In tribute to the philosophy of Bat-Ami Bar On, this article draws upon her Arendtian analysis of fascism to explore recent dynamics of ethnic nationalism in the US. Whereas Bar On analyzed the problem of citizen-soldiers, this study extends analysis toward the citizen culture-soldier, suggesting that recent dynamics in the US are suggestive of a Cultural Revolution that threatens the inclusive practice of citizenship required of democracy. Bar On’s work motivates philosophers to not be lulled into acceptance (...) of anti-democratic practices of citizenship. The values of respect, equality, and equity suggest that another form of citizenship should be practically pursued. (shrink)

In the modern world, there is a growing interest in the problem of forming a person’s identity. The category of “identity,” despite the diversity of theoretical and empirical research, remains complex. The article is devoted to the study of transformations of the collective identity of Ukrainian citizens after the Revolution of Dignity, in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war in Eastern Ukraine. In the period from 2013 to 2019, there have been radical changes in many spheres of public life (...) in Ukraine. The Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of the Crimea, and the war in the Donbas all led to significant political, legal, and socio-economic and socio-cultural changes that contributed to the processes of the transformation of the collective identity of Ukrainian citizens. The aim of this article is to study the dynamics of the changes in the collective identity of Ukrainian citizens after the Revolution of Dignity through the prism of the integrative approach. (shrink)

Third World Citizens and the Information Technology Revolution Content Type Journal Article Category Review Pages 515-522 DOI 10.1558/jcr.v11i4.515 Authors Nicolas Adam, Centre d’études sur l’intégration et la mondialisation, Université du Québec à Montréal, 400, rue Sainte-Catherine Est, Pavillon Hubert-Aquin, 1er étage, bureau A-1560, Montréal H2L 2C5 Canada Journal Journal of Critical Realism Online ISSN 1572-5138 Print ISSN 1476-7430 Journal Volume Volume 11 Journal Issue Volume 11, Number 4 / 2012.

Notions of democracy and nationhood constitute the pivotal legacy of the American Revolution, but to understand their development one must move beyond a purely American context. Citizens of a Common Intellectual Homeland explores the simultaneous emergence of modern concepts of democracy and the nation on both sides of the Atlantic during the age of revolutions. Armin Mattes argues that in their origin the two concepts were indistinguishable because they arose from a common revolutionary impulse directed against the prevailing hierarchical (...) political and social order. The author shows how the reconceptualization of democracy and the nation, which resulted from this revolutionary impulse, received its decisive form from the French Revolution. Although the French Revolution was instrumental in redefining the two terms, however, neither were these changes confined to France, nor did the new meanings merely radiate from France to other countries. To illustrate the transatlantic emergence of these ideas, Mattes considers the works of pairs of prominent intellectual contemporaries--one in America and the other in Europe--each writing on a common topic. The thinkers and topics include Thomas Paine and Edmund Burke on the transatlantic revolutions, John Adams and Friedrich von Gentz on the mixed constitution, James Madison and Immanuel Kant on perpetual peace, and Thomas Jefferson and Destutt de Tracy on the nation. Mattes's approach highlights the significant impact that the French Revolution had on the evolution of thought in the period, demonstrating that the emergence and early development of modern concepts of democracy and the nation in America were intimately tied to revolutionary events and processes in the larger Atlantic world. Preparation of this volume has been supported by the Thomas Jefferson Foundation. Jeffersonian America. (shrink)

Oppressive governments that use violence against citizens, e.g. murder and torture, are usually thought of as liable to armed revolutionary attack by the oppressed population. But oppression may be non-violent. A government may greatly restrict political rights and personal autonomy by using surveillance, propaganda, manipulation, strategic detention and similar techniques without ever resorting to overt violence. Can such regimes be liable to revolutionary attack? A widespread view is that the answer is ‘no’. On this view, unless a government is or (...) is likely to turn violent, revolution against it is disproportional. After all, revolution would involve launching potentially lethal attacks against oppressors who do not threaten the lives and bodily integrity of their subjects but pose only lesser threats. I argue that this claim of disproportionality is false. Armed revolution against Stably Non-violent Oppressive Regimes can be proportional under some circumstances, thus they may be liable to revolutionary attack. My argument relies on the Responsibility-Sensitive Account of Proportionality. This account holds that responsibility for posing threats renders agents liable to greater defensive harms than the harms with which they threaten. Even if non-violent oppressive regimes do not threaten citizens with murder, serious physical injury, or enslavement, their responsibility for creating an environment in which citizens’ political rights and personal autonomy are extremely restricted may loosen the proportionality requirement of inflicting defensive harm and render them liable to revolutionary attack. (shrink)

ABSTRACTFrom 1797 to 1801 a controversy played out on the pages of the Medical Repository, the first scientific journal published in the United States. At its centre was the well-known feud between the followers of Antoine Lavoisier and Joseph Priestley, the lone supporter of the phlogiston model. The American debate, however, had more than two sides. The Americans chemists, Samuel Latham Mitchill and Benjamin Woodhouse, who rushed to support Priestley did not defend his scientific views. Rather, as citizens of a (...) republic, they defended his right to have them. They also castigated the assertions of the “French chemists,” whose claims that the new chemistry obviated debate seemed unsettlingly similar to the dictatorial ambitions of the French state. Using the Medical Repository, Mitchill and Woodhouse sought a compromise that validated the new chemistry, but united it with a more egalitarian form of discourse. The desired balance eluded them. Priestley proved too stubborn, and as the French Revolution descended into dictatorship and war, Mitchill and Woodhouse came more to realize that truly prising French chemistry from the culture of the revolutionary era. The episode left Mitchill and Woodhouse disillusioned with chemistry and hoping to redirect scientific enthusiasm to more pious ends. (shrink)

The French Revolution, and certain ideas of the Enlightenment, produced a radical change in the meaning of the term geming (revolution) that, becoming a slogan, spawned a new current of thought at the end of the Qing Dynasty. Known belatedly in China, it was first presented as a negative term to preach urgent political reform, then became the subject of polemical debate between reformers and revolutionaries. At the same time, the term geming, which originally referred to "change of (...) heavenly mandate", never ceased to provoke various interpretations depending on the period and the political position of the commentators. The objective of this article is to question the process of transformation of this notion and its adaptation to Chinese reality, in order to better measure what constitutes the legacy of the French Revolution in the construction of modern China. (shrink)

Based on Kant’s political thought, this article deals with the relationship between a ruler’s power and freedom, law and morality. The assumed external freedom is to be guaranteed to individuals by a valid political authority (sovereign); however, the authorities do not have to obey the law, which means that the freedom of citizens is threatened. Thus, a tension appears between the freedom of the individual and obedience to an unjust law. From an authority’s perspective, peace is more important than moral (...) development, and from a moral perspective, the rule of law is less important than ethical perfection. This leads to the question of whether revolutionary changes to the system can be justified on the basis of Kant’s assumptions, as some liberal interpretations of Kant’s thought propose. In this article, I argue that although the revolutionary moment is possible within Kant’s political philosophy, it is in a different place than most liberal authors point out and has no link to the common understanding of revolution. (shrink)

John Locke affirms a right to revolt against tyranny, but he denies that a minority of citizens is at liberty to exercise it unless a majority of their fellow citizens concurs in their judgment that the government is a tyranny. In a recent article, Massimo Renzo takes an equivalent position, on which a revolutionary vanguard requires the consent of the domestic majority before being permitted to revolt. Against Locke and Renzo, I argue that a minority of citizens can have a (...) liberty to revolt, whatever the domestic majority may hold. My argument concentrates on the moral force of majority rule, which turns out to presuppose the satisfaction of a number of background conditions. When any of these conditions fails to obtain, no domestic majority can justifiably block a minority’s liberty to revolt against tyranny. For the purposes of the theory of revolution, this minority has to be large enough to have a reasonable prospect of (military) success. Without that prospect, the minority will be anyhow forbidden to revolt, on grounds familiar from just war theory. However, for the purposes of the theory of political legitimacy, prospects of success are irrelevant. All that matters are the conditions under which any citizen is released from their ordinary duty not to overthrow the government. (shrink)

Common space and public open spaces are studied and investigated from various aspects in western contexts. What is the most considered in this study is the relationship between public open space and democratic functions in eastern context and especially in Middle Eastern countries. The notion of public is connected to the notion of people in the framework of the nation-state political organization. What was happened in Cairo in 2011, just as in Kiev in 2014, and Turkey 2013 was the prolonged (...) and mass occupation of public space by citizens. Indeed, physical space for the expression of democratic rights and claims is important in modern democracy. Tehran is studied as the example of a contemporary metropolis that embodies spatial-political tensions within its urban form. Tehran’s urban form remains deeply rooted in the historical ideologies of space in shaping a contemporary space of sovereignty. By reading the city through transformation of public spaces, the relationship between its architecture and political power will be exposed as an example in which the architecture of the city is charged with enabling an ideological interaction through action and reaction, revolution and resistance. This study focuses on Tehran during two major intervals 1921-1950(politics towards modernity)/1951-1979(Architecture for revolution) and the roots and results of these critical periods and their integration to political theology in contemporary middle-east metropolis. (shrink)

Republicanism and imperialism are typically understood to be located at opposite ends of the political spectrum. In Imperial Republics, Edward G. Andrew challenges the supposed incompatibility of these theories with regard to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century revolutions in England, the United States, and France. Many scholars have noted the influence of the Roman state on the ideology of republican revolutionaries, especially in the model it provided for transforming subordinate subjects into autonomous citizens. Andrew finds an equally important parallel between Rome's expansionary (...) dynamic — in contrast to that of Athens, Sparta, or Carthage — and the imperial rivalries that emerged between the United States, France, and England in the age of revolutions. Imperial Republics is a sophisticated, wide-ranging examination of the intellectual origins of republican movements, and explains why revolutionaries felt the need to 'don the toga' in laying the foundation for their own uprisings. (shrink)

This article examines democratic practice after the revolution that brought an end to authoritarian dictatorship in Portugal in April 1974, taking the Portuguese case as an opportunity to theorize democratic practice and historical processes that shape its emergence. The argument stresses the distinctive features of democracy born in social revolution and the explanatory role of the partial inversion of social hierarchies and remaking of cultural repertoires in social revolutionary settings. The Portuguese case is compared to its larger neighbor, (...) Spain, which moved from authoritarianism to democracy at roughly the same time following a process of change thoroughly unlike that of Portugal. Comparisons with other instances of postrevolutionary democracy and implications for more conventional democratic systems are also introduced. A central theme concerns the extent to which democracies attain the ideal of full political equality among citizens. This article asserts that democracies born in social revolution may approximate that ideal for reasons rooted in their historical pathways to representative government. (shrink)

History begins in a struggle producing two figures, Master and Slave. It ends in a “universal and homogeneous state”, an Empire. Revolution with its inevitable terror is the central point in this history. Kojève himself had experienced the Russian revolution and Civil War; in 1920 he left Russia for Germany, where till the end of 1923 he had witnessed the same strife between the “left” and the “right”. This experience is the basis of his view of history, his (...) interpretation of the path from Mastery and Slavery to the figure of the Citizen, to universal recognition. The French revolution with the Jacobins’ terror and Napoleon’s Empire represent for him the model by which to understand not only the revolutions of the twentieth century, but of the entire course of history. (shrink)

Students in 1989 were at pains to distinguish their actions from those taken by students in the Cultural Revolution. Yet there were important similarities. In the present paper, we identify influence on the Democracy Movement from the Cultural Revolution through (1) the expansion and/or widespread familiarization of repertories of collective action available to Chinese activists; (2) precedents for collective action that may have lowered the barriers to action for some while raising them for others; (3) the participation of (...) people at different stages of their lives in both movements; (4) the transformation of the significance of the ideas of democracy and political authority wrought by the Cultural Revolution for many Chinese; (5) the impact of the Cultural Revolution on Chinese intellectuals; (6) the material consequences of the Cultural Revolution which contributed to China's position in the post-Mao era and the specific issues reform and protest sought to confront; (7) the discourse of corruption which provided the 1989 movement with its strongest links between students and ordinary citizens, and which was accentuated in the Cultural Revolution; (8) the affirmation of the value of ordinary life by which students in the 1980s, encouraged by the `literature of the wounded', rebelled against the Puritanism and denigration of `unauthorized' personal relationships that had been characteristic of the Cultural Revolution; (9) the role of the Cultural Revolution as a cautionary tale, shaping the movement itself, inhibiting some older intellectuals from participating, and determining much of how the government viewed and responded to the Democracy Movement; and (10) the embeddedness in different ways of both Cultural Revolution and 1989 protests in an international context. (shrink)

In the early 1990s Israel underwent a so-called constitutional revolution. According to the champions of this revolution, Israel has essentially become, as a result of this momentous event, a constitutional democracy, upholding individual freedom and liberties and allowing for judicial review of parliamentary legislation. Despite the congratulatory rhetoric, it is generally agreed upon that the constitution is still in need of some essential supplements before Israel can qualify as a fully constitutional democracy. The main question addressed in this (...) paper is the following: is it ‘reasonable’ that Israel take the further necessary steps that qualify it as a fully constitutional democracy? The doubts raised in this regard stem from the very concerns that lead political philosophers (mainly Rawls) to stress the unique value of liberal democracy. As they argue, liberal democracy provides deeply divided societies with the best means to secure their legitimacy and political stability. Israel's political realities, I argue, defy this claim. Moreover, Israel's political realities may also carry a valuable lesson to other states, even to seemingly robust liberal democracies. It is not the purpose of the paper, of course, to argue that Israel's existing rule of government should be embraced by other states – far from that. Israel should undergo some radical changes so that it can protect the rights and interests of all its citizens. Yet, to achieve this purpose, it should transcend, I will argue, liberal democracy. As matters stand, simply strengthening its liberal character, Israel's political system may be exposed to a growing challenge to its legitimacy and stability. It should, therefore, reject liberal democracy and especially the principle of neutrality that is intimately connected with a liberal rule of government and embrace, instead, the ideal of multicultural democracy. This ideal, I argue, is better equipped to answer the need of deeply divided societies to secure their legitimacy and stability. (shrink)

David Hume offers a well conceived plan for the formation of government and its political workings. Furthermore, he grants that in special circumstances the citizens of a particular government may revolt. However, with respect to obedience and disloyalty, Hume gives no formal rules for revolution. We would like something more from Hume regarding revolution and, more specifically, what he considers justified revolution. Some authors, such as Richard H. Dees, find the basis for Hume’s account of justified (...) class='Hi'>revolution in his historical works. By connecting Hume’s historical writings with his political theory, we find a fuller account of revolution. Such an account, however, does not require him to give a rule or maxim prescribing revolution since such a rule or maxim would obviously go against his political theory as stated in the Treatise and his political essays. In sum, justified revolution for Hume centers around the established political practices and the principled causes held by factions. Unjustified revolutions, however, are denoted by lack of adherence to established practices and want of a genuine cause. They are, rather, motivated by speculative factions subject to fanaticism and enthusiasm which are the foundations of Hume’s political worries. These central tenets of Hume’s view of revolution are delineated within this paper. (shrink)

It is the sole topic of conversation throughout Europe. An economic crisis with an underlying crisis of values is devastating everything, while politics has nothing to say. An attempt was made to base the European Unión on a single currency, and the resulting traders’ Europeprevented the desired political project from bearing fruit. Instead of comparing different legal systems before creating a constitution for citizens, we have seen the birth of a new idolatry that is connected with a perverse fatalism. Only (...) macroeconomic figures are considered to be important, while citizens have to suffer because of the actions of a few unscrupulous people who worship profit as well as having legalised usury. Given this situation it is necessary to take all types of precaution, and that is why it is a good idea to see what classical authors have to say. The Enlightenment seems to be a failed project that urgently needs to be restarted. It may be enormously useful to re-read Rousseau, as Cassirer did during the rise of Nazism so that it could be fought on the basis of the history of ideas. His discourse on inequality could not be more relevant now. And the same consideration applies to the genealogical study of the French revolution by Tocqueville. That was the revolution par excellence which Kant described as a symbol of the moral progress of mankind. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Citizens Without Sovereignty: Equality and Sociability in French Thought, 1670–1789Patrick HenryCitizens Without Sovereignty: Equality and Sociability in French Thought, 1670–1789, by Daniel Gordon; viii & 270 pp. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, $39.50.Under examination here is the early modern period in France from Louis XIV to the French Revolution when kings ruled absolutely and citizens were without sovereignty. Discarding the traditional image of the Enlightenment as the (...) absolute enemy of absolutism, Gordon, in this sense, follows Norbert Elias and Robert Darnton who treat the Enlightenment as part of an elitist and hierarchical establishment. More specifically, as his subtitle indicates, Gordon portrays the invention of a “nonpolitical polis” (p. 6), an ideological social space where, despite political inequality, citizens could practice social equality in a hierarchical régime. The rise of this “nondemocratic egalitarian ethos” (p. 7) brought with it a new cult of sociabilité, a term invented in the eighteenth century to describe the idealization of the private sphere and the practice of social equality.The first chapter, then, ties sociability not to democracy, as in the Habermasian model, but to the absolutism that stimulated it and coexisted with it. A series of five ideal types of sociability depict how men and women, members of the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy, came together—in commerce, public welfare, scientific academies, salons, cafés, public libraries, and various other social situations not protorevolutionary in character—to create a bond among equals [End Page 279] under the ancien régime. In this framework, progress and modernity are born during the absolute monarchy where sociability suggests conviviality rather than class warfare. Every major French novel of the eighteenth century supports Gordon’s refutation of De Toqueville’s surprising statement that “noblemen and bourgeois never met except by chance in private life “in prerevolutionary France” (p. 27).In chapters two and three, Gordon examines the nature of the rules of sociability found in courtesy literature and their functioning as the imagined basis of the newly invented idealized space called société. In addition to analyzing in great detail the nature and frequency of the vocabulary invented to define and describe sociabilité, Gordon discusses sociabilité in the context of natural law theory in Hobbes, Bossuet, and among others, Pufendorf, who wanted to refute Hobbes by showing that self-interest leads humans to establish stable social relations even before government orders them to do so. Holbach surfaces here too for having amalgamated the older language of politeness and the newer language of natural law. In Holbach, as in the Encyclopédie, sociability, based on egalitarian premises of natural law, is nonetheless fully compatible with the hierarchical regime. Among other things, this shows clearly that the philosophes never preached the French Revolution. Striving to eliminate the abuses of despotism and establish equality in private life was not tantamount to working for political equality and the abolition of all rank. In this same vein, Gordon paints the apolitical essence of the private sphere and, by a rigorous study of the seventeenth-century manuals of polite living, shows convincingly (this time against Elias who saw the court as a model of refined behavior) that the salon was indeed a world unto itself, independent of preexisting social hierarchies. Rejecting Paul Hazard’s conception of absolute rupture between seventeenth-century culture and eighteenth-century thought, Gordon destroys the facile dichotomy between seventeenth-century hierarchy and eighteenth-century equality and, once again, admirably depicts the compatibility of Enlightenment and absolutism.If chapters one to three underscore a certain continuity between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, chapters four and five explain important changes. It is not, for example, the mere preservation of the idea of sociable communication but rather its new use that is germane in understanding the Enlightenment. Now “conversation” and “civility” no longer had meaning only for an urban elite but had in fact become ideals in all philosophical endeavors including the writing of universal history. Sociable communication had become the defining characteristic of modern nations. In the fourth chapter, by analyzing in detail the works of Jean-Baptiste Suard, Gordon demonstrates the meaning that the writing of universal history in Scotland acquired within the French... (shrink)

Madame Legros est une bourgeoise parisienne qui a obtenu en 1784 la libération de Latude, enfermé depuis plus de trente ans dans différentes prisons par des lettres de cachet. Cet article présente son histoire familiale et personnelle avant d’inscrire son action dans une histoire collective des engagements féminins. Il tente une mise en perspective des causes profondes de son engagement par rapport à la lecture qui en a été faite par ses contemporains comme après la Révolution.

The reasonable human nature appears in the Enlightenment’s philosophy as a reduction of the human being and its manifestations to a complex of natural impulses when all former norms of perception, reflections, inclinations, actions and the moral principles, which lie in their basis, are canceled in the free human self-experimenting. The monarchy idea depreciates when its citizens turn in the public good’s proponents on the basis of a blind republican consent about the egoism’s limitation (Robespierre) and a prosopo-peia of freedom (...) that gives to a nation the self-government illusion. The reconsideration of the revolutionary moment as a self-affirmation of romantic spirit is connected for Tolstoy with the “world will” novel poetics opening evolutionary moment in the affective and reflexive dynamics of the hero’s consciousness, the limiting witness of the narrator and the author’s horizon of progressive movement to the historical process’s purpose that creates the belief in the need of coexistence with other participating consciousnesses. The revolutionary and evolutionary reflection of Tolstoy is related to the monoteis-tic prosopopoeia of divine kenosis. From an artistic representation of signifying articulations of the evolutionary world the teacher’s reflection of Tolstoy is born. For Tolstoy revolution is the moment of the senseless violence aiming to eliminate the common evil of the world. The conceptual basis of literary culture as an art and ideological formatting of reactive consciousnesses for Tolstoy is an infinite aspiration to the human self-limitation. (shrink)

ESPAÑOL: Aunque Aristóteles llegó a calificar como «revolución» el cambio violento de las politeias griegas y Arendt, al revisar el uso moderno del término, ve a ésta como el surgimiento de una inevitable y desconocida forma de gobierno que, a través también de la violencia, busca la libertad e igualdad política de todos los ciudadanos, fue Ortega quien se atrevió a aseverar que lo menos esencial de las revoluciones es la violencia, apuntando con ello a la aparición de un discurso (...) y una narrativa que quebranta y modifica nuestra percepción del mundo. Sin embargo, a pesar de mantener dicha intención quebrantadora, el discurso revolucionario parece haberse convertido en ciertas zonas de Latinoamérica en un arte factus lingüístico —término que usó también Ortega— que sirve a la concentración del poder y la ideología ( en el sentido usado por Teun van Dijk) de un grupo social específico. ENGLISH: Although Aristotle came to qualify as a «revolution» violent change of the Greek polity and Arendt, reviewing the modern use of the term, sees this as the emergence of an inevitable and unknown form of government, also through violence, seek freedom and political equality of all citizens, was Ortega who dared to assert that the least essential of revolutions is the violence, pointing to the emergence of this discourse and narrative breaks and changes our perception of the world. However, despite this intention to keep disruptive, revolutionary discourse seems to have become in parts of Latin America in a language factus art — a term also used by Ortega — serving concentration of power and ideology (in the sense used by Teun van Dijk) of a particular social group. (shrink)

The notions of duty and obligation constitute the central focus of Rawls's account of political authority. This chapter examines Rawls's accounts of (1) the justification of political authority; (2) the essential elements of a just constitutional regime; (3) the conditions under which resistance to just institutions is permissible or required; and (4) the conditions under which institutions cease to deserve fidelity and obedience. It commences with Rawls's accounts of duty and obligation, focusing on his accounts of (1) the duties and (...) obligation of citizens; and (2) the duty to obey unjust laws. Rawls discusses two instances in which certain forms of resistance are justifiable: civil disobedience; and conscientious refusal. Rawls's account continues to be oriented by the underlying notion that the legitimate exercise of coercive political power must be justifiable on terms that persons subject to that power can affirm on due reflection. (shrink)

Voltaire, the pen name of François-Marie Arouet (1694-1778), was one of the most influential leaders of the French Enlightenment. His defense of individual freedom of conscience and his criticisms of religious fanaticism and oppressive orthodoxy had a telling effect on Western history, inspiring several leading founders of America's new laws. This is the first English translation of many of his key texts from his famous pamphlet war for tolerance, written from 1750 to 1768, originally published under pseudonyms to avoid imprisonment (...) and to educate the average citizen. Included are "The Sermon of Rabbi Akib" (a searing attack on anti-Semitism), "Prayer to God" (from the famous Treatise on Tolerance), the hugely popular "Catechism of the Honest Man," "The Dinner at Count Boulainvillier's," and other witty, sometimes acerbic pieces that point out the errors in the Bible, the corruption of the clergy, and the religiously-inspired persecutions, both of his day and across the ages. Many of these pamphlets were burned in a losing battle by the authorities. With a lengthy introduction and copious notes by the editor and translator, plus an appendix including first-hand accounts of the battle by noted mathematician and French revolutionary Condorcet, Frederick the Great, Irish writer Oliver Goldsmith, and others, this excellent compilation will be a welcome addition to the libraries of anyone with an interest in human rights and freedom of thought. (shrink)

Stefan Jonsson uses three monumental works of art to build a provocative history of popular revolt: Jacques-Louis David's _The Tennis Court Oath_ (1791), James Ensor's _Christ's Entry into Brussels in 1889_ (1888), and Alfredo Jaar's _They Loved It So Much, the Revolution_ (1989). Addressing, respectively, the French Revolution of 1789, Belgium's proletarian messianism in the 1880s, and the worldwide rebellions and revolutions of 1968, these canonical images not only depict an alternative view of history but offer a new understanding (...) of the relationship between art and politics and the revolutionary nature of true democracy. Drawing on examples from literature, politics, philosophy, and other works of art, Jonsson carefully constructs his portrait, revealing surprising parallels between the political representation of "the people" in government and their aesthetic representation in painting. Both essentially "frame" the people, Jonsson argues, defining them as elites or masses, responsible citizens or angry mobs. Yet in the aesthetic fantasies of David, Ensor, and Jaar, Jonsson finds a different understanding of democracy-one in which human collectives break the frame and enter the picture. Connecting the achievements and failures of past revolutions to current political issues, Jonsson then situates our present moment in a long historical drama of popular unrest, making his book both a cultural history and a contemporary discussion about the fate of democracy in our globalized world. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that it is Foucault's conception of Socratic erotics, presented in Volume 2 of the History of Sexuality series, which provides him with a theoretical ground in the history of philosophy for his notions of political activism, power and government. Once we understand this, it is possible to understand how Foucault, rather than using a mixture of demonstration and diplomacy to oppose the idealization of revolution that eventually leads to the 'permanent revolution' of Stalinism, (...) opposes it instead with a philosophical mutation of it - that is, with a permanent revolution of his own: the ceaseless self-transgression of/by the citizen. It is a conception that is finally unsuccessful for grounding an effective theory of political activism. Key Words: activism • erotics • Foucault • freedom • government • Greece • politics • sexuality • Socrates • subject. (shrink)

While many historians and philosophers have sought to understand the ‘failure’ of the French Revolution to thrive and to avoid senseless violence, very few have referred to the works of two women philosophers who diagnosed the problems as they were happening. This essay looks at how Mary Wollstonecraft and Olympe de Gouges theorised the new tyranny that grew out of the French Revolution, that of ‘petty tyrants’ who found themselves like ‘cocks on a dunghill’ able to wield a (...) new power over those less fortunate than themselves. Both offer diagnoses and prognoses that revolve around education. Wollstonecraft argues that a revolution that is not backed by a previous education of the people is bound to result in chaos and violence. Such education, however, must be slow, and it necessitates the reform of the institutions that most shape the public’s character. A revolution, perforce, is fast, and it often takes several years, or even generations before the spirit of the reforms finds itself implemented into new institutions. Olympe de Gouges shares Wollstonecraft’s worry and she observes that the men who were once dominated quickly become tyrants themselves unless their moral character is already virtuous. But the state of being dominated leaves little room for virtue; hence, newly minted citizens need to be educated in order not to replicate the reign of tyranny onto other. Gouges suggests that the answer to the difficulty she and Wollstonecraft highlighted was to educate the people where they could be found: on the streets, or, where they could easily and willingly be gathered: in theatres. By helping organise revolutionary festivals, highlighting the ways in which citizens could be virtuous, and writing plays to awaken their virtue, and proposing a reform of the theatre, so that the production of such plays would be possible, Gouges offered a plan for the civic education of French citizens in the immediate aftermaths of the Revolution. Unfortunately, the chaos she and Wollstonecraft had sought to remedy, led by the cocks or petty tyrants, ensured that they were unable to see through their plans, with Wollstonecraft having to leave Paris and Gouges being sent to the guillotine. (shrink)

There is an emergency to inform people about the biotechnological revolution and its multidirectional consequences in every day's life. Bioethical issues should be methodically analysed, since the definition of the term depends upon the educational background and the speciality of each scientist involved.An increasing international awareness is gradually expressed by the various bodies, (political authorities, educational Institutions etc), materialized through a series of declarations and legislative regulations or by establishing various assemblies responsible for bioethical issues. However the economic dimension (...) interfering in the field causes a strong pressure for acceleration of the relevant research and its applications. Thus, the role of the assemblies is deteriorated mainly to consultative recommendations hardly efficient for the acceptance of protective for the consumers countermeasures. The mean citizen is unprotected against the consequences concerning him and his environment. Therefore there is a demand for stregthening the educational initiatives addresed either to the students of particular disciplines or to the wide public which will hopefully increase the level of the respective knowledge. (shrink)

Throughout his career, Alexis de Tocqueville was deeply concerned about the replacement of public-minded politics by materialistic egoism in modern democratic societies. Though there is a substantial literature on his response to democratic materialism, the poetic aesthetic category of the ideal and beautiful has been rarely discussed as a major element of his remedy for the crisis. Contrary to a common scholarly assumption, this article argues that Tocqueville conceived democratic individuals’ poetic taste for the ideal and beautiful as a key (...) source of materialistic democracy’s political redemption. Focusing on his poetic idealisation of the French revolutionaries of 1789, the article recovers a branch of his political aesthetics according to which the beauty of a heroic moral ideal inspired by revolutionary political actors can play a significant role in generating public-spirited politics in a democratic society. Unlike contemporary neo-Tocquevillian scholars who tend to privilege the language of interest or duty in reinvigorating the public life of liberal democracy, Tocqueville believed in an alternative strategy premised on the essentially poetic nature of democratic citizens. (shrink)

Au vu de l’éclosion soudaine de ce « printemps arabe » qui a essaimé de pays en pays, cet article montre comment, à l’ère de la transparence et de la simultanéité, les moyens d’information et de communication ont créé un champ d’action propice au soulèvement contre les dictatures. Mais, si les réseaux sociaux numériques – Facebook en particulier –, les SMS, et les e-mails, ont donné aux citoyens les moyens de leur révolution, il est aussi question d’imagination constituante. En effet, (...) les chaînes d’information en continu du monde arabe – Al Jazeera principalement –, ont alimenté un imaginaire révolutionnaire à coup d’images télévisuelles, et surtout de discours informationnel « ami », souvent protecteur, qui a en même temps insufflé des idées et du courage à des peuples arabes endormis depuis des décennies, qui soudain croient en une révolution possible et passent à l’action.This article shows how, in the sudden “Arab Awakening” and its domino effect as it spread from country to country, means of information and communication in an age of transparency and simultaneity opened up a sphere for action that could potentially trigger an uprising against dictatorship. But although the social networking sites – especially Facebook –, text messaging and emails gave citizens the means to revolt, there is also the question of the imagination that created that terrain. The 24-hour news channels in the Arab world, especially Al Jazeera, nourished the revolutionary imagination with telegenic images and especially a “ friendly” and often protective informational discourse that, in parallel, inspired people with courage and ideas after decades of slumber, galvanising them into action. (shrink)

It is often argued that Kant’s understanding of the right to revolution is contradictory. On the one hand, he expresses enthusiasm for the French Revolution and the ideas on which it rests, while on the other, he openly denies the existence of a legal right to revolution. This paper aims to make Kant’s position plausible by showing that he does not deny the right to revolution in all states, but only in those that fulfill the purpose (...) for which they were created, which is to protect the rights and freedoms of all citizens. (shrink)

Similarly to other European countries, Romania faced multiple and intertwined crises during the interwar period, including successive moments of social turmoil, the activity of its hostile neighbours, the emergence of various far-right groups contesting the liberal order, and the looming spectre of the revolution. Among these threats, the fears of revolution and the intense activity of the Comintern worked both as main causes and discursive tools when the state resorted to emergency powers, which took the form of the (...) state of siege in interwar Romania. By drawing on the files created by the Romanian secret police of that time, I argue that the state-of-siege mechanisms targeted not only those “threats” the state institutions invoked as reasons to justify the resort to emergency powers, but much broader categories of citizens. Several leaders of the political opposition, such as Pantelimon Halippa, or intellectuals involved in defending the civil rights engaged in vivid debates on the risks lurking behind the abuse of emergency powers. Finally, the abusive use of the state of siege worked as a corrosive force against the liberal order of the 1923 Constitution and heavily contributed to the establishment of King Carol II’s dictatorship in 1938. (shrink)

Defends confrontational modes of citizenship as a means to reinvigorate democratic participation and regime accountability. A growing number of people are enraged about the quality and direction of public life, despise politicians, and are desperate for real political change. How can the contemporary neoliberal global political order be challenged and rebuilt in an egalitarian and humanitarian manner? What type of political agency and new political institutions are needed for this? In order to answer these questions, Confrontational Citizenship draws on a (...) broad base of perspectives to articulate the concept of confrontational citizenship. William W. Sokoloff defends extra-institutional and confrontational modes of political activity along with new ways of conceiving political institutions as a way to create political orders accountable to the people. In contrast to many forms of democratic theory, Sokoloff argues that confrontational modes of citizenship (e.g., protest) are good because they increase the accountability of a regime to the people, increase the legitimacy of regimes, lead to improvements in a political order, and serve as a means to vent frustration. The goal is to make the word citizen relevant and dangerous to the settled and closed practices that structure our political world and to provide a hopeful vision of what it means to be politically progressive today. William W. Sokoloff is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas, Rio Grande Valley. (shrink)

ExcerptNow a century old, Carl Schmitt’s The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy still provides useful training for historians in the necessary task of making distinctions between “liberalism” and “democracy,” two movements that arose with overlapping but distinct core principles in eighteenth-century Europe, often competed with each other, and sometimes came into bloody conflict. Schmitt makes one highly controversial assertion, however, near the beginning of this book. After agreeing with Alexis de Tocqueville that the spread of democracy was the most powerful political (...) trend of the nineteenth century, a trend that became almost irresistible,1 Schmitt declares that there is a crucial flaw in the argument of Jean-Jacques Rousseau that exposes a major problem with democratic theory in general. Democracy has taken so many different forms, according to Schmitt, that it can only be defined according to the basic principle that political decisions are only binding for those who participated in making them. This belief presupposes “that the will of the outvoted minority is in truth identical with the will of the majority. Rousseau’s frequently cited arguments in the Contrat social are fundamental [emphasis added] for democratic thought and ultimately conform to an old tradition.”2 Schmitt refers here to Rousseau’s argument in On the Social Contract (book IV, ch. 2) that if the proposition you supported fails to gain a majority in a referendum, you should acknowledge that you had been mistaken when you voted, because the question posed to citizens was not exactly whether they personally approved of the proposition, but “whether or not it conforms to the general will that is theirs.”3 Schmitt observes caustically that “with this Jacobin logic one can, it is well known, justify the rule of a minority over the majority, even while appealing to democracy.” The first democratic movement of the modern era, the Levellers in the English Civil War, had already attempted this, Schmitt argues, when they proclaimed in 1649 that only the “well-affected” deserved the right to vote in parliamentary elections.4 Schmitt concludes that democracy is therefore highly vulnerable to the emergence of dictatorship, and that the Bolsheviks had just as strong an argument in 1923 that their brutal dominion by an “enlightened” minority was truly democratic as did the Jacobins of 1793. “Theoretically, and in critical times also practically, democracy is helpless [emphasis added] before the Jacobin argument, that is, when faced with the authoritative identification of a minority as the people.” The meaning here of “authoritative identification” (entscheidenden Identifikation) is unclear; Schmitt does not seek to explain why the majority in a democracy should ever accept a minority’s claim that it alone possesses civic virtue or wisdom.5 A very similar argument about Rousseau was made nevertheless by J. L. Talmon in The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (published in 1952), which has in turn influenced some recent scholars who, like Talmon, do not acknowledge any intellectual debt to Schmitt.6. (shrink)

After the emergence of a popular resistance movement to direct rule by an absolutist monarchy, and several years of civil war, King Gyanendra of Nepal yielded power to an elected Congress in 2006. Within one year, Nepali citizens saw the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Accord, the establishment of a Constituent Assembly, the declaration of the Nepali state, and the declaration of the Nepali Republic a year after that. An Interim Constitution was adopted by 2007, which endowed the Constituent Assembly (...) with the authority to draft Nepal’s permanent Constitution, and established the limitations under which the Assembly must operate — all apparently legitimate steps in establishing a Constitutional order. What initially appeared to adhere to an established model of post-sovereign constitution-making failed in its first attempt. Indeed, the drafting and ratification of a permanent constitution is no easy task. Why did the first Constituent Assembly fail? Where did the constitution-making process divert from the post-sovereign model, and what caused it? I examine the process from the establishment of Nepal’s first Constituent Assembly to the short-lived deliberations of the Assembly, followed by the dissolution of the Assembly for failing to achieve its mandate. I also trace Nepal’s constitution-making process along the post-sovereign model, and assess whether they adhered to or diverted from the model. It is understood that no political models are fixed in the sense that adherence or divergence is necessarily incompatible with success or failure. However, I use Andrew Arato’s post-sovereign model as a guide for identifying the stages in the constitution-making process, and for a background to the discussion on where the first Assembly failed. (shrink)

Education is a pillar of buen vivir, the guiding ideal of Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution. In this framework, Ecuador made significant shifts in its education system from 2006 to 2016, the decade of the Citizens’ Revolution. The key buen vivir concepts and processes that framed these shifts were considering education as a right, as a social debt, and as a driver of a more just, knowledge-intensive and clean economy. Resource allocation, general access, learning, and inclusion of structurally marginalized groups showed (...) significant improvement in this decade, along with other key political, economic and social changes, thus making significant advances in the emancipation of society toward buen vivir, and marking elements of how and why advancing this transformation is important. (shrink)

ABSTRACT English-language commentary on the role of the French Revolution in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit tends to equate the so-called “fury of destruction” (Furie des Verschwindens) with the violent dialectic of rival factions’ rush for power. Here it is argued that “Absolute Freedom and Terror” ought instead to be read in the light of a “fury of disappearance”, namely in terms of the extinction of dissenting citizens’ legal personhood. This is achieved by recourse to civil death, a criminal sentence (...) that declares the individual, who is very much alive, legally dead. While there are some actual and quite painful consequences for recipients of such a sentence, civil death is effective mainly on the philosophical and constitutional planes, where it maintains the illusion of a unanimous general will, fleetingly securing the state from failure. A focus on personhood and civil death also taps into the larger Hegelian dialectic of legalism and tradition, and into the various shapes community life takes therein, beginning with Greek Ethical Life, and ending in Absolute Freedom and Terror. (shrink)

George Orwell wondered why oppressed proletariats in the communist and capitalist worlds did not rise up and replace the governments that oppressed them with something better for them. This is a puzzle we still face today, wherever a majority faces exploitation. The chapter examines the question of why exploited peoples don’t replace exploitative governments in their own best interest, whether through revolution or through the ballot box. The question is examined through the lens of the political philosophy and political (...) fiction of George Orwell, with special attention to how his philosophy applies to the modern USA and the Trump administration. It is argued that in the modern US, there are many reasons why the masses are exploited, but the most important is that they don’t understand the nature of their exploitation. Citizens are often isolated in reality bubbles. Our basic human irrationality, hypocrisy, and willingness to rewrite the past, are harnessed and used against us. International conflicts stoke nationalism and prevent the masses from finding a common identity with the masses worldwide. Within the US, conflicts between different social groups pit the masses against one another, and prevent them from recognizing their common condition. (shrink)

George Orwell wondered why oppressed proletariats in the communist and capitalist worlds did not rise up and replace the governments that oppressed them with something better for them. This is a puzzle we still face today, wherever a majority faces exploitation. The chapter examines the question of why exploited peoples don’t replace exploitative governments in their own best interest, whether through revolution or through the ballot box. The question is examined through the lens of the political philosophy and political (...) fiction of George Orwell, with special attention to how his philosophy applies to the modern USA and the Trump administration. It is argued that in the modern US, there are many reasons why the masses are exploited, but the most important is that they don’t understand the nature of their exploitation. Citizens are often isolated in reality bubbles. Our basic human irrationality, hypocrisy, and willingness to rewrite the past, are harnessed and used against us. International conflicts stoke nationalism and prevent the masses from finding a common identity with the masses worldwide. Within the US, conflicts between different social groups pit the masses against one another, and prevent them from recognizing their common condition. (shrink)

Euromaidan and dignity revolution, which further continues, clearly show that without change in the national policy of culture change the country will be very difficult. It's tactics and strategy formation space of life for the citizens of Ukraine, information about Ukrainian and country in the world, formed throughout history and established in today's harmful and humiliating stereotypes, myths. Obviously the official state culture has long been not satisfied an active, creative part of society. Outside the official data analysis of (...) cultural policy meet in publications, cultural in content, authored by writers, critics, scholars and public figures. Balance cultural processes, that attitude to culture as an important tool strengthening state sovereignty on the political, spiritual, economic and other levels and other levels within Ukraine and abroad ensured civil society. They monitor cultural processes. Among the most notable, sharp and accurate assessments of cultural policy is advisable to allocate positions L. Kostenko, I. Dziuba, O. Zabuzhko, M. Riabchuk and other lesser-known experts. These persons is difficult to accuse of bias. In the article was put goal disclose the relationship to the national cultural policy of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and civil society experts, that are recognized in Ukraine and the world. (shrink)

How should we think about public rioting for political ends? Might it ever be more than morally excusable behavior? In this essay, I show how political rioting can sometimes be positively morally justified as an intermediate defensive harm in between civilly disobedient protest and political revolution. I do so by reading political rioters as, at the same time, uncivil and ultimately conciliatory with their state. Unlike civilly disobedient protestors, political rioters express a lack of faith in the value or (...) applicability of civility in interacting with the state under the political status quo. But unlike political revolutionaries who aim at separation from the state, political rioters paradigmatically seek fuller inclusion within it. By rejecting even the appearance of compliance with the political status quo’s systems of justice, political rioters can create a unique venue for systemically marginalized citizens to express warranted disrespect for the state that maintains them in ongoing subjection, as well as their inviolable respect for themselves as persons with dignity beyond the boundaries of civility. (shrink)

Grounded in a postcolonial, liberationist urban vision, this article lamented the theological and political paralysis of urban denialism that fails African cities and African urban populations. Considering different possible urban trajectories towards 2063 – ranging from floundering to flourishing, implosion to explosion, and apocalyptic disaster to complete rebirth – it then proposed theologies of African urban citizenship, as response. It sought to articulate a vision of citizen-driven African cities, remaking cities ‘from below’, through interconnected and intersectional urban movements. It (...) considered urban citizenship not as the decent and orderly conduct of subjects of the nation-state but as the disruptive and transformative presence and participation of citizens of God’s new city, breaking into cities across the African continent. While it bemoaned the absence of ‘Africa’s urban revolution’ from mainstream theologies and politics practised in the African context, and the insufficient attention paid to it even by the Africa 2063 manifesto, it dared to evoke hope, in spite of evidence to the contrary. This should be viewed as a conceptual contribution, fusing literature study with deep urban immersion. Contribution: Grounded in a postcolonial, liberationist urban vision, this article lamented the theological and political paralysis of urban denialism that fails African cities and African urban populations, contemplating theologies of African urban citizenship instead. (shrink)

Are we the Citizens of just one empirical world? Have all reminiscences to the transcendental become atavistic in the political domain? This article defends the lasting relevance of the kantian doctrine of analogy for the significance of both religion and politics in post-modern times. The symbolic representation of the indemonstrable concept of practical reason itself functions as well in politics as in religion in the manner of a typology of the law and a legislation, which must be understood as the (...) always indirect representation of the absolute good will. Only this idea avoids the empirical illusions of an imaginary self-sufficient political or religious authority. All authority based on the concept of God as legislator as far as a promulgator of the moral law, with its intrinsic character of obligation, is conceived as unavoidable for the finite reason. Therefore the execution of the king during the French revolution as a legal act in itself is inconceivable as far as it intended the abrogation of the representation of the instance of executive obligation as such. All political doctrines that would claim the installation of the moral kingdom of God on earth are equally chimerical. Since Kant only claims the idea of legislation of practical reason and the guarantee of the viability of morals in the empirical world when evoking God in practical philosophy and calling upon the historical Christian religion, his theological political doctrine goes beyond the ideological political and religious setting of his time and it remains on the contrary a valuable warning for actual political and religious terrorism. (shrink)

A silent revolution has occurred in the most highly industrialized countries. This is the utilization and acceptance of various healing practices (which for convenience has often been labeled as “alternative medicine,” a.k.a. “whole person healing”) by an enormous fraction of the population. Moreover, this population cohort is much wealthier and better educated than the average citizen. It is no longer possible for this generation in the Western world to ignore or denigrate the medicine and healing practices used by (...) hundreds of millions in other cultures. What is obviously needed is a retreat from the innate skeptical reaction of much of the stance of western medicine, the development of a mutual respect for other cultures and their achievements, and a genuinely open, scientific and wholistic approach to the issues, especially in this context, to other practices of whole person healing. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt’s On Revolution offers a critique of modern representative democracy combined with a manifesto-like treatise on council systems as they have arisen over the course of revolutions and uprisings. However, Arendt’s contribution to democratic theory has been obscured by her commentators who argue that her reflections on democracy are either an aberration in her work or easily reconcilable within a liberal democratic framework. This paper seeks to provide a comprehensive outline of Arendt’s writing on the council system and (...) a clarification of her work outside the milieu of the post-cold war return to Arendt. Her analyses bring to light a political system that guarantees civil and political rights while allowing all willing citizens direct participation in government. Framing her discussion within the language of the current renewed interest in constituent power, her council system could be described as a blending together of constituent power and constitutional form. Arendt resists the complete dominance and superiority of either element and argues that the foundation of a free state requires nothing less than the stabilisation and persistence of constituent power within an open and fluid institution that would resist either the bureaucratisation of politics or its dispersal into a revolutionary flux. Although one may conclude that her institutional suggestions are far from flawless, her political principles allow a conceptualisation of democracy in more substantial ways than current liberal political philosophy. (shrink)

In his most recent book, Philip Pettit presents and defends a “republican” political philosophy that stems from a tradition that includes Cicero, Machiavelli, James Harrington, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Madison. The book provides an interpretation of what is distinctive about republicanism—namely, Pettit claims, its notion of freedom as nondomination. He sketches the history of this notion, and he argues that it entails a unique justification of certain political arrangements and the virtues of citizenship that would make those arrangements possible. Of (...) historical and philosophical interest, he stresses, is the fundamental contrast between freedom as nondomination and slavery. Joseph Priestly, for instance, invoked this contrast in defending the cause of the American Revolution, and in 1769 declared, incredibly, that if the parliament of Great Britain continued to tax the American colonies, “the colonists will be reduced to a state of as complete servitude, as any people of which there is an account in history”. Those opposed to American independence, among them Jeremy Bentham, relied instead on a Hobbesian notion of freedom as noninterference, using it to argue that the colonists were no more interfered with by the British government than were citizens of Britain. Drawing out this contrast, Pettit aims to establish that a republican view of freedom better supports the institutions of a constitutional democracy than does liberalism. His account of the distinguishing characteristics and strengths of republicanism is, however, only partially successful. Neither his case that a republican notion of freedom provides for a more solid defense of democratic institutions and constitutional protections than is available within liberalism, nor his argument that republicanism can better address “private” injustices, is convincing. (shrink)

Kant's views on revolution have been widely discussed, and commentators have long been astounded that the philosopher who made famous the principle that persons are ends in themselves could reach such abhorent conclusions as that citizens owe unqualified obedience to their supreme ruler. I address an important and ignored sub-issue of this topic: the relations between Kant's doctrine of the division of governmental powers and his doctrine of absolute obedience. I argue that these two doctrines are not compatible; Kant's (...) defense of absolute obedience undermines his own division of powers. Examining exactly why this is the case leads to several further results. First, a constitutional court is crucial to a republic. Second, Kant is closer to a consistent view of government and obedience than first appears. Third, Kant's account of the division of powers was theoretically behind his times. Fourth, there is a crucial distinction between the separation of governmental powers and a system of checks and balances among the three branches of government. Fifth, Kant did grasp the relevant principles governing impeachment - a far more drastic measure than a constitutional court. Finally, most of the principles needed to revise Kant's constitutional theory are already contained in his published writings. Kants Thesen zur Revolution sind viel diskutiert worden, und lange Zeit waren Kommentatoren darüber verwundert, daß der Philosoph, der das Prinzip berühmt gemacht hat, wonach Personen Zwecke an sich selbst sind, insbesondere zu der abschreckenden Schlußfolgerung kommen konnte, die Bürger eines Staates hätten dem Herrscher unbedingten Gehorsam zu leisten. Ich befasse mich mit einem wichtigen und regelmäßig übersehenen Aspekt dieses Problemfeldes: Dem Verhältnis zwischen Kants Lehre von der Gewaltenteilung und seiner These vom absoluten Gehorsam des Staatsbürgers. Ich behaupte, daß diese beiden Lehren nicht miteinander vereinbar sind; Kants Verteidigung des absoluten Gehorsams unterminiert seine Gewaltenteilungsthese. Eine genaue Untersuchung der Frage, warum das so ist, führt zu weiteren Resultaten: Erstens ist ein Verfassungsgericht wesentlich für eine Republik. Zweitens ist Kant näher an einer konsistenten Auffassung von Staat und Gehorsam als dies auf den ersten Blick zu sein scheint. Drittens bleibt Kants Auffassung zur Gewaltenteilung hinter der Entwicklung seiner Zeit zurück. Viertens besteht ein wesentlicher Unterschied zwischen der Trennung der Staatsgewalten einerseits und einem System von "checks and balances" der drei Zweige der Staatslenkung andererseits. Fünftens hat Kant durchaus die relevanten Prinzipien eines "impeachment" erkannt - eine wesentlich drastischere Einrichtung als die eines Verfassungsgerichts. Schließlich sind die meisten der Prinzipien, die für eine Revision von Kants Verfassungstheorie notwendig sind, bereits in seinen eigenen Werken enthalten. (shrink)

In On Revolution and other writings, Arendt expresses her enthusiasm for the council system, a bottom-up political structure based on local councils that are open to all citizens and so allow them to participate in government. This aspect of her thought has been sharply criticized – ‘a curiously unrealistic commitment’ (Margaret Canovan), ‘a naiveté’ (Albrecht Wellmer) – or, more often, simply ignored. How, her readers generally wonder, could Arendt in all seriousness advocate the council system as an alternative to (...) parliamentary democracy? In this paper, I will pursue two distinct but related aims. First, I want to show that Arendt’s ideal of council politics is an integral element of her thought. It is connected to – indeed, follows from – some of her most central notions, namely her concept of freedom, her valuation of ‘public happiness’ and her distinction between opinion and interest. Second, I want to defend the ideal in the face of the criticisms that have been levelled against it. I seek to show that it is a cogent and pertinent proposition, not ‘a curiously unrealistic commitment’. (shrink)

The 1989 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe and the subsequent transitions have commonly been interpreted in political terms, as movements towards democracy, or in economic terms, as escape from the command economy towards the free market. We revisit the problem to suggest a different reading. We argue that in the legitimization crisis of real socialism, a pivotal role was played by the burden of social oversaturation and bureaucratic arbitrariness, which met its desired alternative in social imaginaries of impersonal, objective (...) social system. For the citizens of Central and East European countries, this fantasy was matched by the promise of the free market, which was morally contrasted to the experience of daily life under late socialism. We argue that this desire to escape from arbitrariness to objectivity is a particularly strong motive in the imaginary of modernity which found one of its historical manifestations in the disappointment with real socialism. (shrink)

What is the relationship between anger and justice, especially when so much of our moral education has taught us to value the impartial spectator, the cold distance of reason? In _Sing the Rage_, Sonali Chakravarti wrestles with this question through a careful look at the emotionally charged South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which from 1996 to 1998 saw, day after day, individuals taking the stand to speak—to cry, scream, and wail—about the atrocities of apartheid. Uncomfortable and surprising, these public (...) emotional displays, she argues, proved to be of immense value, vital to the success of transitional justice and future political possibilities. Chakravarti takes up the issue from Adam Smith and Hannah Arendt, who famously understood both the dangers of anger in politics and the costs of its exclusion. Building on their perspectives, she argues that the expression and reception of anger reveal truths otherwise unavailable to us about the emerging political order, the obstacles to full civic participation, and indeed the limits—the frontiers—of political life altogether. Most important, anger and the development of skills needed to truly listen to it foster trust among citizens and recognition of shared dignity and worth. An urgent work of political philosophy in an era of continued revolution, _Sing the Rage_ offers a clear understanding of one of our most volatile—and important—political responses. (shrink)

ArgumentThis paper examines the earthquake monitoring and prediction program, called “collective monitoring, collective defense,” in communist China during the Cultural Revolution, a period of political upheavals and natural disasters. Guided by their scientific and political ideas, the Chinese developed approaches to earthquake monitoring and prediction that emphasized mass participation, everyday knowledge, and observations of macro-seismic phenomena. The paper explains the ideas, practices, and epistemology of the program within the political context of the Cultural Revolution. It also suggests possibilities (...) for comparative analysis of science, state, and natural disasters. The paper redefines the concept of “citizen science” and argues that the concept provides a useful comparative perspective on the intimate relationship between science and the macropolitics of modern state and society. (shrink)