Despite the Aristotelian renaissance in the philosophy of education, the development of virtue has not received much attention. This is unfortunate, because an attempt to draft an Aristotelian model of moral development can help philosophers to evaluate the contribution Aristotelian virtue ethics can make to our understanding of moral development, provide psychologists with a potentially richer account of morality and its development, and help educators to understand the developmental phase people are in. In the article, it is (...) argued that the Aristotelian categories of the ‘morally indifferent’, ‘un-self-controlled’, ‘self-controlled’ and ‘properly virtuous’ can be interpreted as the successive stages or levels of a comprehensive developmental model. For each stage, it will be made clear whether people are committed to virtue, whether they act virtuously or not, whether they act with pleasure or pain, and which desires and reasons they have for acting. The article closes with suggestions about what needs to be done if the proposed Aristotelian account of moral development is to become psychologically more realistic and educationally useful. (shrink)

Aristotle is oftentimes viewed through a strictly philosophical lens as heir to Plato and has having introduced logical rigor where an emphasis on the theory of Forms formerly prevailed. It must be appreciated that Aristotle was the son of a physician, and that his inculcation of the thought of other Greek philosophers addressing health and the natural elements led to an extremely broad set of biologically- and medically-related writings. As this article proposes, Aristotle deepened the fourfold theory of the elements (...) with anatomic and physiologic observations. In books like History of Animals, Parts of Animals, and the lost Anatomai, he actively dissected organisms and recorded his findings. The corpus of medically-related literature Aristotle developed had a direct influence on subsequent Greek thinkers, including Galen, and on Medieval Islamic and modern Western practitioners such as William Harvey. Aristotle's ideas continue to influence modern medical thinkers in Europe and America through both his interpretation by European philosophers gaining the attention of medical humanists, and his writings' enduring impact on medical researchers balancing scientific with more personalistic approaches to medicine. (shrink)

Although profoundly influential for essentially the whole of philosophy’s twenty-five hundred year history, the model of a science that is outlined in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics has recently been abandoned on grounds that developments in mathematics and logic over the last century or so have rendered it obsolete. Nor has anything emerged to take its place. As things stand we have not even the outlines of an adequate understanding of the rationality of mathematics as a scientific practice. It seems reasonable, in (...) light of this lacuna, to return again to Frege—who was at once one of the last great defenders of the model and a key figure in the very developments that have been taken to spell its demise—in hopes of finding a way forward. What we find when we do is that although Frege remains true to the spirit of the model, he also modifies it in very fundamental ways. So modified, I will suggest, the model continues to provide a viable and compelling image of scientific rationality by showing, in broad outline, how we achieve, and maintain, cognitive control in our mathematical investigations. (shrink)

In his Poetics, Aristotle articulated certain ideas on the structure of drama that dominated both dramatic literature and theatre practices for the centuries to come. In this article I show how the thorough analysis of his statements leads us to believe that he endorses causality, narrativity, and temporal linearity as primary factors in the organization of dramatic and stage texts. Tracing various modifications of causality throughout theatre history, I use the work of the two prominent contemporary directors, Eimuntas Nekrosius and (...) Anatoly Vasilyev, to demonstrate how postmodernist theatre has arrived at non-Aristotelian theatrical model based on the unity of a time–space continuum rather than temporal development. (shrink)

One field in ethics that has been developed during recent decades is virtue ethics, represented most importantly by Alasdair MacIntyre's work After Virtue. Virtue ethics is not opposed to principle-based ethics, but rather complements its task and develops it more fully. In the field of US bioethics, this option has proved to be even more fruitful, especially in the work of Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma. Virtue ethics is also being reappraised in relation to the ethics of organisations and business. (...) It is considered that the best way of running a company does not depend solely on a group of ethical principles or agreed criteria, but on the effective exercise of certain qualities of character. Indeed, minimal ethics do not guarantee the excellence of organisations, or even their correct development. They guarantee certain standards of coexistence, but this is not sufficient to carry forward a collective enterprise in a creative way. It is impossible to achieve the aims of an organisation without ambition, magnanimity, humility, prudence, responsibility and courage. This group of intangible elements are virtues. This article explores the process of decision-making in the light of Aristotelian ethics, in particular his work Nicomachean Ethics. Making decisions is a common task on the managerial agenda. The decisions of a manager affect individuals, the future of the organisation and, of course, they have consequences for the organisation and its surroundings. Aristotle dedicates Book III of the work in question to studying the art of deliberation and examining which virtues must be taken into account when reaching the best decision. Aristotle tells us that we deliberate about things that are within our power and can be done. There can be no deliberation upon exact and sufficient knowledge; however, we deliberate upon the things that are brought about by our own efforts, although not always in the same way. Leading an organisation is not a mechanical matter, but rather a process that requires creativity and responsibility. There are many different ways of doing it. Following the Aristotelian doctrine, this article aims to examine the elements that must be taken into consideration for correct decisions to be made. The following virtues play a fundamental role in this process: prudence, fortitude, justice and temperance, referred to below as called cardinal virtues. (shrink)

A Bilingual International Conference on the History and Actuality of the Polish Contribution, from the Lvov-Warsaw school to phenomenology, to Twentieth Century Philosophy. Colloque international bilingue portant sur l'histoire et l'actualité de la contribution polonaise, de l'école de Lvov-Varsovie à la phénoménologie, à la philosophie du vingtième siècle.

Quine's well-known ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (1951) plays a key role in the debate about the analytic-synthetic distinction. Taking to task the ideas of Carnap in particular, Quine shows that logical positivism works with a concept of scientific rationality that is based dogmatically on, among other things, the opposition analytic-synthetic.

One field in ethics that has been developed during recent decades is virtue ethics, represented most importantly by Alasdair MacIntyre's work After Virtue. Virtue ethics is not opposed to principle-based ethics, but rather complements its task and develops it more fully. In the field of US bioethics, this option has proved to be even more fruitful, especially in the work of Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma. Virtue ethics is also being reappraised in relation to the ethics of organisations and business. (...) It is considered that the best way of running a company does not depend solely on a group of ethical principles or agreed criteria, but on the effective exercise of certain qualities of character. Indeed, minimal ethics do not guarantee the excellence of organisations, or even their correct development. They guarantee certain standards of coexistence, but this is not sufficient to carry forward a collective enterprise in a creative way. It is impossible to achieve the aims of an organisation without ambition, magnanimity, humility, prudence, responsibility and courage. This group of intangible elements are virtues. This article explores the process of decision-making in the light of Aristotelian ethics, in particular his work _Nicomachean Ethics_. Making decisions is a common task on the managerial agenda. The decisions of a manager affect individuals, the future of the organisation and, of course, they have consequences for the organisation and its surroundings. Aristotle dedicates Book III of the work in question to studying the art of deliberation and examining which virtues must be taken into account when reaching the best decision. Aristotle tells us that we deliberate about things that are within our power and can be done. There can be no deliberation upon exact and sufficient knowledge; however, we deliberate upon the things that are brought about by our own efforts, although not always in the same way. Leading an organisation is not a mechanical matter, but rather a process that requires creativity and responsibility. There are many different ways of doing it. Following the Aristotelian doctrine, this article aims to examine the elements that must be taken into consideration for correct decisions to be made. The following virtues play a fundamental role in this process: prudence, fortitude, justice and temperance, referred to below as called cardinal virtues. (shrink)

The overall objectives of this article are to help the reader see and understand through Aristotelian lenses: (1) positive and negative aspects of the Leveraged Buyout (LBO) business model; and, (2) how LBO practices can be reformed so as to retain positives and reduce negatives. Aristotelian lenses considered are: wealth acquisition through wealth expansion, wealth creation, and wealth transfers; distributive and corrective justice; and, a dialectic analytic process of retaining positives, reducing negatives, and reforming. Key net positive wealth (...) expansion aspects of the model are discussed with respect to: profitability for the owners, managers, and investors of LBO firms; potential productivity improvements on the cost and revenue sides; and, potentially greater credit availability. Negative wealth transfer and destruction aspects with respect to: a relatively high rate of bankruptcies in some countries and in economic downturns; LBO firm gains without responsibility for losses; wealth transfers from employees, creditors, ordinary vs “carried interest” taxpayers; and, damaged wealth expansion and creation capabilities of acquired organizations are discussed. Potential reforms that could reduce negatives, retain positives, and reform the model are discussed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Agent-Centered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian InternalismDaniel E. PalmerGeorge W. Harris. Agent-Centered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian Internalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Pp. xi + 434. Cloth, $60.00.Contemporary philosophers have found substantial resources in the ethical writings of both Aristotle and Kant. Together Aristotelian-inspired virtue ethics and Kantian constructivism have not only contributed greatly to the resurgence of interest in normative (...) theory in recent decades, but have also provided the most prominent alternatives to the utilitarianism that has dominated Anglo-American ethics for so long. However, the development of these ethical projects has been carried out largely independently of one another. In Agent-Centered Morality, George Harris helps to overcome this lacuna by comparing and contrasting these two competing versions of [End Page 449] morality. As such, this work is a welcome addition to the literature both as a survey of recent work in Aristotelian and Kantian ethics as well as an account of the many ways in which they converge and diverge in their corresponding treatments of practical rationality.Harris begins by noting that the appeal of both the Aristotelian and Kantian models is that they attempt to generate a foundation for ethics within an account of practical reason, and thus to ground morality within a deliberative perspective that connects the demands of morality with an agent's own meaningful commitments. As such, Harris correctly argues that these projects have much more in common than has sometimes been supposed. The central question that Harris raises in this book is which account of practical reason is best suited for this task. His thesis is that the Aristotelian model gives us a more plausible picture of the role of norms within practical rationality.The major distinction between the Aristotelian and the Kantian models according to Harris is that while on the Aristotelian model the norms made use of in practical judgments are symmetric in their regulative function, the Kantian model provides an asymmetrical account of norms. To arbitrate between these two views, Harris proposes an integration test. The point of the integration test is to assure that our account of practical rationality and the function of regulative norms that it provides can support the integrity of rational agents. Minimally then, the test will favor the account of practical rationality that best "integrates the various concerns of rational human agents in a way that preserves integrity" (32).While the above vastly simplifies Harris's rich treatment of this issue, it nonetheless allows us to see how Harris goes about arguing for the superiority of the Aristotelian view. For Harris maintains that the Aristotelian symmetrical model integrates regulative norms better than the Kantian model. To show why, Harris makes use of a number of examples to demonstrate that regulative norms function in a symmetrical fashion in regards to one another for the agent of integrity. For instance, to show that the norm of impartial respect is sometimes regulated by the norm of impartial sympathy, Harris gives an example of someone who breaks a lunch date in order to help a dog that is being mistreated. Likewise, Harris uses examples to argue that sometimes even partial norms, like that of parental concern, regulate the impartial norm of respect. Harris believes that these cases demonstrate that the regulative norms made use of in practical deliberation must function in a symmetrical fashion. Thus, Harris thinks we have good reason to reject the Kantian view "that the integrative function of practical reason is achieved by an impartial norm that is asymmetrical in its regulative function" (127).Though interesting and worthy of attention, I am not convinced that Harris makes use of the most plausible understanding of the Kantian model of practical rationality in his central argument. By focusing almost exclusively upon the idea of respect, Harris assumes that the best reading of the Kantian project will be founded primarily in the idea of impartial respect. However, if we adopt a procedural understanding of the Categorical Imperative, a plausible case could be made that a Kantian account of practical rationality can account for the examples that Harris makes use of just as well as the Aristotelian... (shrink)

Drawing on the theory of ‘mental models’, I have previously shown that the valid syllogisms in the Aristotelian logical system, including all of its figures and moods, are very easy for the human mind. Indeed, they can even be used to predict inferences that people can make with quantified sentences. In this paper, I further argue that, if mental models theory is correct, then also the Aristotelian conversion rules are not hard for the human mind. My (...) account here again focuses on the distinction made by the mental models theory between canonical and noncanonical models. (shrink)

AUGUSTINE WISHED TO DEFEND AND MAKE AS INTELLIGIBLE AS POSSIBLE THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. I SHOW HOW AUGUSTINE WORKS WITH AN ARISTOTELIAN MODEL OF PREDICATION, DERIVES AN INCOMPLETENESS RESULT WITHIN THE STANDARD FORMS OF PREDICATION, AND ACCEPTS, WITH SOME QUALIFICATION, A NONSTANDARD FORM OF PREDICATION USED BY ARISTOTLE FOR PREDICATING PRIMARY SUBSTANCE OF MATTER.

El debate en torno a Aristipo de Cirene, cuya concepción de la felicidad coloca en el centro de la escena al placer, pone en tela de juicio las afirmaciones propias de aquellas éticas nucleadas bajo el epíteto de eudemonistas. Con el desplazamiento de la felicidad del sitial del fin, Aristipo reformula la dimensión ética tradicional: a través del ejercicio de la enkráteia, y lejos de caer en un relativismo subjetivista, intenta construir una ética que tenga como base un objetivismo gnoseológico. (...) Demostraremos, además, que al ejercicio de la enkráteia cirenaica subyace la noción de autosuficiencia ( autárkeia ) –entendida en términos aristotélicos– del individuo . Esto nos enfrentará, irremediablemente, a la noción aristotélica de felicidad (en estrecho vínculo con la noción de enkráteia ), la cual no comporta una noción de autosuficiencia individual sino que restringe la posibilidad de la autárkeia a la autosuficiencia de la pólis. (shrink)

Current biological sciences standardly ascribe proper functions to biological parts, traits and mechanisms. In addition, realism about proper functions has an important space within the ongoing debate in philosophy of biology. Functional ascriptions are often conceived of as tracking objective, observer-independent higher-level features of the inquired object, rather than merely depending on a methodological, descriptive or epistemic attitude. In this paper, I argue for a realist account of proper bio-functions based on standard causal explanations of an organism’s behaviour: such explanations (...) are most intelligible if the autonomy of special sciences rests on the ontological and causal autonomy of their respective objects. I take into consideration the Aristotelian theoretical framework on teleological causation and reconstruct his arguments against his reductionist rivals. Finally, I consider the recent revival of Emergentism and try to establish to what extent the Neo-emergentist framework fits with the Aristotelian model, which I show to be partially valid also within an evolutionist view. (shrink)

The present paper analyses the correctness of an argument aiming to show that Aristotelian ontology justifies a better interpretation of the world than naturalistic ontology. The problems connected with this argument can be reduced to three: (1) the assumption of a scientific appoach to the world does not imply the exclusion of subjectivity or intentionality; (2) the assumption of an ontology of substances does not imlpy the exclusion of ontological models deriving from the scientific approach to the world; (...) (3) the assumption of an ontology of substances is linked to the problem of the relation between the objective and the subjective world, involving the negation of causal closure of the objective world. An analysis of these problems will be presented below, together with a hypothesis of solution to the problem of illusoriness of the subjective dimension, in order to justify the confutation of an extreme naturalistic conception such as eliminativism. (shrink)

There are many good reasons for seeing Aristotelian hylemorphism and atomism as diametrically opposed theories of matter. Aristotle himself had forcefully combatted the physical model of Leucippus and Democritus, whose ontology consisted of indivisible material bodies moving in an immaterial void, presenting his own model as an alternative. This alternative excluded both indivisibles and the void and postulated instead a plenist world made up of substances all of which were infinitely divisible continua composed of universal matter and specific substantial (...) forms. Unlike elementary atoms, Aristotle’s elementary substances could transmute into one another: water, when evaporating, was said to turn into air. (shrink)

This dissertation is a comparative study of Aristotelian and Chinese logic. I briefly overview the reports of difficulties in understanding that derives from cultural differences. I claim that these difficulties not only result from the fact that concepts in each language fail to match properly, but also from the fact that the logical spaces themselves are structured differently. Aristotelian logic is based on the structure of a classificatory system---a hierarchical structure of names for kinds of things organized into (...) genera/species. Chinese logic is based on a Chinese binary system---a yin-yang structure of associative relations. ;I discuss the difficulties of translating the first three chapters of Matthew Lipman's Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery---one of a series of novels used in the Philosophy for Children Project---into Chinese. These chapters discuss the logical relations constituting the Aristotelian Square of Opposition. I find that most translation problems result from the fact that the logical structures of these two languages fail to match. ;I report my research on the responses of American and Chinese school children to reading chapter one of Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery , one in the original English version and the other in Chinese. The study of discussions among older children offers evidence for my claim that logical spaces of Western and Chinese thinking are structured differently, but the study of discussions among younger children gives a hope that there is a chance for there to be communication between the two very different ways of thinking. ;The conclusion is that Aristotelian logic and Chinese logic have two very different objectives, and as a consequence, different patterns for constructing logical relations. These two patterns represent two thinking models. The former is like a tree. It represents a finite number of things according to a presumed order. The latter is like a net; from any point on the net, one can link to any number of related points in an ever-changing world. The possibility of a mutually beneficial rapprochement between Chinese and Aristotelian logic depends on whether we can lay out a way for each side to understand the other in a common discourse. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to make a case for Aristotelian friendship as a ‘method’ of moral education qua mutual character development. After setting out some Aristotelian assumptions about friendship and education in the “Aristotle and Beyond: Some Basics about Character Friendship and Education”section, I devote the “Role-Model Moral Education Contrasted with Learning from Character Friends” section to role modelling and how it differs from the idea of cultivating character through friendships. “The Mechanisms of Learning from Character (...) Friends” section then explores the mechanisms of Aristotelian friendship education directly: those identified by him and those which can be elicited more obliquely from his texts. I end in the “Concluding Remarks and Classroom Applications” section with some reflections on how this model of friendship as a moral method could be applied in current educational contexts. While the idea of character friendship as an educational method comes with many assets, it also imports various liabilities that may lead to painful friendship terminations. I have put the spotlight on those liabilities in two previous articles. In contrast, the goal here is to impart a new edge and added force to the idea that a certain Aristotle-defined type of deep friendships may have a unique role to play in facilitating moral growth, above and beyond other developmental learning mechanisms. (shrink)

Based on an examination of Galileo’s mechanics, Peter Machamer and Andrea Woody (and Machamer alone in subsequent articles) proposed the scientific use of what they call models of intelligibility. As they define it, a model of intelligibility (MOI) is a concrete phenomenon that guides scientific understanding of problematic cases. This paper extends Machamer and Woody’s analysis by elaborating the semantic function of MOIs. MOIs are physical embodiments of theoretical representations. Therefore, they eliminate the interpretive distance between theory and phenomena, (...) creating classes of concrete referents for theoretical concepts. Meanwhile, MOIs also provide evidence for historical analyses of concepts, like ‘body’ or ‘motion’, that are otherwise thought to be too basic for explicit explication. These points are illustrated by two examples also drawn from Galileo. First, I show how the introduction of the balance as an MOI leads Galileo to reject the Aristotelian conception of elemental natures. Second, Galileo’s rejection of medieval MOIs of circular motion constrains the reference of ‘conserved motion’ to curvilinear translations, thereby excluding the rotations that had been included in its scope. Both uses of MOIs marked important steps toward modern classical mechanics. (shrink)

In recent years there has been an increased interest in the application of Aristotelian virtue to business ethics. The objective of this paper is to describe the moral and intellectual virtues defined by Aristotle and the types of pedagogy that might be used to integrate virtue ethics into the business curriculum. Virtues are acquired human qualities, the excellences of character, which enable a person to achieve the good life. In business, the virtues facilitate successful cooperation and enable the community (...) to achieve its collective goals. The cultivation of virtue in students requires imparting knowledge about virtue and training students to be virtuous. A variety of instructional techniques are discussed including using case studies, collaborative and cooperative learning, role-playing, and video presentations. Business educators should emphasize to students that virtue considerations apply both to possible actions they may take and to themselves as moral agents. Since faculty may be viewed as role models, it is especially important that they set proper standards of behavior for students to emulate. (shrink)

Current popular narratives regarding the history of astronomy espouse the narrative of scientific development arising from clashes between observed phenomena and dogmatic religious scripture. Such narratives consider the development of our understandings of the cosmos as isolated episodes in ground-breaking, world-view shifting events, led by rational, objective and secular observers. As observation of astronomical development in the early 1600s shows, however, such a narrative is false. Developments by Johannes Kepler, for instance, followed earlier efforts by Nicholas Copernicus to refine (...) class='Hi'>Aristotelian-based dogma with observed phenomena. Kepler's efforts specifically were not meant to challenge official Church teachings, but offer a superior system to what was than available, based around theological justifications. Popular acceptance of a heliocentric model came not from Kepler's writings, but from the philosophical teachings of Rene Descartes. Through strictly mathematical and philosophical reasoning, Descartes not only rendered the Aristotelian model baseless in society, but also provided a cosmological understanding of the universe that centred our solar system within a vast expanse of other stars. The shift than, from the Aristotelian geocentric model to the heliocentric model, came not from clashes between theology and reason, but from negotiations between theology and observed phenomena. (shrink)

It is shown that Aristotelian dialectic can be analyzed as having two parts: a core formal model that has a formal dialogue structure and a set of ten definable supplementary characteristics that lie outside the core structure. Some current argumentation tools used in artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems are applied to the task of extending the core formal model to include the supplementary characteristics. Using these tools it is explained how the structure of a dialogue can be mapped into (...) an argument diagram that can be analyzed and evaluated using standard argumentation techniques such as argumentation schemes, types of dialogue, critical questions and a dialectical concept of burden of proof. Disputed issues on how the elenchus fits the standard dialogue typology are discussed, and it is concluded that it fits best into a type of dialogue called examination dialogue that is closely related to persuasion dialogue. (shrink)

This chapter examines key Confucian worries about the Aristotelian sophos as a model of human flourishing. How strong are these worries? Do Aristotelians have good replies to them? Could the Aristotelian sophos, and this figure's distinguishing feature, sophia, be more appealing to the Confucian than they initially appear?

In this chapter, it is argued that the Mind-Body Powers model of neural correlates of consciousness provides a metaphysical framework that yields the theoretical possibility of empirically detecting consciousness. Since the model is informed by an Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphic ontology rather than a physicalist ontology, it provides a philosophical foundation for the science of consciousness that is an alternative to physicalism. Our claim is not that the Mind-Body Powers model provides the only alternative, but rather that it provides a sufficient (...) framework for empirically detecting and scientifically studying consciousness. Elsewhere, the integrated information theory’s prediction about the neural correlate of being conscious has been used to illustrate how the Mind-Body Powers model grounds the possibility of empirically detecting consciousness (see M. Owen, 2021, ch. 8). The theory’s prediction was used as one plausible example of a hypothesis about the nature and location of the neural correlate that can be combined with the model. However, there is no settled conclusion about which neurobiological theory of consciousness accurately identifies the neural mechanisms corresponding to being conscious (NAS, 2021, p. 39; Sattin et al., 2021; Seth, 2017; Seth & Bayne, 2022). Therefore, this work will employ another plausible neurobiological prediction provided by the Temporal Circuit Hypothesis. The hypothesis is combined with the Mind-Body Powers model to demonstrate that empirically detecting consciousness is metaphysically plausible wholly apart from a physicalist framework. (shrink)

‘Virtue ethics’ is prominent, if not pre-eminent, in contemporary moral philosophy. The philosophical model for most of those urging a ‘virtues approach’ to ethics is of course Aristotle. Some features, at least, of the motivation to this renewed concern with Aristotelian ethical thought are fairly clear. Notoriously, Kant held that the only thing good without qualification is the good will; and he then made it difficult to grasp what made the will good when he denied that it could be (...) its preoccupation with or attention to anything in the world. The idea of the good will then seems to be an idea of something which transcends the world, and therefore to be no easier to make sense of, or to believe in, than Plato′s form of the good is usually thought to be. The first obvious attraction of Aristotle′s ethics, then—at least to those of an empiricist or worldly cast of mind—is that it promises an understanding of the ethical which locates that robustly within the world. Aristotle′s virtues are real this-worldly existences. They are, moreover, qualities whose place in our lives seems to be explained readily, and attractively, in Aristotelian terms. Moral virtue is essentially connected with eudaimonia, a concept variously construed as happiness, as living well, or even as flourishing. Morality is important because of the contribution it makes to the living of a fully human life. And a ‘fully human’ life is characterizable in what modernity calls ‘humanist’, or sometimes ‘naturalistic’, terms: it requires no invocation of transcendence or other-worldliness. (shrink)

Several authors have recently studied Aristotelian diagrams for various metatheoretical notions from logic, such as tautology, satisfiability, and the Aristotelian relations themselves. However, all these metalogical Aristotelian diagrams focus on the semantic (model-theoretical) perspective on logical consequence, thus ignoring the complementary, and equally important, syntactic (proof-theoretical) perspective. In this paper, I propose an explanation for this discrepancy, by arguing that the metalogical square of opposition for semantic consequence exhibits a natural analogy to the well-known square of opposition (...) for the categorical statements from syllogistics, but that this analogy breaks down once we move from semantic to syntactic consequence. I then show that despite this difficulty, one can indeed construct metalogical Aristotelian diagrams from a syntactic perspective, which have their own, equally elegant characterization in terms of the categorical statements. Finally, I construct several metalogical Aristotelian diagrams that incorporate both semantic and syntactic consequence (and their interaction), and study how they are influenced by the underlying logical system’s soundness and/or completeness. All of this provides further support for the methodological/heuristic perspective on Aristotelian diagrams, which holds that the main use of these diagrams lies in facilitating analogies and comparisons between prima facie unrelated domains of investigation. (shrink)

As we build increasingly intelligent machines, we confront difficult questions about how to specify their objectives. One approach, which we call human-centered, tasks the machine with the objective of learning and satisfying human objectives by observing our behavior. This paper considers how human-centered AI should conceive the humans it is trying to help. We argue that an Aristotelian model of human agency has certain advantages over the currently dominant theory drawn from economics.

The ‘model approach’ facilitates a quantitative-oriented study of conceptual changes in large corpora. This paper implements the ‘model approach’ to investigate the erosion of the traditional art-nature distinction in early modern natural philosophy. I argue that a condition for this transformation has to be located in the late scholastic conception of final causation. I design a conceptual model to capture the art-nature distinction and formulate a working hypothesis about its early modern fate. I test my hypothesis on a selected corpus (...) of 25 works published in the Dutch academic milieu between 1607 and 1748. I analyse the corpus through a procedure based on concordancing of keywords associated with the model. I argue that the results obtained constitute a successful pilot study for the implementation of the model approach on larger scale research. (shrink)

The concept of second nature plays a central role in McDowell's project of reconciling thought's external constraint with its spontaneity or autonomy: our conceptual capacities are natural in the sense that they are fully integrated into the natural world, but they are a second nature to us since they are not reducible to elements that are intelligible apart from those conceptual capacities. Rather than offering a theory of second nature and an account of how we acquire one, McDowell suggests that (...) Aristotle's account of ethical character formation as the acquisition of a second nature serves as a model that can reassure us that thought's autonomy does not threaten its naturalness. However, far from providing such reassurance, the Aristotelian model of second nature actually generates an anxiety about how the acquisition of such autonomous conceptual abilities could be possible. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Pseudo Justin's objections to Aristotle's cosmological doctrines, and aims to show that, as a result of his criticisms to Aristotle's viewpoints, an entirely new view of the natural world bursts in. A few arguments by Pseudo Justin against the Aristotelian cosmology are analysed, and the author shows that Pseudo Justin makes use of conceptual tools and of some assumptions Aristotelian in character without resorting to the creationist argument. If what is suggested in this paper (...) is sound, Pseudo-Justin would have put forward and advanced for the first time some aspects of the physical model which turned out to be dominant from Modernity onwards several centuries before the new approach to nature starting in the XVII century. (shrink)

I use the theory of the division of labor as a case-study in the logic of social explanation and to test the explanatory power of a new Aristotelian model for social theory. The classical political economists from Adam Smith to Karl Marx argue that the divisions of labor is both efficient and natural. I claim that this explanation suffers from a two-fold reductionism: the moral dimension of the division of labor is reduced to technical efficiency; and the customary and (...) stipulated dimensions of the division of labor are reduced to nature. This reductionism collapses two important Aristotelian distinctions: that between moral reason and technical reason ; and that between nature , custom , and deliberate stipulation . I revise these concepts in the light of modern natural, social and philosophical sciences into a framework for social theory: I show that, in human conduct, technical reason always presupposes moral reason; and I show that every social institution is the joint product of nature, custom, and stipulation: just as custom presupposes nature, so stipulation presupposes custom. I then use this framework to criticize Aristotle as well as classical political economy. By transcending the positivist dichotomy of ends and means, I restore moral reason to supremacy over technique. By transcending the Sophistic dichotomy between nature and convention, I restore custom to its rightful place at the center of social theory. (shrink)

Recent reconstructions of Heidegger's thoughts on ethics have a curious paradoxical feature. On the one hand, Heidegger, particularly in his Aristotle lectures of the 1920s, offers a view of practical reason on which Dasein has its “moral knowledge” in a fully perceptual, non-cognitive way. This generally sets Heidegger in opposition to the whole business of principled moral justification before the fact. On the other hand, the literature is peppered with what appear to be principled denunciations of immorality—particularly violations of other (...) Dasein—grounded in the analytic of Dasein. To see human life as having a stable ergon (“business” or “function”), with certain broad tasks to pursue and vices to avoid, is not necessarily counter-Aristotelian; on the contrary, it is basic to the kind of Aristotelianism Husserl pursued in his own lectures on ethics. Here I set Heidegger's Aristotelian model of practical reason amid the competing, though similar, Aristotelianisms of John McDowell and Husserl, which differ on their handling of the human ergon. I conclude that Heidegger's views on practical reason and moral knowledge certainly constrain and very much alter the business of moral justification, but they do not precisely rule it out. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to point out that some mathematical doctrines attributed by Aristotle to Plato find their origin in a threefold order of problems: first, in some allusions contained in the dialogues, which might create ambiguities within the so-called standard model of ideas; second, in the Aristotelian interpretation of ideal entities as universals or predicates, an interpretation in turn partly authorized by Plato himself; third, in the tendency not to emphasize the possibility of understanding participation and (...) the whole-part relationship from a non-quantitative point of view. In this paper I will disregard the complex debate about whether or not to attribute the unwritten doctrines of the Aristotelian account to Plato, but I will appraise in what sense some Aristotelian objections to participation may arise from the fact of conceiving of numbers and magnitudes as ideas. (shrink)

This paper explores a specific problem within an important philosophical genre of the fourteenth century: the debates over the perfection of species. It investigates how the problem of defining limits for continuous magnitudes – a problem typical of Aristotelian physics – was integrated into these debates at the levels of genera, species, and individuals as these entities began to be conceptualized in quantitative terms. After explaining the emergence of this problem within fourteenth-century metaphysics, the paper examines the contributions of (...) three philosophers – Hugolinus of Orvieto, John of Ripa, and Paul of Venice – who offered varying solutions to the challenge of defining limits between species. It demonstrates that two primary solutions arose, inspired by continuous and discrete mathematical objects. It is shown that whereas Hugolinus of Orvieto advocates for a continuist model, John of Ripa proposes a discrete one. The last part of the paper examines Paul of Venice's hybrid approach, which combines elements from both models, facilitating a more comprehensive treatment of species particularly difficult to analyse, namely geometric figures. The conclusions of this comparative study underscore how profoundly the metaphysical reflections of the Middle Ages contributed to the analysis of the structure of the continuum and the extension of the notion of quantity to various objects. (shrink)

Neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) are neural states or processes correlated with consciousness. The aim of this article is to present a coherent explanatory model of NCC that is informed by Thomas Aquinas’s human ontology and Aristotle’s metaphysics of causation. After explicating four starting principles regarding causation and mind-body dependence, I propose the Mind-Body Powers model of NCC.

I argue that Edward Feser misconstrues the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition on issues relevant to the arguments for God’s existence that proceed from finality in nature because he misapplies the A-T view that ordering to an end is inherent in natural things: (1) Feser speaks as if human action in no way serves as a model for understanding action for an end in nature; (2) he misreads, and ultimately undermines, the Fifth Way, by substituting intrinsic end-directedness in place of end-directedness; (3) (...) he overlooks striking similarities between Paley’s argument from design and the Fifth Way. He also fails to consider the role of the good in the Fifth Way. (shrink)

This essay aims to construct a relationship between Aristotle's account of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics and the ideal of companionship articulated and lived out by St. Ignatius of Loyola, the founder of the Jesuit order. Although on the surface, it may seem as though Aristotelian friendship and Ignatian companionship have little in common, given that the accounts were developed in such different contexts, I argue that there are similarities worth exploring. Taken together, the accounts can help illuminate the (...) good of friendship as we experience it in the current age. The essay has three parts. In Part I, I set out Aristotle's account of friendship, focusing especially on his claims about shared activity in friendship and the role that friends play in times of suffering and bad fortune. In Part II, I turn to the Ignatian idea of companionship, both as he wrote about it and as he lived it. Ignatian spirituality takes it as a given that human life often follows a very rocky and difficult path. The spiritual practices of the Ignatian tradition are designed to help us cultivate the dispositions and habits necessary to sustain us through those experiences of grief, agony, and isolation. Those same dispositions and habits, I will suggest, also enable us to sustain our friends and be good companions during times of both joy and despair. In Part III, I will draw these two accounts together and consider what friendship on this Aristotelian-Ignatian model might look like today. Here I will focus on the ways in which friends are companions to each other during the despair and isolation occasioned by serious illness, trauma, and death. Both Aristotle and Ignatius have important insights into the value and function of friendship in these moments, insights that can help us think through the contemporary version of the same problem. (shrink)

Abstract: This chapter examines the role of the virtuous agent in the acquisition of virtue. It rejects the view of the virtuous agent as a direct model for imitation and instead focuses on recent research on the importance of phronesis. Phronesis is understood as a type of moral ‘know how’ expertise that is supported by a variety of abilities, from emotional maturity, to self-reflection, to an empathic understanding of what moves others, to an ability to see beyond the surface and (...) understand the complexities of human behaviour. If we want to acquire virtue instead of focusing on the virtuous agent as such we should be trying to understand the abilities exemplified by his phronesis. As part of this project, I also consider philosophers who seek inspiration from the empirical sciences to shed light on how phronetic expertise is developed and what relevance this may have for moral education. (shrink)

In recent decades, a growing number of biologists has testified to the priority of the whole organism with respect to its parts and protested against the dominance of mechanist and reductionist accounts of the organism in biological science. To see disinterested inquiry thus shaped “by constraint of facts” will delight, but cannot surprise, an Aristotelian. Taking this rediscovery of nature by biologists as an occasion for reflection, this essay considers, first, what is presupposed by any healthy biological inquiry, second, (...) the prospects of renewal for the science itself, and, finally, a good that could follow from such a renewal. Aristotelian biology is an invitation to consider the forms of living things. Since “philosophy claims to know” , philosophers are called to bear witness to the primacy of form and, like biologists, to be models of attentiveness to form. (shrink)

Human affectivity is a research topic situated at the intersection of psychology, philosophical anthropology, theory of action and ethics. This article reconstructs the Aristotelian theory of emotions in the context of his theory of aspiration /recij ) and in terms of their function as primary evaluators of situations, which forms the basis for virtue ethics. The Aristotelian model integrates desire, motivation and morality for a rational being in community. Affects reveal the profile of relevance of the world to (...) a person as an indispensable basis for the work of practical reason. They are analysed in the dimensions of their cognitive core, their social, bodily, and motivational aspects. Affectivity constitutes a primary evaluative response to situations and thereby disposes human beings to realise their call to morally good, virtuous and fulfilling action. (shrink)

I argue that the theory of happiness now dominant among philosophers embraces a flawed, technicizing model that represents happiness as a set of mental states produced by actions and events. This view contrasts with Aristotle’s conception, according to which happiness is not produced by (but is tantamount to) long-term activity and incorporates (but is not reducible to) a set of mental states. I then go on to criticize the skill model of happiness on three main grounds. First, unlike the (...) class='Hi'>Aristotelian model, it necessarily instrumentalizes activity while setting no principled limit to the manipulation of human action and experience. Second, and again contra Aristotle, it privileges an efficient (rather than formal) conception of causation while obscuring the way in which happiness is inextricably grounded in its conditions, which in turn has various deleterious upshots. Third and finally, the skill model yields a highly questionable notion of happiness as measurable. (shrink)

This book articulates the theoretical outlines of a feminism developed from Aristotle’s metaphysics, making a new contribution to feminist theory. Readers will discover why Aristotle was not a feminist and how he might have become one, through an investigation of Aristotle and Aristotelian tradition. The author shows how Aristotle’s metaphysics can be used to articulate a particularly subtle and theoretically powerful understanding of gender that may offer a highly useful tool for distinctively feminist arguments. This work builds on Martha (...) Nussbaum’s ‘capabilities approach’ in a more explicitly and thoroughly hylomorphist way. The author shows how Aristotle’s hylomorphic model, developed to run between the extremes of Platonic dualism and Democritean atomism, can similarly be used today to articulate a view of gender that takes bodily differences seriously without reducing gender to biological determinations. Although written for theorists, this scholarly yet accessible book can be used to address more practical issues and the final chapter explores women in universities as one example. This book will appeal to both feminists with limited familiarity with Aristotle’s philosophy, and scholars of Aristotle with limited familiarity with feminism. (shrink)

Words have determinable sense only within a complex of unstated assumptions, and all interpretation must therefore go beyond the given material. This book addresses what is man's place in the Aristotelian world. It also describes man's abilities and prospects in managing his life, and considers how far Aristotle's treatment of time and history licenses the sort of dynamic interpretation of his doctrines that have been given. The ontological model that explains much of Aristotle's conclusions and methods is one of (...) life-worlds, in which the material universe of scientific myth is no more than an abstraction from lived reality, not its transcendent ground. (shrink)