The paper focuses on the complex relations between aesthetics and phenomenology as they show themselves within the core locus of their interplay—the realm of the visible and the invisible. To do so, the paper examines a specific case study, a Rembrandt painting—A Woman Bathing in a Stream (1654)—through which the discussion illuminates the interconnected and inseparable relationship between aesthetics and phenomenology in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the visible and the invisible. The reading addresses both dimensions of the (...) visible: the essential intersubjective aspect of life and its complex visual representation in art. To achieve this, the paper first explores Merleau-Ponty’s late aesthetic ontology—a phenomenology that perceives the aesthetic realm, particularly the visible domain, as originating from human corporeal existence, thereby redefining the act of seeing and the concepts of the visible and the invisible; I show the manner in which invisible elements permeate our visual experience in the Rembrandt painting and in seeing as such. The paper also reveals the unique ontological role of painting and the painter in unveiling the aesthetic world, and in guiding the philosopher toward a vision that true philosophy—phenomenology—must embrace. The paper concludes by rethinking the significance of aesthetics, and especially, the arts, to phenomenological thought, and the necessity of phenomenology to aesthetic thought. (shrink)

_Philosophers consider race and racism from the perspective of lived, bodily experience._.

What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This volume collects thirteen new papers on these topics: twelve by leading and respected philosophers and one by a leading color-vision scientist. All focus on consciousness in the "phenomenal" sense: on what it's like to have an experience. Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for physicalism, the view that the mind is physical. The controversy has gained focus over the last few decades, and (...) phenomenal knowledge and phenomenal concepts--knowledge of consciousness and the associated concepts--have come to play increasingly prominent roles in this debate. Consider Frank Jackson's famous case of Mary, the super-scientist who learns all the physical information while confined in a black-and-white room. According to Jackson, if physicalism is true, then Mary's physical knowledge should allow her to deduce what it's like to see in color. Yet it seems intuitively clear that she learns something when she leaves the room. But then how can consciousness be physical? Arguably, whether this sort of reasoning is sound depends on how phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge are construed. For example, some argue that the Mary case reveals something about phenomenal concepts but has no implications for the nature of consciousness itself. Are responses along these lines adequate? Or does the problem arise again at the level of phenomenal concepts? The papers in this volume engage with the latest developments in this debate. The authors' perspectives range widely. For example, Daniel Dennett argues that anti-physicalist arguments such as the knowledge argument are simply confused; David Papineau grants that such arguments at least reveal important features of phenomenal concepts; and David Chalmers defends the anti-physicalist arguments, arguing that the "phenomenal concept strategy" cannot succeed. (shrink)

One does not just live in a crisis: a crisis calls for action. Etymologically, from the Greek krisis, it is a turning point or a moment of decision. It not only alters perception; it alters the demands for living. It stands out from the everyday. If we follow Gail Weiss (2008), we could say that a crisis is a moment when the ground called “ordinary life” is interrupted in such a way that it no longer functions as an out-of-awareness backdrop (...) but itself becomes the visible figure. But what happens when the ground is already permeated by crises, large and small? How should we think about crisis when we cannot call upon a simple binary—times of crisis and somehow livable normal times? How to think, conceptually, about those communities who live with what is variously termed “slow death” (Berlant 2011), “slow violence,” (Nixon 2011) or “chronic crisis” (Vigh 2008) that make the everyday a source of such continual threat that crisis and non-crisis shade into one another? I ask these questions in the context of my twenty-year history of research in African American communities in which families are caring for children with disabilities and chronic illnesses. (shrink)

In one way or another, the other plays an important role in educational settings. Over the last few decades, the recourse to philosophical phenomenology has proved to be helpful for the discussion of this topic. Coming from this thematic direction, this article focuses on the other in its constitutive function for the construction of identity. Both within the phenomenologist Bernhard Waldenfels’ theory of responsivity as well as in the pedagogue Wilfried Lippitz’ theory of alterity, the other is a structural (...) part of the self. It will be shown that within these theories the possible dangers of an encounter with the other cannot be addressed in an adequate way. However, this is especially important in educational contexts. Therefore, with regard to the philosophies of Jean‐Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, I would like to present two additional phenomenological approaches from which the pedagogical discussion can benefit. Both Sartre and Beauvoir put great focus on possible obstacles regarding the en‐ counter with the other. Whereas Sartre identifies negativity as an essential part of human existence, Beauvoir enriches these thoughts with an ethical component. Against the background of these philosophies, the other comes into view as a possible source of both objectification and empowerment. Lastly, the article shows that an implementation of these considerations in teacher training can lead to a deeper understanding of the constitution of identity and the inherent possibilities of any interaction with the other. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is phe-nomenological interpretation of the various faces of divinity in the later Heidegger and elucidation of the human comportment corresponding to this divinity. In the first chapter, I will make clear the relation between ontological difference in the sense of the later Heidegger and the primordial dimension of divinity which is called the last god and the sacred. Further, the relation between such divinity and entity as a whole will be clarified. In the second chapter, (...) I will elucidate the place of the divinities in the manifestation of entity as a whole by considering the role of the godlikes in the fourfold. When the primordial alterity of the last god should be experienced in entity as whole, which leads to the notion of the godlikes, it must confront human subject in totally asymmetrical manner. Such asymmetrical communication can be structurally made explicit by taking the concept of “discourse” in Being and Time into account. Finally, I will consider the character of human comportment called preservation with focusing on its relation to the later Heidegger’s conceptions of divinity. This will shed light on how human beings could properly appreciate the experience of what is beyond our understanding and nevertheless supporting our existence.El objetivo de la ponencia es llevar a cabo una interpretación fenomenológica de las diversas facetas de la divinidad en el Hei-degger tardío y elucidar el comportamiento humano respecto de esta divinidad. En el primer capítulo, se esclarece la relación entre la diferencia ontológica en el sentido que le da el segundo Heidegger y la dimensión primordial de la divinidad, llamada el último dios y lo sagrado. A conti-nuación, se esclarecerá la relación entre la divinidad así concebida y lo ente en totalidad. En el segundo apar-tado, se elucidará el lugar de las divinidades en la manifestación de lo ente en totalidad considerando el papel de los divinos la Cuaternidad. Cuando la alteridad primordial del último dios se experimente en lo ente en totaliadd, lo cual conduce a la noción de los divinos, tiene que enfrentarse al sujeto humano de una forma totalmente asimétrica. Esta comunicación asimétrica puede explicitarse estructuralmente mediante la consideración del concepto del discurso en Ser y tiempo. Final-mente, consideraré el carácter del comportamiento humano denominado la preservación, con especial atención a su relación con la noción de lo divino en Heidegger tardío. Esto arrojará luz sobre cómo los seres humanos podrían apreciar de manera adecuada lo que está más allá de nuestra comprensión y sin embargo, sostiene nuestra existencia. (shrink)

This text develops a novel methodology for social investigation into the Flint (Michigan, USA) water crisis by using classical Husserlian phenomenology as its point of departure. To develop a proper method in a case like this, the author uses as primary data the experiences of the affected community. The text investigates philosophically how a water crisis happens as well as the structures of power responsible. This book grounds contemporary theories of power in a phenomenology of social experience. Key (...) to that grounding is the careful elaboration of subject positions in power structures as partially constitutive of lifeworlds (lebensumwelten) for consciousness. The applied phenomenological tools unravel the central enigma of how a community’s concerns and the dictates of power can become so disastrously estranged. This text appeals to researchers and students working not just in phenomenology and philosophy but also to those working in the field of environmental humanities and on social justice issues. (shrink)

Dastur is well respected in France and Europe for her mastery of phenomenology as a movement and her clear and cogent explications of phenomenology in movement. These qualities are on display in this remarkable set of essays. The book is organized into four areas of inquiry: Language and Logic, Ego and Other, Temporality and History,and Finitude and Mortality. In each, Dastur guides the reader through a series of phenomenological questions that also serve to call phenomenology itself into (...) question, testing its limits and pushing it in newdirections. Taking a cue from Merleau-Ponty, Dastur sees phenomenology not as a doctrine, a catalogue of concepts and catchphrases authored by a single thinker, but rather as a movement in which several thinkers participate, each one contributing to and inflecting the development of the movement in unique ways. She thus draws inspiration from Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Ricoeur, Gadamer, Fink, and Patocka, moving with ease from one thinker's conceptual vocabulary and outlook to the next's, feeling at home in each, and communicating their central ideas with clarity.Through her critical and productive dialogue with multiple phenomenological thinkers, Dastur concisely shows one thinker's debts to and departures from another and reveals the limits of one's approach while highlighting the innovation of another's. She does this judiciously, without choosing sides, because for her, phenomenology is above all a way of thinking through a problem and practicing a method. The fecundity of the movement is appreciated only by participating in it--it has always thought of itself as philosophical research undertaken by and through a community of thinkers who share certain fundamental questions and ways of approaching those questions, even if their responses to these questions often differ. In this regard, Dastur is both one of the clearest guides to phenomenology and one of France's most able practitioners of phenomenology. (shrink)

... Let me start my investigation by taking a brief look at the way in which self-awareness is expressed linguistically, as in the sentences "I am tired" or ...

Phenomenological descriptions of depressed mental life offer a profound understanding of depression from the first-person perspective. In this paper, such descriptions are developed by drawing on the work by Ludwig Binswanger and on the autobiographical report of depression by Piet C. Kuiper . I will argue that Binswanger’s central claim in his phenomenological description of the depressed state of mind fails due to crucial misunderstandings of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. Nonetheless, by drawing on Kuiper’s first-hand account, I will develop a (...) phenomenological description of depressed mental life, highlighting the altered manner of pre-reflective valuing in depression and introducing the concept of a ‘depressive habituality.’ This term refers to the acquisition of a new set of habitualisations, especially on the foundational levels of automatic mental life. It offers explanations for the fact that it is not easy to recover from depression and that people may more easily become depressed again. (shrink)

Focusing on the topics of self-awareness, temporality, and alterity, this anthology contains contributions by prominent phenomenologists from Germany, Belgium, France, Japan, USA, Canada and Denmark, all addressing questions very much in the center of current phenomenological debate. What is the relation between the self and the Other? How are self-awareness and intentionality intertwined? To what extent do the temporality and corporeality of subjectivity contain a dimension of alterity? How should one account for the intersubjectivity, interculturality and historicity of the subject? (...) These questions are not only of relevance for phenomenologists, but for anybody coming from disciplines influenced by phenomenological methodology, such as sociology, psychology, psychiatry and anthropology. (shrink)

Psychogenic depersonalization is an altered mental state consisting of an unusual discontinuity in the phenomenological perception of personal being; the individual is engulfed by feelings of unreality, self-detachment and unfamiliarity in which the self is felt to lack subjective perspective and the intuitive feeling of personal embodiment. A new sub-feature of depersonalization is delineated. 'Prosthesis' consists in the thought that the thinker is a 'mere thing'. It is a subjectively realized sense of the specific and objective 'thingness' of the (...) particular object thought about. I show that prosthesis is an important cognitive feature of depersonalization, and may be psychologically connected with the tendency of depersonalized individuals to report 'philosophical' types of thinking. Indeed, several philosophical issues concerning the identity of the self appear to have been enhanced by prosthesis experiences. Thus, far more efficient than William James's experimental attempts to uncover philosophical truths under the influence of nitrous oxide intoxication, prosthesis may be a safe and recommended experience for philosophers. The history of depersonalization theories is presented from Krishaber to Freud, and the main approaches to prosthesis criticized. Finally, a fresh approach to psychogenic depersonalization is outlined on the basis of certain cognitive similarities with visual agnosia. This paper may be understood as continuing the Jamesian tradition 'experimental abnormal psychology', that is, of examining extraordinary mental states with an eye to their philosophical implications. (shrink)

The debate over the ethics of radically, technologically altering the capacities and traditional form of the human body is rife with appeals to and dismissals of the importance of the integrity of the human species. Species-integrist arguments can be found in authors as varied as Annas, Fukuyama, Habermas, and Agar. However, the ethical salience of species integrity is widely contested by authors such as Buchanan, Daniels, Fenton, and Juengst. This article proposes a Phenomenological approach to the question of species-integrity, arguing (...) in favor of a phenomenon of species-recognition that carries an ethical pull. Building on Husserl’s Phenomenological account of empathy and the lived-body, as well as Schopenhauer’s concept of compassion as an ethical urphenomenon, I develop a “Phenomenological species concept” , which I argue has the ethical significance that biological species concepts do not. The PSC reorients the debate over human alteration and species integrity. (shrink)

This paper explores Husserl's phenomenological description of the constitution of the alter ego within the sphere of transcendental subjectivity. It is important at the start to point out that the Other plays a crucial role in securing the intersubjective nature of the experienced world. Although Husserl goes on in the "Fifth Cartesian Meditation" to consider the constitution of an objective world common to all subjects and the establishment of a community of monads, my primary focus in this paper will be (...) the examination of the initial steps whereby the sense, "other ego," is constituted by the transcendental ego. My main task, then, will be to examine the reduction to the sphere of ownness, the appresentative transfer of sense from ego to alter ego, and the criterion of harmonious behavior. My primary criticisms will center around certain difficulties inherent in the attempt to uncover a primordial sphere of ownness and problems that arise from a shift in concern from the life-world (everyday) attitude to the attitude following the performance of the epoché. Part I of the paper will consist of a general discussion of Husserl's phenomenological project, Part II will be a detailed study of the alter ego, and Part III a general statement of problems and objections. (shrink)

Argues that a coherent theory of ethics requires an account of selfhood.

Phenomenology has been adapted for use in qualitative health research, where it’s often used as a method for conducting interviews and analyzing interview data. But how can phenomenologists study subjects who cannot accurately reflect upon or report their own experiences, for instance, because of a psychiatric or neurological disorder? For conditions like these, qualitative researchers may gain more insight by conducting observational studies in lieu of, or in conjunction with, interviews. In this article, we introduce a phenomenological approach to (...) conducting this kind of observational research. The approach relies on conceptual grounding to focus a study on specific aspects of the participants’ experiences. Moreover, the approach maintains the openness to novel discoveries that qualitative research requires while also providing a structured framework for data collection and analysis. To illustrate its practical application, we use examples of hemispatial neglect—a neurologic disorder in which patients characteristically lack awareness of their own illness and bodily capacities. However, the approach that we describe can be applied more broadly to the study of complex illness experiences and other experiential alterations. (shrink)

This paper tackles the concept of alterity through an embodied perspective. By questioning my lived experience of cancer and how illness—as a disruptive event (Carel, 2008, 2016, 2021)—enables philosophical reflection and the exploration of ‘other’ ways of being-in-the-world (Merleau-Ponty 2012 [1945]), I ask if an embodied ‘chimeric-thinking’ can be used to question established notions of alterity and reshape our relationship with ‘otherness’ (Leistle 2015, 2016b). Building on a phenomenological approach to illness (Carel 2012, 2014, 2016, 2021), and a feminist post-humanist (...) approach (Haraway 1990, 1991, 2016), I present a case in which an autoethnographic and phenomenological approach focused on embodied experience may help revise dominant perspectives, providing access to understanding and engaging with profound biopsychosocial and somatic transformations. (shrink)

Phenomenology's systematic exploration of how a world comes into existence for knowers – knowers who are often conceptualized as individual and ostensibly isolated – requires that it provide some account of the constitution of alterity. In this paper, I address this issue by arguing that we apperceive alterity in terms of the intentionality of behavior. A corollary of this argument is that the apperception of an alter as specifically human is a secondary attribution, following the primary apperception of intention. (...) I further argue that the intentionality of behavior is understood through the projection of a narrative frame, or a “protonarrative,” onto the alter's behavior. I suggest that protonarrativity is the form that experience takes as its ontological condition. Our living is not simply known to us reflectively as protonarrative; rather, experience is lived as protonarrative. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the definitional problems of altered states of consciousness and their potential relevance in phenomenological investigation. We suggest that visionary states or visionary phantasy working induced by psychedelics, as extraordinary types of altered states, are appropriate subjects for phenomenological analysis. Naturally, visionary states are not quite ordinary workings of the human mind, however certain cognitive psychological and evolutionary epistemological investigations show that they can give new insights into the nature of consciousness. Furthermore, we suggest (...) that contemporary inquiries concerning altered states in consciousness studies give an opportunity to complete the contemporary phenomenological investigations of phantasy with the notion of visionary phantasy. Here we propose that the similarities and differences between Dieter Lohmar’s weak phantasy and Benny Shanon’s concept of vision are precisely discernible, and, consequently, it may be possible that weak phantasy and visionary phantasy are situated on the two outermost poles of the colorful spectrum of phantasy activity. (shrink)

Extant literature suggests a correlation between the thematic core of an adolescent’s personal account of depression and the trajectory of her personality development. This possible correlation has not been explored in a way that includes detailed qualitative analyses of reported experiences of adolescent depression. By discussing a single case design, this contribution illustrates and justifies an interpretative procedure that has been implemented to assist such an exploration. The paper focuses on the suitability of this approach for the investigation of all-encompassing (...) alterations of the experiential field in psychopathological conditions. I argue that this suitability is grounded in a phenomenological understanding of the explicative task in terms of a disclosure of the intentional constitution of the life-world of adolescent depression. The discussion begins with a contextualization of the single case design within a multilayered and methodologically mixed study. Against this background, I illustrate the steps of a ‘systematic of interpretation’ aimed at exposing meaning horizons. Touching on issues concerning the empirical validity of the approach, these meaning horizons are construed as objectively plausible frames of intelligibility of a subjectively particular form of experience. Drawing on a characterization of transcendental arguments, I discuss the relationship between the illustrated procedure and the investigational attitude that, according to Husserl, defines phenomenology as a properly philosophical endeavor. In this context, I eventually characterize the illustrated procedure as a crossover approach to human experiential life aligned with the tradition of phenomenological psychopathology. (shrink)

This text argues that Husserl’s late philosophy of temporal and bodily subjectivity can only be understood by means of the interplay between different reductions. For various reasons, this decisive methodological aspect has been largely overlooked by most interpreters. As a consequence, the co-originality of the constitution of space and time, which first enables a comprehensive grasp of the originary processes in the living streaming present, has remained virtually unknown. This also means that the proper understanding of egology and intersubjectivity has (...) been obfuscated. It is only by bringing out the bodily and temporal foundations of the lebendige Gegenwart as presented in the C-manuscripts that Husserl’s investigations of constitutive intersubjectivity in other texts can ultimately be clarified. Notably this calls for a renewed understanding of the role of Vergegenwärtigung, showing that the community of streams, not located in my ego but precisely in a manifold of streaming living presents, are united by means of an “intersubjective association”. The problem of the individualization of the “intersubjective streaming being” that characterizes the monadic totality here finds its solution, by means of a ceaselessly ongoing and self-altering duplicity that accounts for my pre-identity at the deepest genetic level. (shrink)

_Pragmatic Perspectives in Phenomenology_ offers a complex analysis of the pragmatic theses that are present in the works of leading phenomenological authors, including not only Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, as it is often the case within Hubert Dreyfus’ tradition, but also Husserl, Levinas, Scheler, and Patocka. Starting from a critical reassessment of existing pragmatic readings which draw especially on Heidegger’s account of Being-in-the-world, the volume’s chapters explore the following themes as possible justifications for speaking about the pragmatic turn in phenomenology: (...) the primacy of the practical over theoretical understanding, criticism of the representationalist account of perception and consciousness, and the analysis of language and truth within the context of social and cultural practices. Having thus analyzed the pragmatic readings of key phenomenological concepts, the book situates these readings in a larger historical and thematic context and introduces themes that until now have been overlooked in debates, including freedom, alterity, transcendence, normativity, distance, and self-knowledge. This volume seeks to refresh the debate about the phenomenological legacy and its relevance for contemporary thought by enlarging the thematic scope of pragmatic motives in phenomenology in new and revealing ways. It will be of interest to advanced students and scholars of phenomenology who are interested in moving beyond the analytic-continental divide to explore the relationship between practice and theory. (shrink)

"Alterity and Criticism: Retracing Time in Modern Literature" argues that the role of time in canonical literature underlies the experience of alterity and requires a new hermeneutic to clarify how the self emerges in literary texts. Romantic poetry from Goethe to Shelley and the modern prose tradition from Flaubert to Butor constitute different traditions but also indicate, on a textual basis, how alterity is crucial to reading, thus encouraging us to interpret literary texts in terms of the related concerns of (...) self, other and time. This volume engages in discussions of cultural semiotics and late phenomenology, and provides insights into how modern literature provides one way of assessing the possibility of World Literature for our own time. It will be of interest to students and scholars of both literature and philosophy. (shrink)

Phenomenological psychiatry has suffered from a failure to translate its insights into terms specific enough to be applied to psychiatric diagnosis or to be used in contemporary research programs. This difficulty can be understood in light of the well-known tradeoff between reliability and validity. We argue, however, that with sufficient ingenuity, phenomenological concepts can be adapted and applied in a research context. Elsewhere, we have described a phenomenologically oriented conception of schizophrenia as a self- or ipseity-disorder with two main facets: (...) decline in the sense of existing as a subject of awareness (diminished self-affection) and heightened awareness of aspects of experience that would normally remain tacit or presupposed (hyperreflexivity). This approach is consistent with Minkowski, Blankenburg, and Kimura and offers one possible synthesis of their views. Here we describe two areas of empirical research that are congruent with, or actually inspired by, a phenomenological approach emphasizing such disorders of consciousness and self-experience: (1) Phenomenologically oriented, interview studies show that, whereas negative-symptom patients generally deny any diminishment of affect and thinking, they do describe qualitative alterations of experience suggestive of hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection. (2) Another line of research suggests that the early detection of schizophrenic symptoms may be enhanced by adopting a phenomenological approach. (shrink)

1. Husserl’s theory of primordial reduction proves to be notorious: it is essential to his analysis of alterity, yet the theory itself incurs various criticisms. On a popular reading, primordial re...

How to communicate with "the other" who is culturally different from oneself is one of the greatest challenges facing North-South relations. This paper builds on existential-phenomenological and poststructuralist concepts of alterity and difference to strengthen the position of Latina and other subaltern speakers in North-South dialogue. It defends a postcolonial approach to feminist theory as a basis for negotiating culturally differentiated feminist positions in this age of accelerated globalization, migration, and displacement.

Husserl's phenomenology has often been criticized for its Cartesian, fundamentalistic, idealistic and solipsistic nature. Today, this widespread interpretation must be regarded as being outdated, since it gives but a very partial and limited picture of Husserl's thinking. The continuing publication of Husserl's research manuscripts has disclosed analyses which have made it necessary to revise and modify a number of standard readings. This anthology documents the recent development in Husserl research. It contains contributions from a number of young phenomenologists, who (...) have all defended their dissertation on Husserl in the nineties, and it presents a new type of interpretation which emphasizes the dimensions of facticity, passivity, alterity and ethics in Husserl's thinking. (shrink)

Patient support tools have drawn on a variety of disciplines, including psychotherapy, social psychology, and social care. One discipline that has not so far been used to support patients is philosophy. This paper proposes that a particular philosophical approach, phenomenology, could prove useful for patients, giving them tools to reflect on and expand their understanding of their illness. I present a framework for a resource that could help patients to philosophically examine their illness, its impact on their life, and (...) its meaning. I explain the need for such a resource, provide philosophical grounding for it, and outline the epistemic and existential gains philosophy offers. Illness often begins as an intrusion on one’s life but with time becomes a way of being. I argue that this transition impacts on core human features such as the experience of space and time, human abilities, and adaptability. It therefore requires philosophical analysis and response. The paper uses ideas from Husserl and Merleau-Ponty to present such a response in the form of a phenomenological toolkit for patients. The toolkit includes viewing illness as a form of phenomenological reduction, thematizing illness, and examining illness as altering the ill person’s being in the world. I suggest that this toolkit could be offered to patients as a workshop, using phenomenological concepts, texts, and film clips to reflect on illness. I conclude by arguing that examining illness as a limit case of embodied existence deepens our understanding of phenomenology. (shrink)

It is an ancient view, to be found even in Aristotle’s analysis of friendship, that the other is an alter ego, another myself. More recently, this conception has provoked spirited debate within and without the phenomenological tradition. It can be found in a wide variety of texts, from Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations to Thomas Nagel’s “What is it like to be a bat?” The basic position can be summarized as follows. Intentional experiences are subjective, first-person experiences, not objective, third-person experiences.

Altered states of consciousness (ASC), especially hallucinatory ones, are philosophically and scientifically interesting modes of operation of the mind–brain complex. However, classical definitions of ASC seem to capture only a few common characteristics of traditionally regarded phenomena, thus lacking exact classification criteria for assessing altered and baseline states. The current situation leads to a priority problem between phenomena-based definitions and definition-based phenomena selection. In order to solve the problem, this paper introduces a self-mapping procedure that is based on (...) a three-part analysis on certain aspects of hallucinatory altered consciousness. Starting with commonalities found in current definitions of ASC, issues with self-evaluation, sources of data, and baseline comparison are analyzed first. Next, the concept of alterations is examined with respect to temporal dynamics, change mechanisms, and mental subsystems. Finally, hallucinatory phenomena are discussed regarding various definitions, the relationship between “external” and “internal,” and the “trueness” issue of hallucinations. Conclusive to the analysis above, a technically based working definition of ASC and a stepwise operationalization procedure are also proposed. (shrink)

The phenomenological method, characterized by the suspension of judgment (epoché), has helped analyzing the subjective experience of patients affected by mental disorders. Psychiatry, dealing with the human being itself in its complexity and unicity, is placed between the biological positivistic attempt, for which the symptoms of mental illness are a mere consequence of brain dysfunctions and the phenomenological-existential approach, inclined to consider the symptoms as meaningful phenomena of the person’s subjective experience. Eugène Minkowski, Ludwig Binswanger, Arthur Tatossian, Kimura Bin, Henri (...) Maldiney and Hubertus Tellenbach are fundamental authors in the phenomenological psychopathology of depression; they described the alterations of the lived time, space, body and others experienced by the depressed. Starting from the main theoretical contributions of the authors, we will focus on the psychopathology and discuss the key themes of clinical depression: guilt, poverty and hypochondriasis. Finally we will focus on the typus melancholicus construct. (shrink)

Six individuals with experience of psychosis were interviewed about their psychotic experiences. The material was analyzed using the empirical phenomenological psychological method. The results consist of a whole meaning structure, a gestalt, entailing the following characteristics: The feeling of estrangement in relationship to the world; the dissolution of time; the loss of intuitive social knowledge; the alienation of oneself, and finally; the loss of intentionality/loss of agency. In brief, the results show that an altered perception of the self and (...) the world was an essential part of the psychotic experience where subjects described themselves as changed; something was sensed as being wrong as psychosis is perceptible but hard to communicate. The normal life-world experience was altered and reality seemed strange. Time perception seemed to be changed as temporality appeared dissolved and the experience of time was focused on the current moment excluding the future. The subjects described loss of intentionality, they were no longer agents in their actions but partly steered by others and they could feel as if their experiences were not theirs. The patients also describe problems regarding their ability to socialize and communicate with others. They seem to lose their intuitive social capacity and were prone to suspiciousness. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 87-90 [Access article in PDF] Phenomenological and Biological Psychiatry:Complementary or Mutual? James Morley Keywords: phenomenology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, ontology. We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be answered the problems of life have still not been touched at all. (Witgenstein, Tractatus, 6.52) IF ONE WAS TO PERFORM a thought experiment by imagining a scientifically explained universe, how would this explained universe (...) resolve my issues of value and meaning? Would it help me to live a better life? In one sentence, Witgenstein expressed exactly the issues dividing, and defining, the phenomenological and biophysical approaches to psychiatry. (Natural) scientific questions are concerned with relations of physical causality while phenomenology is aimed at the problems of life, i.e., the elucidation of lived personal meanings.Clarifying the relation between phenomenology and the general psychiatric literature is clearly a significant undertaking. At this juncture in the history of psychiatry where the biophysical model is so dominant, the authors' efforts are especially welcome, as I wholeheartedly appreciate, and thank the authors for this endeavor. I only wish to explicate a few issues latent within the article and perhaps add a few supportive points. Explicitly or implicitly, the need for phenomenology in psychiatry is long enduring and will always persist (Ellenberger 1981, 1993). The integration of phenomenology with general psychiatric practice would certainly serve the needs of patients and society generally. But, in the present state of affairs where the biological model is so preeminent, a full accounting of the dramatic divergences between the two approaches is necessary if there is to be authentic dialogue between them.Essentially, I want to stress that phenomenology and natural science medicine are genuinely distinct paradigms for construing reality and organizing knowledge. As distinct scientific paradigms, each one is holistically self-contained. Like soap bubbles, if pushed together too forcefully one or the other may burst. In this case, it is more likely that the smaller, less prevalent paradigm would burst by becoming absorbed into the more dominant paradigm. I believe that this is precisely the risk when phenomenology is introduced to conventional psychiatry as "complementary." Whereas one could hardly object to any application of empathy and understanding toward the experiences of patients, it would be tragic if the [End Page 87] full philosophical power of phenomenology were to be overlooked in favor of its mere utility as a preliminary stage of diagnosis and assessment, a framework for bedside manners, or worst of all, an appendage to neuroscience or pharmacology. This would not be phenomenology but the very symptomatology that the authors have has so clearly distinguished from true phenomenology.This equation of phenomenology with symptomatology is exactly the misunderstanding that the authors so effectively address. However, I would hesitate to join the authors' optimism in regard to phenomenology's potential complementary role to conventional psychiatric practice. Furthermore, in the process of paradigm mix, certain constituents of each paradigm may be taken out of context and the strength of each paradigm thus diluted. For example, the very power of the experimental method is its reduction of phenomena to measurable variables that can be altered in order to discern causality. Unmeasurable variables detract form the rigor of this entire approach. Then on the other hand, phenomenological empathy is only possible within a standpoint that is severed from the causal thinking of experimental science. This is the holistic perceptual shift that cannot be accomplished when one only appends phenomenological insights to an otherwise materialist approach to psychiatry. Thus, it is not at all clear how one can be both phenomenological and nonphenomenologically natural scientific. Instead of positioning phenomenology as a potential complimentary component of natural-science psychiatry, both world views need to be examined, on their own terms, in a framework of mutuality.Empathy or the understanding of other peoples subjective experience is indeed an essential component of the application of phenomenology to clinical assessment and especially therapeutic treatment. But, to limit phenomenology to this theme alone may not honor the profoundly radical character of this paradigm. As the authors point out, phenomenology asks the practitioner to... (shrink)

Recently, a three-dimensional construct model for complex experiential Selfhood has been proposed (Fingelkurts et al., 2016b,c). According to this model, three specific subnets (or modules) of the brain self-referential network (SRN) are responsible for the manifestation of three aspects/features of the subjective sense of Selfhood. Follow up multiple studies established a tight relation between alterations in the functional integrity of the triad of SRN modules and related to them three aspects/features of the sense of self; however, the causality of this (...) relation is yet to be shown. In this article we approached the question of causality by exploring functional integrity within the three SRN modules that are thought to underlie the three phenomenal components of Selfhood while these components were manipulated mentally by experienced meditators in a controlled and independent manner. Participants were requested, in a block-randomised manner, to mentally induce states representing either increased (up-regulation) or decreased (down-regulation) sense of (a) witnessing agency (“Self”), or (b) body representational-emotional agency (“Me”), or (c) reflective/narrative agency (“I”), while their brain activity was recorded by an electroencephalogram (EEG). This EEG-data was complemented by first-person phenomenological reports and standardised questionnaires which focused on subjective contents of three aspects of Selfhood. The results of the study strengthen the case for a direct causative relationship between three phenomenological aspects of Selfhood and related to them three modules of the brain SRN. Furthermore, the putative integrative model of the dynamic interrelations among three modules of the SRN has been proposed. (shrink)

Our position is that psychology must have a sound basis if it is to develop properly. Due to the historical influences of the physical sciences on the development of psychology, we do not believe that psychology has been developing within a proper frame of reference and it is our opinion that a phenomenological perspective can provide a more adequate frame of reference. This is true for experimental psychology as well as clinical psychology and personality theory. However, in order to understand (...) the project of phenomenological psychology, it should be understood that a wholly different way of looking at psychological subject matter and methods is being suggested and thus, standard natural scientific criteria are not applicable. The lack of appreciation of this fact has led to innumerable misunderstandings in the past and still contributes to communication problems in the present. Consequently, after the clarification of key terms and after speaking to these difficulties of communication, the approach in this article was to speak from within the perspective of phenomenological psychology itself and we have tried to describe the general kinds of problems that spontaneously arose when we attempted to do research on psychological phenomena. The presence of these problems in no way altered our fundamental thesis that, in principle, it is possible to conduct precise and rigorous experiments within the framework of phenomenological psychology even though different means of executing precision and rigor will have to be invented. The specific challenge mentioned in this paper concerning the articulation of the praxis of phenomenological psychology was seen in the light of being able to conceive of new ways of approaching the phenomena of psychology, and this is essentially a theoretical task. (shrink)

I argue in this paper that Maurice Merleau-Ponty provides a compelling account of alterity in The Prose of the World. I begin by tracing this account of alterity back to its roots in Phenomenology of Perception. I then show how the dynamic of expression articulated in The Prose of the World overcomes the limitations of the account given in the earlier work. After addressing an objection to the effect that the account given in The Prose of the World fails (...) for the same reason as the one given in Phenomenology of Perception, I argue that the key to Merleau-Ponty’s more successful account of alterity is provided by the phenomenon of orientation. (shrink)

This dissertation is a contribution to the contemporary field of phenomenological psychopathology, or the phenomenological study of psychiatric disorders. The work proceeds with two major aims. The first is to show how a phenomenological approach can clarify and illuminate the nature of psychopathology—specifically those conditions typically labeled as major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder. The second is to show how engaging with psychopathological conditions can challenge and undermine many phenomenological presuppositions, especially phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy and its (...) corresponding anti-naturalistic outlook. In the opening chapter, I articulate the three layers of the subject matter of phenomenological research—what I refer to as “existentials,” “modes,” and “prejudices.” As I argue, while each layer contributes to what we might call the “structure” of human existence, they do not do so in the same way, or to the same degree. Because phenomenological psychopathology—and applied phenomenology in general—aims to characterize how the structure of human existence can change and alter, it is paramount that these layers be adequately delineated and defined before investigating these changes. In chapters two through five, I conduct hermeneutic and phenomenological investigations of psychopathological phenomena typically labeled as major depressive disorder or bipolar disorder. These investigations address the affective aspects of depression and mania, and the embodied aspects of depression. In addition to clearly articulating the nature of these phenomena, I show how certain psychopathological conditions involve changes in the deepest or most fundamental layer of human existence—what I refer to as existentials. As I argue, many of the classical phenomenologists (including Husserl and Heidegger) believed that these structural features were necessary, unchanging, and universal. However, this presupposition is challenged through the examination of psychopathological and neuropathological conditions, undermining the status of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. While this challenge to classical phenomenology is only sketched in the early chapters, in chapters six and seven I develop it in more detail in order to achieve two distinct ends. In chapter six I argue that psychopathology and neuropathology not only challenge phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy, but also supply a key to developing a phenomenological naturalism (which I contrast with a naturalized phenomenology). Phenomenological naturalism, as I articulate it, is a position in which phenomenology is not subsumed by the metaphysical and methodological framework of the natural sciences, but nonetheless maintains the capacity to investigate how the natural world stands independent of human subjectivity (and how events in the natural world can bring about changes in the most fundamental structures of human existence). In the seventh chapter I argue that a phenomenology in which existentials are contingent and variable rather than necessary and unchanging allows phenomenologists to contribute to new dimensional approaches to psychiatric classification. Rather than begin from distinct categories of disorder, these approaches begin from distinct core features of human existence. These features, referred to as either dimensions or constructs, can vary in degree and are studied in both normal and pathological forms. (shrink)