Conceptualized within the framework of self-determination theory, the aim of the current study was to investigate the relation between perfectionistic concerns and (a) controlled (non-self-determined) motivation and (b) performance anxiety through basic psychological need frustration (frustration of competence, autonomy, and realtedness), and if these relations would be moderated by controlling teaching/coaching conditions. We used a cross-sectional moderated mediation design and purposefully selected Norwegian elite junior performers (N = 171; Mage = 17.3; SDage= 0.94) from talent development schools, who completed an (...) online questionnaire to report their perceptions of the study variables. Associations were examined using structural equation modeling. The results showed that perfectionistic concerns were positively associated with controlling conditions, basic needs frustration, controlled motivation, and performance anxiety. Reported controlling teaching/coaching conditions moderated the positive indirect relationship between perfectionistic concerns and (a) controlled motivation and (b) performance anxiety through competence need frustration. Specifically, these indirect associations were evident for performers reporting moderate or high levels of controlling teaching/coaching conditions. In contrast, there were no indirect associations via competence need frustration for those performers who reported low levels of controlling conditions. In conclusion, the results indicate that perfectionistic concerns appear to be a vulnerability factor that exposes elite junior performers to higher risks of entering a debilitative motivational process. This seems especially likely when exposed to controlling teaching/coaching conditions. Coaches and teachers working with elite junior performers should avoid using controlling mechanisms and instead foster autonomous functioning. (shrink)

In “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment” Angela Smith defends her nonvoluntarist theory of moral responsibility against the charge that any such view is shallow because it cannot capture the depth of judgments of responsibility. Only voluntarist positions can do this since only voluntarist positions allow for control. I argue that Smith is able to deflect the voluntarists’ criticism, but only with further resources. As a voluntarist, I also concede that Smith’s thesis has force, and I close with a (...) compromise position, one that allows for direct moral responsibility for the nonvoluntary, but also incorporates a reasonable control condition. (shrink)

Learner control is an important instructional design in video-based learning. This study assessed two conditions: a full learner control where learners direct their learning path, and a hybrid learner control where learners follow the instructor-set path but still enjoy certain aspects of control. Two groups of university students participated in this study by learning statistics through online video courses. The findings show that the full learner control condition attained higher learning performance than the hybrid (...) learner control condition, but spent more time than the latter. The full learner control condition scored higher than the hybrid condition in the difficult sections of video-based learning; but no significant difference was found in the easy section. There was a significant difference between the two conditions in learning agency, but no differences in cognitive load and affective and cognitive engagement. Hierarchical regression analysis indicated differences between the full and the hybrid learner control conditions in the factors predicting overall scores. The findings carry important contributions and implications for the research and practice of instructional designs in online video-based learning such as MOOCs. (shrink)

The major argument of this article is that failing to measure what is taking place in treatment and control conditions can lead to scientifically invalid conclusions. It is argued that researchers are ethically responsible for being aware that variables related to the therapist, client, and the therapeutic relationship might play a confounding role when treatment and control conditions are compared. As a consequence, they should either measure these variables or be tentative in their interpretation of their findings.

The current study is a pilot trial to examine the effects of a nonelective, classroom-based, teacher-implemented, mindfulness meditation intervention on standard clinical measures of mental health and affect in middle school children. A total of 101 healthy sixth-grade students (55 boys, 46 girls) were randomized to either an Asian history course with daily mindfulness meditation practice (intervention group) or an African history course with a matched experiential activity (active control group). Self-reported measures included the Youth Self Report (YSR), a (...) modified Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, and the Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Measure –Revised. Both groups decreased significantly on clinical syndrome subscales and affect but did not differ in the extent of their improvements. Meditators were significantly less likely to develop suicidal ideation or thoughts of self-harm than controls. These results suggest that mindfulness training may yield both unique and non-specific benefits that are shared by other novel activities. (shrink)

IntroductionDue to the actual limitation of training conditions, the freestyle skiing aerials winter training term is short. Training tasks such as adaptability training and developing new skills are needed in summer training. When facing different training environments, freestyle skiing aerial athletes’ executive control over their abilities could be affected, which can affect their performance. Therefore, we want to research the effect of training conditions on executive control in freestyle skiing aerials athletes and its neural mechanism.Materials and methodsThirty-two freestyle (...) skiing aerials athletes were recruited. We evaluated their executive control and used fNIRS to measure oxygenated hemoglobin concentration changes in the prefrontal cortex during a rapid event-related design go/nogo task with different training condition-activated materials.ResultsAthletes’ behavior control in the summer condition has a lower accuracy than it is in the control condition. Athletes’ behavior control in the summer and winter training conditions had a longer reaction time than that in the control condition. The activation of the bilateral dlPFC and orbitofrontal cortex had a significant main effect across training conditions when freestyle skiing aerial athletes completed executive control tasks. The activation of athletes’ bilateral vlPFC and left dlPFC had an interaction between training conditions and behavioral control.ConclusionDifferent training conditions can lead to freestyle skiing aerial athletes executive control ability to drop, players in different training conditions show less activation on both sides of the vlPFC and orbitofrontal. The bilateral vlPFC and left dlPFC have an integrated effect on behavior inhibition across training conditions. (shrink)

What we pay attention to is influenced by both reward learning and aversive conditioning. Although early attention tends to be biased toward aversively conditioned stimuli, sustained ignoring of such stimuli is also possible. How aversive conditioning influences how a person chooses to search, or the strategic control of attention, has not been explored. In the present study, participants learned an association between a colour and an aversive outcome during a training phase, and in a subsequent test phase searched for (...) one of two targets presented on each trial; one target was rendered in the aversively conditioned colour (CS+) and the other in a neutral colour (CS-). Given the distribution of colour stimuli in the search array, it was more optimal to search for and report a target in one of the two colours on some trials. Our results demonstrate that participants were biased away from the CS+ target, which resulted in non-optimal search on some trials. Surprisingly, rather than accentuate this bias, greater state anxiety was associated with a stronger tendency to find and report the CS+ target. Our findings have implications for our understanding of the learning-dependent control of attention and abnormal attentional biases observed in high-anxious individuals. (shrink)

The mastery of contemporary scientific and technological revolution is both a consequence and a condition of the purposeful control of social processes. Bourgeois social sciences failed to elaborate a comprehensive theory of social control since they ignore the social subject of the cognition and control of social processes. The scientific concept of social control arises due to the Marxist-Leninist analysis of the subject-object dialectic in the historical process with the formation of the advanced socialist society.

The ascription of intentional states to the self involves knowledge, or at least claims to knowledge. Armed with the working definition of knowledge as 'the ability to do things, or refrain from doing things, or believe, or want, or doubt things, for reasons that are facts' [Hyman, J. Philos. Quart. 49:432—451], I sketch a simple competence model of acting and believing from knowledge and when knowledge is defeated by un-experienced changes of state. The model takes the form of three concentric (...) circles. The 'periphery' is analogous to Fodor's [(1983), The modularity of mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA] input systems. The 'core' contains copies of peripheral representations, and between these representations there is executive competition. At the 'nucleus', operations are performed on the core representations of, at least, negation and recursion. I argue that this provides a fruitful way in which to conceptualise why theory-of-mind tasks challenge pre-school children, how some degree of first-person authority is mental state attribution is possible, and how executive inhibition is achieved. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the technologizing of most things in our daily lives, from work and education to finance and leisure, can be seen to promote a loss of the tangible and a rootlessness for human societies, causing a disorientation in the knowledge and beliefs acquired over millennia. Arendt’s proposal that ‘the earth is the very quintessence of the human condition’ (1958, p. 2) appears to be challenged as digital interactions create new spaces that coax humans away (...) from a focus on their physical world. Instantaneity and simultaneity avoid the historic conditions of humanity in relation to time and place, while the hyperreal images and simulations of the virtual either distort reality or do not depict anything with a real existence. Stiegler goes so far as to suggest that human knowledge and memory is being confiscated by technology. The acceleration of reality, as a condition of the instant, erases the beginning as much as the end, and past, present and future are diminished as contemporary becomes simply temporary. My position, while not utopian, does not seek to be irrationally dystopian and accepts that there is much in technology that advances human physical well-being and thought. It is, however, cautionary in its concern that private technology corporations, having seconded science, actively seek to increase their market and control over hyperconnectivity, thinking, knowledge and the human condition. I draw on the writings of Stiegler and Virilio in particular, both of whom acknowledge a debt to Heidegger. (shrink)

Several target articles in this BBS special issue address the topic of cerebellar and olivary functions, especially as they pertain to motor earning. Another important topic is the neural interaction between the limbic system and the cerebellum during associative learning. In this commentary we present some of our data on olivo-cerebellar and limbic-cerebellar interactions during eyeblink conditioning. [HOUK et al.; SIMPSON et al.; THACH].

The current investigation examined the bidirectional effects of cognitive control and emotional control and the overlap between these two systems in regulating emotions. Based on recent neural and cognitive findings, we hypothesised that two control systems largely overlap as control recruited for one system (either emotional or cognitive) can be used by the other system. In two experiments, participants completed novel versions of either the Stroop task (Experiment 1) or the Flanker task (Experiment 2) in which (...) the emotional and cognitive control systems were actively manipulated into either a high or low emotional-load condition (achieved by varying the proportions of negative-valence emotional cues) and a high and a low cognitive control condition (achieved through varying the proportion of conflict-laden trials). In both experiments, participants’ performance was impaired when both emotional and cognitive control were low, but significantly and similarly improved when one of the two control mechanisms were activated – the emotional or the cognitive. In Experiment 2, performance was further improved when both systems were activated. Our results give further support for a more integrative notion of control in which the two systems (emotional and cognitive control) not only influence each other, but rather extensively overlap. (shrink)

Controlled human infection (CHI) studies involve the deliberate exposure of healthy research participants to infectious agents to study early disease processes and evaluate interventions under controlled conditions with high efficiency. Although CHI studies expose participants to the risk of infection, they are designed to offer investigators unique advantages for studying the pathogenesis of infectious diseases and testing potential vaccines or treatments in humans. One of the central challenges facing investigators involves the fair selection of research subjects to participate in CHI (...) studies. While there is widespread agreement that investigators have a duty to select research participants fairly, this principle also yields conflicting ethical imperatives, for example requiring investigators to both exclude potential participants with co‐morbidities since they face increased risks, but also to include them in order to ensure generalizability. In this paper we defend an account of fair subject selection that is tailored to the context of CHI studies. We identify the considerations of fairness that bear directly on selecting participants for CHI studies and provide investigators and members of IRBs and RECs with a principled way to navigate the conflicting imperatives to which these considerations give rise. (shrink)

Stereotype threat is a possible reason for difficulties faced by girls and women in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. The threat experienced due to gender can cause elevated worry during performance situations. That is, if the stereotype that women are not as good as men in math becomes salient, this stereotype activation draws women’s attention to task-irrelevant worry caused by the fear of conforming to the negative stereotype. Increased worry can reduce cognitive resources, potentially leading to performance (...) decrements. We argue that such worry is more pronounced immediately after an unrelated self-control demand, which is assumed to temporarily decrease people’s self-control exertion over their attention and stream of thought. This prediction was examined in an experiment conducted with 102 participating university students enrolled in courses in which math plays a crucial role. After the manipulation of self-control capacity, stereotype threat was induced for the female students, but not the male students. Then, the students were asked to report their thoughts during a math performance situation three times. Multiple-group autoregressive path models revealed that when self-control capacity was relatively low, female compared with male students reported more intense worry in the initial two thought protocols. In contrast, in the relatively high self-control capacity condition, female and male students did not differ significantly in their reported worry at any time. These results expand on previous findings, suggesting that threat effects depend on definable situational self-control conditions. (shrink)

It has long been thought that control is necessary for moral responsibility. Call this the control condition. Given its pride of place in the free will debate, “control” has almost always been taken to be shorthand for voluntary control, an exercise of choice or will. Over the last few decades, however, many have been arguing for including a range of attitudes for which we seem to be responsible that, if controlled at all, must be controlled (...) via a very different mechanism, namely, evaluative judgment. Call this second type of control evaluative control. In this paper I will present and discuss in detail an additional agential stance—reasonish regard—for which we treat one another as responsible, but that is ungoverned by either of the first two types of control. If we want to require a control condition for responsibility, then, we will need to introduce and include a third type of control, what I call empathic control. (shrink)

Skill or control is commonly regarded as a necessary condition for intentional action. This received wisdom is challenged by experiments conducted by Joshua Knobe and Thomas Nadelhoffer, which suggest that moral considerations sometimes trump considerations of skill and control. I argue that this effect (as well as the Knobe effect) can be explained in terms of the role normative reasons play in the concept of intentional action. This explanation has significant advantages over its rivals. It involves at (...) most a conservative extension rather than a radical revision of what we tend to believe about intentional action, and it fits better with the way we conceive of the relation between intentional action and moral responsibility. (shrink)

People experiencing alien control report that their thoughts, movements, actions, and emotions have been replaced by those of an "other." The latter is commonly a perceived persecutor of the patient. Here I describe the clinical phenomenology of alien control, mechanistic models that have been used to explain it, problems inherent in these models, the brain deficits and functional abnormalities associated with this symptom, and the means by which disordered agency may be examined in this perplexing condition. Our (...) current state of knowledge implicates potentially reversible dysfunction in certain key brain regions (especially the right parietal cortex), which is temporally related to the presence of symptoms. Alien control is quintessentially a disorder of agency. (shrink)

The present study uses EEG time-frequency representations with a Flanker task to investigate if and how individual differences in bilingual language experience modulate neurocognitive outcomes in two bilingual group types: late bilinguals and early bilinguals. TFRs were computed for both incongruent and congruent trials. The difference between the two was then compared between the HSs and the L2 learners, modeled as a function of individual differences with bilingual experience within each group separately and probed for its potential symmetry between brain (...) and behavioral data. We found no differences at the behavioral and neural levels for the between-groups comparisons. However, oscillatory dynamics of inhibition and cognitive control were found to be modulated by individual differences in bilingual language experience, albeit distinctly within each bilingual group. While the results indicate adaptations toward differential brain recruitment in line with bilingual language experience variation overall, this does not manifest uniformly. Rather, earlier versus later onset to bilingualism—the bilingual type—seems to constitute an independent qualifier to how individual differences play out. (shrink)

Abstract. Our human condition is often defined in terms of human fallibility; we are human specifically because we fail to live up to our own expectations. This paper explores various conceptions of one form of human fallibility: self-control failure. Self-control failure is examined through two conceptualizations, with each conceptualization observed through a corresponding theological and psychological lens: first, as the result of a divided, conflicted humanity, as understood by the Catholic Doctrine of Original Sin and psychological Dual-Process (...) Theories of Cognition; and second, as the result of limited goal perception, as understood by Islamic conceptions of human memory and psychological Construal Level Theory. A concluding discussion considers two broader implications of the preceding analysis: first, that an appropriate understanding of human fallibility can help us to mitigate its effects, and second, that a conversation regarding overlapping concepts across academic disciplines and religious traditions can enrich understanding of said concepts. (shrink)

A varied air volume air-conditioning system comprises diverse input and/or output disturbances, which are commonly nonlinear, with large lag and uncertainty. Based on the traditional control methods, testing the controlling parameters of a VAV air-conditioning system is challenging. Sliding mode control could improve the robustness of the system due to the adaptive capacity of disturbance rejection. Moreover, the fuzzy algorithm could be employed to determine the stability of a sliding control system by adjusting the parameters in the (...) approach rate, reducing the switching frequency, and weakening chatter. Fuzzy sliding mode control is investigated in this paper to improve the performance of a VAV air-conditioning system. Simulation results verify that the sliding mode control is suitable for a VAV air-conditioning system to achieve good adaptability and robustness considering the influence of multiple external variable disturbances. In addition, the chattering of the system is improved after the introduction of fuzzy control. (shrink)

Doug Husak has argued, persuasively I think, that there is no literal ‘act requirement’ in Anglo-American law. I begin by reviewing Husak’s reasons for rejecting the act requirement, and provide additional reasons to think he is right to do so. But Husak’s alternative, the ‘control condition’, I argue, is inadequate. The control requirement is falsified by the widespread practice of holding extremely intoxicated offenders liable for criminal conduct they engage in even if they lack control over (...) their conduct at the time of the offense, and even if they are acting involuntarily. I provide examples from Canadian, US and German law to flesh out our legal practices with respect to intoxicated offenders. I then argue that, at least with respect to one class of intoxicated offenders–those known as ‘grand schemers’, who plan their criminal offending prior to rendering themselves incapable of voluntary control over their conduct–we are morally justified in imposing liability. I then propose an alternative to both the act and control requirements: what I call the ‘agency requirement’. I argue that our law does and should impose liability for conduct that is expressive of or constitutive of the defendant’s practically rational agency. Adopting an agency view allows us to expand our focus from just the moment of the offense to temporally extended instances of agency, such as is involved in planned offending by grand schemers. (shrink)

Some proponents of compatibilist moral responsibility have proposed an historical theory which requires that agents deploy character control in order to be morally responsible. An important type of argument for the character control condition is the manipulation argument, such as Mele’s example of Beth and Chuck. In this paper I show that Beth can be exonerated on various conditions other than her failure to execute character control—I propose a new character, Patty, who meets these conditions and (...) is, I argue, morally responsible for her actions despite lacking character control. Thus the character control condition is unmotivated. I suggest there may be an alternative basis for an historical theory of moral responsibility nonetheless. (shrink)

BackgroundThere is numerous literature on mechanisms underlying variability of practice advantages. Literature includes both behavioral and neuroimaging studies. Unfortunately, no studies are focusing on practice in constant conditions to the best of our knowledge. Hence it is essential to assess possible differences in mechanisms of neuroplasticity between constant vs. variable practice conditions. The primary objectives of the study described in this protocol will be: to determine the brain’s structural and functional changes following constant and variable practice conditions in motor learning (...) ; to determine the EEG activation and connectivity between cognitive, sensory, and motor cerebral cortex areas in constant and variable practice conditions and as a function of practice time.MethodsThe study will follow the interventional design with two arms. Fifty participants will be randomly assigned to two groups practicing in constant and variable conditions. CG will be practicing only one pattern of step isometric contractions during unimanual index finger abduction, i.e., 90 trials in all training sessions, whereas VG will practice three different patterns. Each will be practiced 30 times per session in variable conditions. Resting-state fMRI, EEG, and motor task proficiency will be examined before and after practice.DiscussionFindings will enhance our understanding of structural and functional neural changes following practice in constant and variable conditions. Therefore, the study can be considered pure research.Clinical Trial RegistrationStudy registered at clinicaltrials.gov on 9 June 2021. Last version update: 21 December 2021.The protocol has been prepared according to the complete SPIRIT checklist, although the item order has been modified in order to comply with the manuscript structure. (shrink)

To make possible the integration proposed by Domjan et al., psychologists first need to close the research gap between behavioral ecology and the study of Pavlovian conditioning. I suggest two strategies, namely, to adopt more behavioral ecological approaches to social behavior or to co-opt problems already addressed by behavioral ecologists that are especially well suited to the study of Pavlovian conditioning.

Self-control is integral to successful human agency. Without it we cannot extend our agency across time and secure central social, moral, and personal goods. But self-control is not a unitary capacity. In the first part of this paper we provide a taxonomy of self-control and trace its connections to agency and the self. In part two, we turn our attention to the external conditions that support successful agency and the exercise of self-control. We argue that what (...) we call moral security is a critical foundation for agency. Parts three and four explore what happens to agency when moral security is lacking, as in the case of those subject to racism, and those living in poverty. The disadvantages suffered by those who are poor, in a racial minority or other oppressed group, or suffering mental illness or addiction, are often attributed to a lack of individual self-control or personal responsibility. In particular, members of these groups are often seen as irresponsibly focused on short-term pleasures over long-term good, a view underwritten by particular psychological theories of self-control. We explore how narratives about racism and poverty undermine moral security, and limit and distort the possibility of synchronic and diachronic self-control. Where moral security is undermined, the connection between self-control and diachronic goods often fails to obtain and agency contracts accordingly. We close with some preliminary reflections on the implications for responsibility. (shrink)

On the surface, it seems intuitively plausible that if an agent luckily manages to perform a desired action (e.g., rolling a six with a fair die or winning the lottery), the performance of which is not the result of any relevant skill on her part, we should not say that she performed the action intentionally. This intuition suggests that our concept of intentional action is sensitive to considerations of skill, luck, and causal control. Indeed, some philosophers have claimed that (...) in order for an action to be performed intentionally it must be performed with a relevant amount of skill or control - i.e., an intentional action cannot simply be the result of luck. On this view, skill and control are necessary conditions of our everyday concept of intentional action. In this essay, I discuss empirical evidence that challenges this claim. After briefly setting the stage, I examine Al Mele and Paul Moser's thorough analysis of intentional action - paying particular attention to some of the interesting scenarios they offer in support of their position. Next, I discuss the results of some simple psychological experiments that show that people's judgments concerning whether actions are intentional can often be affected by the moral features of these actions - features that may trump considerations of skill, luck, and control. Finally, I conclude that if this is correct, philosophers who claim that skill and control are necessary conditions of the folk concept of intentional action appear to be mistaken. One can test attempted philosophical analyses of intentional action partly by ascertaining whether what these analyses entail about particular actions is in line with what the majority of non-specialists would say about these actions if there is a widely shared concept of intentional action, such judgments provide evidence about what the concept is, and a philosophical analysis of intentional action that is wholly unconstrained by that concept runs the risk of having nothing more than a philosophical fiction as its subject matter. (Mele, 2001, p. 27). (shrink)

There is a conceptual knot at the intersection of moral responsibility and action theory. This knot can be expressed as the following question: What is the relationship between an agent’s openness to moral responsibility and the intentional status of her behaviour? My answer to this question is developed in three steps. I first develop a control-backed account of intentional agency, one that borrows vital insights from the cognitive sciences – in the form of Dual Process Theory – in understanding (...) the control condition central to the account, and demonstrate that this account fares at least as well as its rivals in the field. Secondly, I investigate the dominant positions in the discussion surrounding the role of control in moral responsibility. After consideration of some shortcomings of these positions – especially the inability to properly account for so-called ambivalence cases – I defend an alternative pluralist account of moral responsibility, in which there are two co-extant variants of such responsibility: attributability and accountability. The latter of these will be shown to have a necessary control condition, also best understood in terms of a requirement for oversight, and in terms of the workings of the dual system mechanism. I then demonstrate how these two accounts are necessarily related through the shared role of this kind of control, leading to my answer to the original question: if an agent is open to moral accountability based on some activity or outcome, this activity or outcome must necessarily have positive intentional status. I then apply this answer in a consideration of certain cases of the use of the Doctrine of Double Effect. (shrink)