches (riches which others obtain whilst employing their preferred decision theory). According to the novel aesthetic diagnosis we shall offer of the Newcomb dialectic, missing out in this way does not render one irrational but, rather, subject to being seen as absurd. This is a different kind of cost but not one that undermines one’s rationality. (shrink)

The subject of the study is the connection between the absurd and phenomenology.The texts of representatives of the absurdist trend in literature and philosophy (Camus, Kafka, Musil), as well as the works of academic philosophers of the phenomenological direction (Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Fink) are considered. The commonality of phenomenological interpretations of reality for some texts of the absurdist genre is proved. As a hypothesis, the existence of an epistemological dimension of meaning in the works of the absurd is (...) put forward, interpreted by the author as a reception of the views of phenomenologists, problematized in the inconsistent reduction of phenomena. The methodological basis was the general scientific methods of analysis and synthesis, as well as the critical analysis of the text. The scientific novelty lies in the attempt to present phenomenology as a precursor of absurdism, connected with it through the sphere of axiology. The main contribution of the author is the actualization of the epistemological layer of such a multifaceted phenomenon as the absurd, namely, the elaboration of the hypothesis that in many works of absurdists, the metamorphoses of the characters' consciousness are in fact an inconsistent reduction consisting in explicit metamorphoses of the Ego, as well as violating subject-object relations but not actually bracketing the idea of the world. Many literary contemporaries of Husserl devote their thoughts to the problems of phenomenology to one degree or another, which makes the connection between absurd literature and the key theses of early phenomenology logical. (shrink)

Camus’ early philosophy has been subject to various kinds of criticism. In this paper I address a problem that has not been noticed so far, namely that it appears to be essentially inconsistent. On the one hand, Camus explicitly denies the existence of moral values, and construes his central notion of the absurd in a way that presupposes this denial. On the other hand, he is also committed to the existence of certain values. Both in his literary and philosophical (...) works Camus is not so much interested in the absurd per se, but rather in how we ought to respond to it. In justifying his supposed normative conclusions, he tacitly, but crucially, relies on evaluative judgements. If all this is true, then prospects for defenders of absurdism seem bleak. In whichever way the inconsistency is resolved, they will have to give up or significantly modify central parts of Camus’ early philosophy. But things may not stand quite as bad. As I try to show, there is a route to consistency that preserves much of Camus’ early philosophy, and leaves it prima facie plausible. The key is to re-interpret its normative aspects. Stated a bit provocatively, we need to put Camus in the self-help genre. (shrink)

Many of us experience the activities which fill our everyday lives as meaningful, and to do so we must (and do) hold them to be important. However, reflection undercuts this confidence: our activities are aimed at ends which are arbitrary, in that we have reason to regard our taking them so seriously as lacking justification; they are comparatively insignificant; and they leave little of any real permanence. Even though we take our activities seriously, and our everyday lives to be important, (...) on reflection they seem less meaningful than we suppose. Thomas Nagel claims that this discrepancy is inevitable, and thus that our lives are absurd and to be approached with irony. The aim of this paper is to explore whether it is inevitable, and in particular to examine recent formulations (of Peter Singer, Robert Nozick, and others) of the old idea that we can transcend this absurdity by forming attachments less susceptible to being undercut. (shrink)

Why do well‐functioning psychological systems sometimes give rise to absurd beliefs that are radically misaligned with reality? Drawing on signalling theory, I develop and explore the hypothesis that groups often embrace beliefs that are viewed as absurd by outsiders as a means of signalling ingroup commitment. I clarify the game‐theoretic and psychological underpinnings of this hypothesis, I contrast it with similar proposals about the signalling functions of beliefs, and I motivate several psychological and sociological predictions that could be (...) used to distinguish it from alternative explanations of irrational group beliefs. (shrink)

G. E. Moore observed that to for me to assert, “I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did” would be “absurd”. Over half a century later, the explanation of the nature of this absurdity remains problematic. Such assertions are unlike semantically odd Liar-type assertions such as “What I’m now saying is not true” since my Moorean assertion might be true: you may consistently imagine a situation in which I went to the pictures last (...) Tuesday but fail to believe that I did. Moreover, if you contradict my assertion then your words, “If he went to the pictures last Tuesday then he believes he did” do not express a necessary truth1. Nonetheless it remains absurd of me to assert that p and I don’t believe that p. It seems no less absurd of me to silently judge that p and I don’t believe that p2. But why should it be absurd of me to assert something that might be true of me? Why should it be absurd of me to believe something that might be true of me? (shrink)

When The Absurd Hero in American Fiction was first released in 1966, Granville Hicks praised it in a lead article for the Saturday Review as a sensitive and definitive study of a new trend in postwar American literature. In the years that followed, David Galloway’s analysis of the writings of John Updike, William Styron, Saul Bellow, and J. D. Salinger became a standard critical work, an indispensable tool for readers concerned with contemporary American literature. The New York Times described (...) the book as “a seminal study of the modern literary imagination." David Galloway, himself an established novelist, later extensively revised The Absurd Hero to include authoritative discussions of more than a dozen novels which had appeared since the first revised edition was released in 1970. Among them are John Updike’s Couples, Rabbit Redux, and The Coup; William Styron’s The Confessions of Nat Turner and Sophie’s Choice; and Saul Bellow’s Mr. Sammler’s Planet and Humboldt’s Gift. Through detailed analyses of these works, Galloway demonstrates the continuing relevance of his own provocative concept of the absurd hero and provides important insights into the literary achievements of four of America’s most influential postwar novelists. (shrink)

Jean Paul Sarte, Franz Kafka i Milan Kundera: tres mirades diferents sobre la realitat, tres percepcions del món que participen d'un mateix rerafons filosòfic, d'una mateixa sensibilitat: l'absurd. Tres obres que neixen, creixen i maduren sota l'eclipsi de Déu, en l'atmosfera de la buidor més penetrant i la negació radical del sentit. L'ésser és estantís, feble, pura representació, i la vida humana una comèdia tragicòmica que comença per casualitat i s'acaba també per pura casualitat. Però l'home ha de viure, (...) i si el món no té sentit, caldrà forjar-lo amb les pròpies mans, caldrà projectar una idea per la qual valgui la pena viure i morir (Kierkegaard). Tres iniciatives, tres expectatives, que es configuren sota l'escola de l'absurd i la mort de Déu (Nietzsche). Davant d'aquesta concepció del món marcada pel desencís i l'angoixa hi ha la metafísica de la plenitud de l'ésser (sant Tomàs d'Aquino), que descriu l'univers com un dinamisme perfectiu que té una direccionalitat pròpia, una causa primera i un fi darrer. La lògica del sentit versus la lògica de la buidor. (shrink)

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the University of Virginia and at Texas A&M University. I thank audiences at both institutions for their insightful comments. Special thanks to John Williams for his illuminating comments on an earlier draft. Research for this paper was supported in part by a Summer Grant from the Vice Provost for Research and Public Service at the University of Virginia. That support is here gratefully acknowledged.

It was shown in the previous work of the author that one can avoid the paradox of minimal logic { ϕ , ¬ ϕ } ¬ ψ defining the negation operator via reduction not a constant of absurdity, but to a unary operator of absurdity. In the present article we study in details what does it mean that negation in a logical system can be represented via an absurdity or contradiction operator. We distinguish different sorts of such presentations. Finally, we (...) consider the possibility to represent the negation via absurdity and contradiction operators in such well known systems of paraconsistent logic as D.Batens's logic CLuN and Sette's logic P 1. (shrink)

The absurdity of (i) and (ii) arises because asserting 'p' normally expresses a belief that p. Normally, when (i) is asserted, what is conjointly expressed and asserted, i.e. a belief that p and a lack of belief that p, is logically impossible, whereas normally, when (ii) is asserted, it is differently absurd, since what is conjointly expressed and asserted, i.e. a belief that p and a belief that -p, is logically possible, but inconsistent. A possible source of confusion between (...) 'impossible' and 'inconsistent' is the fact that a proposition which is inconsistent tout court is always self-contradictory and hence necessarily false, unlike one which is inconsistent with other propositions. Whereas the proposition Ibp&-Ibp is inconsistent, the proposition IBp &IB-p is not. I cannot hold a belief which I lack, but I can.. (shrink)

Jean Paul Sarte, Franz Kafka i Milan Kundera: tres mirades diferents sobre la realitat, tres percepcions del món que participen d'un mateix rerafons filosòfic, d'una mateixa sensibilitat: l'absurd. Tres obres que neixen, creixen i maduren sota l'eclipsi de Déu, en l'atmosfera de la buidor més penetrant i la negació radical del sentit. L'ésser és estantís, feble, pura representació, i la vida humana una comèdia tragicòmica que comença per casualitat i s'acaba també per pura casualitat. Però l'home ha de viure, (...) i si el món no té sentit, caldrà forjar-lo amb les pròpies mans, caldrà projectar una idea per la qual valgui la pena viure i morir (Kierkegaard). Tres iniciatives, tres expectatives, que es configuren sota l'escola de l'absurd i la mort de Déu (Nietzsche). Davant d'aquesta concepció del món marcada pel desencís i l'angoixa hi ha la metafísica de la plenitud de l'ésser (sant Tomàs d'Aquino), que descriu l'univers com un dinamisme perfectiu que té una direccionalitat pròpia, una causa primera i un fi darrer. La lògica del sentit versus la lògica de la buidor. (shrink)

L'absurde, le suicide, etc. Premier essai philosophique (1942) de l'auteur. Indispensable (ou presque) à tout apprenti philosophe.

On the basis of observations J. J. C. Smart once made concerning the absurdity of sentences like 'The seat of the bed is hard', a plausible case can be made that there is little point to developing a theory of types, particularly one of the sort envisaged by Fred Sommers. The authors defend such theories against this objection by a partial elucidation of the distinctions between the concepts of spanning and predicability and between category mistakenness and absurdity in general. The (...) argument suggests that further clarification of the concepts of spanning and category mistakenness should be sought in reflection upon the more familiar concepts of a sort of thing and a predicate category. (shrink)

Predictive genetic testing may confront those affected with difficult life situations that they have not experienced before. These life situations may be interpreted as ‘absurd’. In this paper we present a case study of a predictive test situation, showing the perspective of a woman going through the process of deciding for or against taking the test, and struggling with feelings of alienation. To interpret her experiences, we refer to the concept of absurdity, developed by the French Philosopher Albert Camus. (...) Camus' writings on absurdity appear to resonate with patients' stories when they talk about their body and experiences of illness. In this paper we draw on Camus' philosophical essay ‘The Myth of Sisyphus’, and compare the absurd experiences of Sisyphus with the interviewee's story. This comparison opens up a field of ethical reflection. We demonstrate that Camus' concept of absurdity offers a new and promising approach to understanding the fragility of patients' situations, especially in the field of predictive testing. We show that people affected might find new meaning through narratives that help them to reconstruct the absurd without totally overcoming it. In conclusion, we will draw out some normative consequences of our narrative approach. (shrink)

John Broome and Duncan Foley have argued that it is a ‘misperception’ that the ‘control of global warming is costly’ and that we can make ‘sacrifices unnecessary’. There are a number of assumptions that are essential for this idea to work. These assumptions can be challenged. Furthermore, my claim is not merely that the Broome/Foley argument is flawed, and therefore unlikely to be successful. I will argue that it is potentially harmful, leading to harms for the present generation and for (...) future generations. (shrink)

This essay examines whether or not absurdity is intrinsic to human life. It takes Camus’ interpretation of ‘The Absurd’ as its conceptual starting point. It traces such thought back to Schopenhauer, whose work is then critically analysed. This analysis focuses primarily on happiness and meaning. This essay accepts some of Schopenhauer’s premises, but rejects his conclusions. Instead, it considers Nietzsche’s alternatives and the role of suffering in life. It posits that suffering may help people acquire meaning and escape absurdity. (...) It then analyses the role of compassion in absurdity, in reference to Nietzsche’s work and Buddhist teachings. Lastly, it examines absurdity in relation to death, rejecting the notion that death exacerbates absurdity. This paper understands absurdity to be a natural part of the human condition, as characterised by suffering, death and an absence of meaning. It concludes that although human life is absurd by nature, it need not remain so. (shrink)

Camus’ central thesis in The Myth of Sisyphus is that suicide is not the proper response to, nor is it the solution of, the problem of absurdity. Yet many of his literary protagonists either commit suicide or are self-destructive in other ways. I argue that the protagonists that best live up to the characteristics of the absurd man that Camus outlines in the Myth uniformly either commit suicide or consent to their destruction by behaving in such a manner as (...) to invite death. It is my contention that this raises serious questions abuut the validity of Camus’ arguments that suicide is not the proper response to the recognition that life is absurd. (shrink)

This chapter looks to a “Husserlian-influenced” phenomenology to augment our understanding of one of the most significant—and open-ended—categories of theatre to emerge in the past century: the so-called Theatre of the Absurd. Here, Jodie McNeilly-Renaudie and Pierre-Jean Renaudie examine Beckett, SamuelEndgame to make an argument that the standing definitions of “absurdityabsurdity—grounded in Martin Esslin’s genesis of the term—are incomplete. The authors here argue that a consideration Husserl, Edmund differentiation between “two possible ways for meaning to be missing” demonstrates that (...) the very essence of theatrical absurdity involves not only a loss of meaning and the distress and fragmentation that such loss invokes, but, crucially, and in equal measure, the experience of such meaninglessness in terms of human endeavour to overcome it. (shrink)

In "The Myth of Sisyphus", Camus recommends scornful defiance in the face of our absurd, meaningless existence. Although Nagel agrees that human life possesses an absurd dimension, he objects to Camus' existentialist 'dramatics'. For Nagel, absurdity arises from the irreducible tension between our subjective and objective perspectives on life. In this paper I do two things: (i) critically reconstruct Camus' and Nagel's positions, and (ii) develop Nagel's critique of Camus in order to argue that humour is an appropriate (...) response to absurdity. (shrink)

The price for morality as the meaning of existence is the entrance of another kind of absurdity, a moral absurdity. Clearly, there is something absurd about life on The Good Place. Moral worth, both on The Good Place and in our real‐life existence, comes in degrees. Deontological views, most famously associated with Immanuel Kant, hold that the morality of an action is determined based on whether or not it adheres to a moral rule. Care requires being flexible in different (...) situations so as to best foster caring relationships with others. A care ethics approach would give some support to Eleanor's claims in The Good Place, insofar as a caring home life is essential to the development of the child in a variety of ways. The power of caring relationships is perhaps nowhere more salient than in the show's final few episodes. (shrink)

The position advocated in the target article should be called “absurd environmentalism.” Literature showing that general intelligence is related to musical ability is not cited. Also ignored is the heritability of musical talent. Retrospective studies supporting practice over talent are incapable of showing differences in talent, because subjects are self-selected on talent. Reasons for the popularity of absurd environmentalism are discussed.

Le caractère absurde du Vouloir demeure, ainsi qu’il apparaîtra ailleurs, l’intuition majeure de Schopenhauer. Cette recherche de l’absurde est la seconde origine du désintéressement de Schopenhauer à l’égard des thèmes généalogiques. Le dessein philosophique n’est pas d’expliquer le comportement singulier, mais de faire apparaître l’absurde de tout comportement. Pour servir ce dessein, l’étude du Vouloir uniforme et aveugle est plus intéressante que l’étude de ses manifestations particulières, qui peuvent expliquer généalogiquement un caractère dans sa singularité. Précisément, le propos de Schopenhauer (...) n’est pas d’expliquer, mais de dénoncer les explications. Aussi la généalogie n’est-elle invoquée qu’à titre de moyen, et jamais de fin. L’intuition généalogique, qui tourne court, n’est qu’une étape vers l’absurde. (shrink)

In A Confession, a memoir of his philosophical midlife crisis, Tolstoy recounts falling into despair after coming to believe that his life, and for that matter all human life, is meaningless and absurd. Although Tolstoy's account of the origin and phenomenology of his crisis is widely regarded as illuminating, his response to the crisis, namely, embracing a religious tradition that he had previously dismissed as “irrational,” “incomprehensible,” and “mingled with falsehood” seems unpromising, at best. Nevertheless, I argue, Tolstoy's account (...) of his response makes a valuable contribution to contemporary thought about the meaning and absurdity of life. I begin by drawing on classic discussions in the philosophical literature, and on Tolstoy's memoir, in order to characterize the problem of meaning and the problem of the absurd, and to clarify the relation between these problems. I then draw on Tolstoy's account of his response to his crisis in order to characterize a form of faith in our deepest values. I argue that such faith supplies one important part of the story concerning how we might respond to the problem of the absurd — a part that has been overlooked by more recent discussions of these issues. (shrink)

Belliotti unravels the paradoxes of human existence to reveal paths for crafting meaningful, significant, valuable, even important lives. He argues that human life is not inherently absurd; examines the implications of mortality; contrasts subjective and objective meaning, and evaluates contemporary renderings of meaningful human lives.

"Dancing with Absurdity" explores the limitations of knowledge and argues that neither reasoning nor direct observation can be trusted. Not only are they unreliable sources, they do not even justify assigning probabilities to claims about what we can know. This position, called radical skepticism, has intrigued philosophers since before the birth of Christ, yet nobody has been able to refute it. Fred Leavitt uses two unique methods of presentation. First, he supports abstract arguments with summaries of real-life examples from many (...) and varied fields, which make the arguments much more convincing and compelling. He cites more than 200 studies from psychology, mathematics, chaos theory, quantum mechanics, evolutionary theory, history, the corporate world, politics, the military, and current news reporting. Second, Leavitt's writing is user-friendly, even when dealing with complex issues. Whether answering the telephone, turning on the TV, talking with friends, or munching on an apple, we expect things to happen predictably. These expectations, paired with radical skepticism, exemplify cognitive dissonance at the highest level. Although certain of nothing, other than that we can be certain of nothing, it's certain that readers will come to be intrigued by the problem. (shrink)

Joseph Heath lumps in quotas and protectionist measures with cartelization, taking advantage of information asymmetries, seeking a monopoly position, and so on, as all instances of behavior that can lead to market failures in his market failures approach to business ethics. The problem is that this kind of rent and rent seeking, when they fail to deliver desirable outcomes, are better described as government failure. I suggest that this means we will have to expand Heath’s framework to a market and (...) government failures approach. I then try to defuse objections that as a government failure, rent seeking may not appear relevant to what managers ought to do. Solving this conceptual issue will also give us an excuse to revisit a separate conceptual issue: the normatively thick conception of “rent” and rent seeking behavior that some use. This normatively thick conception is problematic, I argue, and I offer the beginnings of a novel, normatively neutral conception that is useful for our purposes in making the ethics of rent and rent seeking behavior more than a merely trivial exercise. (shrink)

AI has strengths that humans cannot replicate, such as scalability, speed, and automation, but this must not mean that we depend entirely on AI for intellectual advancement. For a future where humans coexist with advanced AI, we must acknowledge the existence of intrinsic natural stupidity and absurdity of humans and take them into consideration. Otherwise, increasing the information and processing capabilities of AI may amplify the magnitude of humans’ poor decisions and their consequences, but not the other way around.