This five-step metaphysical proof borrows from the metaphysical thought of Aquinas as well as from Bernard Lonergan’s proof of God in Insight. It makes several advances to proofs of God. Most importantly, by showing that an unconditioned reality must be unrestrictedly intelligible, the second step of the proof is original and lays a stronger foundation than previous proofs for the uniqueness of an unconditioned reality as well as its identification with an unrestricted act of thinking. This point strengthens the argument (...) that this unique reality is a creator of everything else in reality. In so doing, it responds to contemporary criticisms of proofs of God by Richard Dawkins and others. This proof also adapts metaphysical ideas and terms to those arising out of the contemporary scientific world view, so that it is relevant and applicable to quantum and relativity theory, quantum cosmology, and other contemporary cosmological ideas, such as a multiverse and multidimensional physical realities. (shrink)

I argue that a metaphysical controversy, comparable with the ‘pantheism controversy’ of the late 18th century, is being played out today in the world-wide clash between religion and science, in which one side adheres to a strict materialism and the other admits phenomena of inspiritment as having a place in ontology. Just as the pantheism controversy was resolved, to some degree, via the concept of panentheism, so the solution to the contest between science and religion today might be pointing us (...) in a panentheist direction. Taking into account (a) the empirical evidence of science, (b) the widespread evidence of spirit phenomena from different religions and spirit traditions, and (c) that the experience of spirit phenomena varies according to cultural frame of reference, I conclude that spirit phenomena must emanate from something that is common across cultures. The only thing that could be common across cultures is matter: it must be matter itself then that is imbued with spirit. While this position has affinities with panentheism, I argue that ‘panentheism’ is not in fact an appropriate name for it in the 21st century, as this name excludes the experience of many cultures for whom phenomena of inspiritment are not describable in any kind of theistic terms. (shrink)

E. J. Lowe and Ontology, edited by Mirosław Szatkowski, is the outcome of the international conference Jonathan Lowe and Ontology, which took place in Warsaw on 21–23 May 2019. The book consists of fifteen essays by philosophers of international renown; it concerns, among others, meta-ontology, theory of categories, persistence in time, agency, and mental causation. In addition to summarizing the book’s contribution to contemporary formal ontology, this review includes a critical discussion of selected chapters on meta-metaphysics, as well (...) as general and special metaphysics. (shrink)

What is it for an object to persist through time? Do things have essences? What is the relation between an object and its parts? Are objects more real than their parts, or vice versa? Could there be spatio-temporally coincident objects? Do we need an ontology of truth-makers? These interrelated questions reflect the central concerns of contemporary metaphysics, which in recent years has seen an intensification of interest in ontological issues. They are the focus of the essays collected in (...) this volume, which arose from the Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics conference held at the University of Leeds in September, 2006. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. ;A form of metaphysical inquiry is in this thesis both illustrated in detail and defended against the charge of issuing in statements which lack cognitive content. 'Categorial description' concerns the fundamental features of our conceptual scheme: the categories described are those of substance, accident, cause, space and time. ;Following Aristotle's distinction between primary and secondary substances, these two notions are addressed as equivalent to those individual or particular things and their kinds. (...) A particular thing is characterised as not being capable of occuring in the predicate position in a proposition; and as having criteria or principles of individuation and reidentification. Accidents or properties can appear in the predicate position and do not have criteria of identity. ;Secondary substances, or natural kinds, being a species of property, also fail to have criteria for individuation and reidentification. It follows that the recently revived Aristotelian essentialism, as exhibited in particular in the work of Kripke, fails to correctly characterise the category of natural kinds: in that theory, natural kinds have essential properties which enable individuation and reidentification across possible worlds. ;Efficient causation is described, against the background of the Locke-Hume dispute, as involving the concept of necessary connection between cause and effect. Rejecting the theory of Harre and Madden on causal powers, an approach by Mackie is defended whereby this connection is a reflection of our counterfactual thinking. The possible worlds essentialist approach of Lewis to counterfactuals is rejected too, as inadequate. ;Space and time, spatial and temporal relations, and places and moments in time are approached in terms of the other categories of particular and property. The obscurity of fit between these categories is identified as responsible for many philosophical puzzles concerning space and time: for example, McTaggart's 'proof' of the unreality of time; and the recent debate on the possibility of multiple times and multiple spaces. ;In the final chapter, the logical commitments of categorial description concerning conceptual relativism and the nature of reality in itself are explored. It is argued that, since categories are in large part responsible for the kinds of acts there are, a description of our categories is a description of reality itself. Since our categories do not involve the machinery of possible worlds offered by contemporary essentialist theories, those theories fail to describe reality. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that, if we pursue an approach to metaphysics widespread in contemporary philosophy that moves from the study of language to ontology, but do not remove religious claims from the language deemed appropriate for the task, we end up with an approach to metaphysics which is remarkably similar to the kind of theological method which Robert Jenson has advocated for much of his career.

Metaphysics is definitely back on the agenda of contemporary philosophy. It is a metaphysics in the full traditional sense, seeking to provide the means to gain knowledge that covers being as a whole, not just parts of it (such as the metaphysics of mind, the metaphysics of values, etc.). Oxford University Press published three books in 2011 and 2012 each of which spells out that ambition. The present review sums up the main topics covered in (...) these books and offers some comments. (shrink)

I aim to sketch a view of a methodology for metaphysics, suggested by Hookway’s reading of C. S. Peirce, that allows one to hold realist metaphysical views (i.e. ones that avoid anti-realism, or idealism) about some questions, but avoids merely verbal disputes, and ‘unwieldy realism’. It is named for Peirce’s ‘Critical Commonsensism’, and uses pragmatic transcendental arguments to defend realism about non-optional basic commitments, e.g. to generality, agency, normativity, modality, change, concrete substances, and other minds. It is critical because (...) we are entitled to hope that the presuppositions of our most basic non-optional commitments obtain, and commonsensical because we begin with our current practices and proceed with anti-sceptical fallibilism. I consider a number of objections to the proposed methodology, including concerns associated with our identification of presuppositions, with the basic non-optional commitments they are presuppositions of, and the community who are so committed. These questions, I will claim, are open to empirical and anthropological investigation, but can begin with careful observation of human practices of action, inquiry, explanation, and justification. I will defend the view we end up with as realist, rather than anti-realist or quasi-realist, and argue that, given holism of confirmation, we are plausibly justified in believing (rather than merely hoping) a number of metaphysical theses that have stood the test of time. (shrink)

Zawiera teksty filozofów od czasów starożytnych do współczesnych.

_Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics_ is about some of the most fundamental kinds of things that there are; the things that we encounter in everyday experience. A book about the things that we encounter in everyday experience. Contains a thorough and accessible discussion of the nature and aims of metaphysics. Examines a wide range of ontological categories, including both particulars and universals. Mounts a forceful and persuasive case for anti-reductionism.

Exercises designed to stimulate further talking and to indicate further dimensions of the topics are posed throughout the book to encourage a more advanced ...

Originally published in 1920, this title wrestles with the critical conflict in modern philosophy of whether philosophers should employ pure reason in a world of abstracts or, rather, should rely upon experience and rationality to examine the actual world. Hoernlé argues for the latter and emphasises the importance of metaphysics in the intellectual quest for knowing reality. This title is ideal for students of philosophy and provides insightful background into the diverging philosophical views of the early 20th century.

What is it for an object to persist through time? Do things have essences? What is the relation between an object and its parts? Are objects more real than their parts, or vice versa? Could there be spatio-temporally coincident objects? Do we need an ontology of truth-makers? These interrelated questions reflect the central concerns of contemporary metaphysics, which in recent years has seen an intensification of interest in ontological issues. They are the focus of the essays collected in (...) this volume, which arose from the Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics conference held at the University of Leeds in September, 2006. (shrink)

What is an object? How do we look at them? Why do they matter? This collection presents a lively, timely discussion of natural and artifactual objects, considering the relationship between them from a range of philosophical perspectives, including the philosophy of biology, the metaphysics of space and the philosophy of perception. Beginning from the starting point that natural objects are bona fide, endowed with some natural border between themselves and everything else, while artifactual objects depend on the observation of (...) tacit conventions and may include the ordinary objects of everyday life, this volume explores, contextualises and interrogates objects. Contributors discuss a variety of objects including physical, scientific and mental ones, as well as things that appear to question the limits of object-hood, including holes, Quinean 'posits' and language. The very first collection to address this growing topic within analytic philosophy, Natural and Artifactual Objects in Contemporary Metaphysics represents a highly original work, showcasing some of the most important and influential philosophers working in Europe today. (shrink)

The dominant interest here is in metaphysics today; three-quarters of the articles date from the Twentieth Century. The editor has successfully kept internal editing to a minimum; the original authors thus develop their subjects in their own way. Nonetheless, to this reviewer, the composite impression from the book was that metaphysics, if it exists, is disputatious, technical, and inconsequential. This may derive from a persistent image of too many conflicting theoretic alternatives, suggested internally by the approach of many (...) of the contemporary articles, and externally by the editor's desire to be representative. Tending to counter this general dissatisfaction, happily, is a successful section on "Being and Substance." There are many printing errors, disruptive to thought.--E. W. (shrink)

Essentialists hold that at least a certain range of entities can be meaningfully said to have natures, essences, or essential features independently of how these entities are described, conceptualized or otherwise placed with respect to our specifically human interests, purposes or activities. Modalists about essence, on the one hand, take the position that the essential truths are a subset of the necessary truths and the essential properties of entities are included among their necessary properties. Non-modalists about essence, on the other (...) hand, oppose the reduction of essence to modality and hold, rather, that essence is more basic than, and explanatory of, modality. This chapter begins with a brief summary of Kit Fine’s well-known challenges to the modal account of essence and considers a recent attempt by “sparse modalists” like Sam Cowling and Nathan Wildman to respond to Fine’s counterexamples by adding a sparseness constraint to the “bare” modal account of essence. A further question arises, however, as to whether and how Fine’s definitional approach can avoid his own counterexamples against the modal approach to essence. The chapter concludes with some final thoughts concerning the theoretical roles ascribed to essence by modalists and non-modalists. (shrink)

In a recent book, Substance and the Fundamentality of the Familiar, Ross Inman demonstrates the contemporary relevance of an Aristotelian approach to metaphysics and the philosophy of nature. Inman successfully applies the Aristotelian framework to a number of outstanding problems in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of physics. Inman tackles some intriguing questions about the ontological status of proper parts, questions which constitute a central focus of ongoing debate and investigation.

Much recent literature in metaphysics attempts to answer the question, ‘What is metaphysics?’ In this paper I argue that many of the most influential contemporary answers to this question yield the result that feminist metaphysics is not metaphysics. I further argue this result is problematic.

This collection brings together six papers by leading philosophers working within the Aristotelian tradition, covering a number of topics in contemporary ...

Every Thing Must Go aruges that the only kind of metaphysics that can contribute to objective knowledge is one based specifically on contemporary science as it ...

In a recent volume ofZygon: Journal of Religion and Science, Flavius Raslau proposes a new and intriguing integration of Palamite theology with key currents of thought in analytic philosophy of science. The aim of this comment is to provide a concise summary and assessment of Raslau's proposal, along the way making suggestions as to how it might be profitably amended.

This article is aimed at highlighting some possible contributions of Hegel’s philosophy to the contemporary debate around process metaphysics. In the contemporary metaphysical debate, process metaphysics represent an attempt to highlight the limits of the traditional philosophical paradigm, which is based on the notion of substance, and to work within an alternative paradigm, which is based on the notion of process. What exists, then, are not substances, substrates, fixed and stable objects characterized by certain properties, but (...) processes, events, occurrences. The main idea of ​​process metaphysics is that being is dynamic and that this dynamic nature must be the main focus of any comprehensive philosophical explanation of reality. Looking at this revolution, it is necessary to define the very notion of process. In fact, this work of conceptual clarification of the fundamental notion of this new philosophical paradigm is still ongoing. My idea is that Hegelian philosophy can offer some relevant indications to do the job. In this sense, the article will be divided into two parts: on the basis of the analysis of some definitions of the notion of process in the contemporary debate around process metaphysics, I will show 1) the need to determine the minimal ontological structure of the notion of process; 2) the possibility of determining this structure through some conceptual tools provided by Hegel’s logic and in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. (shrink)

Pt. I. Five possible global metaphysical systems for the twenty-first century. Cobb and Griffin's conception of three religious ultimates -- Four additional contenders for a twenty-first-century global metaphysical system -- pt. II. Cosmosyntheism: a new option. The five mutually grounding ultimates and cosmosyntheism's nine key advancements -- The forms -- The dipolar deity -- A world/cosmos -- Creativity/eros -- The plane of mutual immanence -- The logical inconsistencies of all other possible combinations -- pt. III. Cosmosyntheism vs. the five rival (...) contenders: assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each system. Free will -- Conflicting religious truth claims part 1 -- Conflicting religious truth claims part 2 -- The problem of evil -- pt. IV. Implications and applications of cosmosyntheism. Ethics -- Appendix. Cosmosyntheism and applied or practical religion -- Final meditations. (shrink)

This chapter explores some of the relations between Quine’s and Carnap’s metaontological stances on the one hand, and contemporary work in the metaphysics of time, on the other. Contemporary metaphysics of time, like analytic metaphysics in general, grew out of the revival of the discipline that Quine’s critique of the logical empiricists (such as Carnap) made possible. At the same time, the metaphysics of time has, in some respects, strayed far from its Quinean roots. (...) This chapter examines some likely Quinean and Carnapian reactions to elements of the contemporary scene. (shrink)

This book argues that the only kind of metaphysics that can contribute to objective knowledge is one based specifically on contemporary science as it really is, and not on philosophers' a priori intuitions, common sense, or simplifications of science. In addition to showing how recent metaphysics has drifted away from connection with all other serious scholarly inquiry as a result of not heeding this restriction, this book demonstrates how to build a metaphysics compatible with current fundamental (...) physics, which, when combined with metaphysics of the special sciences, can be used to unify physics with the other sciences without reducing these sciences to physics itself. Taking science metaphysically seriously, this book argues, means that metaphysicians must abandon the picture of the world as composed of self-subsistent individual objects, and the paradigm of causation as the collision of such objects. The text assesses the role of information theory and complex systems theory in attempts to explain the relationship between the special sciences and physics, treading a middle road between the grand synthesis of thermodynamics and information, and eliminativism about information. The consequences of the books' metaphysical theory for central issues in the philosophy of science are explored, including the implications for the realism versus empiricism debate, the role of causation in scientific explanations, the nature of causation and laws, the status of abstract and virtual objects, and the objective reality of natural kinds. (shrink)

I explain why the compositionalist conception of ordinary objects prevalent in contemporary metaphysics places the manifest image of the human self in a precarious position: the two theoretically simplest views of the existence of composites each jeopardize some central element of the manifest image. I present an alternative, nomological conception of ordinary objects, which secures the manifest image of the human self without the arbitrariness that afflicts compositionalist attempts to do the same. I close by sketching the consequences (...) of the recommended position for the traditional personal identity debate about the nature and persistence of human selves. (shrink)

This volume is a comprehensive survey of contemporary thought on a wide range of issues and provides students with the basic background to current debates in metaphysics.

Traditionally, Physics has been dominated by the image of objects, that is, by the atomistic metaphysics of absolutely intrinsic properties of qualitatively unchangeable individual entities. The first major challenge to this metaphysics inside physics comes with quantum mechanics, specifically with the well-known phenomenon known as ‘quantum entanglement’. From quantum entanglement it seems that we can conclude that: quantum objects are not independent entities; wholes have an ontological priority over their parts. However, it is arguable that is too risky (...) to infer such conclusions directly from quantum mechanics. If epistemological consequences of quantum mechanics are inescapable, is seems unwise to take any direct ontological consequences from it. After all, quantum mechanics does not refer to the states of physical entities before measurements, but it is just a theory that allows us to calculate the possible outcomes from any given measurement. Still, this does not mean that, indirectly, quantum mechanics does not give some account of quantum reality that deeply challenges traditional objects metaphysics, namely, through the simple existence of the measurement problem; and through the experimental violations of Bell inequality. Even challenged, the object picture in physics can thus prevail. But we must also not forget that on the last decades, Quantum Physics has being evolved beyond the direct scope of quantum mechanics. I will try to argue that in at least some contemporary approaches in Quantum Physics we can see that there is a movement pointing towards a relational ontological view, according to which the ontological primacy is not to be given to individual entities, as self-sufficient elements with their own intrinsic and immutable identities—as in traditional object’s metaphysics—but to some sort of relational structures. I argue that although this relational metaphysics is still to be developed, it will have to be able to account for both the relational and object natures of quantum entities. (shrink)

Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings is a comprehensive anthology that draws together leading philosophers writing on the major themes in Metaphysics. Chapters appear under the headings: Universals Particulars Modality and Possible Worlds Causation Time Persistence Realism and Anti-Realism Each section is prefaced by an introductory essay by the editor which guides students gently into each topic. Articles by the following leading philosophers are included: Allaire, Anscombe, Armstrong, Black, Broad, Casullo, Dummett, Ewing, Heller, Hume, Kripke, Lewis, Mackie, McTaggart, Mellor, Merricks (...) , Parfit, Plantinga, Price, Prior, Putnam, Quine, Russell, Smart, Swinburne, Taylor , Van Cleve, van Inwagen, Williams Featuring a new section on causation, this new edition is highly accessible and provides a broad-ranging exploration of the subject. Ideal for any philosophy student, this reader will prove essential reading for any metaphysics course. The sections and selections of readings have been updated to complement Michael Loux's textbook Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction , third edition. (shrink)

This anthology introduces advanced undergraduates and beginning graduate students to today's debates in metaphysics. The book consists of essays by contemporary metaphysicians, and all but one appear here for the first time. For each of nine topics, there are two essays, one "pro-" and one "con-".

This paper develops and articulates a metaphysics of intersectionality, the idea that multiple axes of social oppression cross-cut each other. Though intersectionality is often described through metaphor, theories of intersectionality can be formulated using the tools of contemporary analytic metaphysics. A central tenet of intersectionality theory, that intersectional identities are inseparable, can be framed in terms of explanatory unity. Further, intersectionality is best understood as metaphysical and explanatory priority of the intersectional category over its constituents, akin to (...) metaphysical priority of the whole over its parts. (shrink)

Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings is a comprehensive anthology that draws together leading philosophers writing on the major themes in Metaphysics. Chapters appear under the headings: Universals Particulars Modality and Possible Worlds Causation Time Persistence Realism and Anti-Realism. Each section is prefaced by an introductory essay by the editor which guides students gently into each topic. Articles by the following leading philosophers are included: Allaire, Anscombe, Armstrong, Black, Broad, Casullo, Dummett, Ewing, Heller, Hume, Kripke, Lewis, Mackie, McTaggart, Mellor, Merricks (...) , Parfit, Plantinga, Price, Prior, Putnam, Quine, Russell, Smart, Swinburne, Taylor , Van Cleve, van Inwagen, Williams. Featuring a new section on causation, this new edition is highly accessible and provides a broad-ranging exploration of the subject. Ideal for any philosophy student, this reader will prove essential reading for any metaphysics course. The sections and selections of readings have been updated to complement Michael Loux’s textbook Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction , third edition. (shrink)

_Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction_ is for students who have already completed an introductory philosophy course and need a fresh look at the central topics in the core subject of metaphysics. It is essential reading for any student of the subject. This Fourth Edition is revised and updated and includes two new chapters on Parts and Wholes, and Metaphysical Indeterminacy or vagueness. This new edition also keeps the user-friendly format, the chapter overviews summarizing the main topics, concrete examples to (...) clarify difficult concepts, annotated further reading at the end of each chapter, endnotes, and a full bibliography. Topics addressed include: the problem of universals the nature of abstract entities the problem of individuation the nature of modality identity through time the nature of time the nature of parts and wholes the problem of metaphysical indeterminacy the Realism/anti-Realism debate. Wherever possible, Michael J. Loux and Thomas M. Crisp relate contemporary views to their classical sources in the history of philosophy. As experienced teachers of philosophy and important contributors to recent debates, Loux and Crisp are uniquely qualified to write this book. (shrink)

Aristotelian metaphysics is currently undergoing something of a renaissance. This volume brings together fourteen essays from leading philosophers who are sympathetic to this conception of metaphysics, which takes its cue from the idea that metaphysics is the first philosophy. The primary input from Aristotle is methodological, but many themes familiar from his metaphysics will be discussed, including ontological categories, the role and interpretation of the existential quantifier, essence, substance, natural kinds, powers, potential, and the development of (...) life. The volume mounts a strong challenge to the type of ontological deflationism which has recently gained a strong foothold in analytic metaphysics. It will be a useful resource for scholars and advanced students who are interested in the foundations and development of philosophy. (shrink)