Este artículo describe la evolución del movimiento pacifista desde las campañas antinucleares de los años 60 y 80 del siglo XX, hasta sus manifestaciones a comienzos del siglo XXI. Pese a que, generalmente, la historiografía ha considerado mayoritariamente al movimiento pacifista como agotado durante los últimos 15 años, la tesis de este trabajo es que aquél se ha reforzado, si bien transformándose y adaptándose a los nuevos desafíos y exigencias del mundo actual. Éstos se centran en la consolidación de la (...) conciencia ciudadana a favor de la paz fruto de la revolución silenciosa del último medio siglo, en el pacifismo humanitario, en el voluntariado, en la diplomacia civil noviolenta, y en los nuevos modelos organizativos de las ONGs, caracterizados por la mesomovilización. (shrink)

This paper employs the critical and analytical techniques of philosophical reflection to present a moral justification for the use of non-violent civil disobedience by Kenyan citizens in pursuit of their aspirations. It sets out with a brief review of political disobedience in Kenya from the advent of the British invasion and domination of the country in the late nineteenth century to the present. Next, it examines the nature of non-violent civil disobedience, outlining the views of four of its most influential (...) advocates, namely, Étienne de La Boétie, Henry David Thoreau, Mohandas Karmachand Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. It then offers a moral justification for non-violent civil disobedience by presenting nine arguments in its favour, with special reference to the Kenyan context. Thereafter, it answers six objections to non-violent civil disobedience. The paper concludes that it is high time that Kenyans gave serious consideration to a commitment to non-violent civil disobedience. (shrink)

In this paper, I intend to appropriate the explanatory power of some of Habermas' recent ideas (such as complementary learning processes, modernization of faith, tolerance, and non-violence) for the purpose of examining the current political situation in Iran. I would like to argue that the recent history of Iran has offered an occasion for a development away from a dogmatic religious consciousness and toward a more tolerant one. I submit that these opposing modes of thought are, respectively, represented by the (...) hardliners in power and the reformists in opposition. The current impasse, I argue, is the result of an asymmetrical learning process, where the conservative camp has not evolved along with the reformers. I submit that the way out of the impasse is a fully fledged non-violent movement of civil disobedience by the opposition. The politics of non-violence engagement can be realized by fostering a culture of tolerance as the acceptance of reasonable disagreements and the rejection of violent means in politics. I argue that such a movement has begun to emerge after the June 12 2009 presidential election in the form of the Green Hope Movement. (shrink)

This article responds to William Scheuerman’s analysis of Edward Snowden as someone whose acts fit within John Rawls’ account of civil disobedience understood as a public, non-violent, conscientious breach of law performed with overall fidelity to law and a willingness to accept punishment. It rejects the narrow Rawlsian notion in favour of a broader notion of civil disobedience understood as a constrained, conscientious and communicative breach of law that demonstrates opposition to law or policy and a desire for lasting change. (...) The article shows that, according to Rawls’ unduly narrow conception, Edward Snowden is not a civil disobedient. But, according to the more plausible, broader conception, he is. It then identifies some advantages of the broader conception in contemporary analyses of new forms of disobedience, including globalized disobedience and digital disobedience. (shrink)

In this article, we will discuss Civil Disobedience as a tool for non-violent protests. We will analyze the ideas from Thoreau to Kant, including the thoughts of Gandhi and Dworkin, verifying the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of their arguments in the political world. With regard to Dworkin and Gandhi, both inspired by Thoreau's thought, civil disobedience to norms provided a change in the political scenario, capable of effecting a mediation of conflicts through non-violence. Kant's perspective, in turn, presents the hypothesis (...) of peaceful resistance when the norms do not correspond to the proposed expectations, the general rule being the idea of respect and obedience to the law. Finally, to conclude this article, we will highlight the writings of Thoreau, Gandhi, Dworkin, and Kant, to postulate that civil disobedience must be linked to the criteria of non-violence, peace, justice, and legitimacy. (shrink)

This book explores a hitherto unexamined possibility of justifiable disobedience opened up by John Rawls’ Law of Peoples. This is the possibility of disobedience justified by appeal to standards of decency that are shared by peoples who do not otherwise share commitments to the same principles of justice, and whose societies are organized according to very different basic social institutions. Justified by appeal to shared decency standards, disobedience by diverse state and non-state actors indeed challenge injustices in the international system (...) of states. The book considers three case studies: disobedience by the undocumented, disobedient challenges to global economic inequities, and the disobedient disclosure of government secrets. It proposes a substantial analytical redefinition of civil disobedience in a global perspective, identifying the creation of global solidarity relations as its goal. Michael Allen breaks new ground in our understanding of global justice. Traditional views, such as those of Rawls, see justice as a matter of recognizing the moral status of all free and equal person as citizens in a state. Allen argues that this fails to see things from the global perspective. From this perspective disobedience is not merely a matter of social cooperation. Rather, it is a matter of self determination that guarantees the invulnerability of different types of persons and peoples to domination. This makes the disobedience by the undocumented justified, based on the idea that all persons are moral equals, so that all sovereign peoples need to reject dominating forms of social organization for all persons, and not just their own citizens. In an age of mass movements of people, Allen gives us a strong reason to change our practices in treating the undocumented. James Bohman, St Louis University, Danforth Chair in the Humanities This monograph is an important contribution to our thinking on civil disobedience and practices of dissent in a globalized world. This is an era where non-violent social movements have had a significant role in challenging the abuse of power in contexts as diverse, yet interrelated as the Arab Spring protests and the Occupy protests. Moreover, while protests such as these speak to a local political horizon, they also have a global footprint, catalyzing a transnational dialogue about global justice, political strategy and cosmopolitan solidarity. Speaking directly to such complexities, Allen makes a compelling case for a global perspective regarding civil disobedience. Anyone interested in how the dynamics of non-violent protest have shaped and reshaped the landscape for democratic engagement in a globalized world will find this book rewarding and insightful. Vasuki Nesiah, New York University. (shrink)

Rawls’s notion of civil disobedience, which still dominates the literature on this subject, comprises at least these three characteristics: it involves breaking the law, is non-violent and public. But implicit in this notion is a certain tension: it shows pessisimism about the proper functioning of the public sphere as earlier normal appeals have failed, but it also displays a certain optimism about its proper functioning as it assumes that civil disobedience may be effective. In my paper I argue that Rawls (...) cannot explain how civil disobedience may be effective as a public appeal for social justice because he does not fully understand what it means for civil disobedience to be public in relation to the public sphere. His analysis would require an additional notion of publicity which, as I argue, is the notion of hermeneutical publicity. From a Bourdieusian perspective I then make a case for the claim that public spheres always suffer from hermeneutic invisibility. This may explain why non-violent appeals for social justice fail as dialogical practices. Finally I suggest how we nevertheless could understand that civil disobedience can be effective as a dialogical practice. (shrink)

Interviewet er lavet i juli 2021. Dets formål er at belyse emner, der er centrale i Celikates’ tænkning, f.eks. den voksende højrefløjspopulisme, migration, voldelige versus ikke-voldelige protester, civil ulydighed og den kritiske filosofis rolle i dag. -/- When Celikates and I sat down digitally in July 2021, the interview’s primary purpose was to examine topics central to Celikates’ thinking, such as the rise of right-wing populism, migration, violent versus non-violent protest, civil disobedience, and the role of critical philosophy today.

La notion de désobéissance civile connaît aujourd'hui un regain d'intérêt qui n'exclut pas toujours les approximations. Les noms de Thoreau, de Gandhi, de King, étroitement liés à son histoire, font désormais partie de la culture générale. Mais sait-on que l'idée d'une obéissance conditionnelle l'État et à ses lois émerge, sous la plume d'un John Locke, dès le XVIIe siècle ouvrant ainsi une brèche féconde dans les théories modernes du contrat social? Sait-on que la désobéissance civile fut, à l'exemple (...) des universitaires norvégiens en 1942, un des modes de résistance à l'occupation nazie? Se souvient-on qu'en Pologne, notamment, c'est une authentique campagne de désobéissance civile qui précipita l'effondrement du régime communiste? De Tolstoï à John Rawls, de la " marche du sel " en Inde aux " enseignants désobéisseurs " en France, ce concept s'est sans cesse enrichi sur les plans philosophiques et stratégiques. En un dialogue fertile avec les textes fondateurs et les grandes campagnes historiques, l'auteur nous montre ce qu'est la désobéissance civile : avant tout, un impératif éthique d'éprouver la légitimité de la loi et, le cas échéant, la faculté de rompre avec son cadre rassurant. Ce livre, qui se veut aussi un manuel pratique, montre que cette forme d'action directe non-violente, souvent efficace contre la tyrannie, peut et doit également contribuer à la respiration de nos démocraties essoufflées.-. (shrink)

Roy Morrison offers a compelling blueprint for building a sustainable ecological civilization by applying a smart, not painful, prescription to today's troubled industrial world. He calls for abolishing income taxes and instead taxing pollution, unlimited growth through trade in information, investing in jobs through a National Trust bank, and ending welfare and poverty through a negative income tax linked to national service.Eco Civilization 2140 is set in the small town of Warner in the year 2140 after the great ecological crisis (...) of the 21st century has passed. It is a peaceful time, where 150 years old is middle age, where virtual reality and the world wide web allows us to snorkel in the Great Barrier Reef from our living rooms and where we grow crops as inputs for nanotech production. "Eco Civilization 2140 is a brilliant, practical recipe for extricating ourselves from impending failure. This kind of imaginative thinking promises a blueprint for success." ?Phil Bosserman, author of More of Us Than You Think "Chock full of ideas of tomorrow that we can use today, Eco Civilzation 2140 is a remarkable work of imagination and vision."?Sonia Shah, author of Crude: The Story of Oil $12.95 / paperback / 114 pages / Writers Publishing Cooperative / 2006 / ISBN 1-930149-37-9.Roy Morrison is an energy consultant, writer and cooperative organizer. He is involved in pioneering work in developing wind hedges and was a former leader of the Clamshell Alliance that used non-violent action to oppose the construction of the Seabrook nuclear power plant. (shrink)

The claim that guns can safeguard freedom is common in US political discourse. In light of a broadly republican understanding of freedom, I evaluate this claim and its implications. The idea is usually that firearms would enable citizens to engage in revolutionary violence against a tyrannical government. I argue that some of the most common objections to this argument fail, but that the argument is fairly weak in light of other objections. I then defend a different argument for the claim (...) that guns can safeguard freedom. I claim that firearm ownership among members of oppressed groups can hinder the use of systematic violence aimed at preventing them from exercising their basic liberties. I show how a commitment to armed self-defense is compatible with non-violent civil resistance as a tool of political change, and show how the former facilitated the latter during the Civil Rights Movement. Finally, I consider the policy implications of my argument. I don’t think it vindicates lax gun control policies. However, it may vindicate some individuals acquiring guns and learning how to use them, and some organizations aiding them in doing so. (shrink)

Traditionally, acts of civil disobedience are understood as a mechanism by which citizens may express dissatisfaction with a law of their country. That expression will typically be morally motivated, non-violent and aimed at changing their government’s policy, practice or law. Building on existing work, in this paper we explore the limits of one well-received definition of civil disobedience by considering the challenging case of the actions of animal activists at sea. Drawing on original interviews with advocates associated with Sea Shepherd, (...) Greenpeace and Humane Society International we find that even if animal activists are morally motivated and civil, the transnational nature of their activity makes it difficult to assess their intention to bring about a change in law or public policy. This means that a civil disobedience defence may not be available to activists operating across international borders. This raises important questions about the usefulness of the civil disobedience concept within the context of a globalised world. We conclude that while the actions of some anti-whaling activists may not meet definitions of civil disobedience as conventionally understood, this says more about the narrow way in which that concept has been traditionally defined, than it does about the type of activity some anti-whaling activists have undertaken in the Southern Ocean. Finally, we argue that activists wishing to make a stand against whaling may have no choice but to act as global citizens because policy change within a single nation-state is unlikely to lead to the cessation of this inherently transnational activity. (shrink)

Despite anxieties about the growing power of neo-liberalism, the crisis of the EU and the upsurge of right-wing political movements, it is important to recognize that utopian movements on the left have also in recent years been symbolically revitalized and organizationally sustained. This article analyses three recent social upheavals as utopian civil society movements, placing the 2008 US presidential campaign of Barack Obama, the Egyptian uprising in Tahrir Square and the Occupy Movement in the USA inside the narrative arc that (...) began with the non-violent democratic uprisings against authoritarian governments four decades earlier. In this new utopian surge, however, there is an unprecedented connection of eastern and western impulses, demonstrating that the tide of democratic thought and action is hardly confined to Judeo-Christian civilizations. (shrink)

Apparently illegal cases of animal rescue can be either open or covert: ‘open rescue’ is associated with organizations such as Animal Liberation Victoria and Animal Liberation New South Wales; ‘covert rescue’ is associated with the Animal Liberation Front. While the former seems to qualify non-controversially as civil disobedience I argue that at least some instances of the latter could also qualify as civil disobedience just so long as various norms of civility are satisfied. The case for such a move is (...) defended against objections that covertness is inherently suspect; a failure to accept responsibility; and inconsistent with civil disobedience as a form of communication. Against such objections, the paper emphasizes the importance of respecting the open texture of the concept of civil disobedience if it is to be of continuing relevance against the backdrop of changing forms of non-violent dissent. (shrink)

In Morocco’s process of liberalization (and democratization), the dynamics between social actors defining themselves as “secular” and those labeled “Islamist” are critical. This paper probes the possibility of these actors transcending their frequent opposition and building mutual trust and “civil” interaction, thereby strengthening civil society and the possibility of continued reform in Morocco. Using Morocco’s recent Equity and Reconciliation Commission as an analytical tool, the paper focuses on the human rights arena as a potentially fruitful place for Islamists and secularists (...) to meet. To what extent is a shared commitment to human rights norms possible for non-violent Islamists and secularists? And can a flexible idea of human rights be an effective tool to create trust despite mutual perceptions of threatening ideal aims in the “other”? (shrink)

McCullough and colleagues draw an historical line from the writings of Percival, who found himself resolving arguments (sometimes violent) between physicians, surgeons and apothecaries, to the concept of civility as a professional virtue and duty. The authors show that civility is a prerequisite to effective cooperation, which itself underpins patient safety and positive clinical outcomes—desirable endpoints of any discussion about healthcare. They exhort academic leaders to teach, role model and reward correct behaviours.1 Why then, as a clinician manager with a (...) deep interest in fostering civility and psychological safety, am I not satisfied? Three reasons: the paper does not adequately explore the reasons why, its focus is largely restricted to academic institutions, and it does not encompass the non-clinical workforce; as a result, its proposed solutions appear ungrounded. Why are ‘good people’, who were attracted to careers that demand altruism and empathy, uncivil in the workplace? What are the competing goals that result in curt, disrespectful or downright rude exchanges? This has been studied. Leape et al concluded that endogenous factors such as personality, insecurity, anxiety, depression, narcissism and responses to prior …. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Joseph de Maistre’s Civilization and its DiscontentsGraeme GarrardIn his study of Sigmund Freud’s social and political thought Paul Roazen claims that Freud was the first to depict the human psyche as torn between two fundamentally antithetical tendencies:The notion of a human nature in conflict with itself, disrupted by the opposition of social and asocial inclinations, the view that the social self develops from an asocial nucleus but that the (...) social trends are also dynamic and emotional in nature, and finally the conception that reason’s control can be extended by a detailed knowledge of the repressed asocial tendencies—all this was not known before Freud. 1Although Freud is undoubtedly the most famous modern exponent of this conception of human nature at war with itself, he was by no means its first, let alone only, proponent. Kant, for example, wrote of the “unsocial sociability of men” over a century earlier. 2 An even more unlikely precursor of this basic assumption of Freudian social psychology is the Catholic reactionary Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821). The social theory elaborated by this arch-paladin of throne and altar—who was, quite literally, plus royalist que le roi, plus catholique que le Pape—is strikingly similar to that expressed by Freud in his famous essay Civilization and Its Discontents (1929). 3 [End Page 429]Both conceived of the individual as “a being both social and evil,” 4 perpetually struggling to prevent the innate aggressiveness of the species from plunging society into a Hobbesian war of all against all. That is why Freud insisted that it “has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man’s aggressive instincts,” 5 a view advanced over a century earlier by Maistre. Events in Europe after 1789 led many conservatives such as Maistre, as events after 1914 would lead Freud, to reject the common Enlightenment view of human beings as naturally sociable and of social life as a reflection of the spontaneous harmony of a natural world governed by laws established by God and discoverable by reason. In Maistre’s view, social and political life are better understood as the artificial and fundamentally precarious imposition of order on the violent flux of nature. Anticipating Freud, he asserts that individuals, if left to their own devices in society, would soon be plunged into a state of social warfare identical to that which Hobbes had attributed to the state of nature. His particular brand of extreme conservative thought derives its social and political authoritarianism from these deeply pessimistic social assumptions, which leave him with more in common (on this subject) with Freud than with either the Enlightenment or fellow conservatives such as Edmund Burke.Homo Homini LupusThe pessimistic, even tragic, argument of Civilization and Its Discontents is that human beings are driven by extremely powerful instincts, the full satisfaction of which is incompatible with social life. According to Freud, the “cultural frustration” that ensues from this incompatibility “dominates the large field of social relationships between human beings. As we already know, it is the cause of the hostility against which all civilizations has to struggle.” 6 Unhappiness, understood as the non-satisfaction of these basic libidinal urges, is therefore a necessary part of human association. “One feels inclined to say that the intention that man should be ‘happy,’” Freud writes pessimistically, “is not included in the plan of ‘Creation.’” 7Freud also argues that, in addition to these basically erotic instincts, there is a “constitutional inclination in human beings to be aggressive towards one another,” 8 which “constitutes the greatest impediment to civilization.” 9 [End Page 430] This ineliminable tendency accounts for Freud’s Hobbesian view of the precariousness of civilization: 10[M]en are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbour is for them not only a potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to... (shrink)

This dissertation argues that there is an agreed upon commonsense view of violence, but beyond this view, definitions for kinds of violence are essentially contested and non-neutrally, politically ideological, given that the political itself is an essentially contested concept defined in relation to ideologies that oppose one another. The first chapter outlines definitions for a commonsense view of violence produced by Greene and Brennan. This chapter argues that there are incontestable instances of violence that are almost universally agreed upon, such (...) as when an adult intentionally smashes a child’s head against a table, purposefully causing harm. It is also claimed that, because political, ideological distinctions between kinds of violence arise from the creation of moral equivalences to the commonsense view of violence, political ideology is the source of disagreement. The second chapter argues that the concept of violence and of the political are essentially contested concepts. Gallie’s criteria for what counts as an essentially contested concept are utilized in order to argue that violence is an essentially contested concept at the level of the political, though not at the level of the commonsense view of violence. In fact, the paradigmatic cases that the commonsense view of violence pertains to serve as the core cases that are then interpreted as kinds of violence at the ideological level. To define violence as altogether wrong, or to define kinds of violence as acceptable and others as wrong is itself a politically ideological move to make, such as when liberalism defines its own uses of violence as justified and legitimate, and its enemy’s violence as unjustifiable and illegitimate. The World Health Organization and Bufacchi’s definitions for violence are presented, as are the definition for terroristic violence defined by Nagel. Erlenbusch’s critique of a liberal view, such as that of Nagel and the World Health Organization, is addressed as a reflection on the fact that, beyond the commonsense view of violence, violence is an essentially contested concept for which an ideologically, politically non-neutral definition is unlikely. The third chapter outlines numerous definitions produced by various philosophers, historians, and theorists, such as Machiavelli, Arendt, Hobbes, Kant, Treitschke, Weber, Bakunin, Sorel, Žižek, and Benjamin. The definitions produced by each demonstrates that person’s political ideological assumptions. Their definitions demonstrate an ongoing disagreement, in the sense of Rancière’s formulation for what counts as a disagreement in that each theorist defines kinds of violence under the yoke of their own political ideology. They all might agree that a single act is violent, under the commonsense view of violence, but they disagree concerning what kind of violence it is. So, though they may point to the same events and actions as examples of violence, what they mean fundamentally differs, and this means that they disagree. Their disagreement arises due to their respective political ideologies. This disagreement shows that there is no neutral justification for the neutrality of a state, particularly if a neutral state must defend itself. The state is instead defined in historically contextual terms of how the state relates to kinds of violence, and the distinctions between kinds of violence are not themselves politically, ideologically neutral. So, the concept of violence, beyond the commonsense view, is an essentially contested concept for which a non-neutral definition is unlikely. Beyond the commonsense view, political ideology is inextricably bound up within distinctions between kinds of violence. The fourth chapter then examines arguments on the question of whether nonviolence counts as a kind of violence. If distinctions between kinds of violence are essentially contested and non-neutrally defined, and nonviolence is defined as distinct from violence, then it follows that nonviolence is an essentially contested concept for which no non-neutral definition is possible, at least beyond a commonsense view of nonviolence. A commonsense view of nonviolence is defined as the assumption that nonviolence is not violent in the way that the commonsense view defines violence. That is, nonviolence occurs when there is no action or event that most people would define as a violent one. Definitions for nonviolence, civil disobedience, nonviolent political actions, and nonviolent direct actions are then outlined. These definitions aim at showing that the doctrine of nonviolence does not merely refer to nonviolent acts, but to a strategy that is a means to defeating violence. Given that what counts as the nonviolence that defeats violence is ideologically a matter of disagreement, nonviolence, in this sense, can count as a kind of violence. The fifth chapter concludes, raising questions concerning how violence can be valued, the degree to which a state cannot neutrally justify its neutrality, and the degree to which, beyond the commonsense view of violence, there ever could be agreement concerning what counts as kinds of violence. 1 In this dissertation, I draw on a number of ideas/passages that appeared earlier in my paper “The Efficacy of Scapegoating and Revolutionary Violence," in Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions: A Journal of the World Union of Catholic Philosophical Societies, ed. William Sweet, 10(2014), 203-219. I am grateful to the editors of the journal for permission to draw on this material here. (shrink)

Drug-trafficking in Colombia has been a widely researched phenomenon, especially now, as the country undergoes a transition process with its older guerrilla. Now more than ever it is fundamental to examine how drug-trafficking organizations violent activities affect the consolidation of peace. This article considers different approaches to study violence derived from drug-trafficking, in order to advance towards the objectives of transitional justice. For that matter, this work is based on the idea that drug-trafficking directly generates and reproduces violence which is (...) fueled by the structural violence present in the Colombian context. My thesis is that this phenomenon deters non-repetition guarantees and weakens democracy, which is why there will be three main arguments presented that will revolve around the lack of consensus and the implications of considering drug wars as civil wars, how decisions related to the conceptual apprehension limit the competence of international humanitarian law, and the need for holistic strategies capable of facing drug-trafficking’s political and violent power. Later, alternatives will be explored around the possibilities that each argument offers, as well as which aspects could contribute to a more appropriate approach to combat drug-trafficking. Lastly, I will defend why implementing bottom-up oriented actions can advance towards transitional justice’s intermediate and final objectives, as it is the only alternative that escapes fatalist, utopian or interventionist scenarios. (shrink)

This paper examines the current interest in ‘art activism’, and the relationship between artistic expression and civil disobedience. Boris Groys has argued that the lack of political dissidence within contemporary art is not down to the ineffectiveness of the aesthetic, but the far more effective intrusion of the aesthetic by the political. As such, the political question of civil disobedience is necessarily an aesthetic one. At the same time, this raises problems for how politically effective artistic dissidence can be. As (...) Grindon argues, if art activism often only mimics ‘real’ social activism, it remains within the boundaries of the gallery system with no real consequences. Most art activism fails to be effective civil disobedience, in this sense, as it already operates within the confines of pre-established curatorial spaces. As such, the use of art for the purposes of civil disobedience cannot be, then, mere aestheticism, but rather must act as ‘an insight into the transformed mechanisms of conquest’ : a conflict over the topology of disobedience which exposes the interrelation of aesthetics and politics through medium, space and archive. This paper critically assesses attempts in contemporary art to re-appropriate the symbolic dimension of dissidence as an aesthetic; in particular the use of militancy, asceticism and dissidence as an attempt to move beyond mere counter-political protest and towards a reclaiming of aesthetics from the intrusions of politics. It uses as a specific case example Militant Training Camp, a social experimental performance camp held at Arcadia Missa Gallery in London, March 2012. This weeklong performance piece was designed to explore the activity and mind-set of militant groups and the idea of non-pacifist activity within wider social movements. Engaging with not only the tradition of anarchist activism, but also more recent artistic engagements with civil disobedience, the camp involved a residential ascetic ‘training programme’ followed by a series of violent performances open to the public, often disturbing other sites of protest such as Anarchist theatres and Occupy sites in the process. The paper uses first-hand documentary evidence and critical reflection on the event in order to argue that, as both an act of civil disobedience, and an exploration of the limits of its aesthetic treatment, the event raises two specific issues surrounding the notion of disobedience and its conceptual possibilities. The first issue is the representation of rage within the context of art activism. Here, the performance is discussed with particular reference to Sloterdijk’s arguments that argues that militancy and revolt operate under a ‘thymotic economy’. However, Sloterdijk’s re-appropriation of the thymotic – a conceptualising of ‘rage’ which is not absorbed within the sublimination of psychology or Habermasian symbolism – is not as simple as offering an alternative, ‘non-symbolic’ rage. Given that modern militancy is always subject to containment, the second issue raised is the formative role of ‘curating’ acts of disobedience. Using the work of Groys on aesthetics and power, the paper assesses how ‘events’ of civil disobedience such as Militant Training Camp are located, represented, circulated and even stored, and the ways in which they might resist their reduction to or supplementing of a further economy which conceals the formative ‘rage’ of disobedience. (shrink)

Perhaps the biggest disconnect between philosophers and non-philosophers on the question of gun rights is over the relevance of arms to our dignitary interests. This essay attempts to address this gap by arguing that we have a strong prima facie moral right to resist with dignity and that violence is sometimes our most or only dignified method of resistance. Thus, we have a strong prima facie right to guns when they are necessary often enough for effective dignified resistance. This approach (...) is distinctively non-libertarian: it doesn’t justify gun rights on the basis of (mere) liberty or security. Nonetheless it is compatible with libertarian defenses of gun rights based on a liberty right to guns, and, if sound, in fact lowers the bar for gun rights in some ways, as it justifies access to guns even when nonviolent means would better achieve the liberty or security aims of potential victims. And although this defense of gun rights is most readily categorized as “conservative” or rightist, it relies upon principles and intuitions about dignity popular among progressives in other domains, such as in disability, women’s, or LGBT rights debates. (shrink)

This paper develops a theory of civil disobedience informed by a deliberative conception of democracy. In particular, it explores the justification of illegal, public and political acts of protest in constitutional deliberative democracies. Civil disobedience becomes justifiable when processes of public deliberation fail to respect the principles of a deliberative democracy in the following three ways: when deliberation is insufficiently inclusive; when it is manipulated by powerful participants; and when it is insufficiently informed. As a contribution to ongoing processes of (...) public deliberation, civil disobedience should be carried out in a way that respects the principles of deliberative democracy, which entails a commitment to persuasive, non-violent forms of protest. (shrink)

The protests which followed the death of Black citizens killed by White police officers in the United States show us clearly that the question of non-violent democratic theory is on the table as it was 60 years ago. Martin Luther King, Jr. was well aware of this issue when he became the most important leader of America’s Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s. King’s recognition of Mahatma Gandhi’s legacy of non-violence helped him in his campaigns for integration and (...) voting rights, while guiding him to democratize the American democracy and re-evaluate the two concepts of ‘individual’ and ‘community’. (shrink)

On the supposition that one’s ethics and politics are fundamentally dignitarian in a broadly Kantian sense—as specifically opposed to identitarian and capitalist versions of Statism, e.g., neoliberal nation-States, whether democratic or non-democratic—hence fundamentally non-coercive and non-violent, then is self-defense or the defense of innocent others, using force, ever rationally justifiable and morally permissible or obligatory? We think that the answer to this hard question is yes; correspondingly, in this essay we develop and defend a theory about the permissible use of (...) force in a broadly Kantian dignitarian moral and political setting, including its extension to non-violent civil disobedience in the tradition of Martin Luther King, Jr; and perhaps surprisingly, we also import several key insights from Samurai and Martial Arts ethics into our theory. (shrink)

This paper makes an argument for the democratic value of distrust. It begins by analyzing distrust, since distrust is not merely the negation of trust. The account that it develops is based primarily on Martin Luther King Jr.’s work in Why We Can’t Wait. On this view, distrust is the confident belief that another individual or group of individuals or an institution will not act justly or as justice requires. It is a narrow normative account of distrust, since it concerns (...) a specific normative task. Distinctions between vertical and horizontal distrust, as well as trust and agnostic trust are also discussed. This paper argues that distrust’s democratic value lies in its ability to secure democracy by protecting political minorities from having their voices ignored. As such, distrust can be viewed as a kind of Madisonian “check and balance” that works to prevent tyranny. Distrust also works to secure democracy by forging new or alternative forms of democratic participation. The main example discussed in this paper is King’s involvement in the Birmingham Campaign during the Black Civil Rights movement in America. In this case, King and his supporters’ distrust of fellow White citizens and political institutions led to alternative forms of political expression such as non-violent protests, boycotts, and other forms of civil disobedience, all of which led to greater racial justice by working to alleviate White tyranny. (shrink)

The book analyses the two decades of the brutal civil war of northern Uganda. The author modified Lederach's peacebuilding framework to include peacemaking to bring out the argument that women and men make significant contributions to the peace processes and point out women's position as top leadership actors. The book uncovers the under-emphasised role of women in peacemaking and building. From grassroots to national level, women were found to have organised themselves and assumed roles as advocates, negotiators and mobilisers. The (...) actions by women became evident at the stalemated Juba peace talks when women presented the Peace Torch to the peace negotiating teams who on the occasion shook hands for the first time and peace was ushered inches Their initiatives and non-violent actions offer lessons to resolve civil conflicts in Africa. The book recommends that women should undergo relevant training in times of peace as this would make them more effective in times of need. (shrink)

The need to control violent and non-violent harm has been central to human existence since societies first emerged. This book analyses the problem of harm in world politics which stems from the fact that societies require the power to harm in order to defend themselves from internal and external threats, but must also control the capacity to harm so that people cannot kill, injure, humiliate or exploit others as they please. Andrew Linklater analyses writings in moral and legal philosophy that (...) define and classify forms of harm, and discusses the ways in which different theories of international relations suggest the power to harm can be controlled so that societies can co-exist with the minimum of violent and non-violent harm. Linklater argues for new connections between the English School study of international society and Norbert Elias' analysis of civilizing processes in order to advance the study of harm in world politics. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that, even when disability rights activists are most clearly acting as activists, they can advance the scholarly activity of disability bioethics. In particular, I will argue that even engaging in non-violent direct action, including civil disobedience, is an important way in which disability rights activists directly support the efforts of disability bioethics scholars. I will begin by drawing upon Hilde Lindemann’s work on relational narrative identity to describe how certain damaging master narratives about disability hinder (...) the uptake of arguments from disability bioethics. Then, I will argue that disability activism, especially non-violent direct action and civil disobedience, provides an effective counterstory to some of the worst of these master narratives, thereby laying the groundwork for the scholarly argument s of disability bioethicists to be given more serious consideration. Ultimately, I conclude that the field of bioethics is improved when it abandons the gross grained, generalizations about who disabled people are and how they act put forth by oppressive master narratives in favor of the more nuanced self-descriptions offered by the counterstories being offered by disabled people themselves. So it is that, by challenging these oppressive master narratives that constrain and distort the social meaning of disability, disability activism can improve mainstream bioethics. (shrink)

Les dictatures militaires latino-américaines des années 1960 à 1980 ont suscité des résistances civiles au nom du droit à la vie et, plus généralement, des droits de l’homme. Les femmes ont été à l’avant-garde de ces combats en Argentine et en Bolivie. Après avoir brièvement présenté ces deux résistances non-violentes, on avancera ici quelques hypothèses relatives à l’engagement collectif de ces femmes en tant que mères et à la réussite de leur entreprise de mobilisation. On discutera notamment les présentations qui (...) font exclusivement reposer la protestation collective sur des caractéristiques liées au genre, en distinguant le discours performatif qui l’accompagne de l’explication de celle-ci. (shrink)

The defeat of russia on the battlefield must be accompanied by the delegitimization of the “russian world”, that is, the loss of attractiveness for the russians themselves of the concept of the supremacy of everything Russian over everything non-russian. Cultivating russia’s greatness as a key task of “russian world” is one of the main reasons for the current Russian armed aggression against Ukraine, but also for Russia’s aggressive foreign policy in the world in general. The purpose of this article is (...) to clarify the main features of the delegitimization of the “russian world” in the regime of social education. To do this, the definition of “russian world” as a special symbolic system, which the modern russian political regime is trying to adjust from the standpoint of aggressive russian geopolitical subjectivity, has been previously clarified. This leads to the performative selfdenial of the “russian world”, which can be traced at the level of the accumulation of symbolic capital, the establishment of political elites (the authorities and the opposition), as well as at the level of the development of civil society. Social learning involves the search at the level of civil society for new forms of communicative self-organization at various levels of collective formation. A way out for such performative self-denial is possible only through the ways of social learning, the search for a change in one’s own identity, and not through attempts at autistic self-affirmation characteristic of the modern russian political regime, as well as the destruction of all political and cultural alternatives to the stateapproved canon. Social education is a way of soft and non-violent delegitimization of the “russian world”, in contrast to rebellion and revolutions, which in russia traditionally only lead to the emergence of even more brutal forms of state dictatorship. The monologic nature of the russian political space provokes the reation of new forms of social consensus outside the russian political system – in the sphere of culture, counterculture, and subcultures. (shrink)

This paper discusses non-ideal theory as guidance for making bad situations better by morally permissible means. It distinguishes constructive theorizing, which suggests ways of improving specific kinds of bad situation, from cautionary theory, which concerns moral risks of actions under bad conditions. Reflective moral judgment yields cautionary precepts, identifying presumptively unjustifiable modes of action. The paper illustrates the application of precepts cautioning about coercion and the exposure of others to significant risks, by considering the 1955–1956 bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, (...) and the ‘Children’s Crusade’ of the 1963 Birmingham desegregation campaign. All such campaigns involve coercive elements, but the paper argues that coercion was not a morally significant factor in either case. Endangerment is another matter: given the violent, sometimes lethal, reactions to civil rights actions under Jim Crow, those two campaigns’ endangerment of innocent persons must be taken very seriously, especially as it concerns Birmingham. And, in fact, potentially lethal anti-reform violence occurred during each campaign. Relevant factors include the preparation and understanding of young participants and the difference in risk that is assumed by engaging in peaceful, nonviolent public actions. (shrink)

In the past decade, Islam has come to be associated more than ever with images of extremism and violence. Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein are stock characters in this association, in the aftermath of 11 September and the ‘war on terror’. Lost in all this is a long record of Muslim experience of non-violent change and peace-making. Yet Islam hardly glorifies violence — and does quite explicitly glorify its opposite. History offers much evidence of Muslim tolerance and civil engagement (...) with other faith and cultural traditions. Non-violent Islam could give fresh life to secularism in Muslim societies. It may help steer public space away from state-dominated as well as other forms of political Islam, with their foolish utopias. Realizing the ideals of non-violence is a perennial struggle for Islamic communities around the world - and is part of the struggle for democratic life. (shrink)

Dans un monde qui a commencé à prendre feu, la stratégie à adopter se pose à présent comme une question vitale. Il n'y a plus le droit à l'erreur, chaque échec stratégique peut coûter extrêmement cher. En nous rappelant de grandes victoires de l'histoire des luttes non-violentes, mais aussi des campagnes plus récentes comme celles des 'Décrocheurs de portraits' ou des 'grèves scolaires pour le climat,' l'auteur nous invite à cesser d'être spectateur et à devenir acteur de l'histoire. Comment agir (...) face à l'urgence climatique et à l'inaction de nos dirigeants? Avec quelles méthodes? Comment lutter efficacement contre le capitalisme et provoquer des changements culturels de grande ampleur? Comment résister à la répression? La Bataille du siècle--véritable manuel d'action civique et politique--propose des stratégies d'action concrètes pour faire émerger un mouvement citoyen de masse: désobéissance civile, non-violence radicale, convergence des luttes climatiques et sociales, complémentarité des alternatives et des résistances, réconciliation du local et du global... Jon Palais nous appelle à transformer la sidération en espérance, car, il en est convaincu, un autre monde est possible.."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Just war theory focuses primarily on bodily harm, such as killing, maiming, and torture, while other harms are often largely overlooked. At the same time, contemporary international conflicts increasingly involve the use of unarmed tactics, employing 'softer' alternatives or supplements to kinetic power that have not been sufficiently addressed by the ethics of war or international law. Soft war tactics include cyber-warfare and economic sanctions, media warfare, and propaganda, as well as non-violent resistance as it plays out in civil disobedience, (...) boycotts, and 'lawfare.' While the just war tradition has much to say about 'hard' war - bullets, bombs, and bayonets - it is virtually silent on the subject of 'soft' war. Soft War: The Ethics of Unarmed Conflict illuminates this neglected aspect of international conflict. (shrink)

Despite triggering one of the largest civilian death tolls in modern history, the policy and human consequences of economic sanctions on Iraq between 1990-2003 remain largely unexamined. This lack of scrutiny mirrors the euphemism and mis-information surrounding the embargo itself and the Oil-for-Food program ostensibly adopted to protect Iraq's civilian population. But it also reflects incomprehension among Western publics - long removed from the realities of hunger and economic destitution - of the intimate link between economic conditions and mortality. Iraq (...) suffered an estimated 1.5 million excess deaths because of a catastrophic undermining of civilian livelihood triggered by the embargo; an outcome termed slow famine in the demographic literature. With much of the population fully dependent on daily food rations of less than 21 cents per person for much of the sanctions period, OfF `relief' was inherently incapable of substituting for a functioning civil economy. Recent positive accounts of the impact of OfF, in the form of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the Oil-for-Food Program, are refuted by close analysis of malnutrition and mortality rates across the sanctions period. The example of Iraq reveals the danger in treating economic sanctions as a cheap, `non-violent' tool for conflict resolution. In reality their deadly power is terrorizing for societies not protected from their application by permanent member status on the UN Security Council, a threat which continues to generate global insecurity. The Iraq experience reveals how current, narrowly framed, international law prohibitions on starvation as a weapon of war need to be extended to cover interference with civilian livelihood and hence access to food. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE ROLE OF AN ULTIMATE AUTHORITY IN RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: A GIRARDIAN ANALYSIS Sara Osborne I. Restorative or Retributive Justice South African Episcopal Archbishop Desmond Mpilo Tutu's account of the gritty practicality of reconciliation versus retribution in his book, No Future Without Forgiveness, focuses long overdue attention on Restorative Justice, a law reform movement probably better known in international than in American legal circles. A persuasive assertion of Restorative Justice (...) advocates in their critique of increasingly retributive practices such as mandatory minimum sentencing, mandatory arrest, death penalty, juvenile incarceration, "three strikes" legislation, no parole, diminished prisoner services, to name a few, is that reintegrating offenders back into a community is a much more effective deterrence to anti-social violence than punishment alone. They have also observed that communitarian ideals and practices, more visible in traditional cultures1 are more conducive to Restorative goals ofreconciliation and reintegration than are practices of retributive justice rooted in ideals of individual rights. Therefore, such adjudicatory practices should serve as models for preferable alternatives. 1An examination ofrestorative justice under code-based systems of law (European, Roman Law) might also reveal more affinities since the focus ofthese systems is to define the permissible, rather than the impermissible. Code-based law begins with the commons; rightsbased law begins with the individual. 80Sara Osborne However, Western-style retributive justice remains the primary model for international law and Restorative Justice is the prophetic "outsider" voice. So, it is appropriate to ask to what extent and under what conditions are Western retributive justice systems able to incorporate or accommodate adjudicatory practices ofnon-Western or traditional cultures? How critical a factor is religion? These questions will appear wherever Western Law struggles to bring more cultural diversity under a unifying umbrella and they deserve close scrutiny. René Girard's insights into the relationship between law, religion, culture and violence are helpful in identifying practical implications ofthe restorative vision and systemic weaknesses ofretribution, and perhaps illuminating a third way. The metaphor of an organ transplant may be useful: without a genetic match between host and donor both risk destruction. It is the thesis of this paper that that genetic material is a very inclusive conceptualization of "religion" which I have named "Ultimate Authority," drawing on Girard's mimetic theory for the theoretical analysis. In other words, "religion" is indeed, always and everywhere, a critical factor in culture-specific institutions ofjustice. A Girardian understanding ofthe relationship between Ultimate Authority and criminaljustice systems indicates that while there are valuable lessons to be learned from trans-cultural dialogue, wholesale transplants may not be possible, or even advisable because conditions essential for comparable success do not exist in Western legal culture. This paper first presents some background about Restorative Justice, followed by an outline ofRené Girard's mimetic theory to define "Ultimate Authority." The second half of the paper describes alternative adjudicatory processes which have attracted the attention of Restorative Justice advocates and concludes with suggestions about future directions for criminal justice policy discussion. Restorative Justice is a movement which drew its initial energy from Civil Rights era non-violent social action. It has found avid supporters among those whose activism for socialjustice is faith-based as well as those whose activism is rooted in more secular communitarian ideologies. Perhaps because of its international following, a significant contribution ofthe movement has been to initiate trans-cultural dialogue about criminal justice, fostering an increased use of alternative dispute resolution techniques, primarily mediation. Restorative Justice doctrine insists that all crime is personal, evidence ofa broken relationship between victim, offender, and community. Restoring "right relationship" between all parties is both a moral and legal obligation; "justice" to be just must go well beyond addressing the specifics of the act which effected the break. In contrast, the focus of The Role ofAn Ultimate Authority81 retributive justice appears abstract, procedural, and narrow in pursuit of impartiality or neutrality, the ideal of Blind Justice.2 Howard Zehr, a consultant on criminal justice and a Canadian Mennonite who wrote the classic Restorative Justice primer, Changing Lenses: A New Focusfor Crime andJustice, describes the retributive criminaljustice process as "a drama between two abstractions," meaning a criminal and a victim, where the "victim" is even further abstracted... (shrink)

This volume is a collection of Devi Prasad’s essays on Gandhi, social justice and social change. The different essays address themes ranging from Gandhi’s ideals of satyagraha and ahimsa, civil disobedience and non-violence, to the Gandhian approach to education as founded in making and crafting as well as participation in the political and social movements of our times. They also engage the revolutionary potential of Gandhi’s thought, drawing parallels between Lenin and Gandhi and analysing the historical significance of Gandhi’s anti-imperialist (...) yet non-violent political philosophy. In sum, the volume dwells on the continuing, critical relevance of Gandhi in our times. It will be of interest to those in education, political science, peace and conflict studies, history and philosophy, as well as to the general reader interested in Gandhian thought. (shrink)

Resumen:La reflexión sobre la exigencia de evitar la guerra y asegurar la paz mundial es hoy, quizá más que nunca, una de las principales tareas de la filosofía política y de la filosofía del derecho. El trabajo aborda la aportación de Virginia Woolf a esta reflexión en varios de sus escritos y, en especial, en su ensayo Tres guineas, considerado uno de los referentes más lúcidos de la genealogía femenina del pensamiento pacifista. El discurso antifascista, antimilitarista y antipatriarcal de Woolf (...) da cuenta de los vínculos existentes entre estas tres raíces profundas del belicismo. Frente a las relaciones de fuerza, el hecho de vivir fuera del imaginario del poder se presenta aquí como oportunidad de acometer tareas civilizatorias imprevisibles. La experiencia y el saber de las mujeres, marginados a lo largo de la historia, pueden ser rescatados subversiva y creativamente para generas prácticas políticas no-violentas y aspirar a una redefinición global de la vida en común.Abstract: Today, one of the main tasks of political philosophy and the philosophy of law is, perhaps, to reflect on the need to avoid war and ensure world peace. This paper discusses the contribution made by Virginia Woolf to this reflection in several of her writings and especially in her essay Three Guineas, which is regarded as one of the most striking examples of pacifist thinking by a female writer. Woolf’s anti-fascist, anti-militarist and anti-patriarchal discourse recognises the links between these three deep roots of warmongering. In the face of struggles for power, the reality of living outside the imaginary of power is presented here as an opportunity to carry out unforeseeable civilizing tasks. Women’s experience and knowledge, which has been marginalised throughout history, can be set free subversively and creatively to generate non-violent political practices and aspire to a global redefinition of coexistence. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:322 BOOK REVIEWS the Holy Office, who in the early 1800s recognized that empirical demonstrations of the earth's motion had finally been given and convinced Pope Pius VII to revoke the longstanding decree against Copernicanism. Unfortunately his greatest opponent turned out to be another Dominican, Father Filippo Anfossi, Master of the Sacred Palace at the time, who had views similar to those voiced by Cardinal Bellarmine in 1615 (pp. (...) 473-475). The story is told in great detail by Walter Brandmiiller and Johannes Griepl, Copemico, Galilei e la Chiesa: Fine delta controversia (1820), gli atti del Sant'Uffizio, Vatican City 1992-summarized in my notice in The Catholic Historical Review 80 (1994): 380-83. It is ironic, of course, that the battle was fought out by two Thomists, the one a progressive and the other a traditionalist, but it is indeed fortunate that it was the progressive Thomist who won out in the end. The Catholic University ofAmerica Washington, D.C. WILLIAM A. WALLACE, O.P. Love Your Enemies: Discipleship, Pacifism and Just War Theory. By LISA SOWLE CAHILL. Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1994. Pp. xii + 252. $17.00 (paper). Lisa Cahill's Love Your Enemies: Discipleship, Pacifism and Just War Theory provides an excellent introduction to questions of peace-making and war-making in the history of Western Christianity. Cahill canvasses the standard sources for her history: the generally pacifist period of the New Testament and the early church (chapters two and three); the emergence of the just war tradition with Augustine and Aquinas (chapters four and five); just war, crusade, and pacifist responses during the Reformation period (chapters six through eight); and just war and pacifist responses in the twentieth -century American debate (chapters nine and ten). Love Your Enemies is relatively comprehensive, even-handed, and well-written. Beyond its general competence, Love Your Enemies provides rich theological fare, situating questions on war and peace in the context of Christian discipleship as a whole. One result of using discipleship as the organizing motif is that pacifism gets an unusually sympathetic and fair hearing. Cahill serves as an excellent reporter on these contentious questions. While often intimating her sympathies, she consistently avoids taking decisive positions or closing avenues of exploration. The title of her final chapter -the "Fragility of the Gospel"-reflects this approach. In this chapter Cahill emphasizes that Christian communities must continuously challenge themselves and their society to live out the gospel of peace (239-44). BOOK REVIEWS 323 What does it mean to live as a follower of Jesus today (ix)? This is Cahill's central question. To this end she asks two further questions. First, what is the way of discipleship established by Jesus with regard to doing violence? Second, to what extent can Christians hope to apply this ethic of discipleship to the wider civil society (40)? These questions arise in a variety of forms throughout the book. For instance, Cahill elegantly shows how a Christian's eschatological commitments (i.e., beliefs about the extent to which God's peaceful rule can be established by a community of believers and/or the extent to which this can be realized in "the world") can affect her response to the possibility of doing violence. While setting as one's task the attempt to find a way to combine Christian discipleship with public responsibility has many strengths, it is not without possible pitfalls. Typically, "Christian responsibility" is contrasted with "the evangelical imperative of non-violence" (see 55-56). But this notion of "responsibility" often begs the central question-i.e., for the Christian, can the most "responsible" stance be anything but what Cahill proclaims to be the evangelical stance of non-violence? While Cahill does acknowledge the strength of the argument by advocates of "responsibility" (i.e., those ~ho set up the non-violent stance in opposition to the faithful following of Jesus), she does not explicitly endorse their move. From her self-professed Catholic context, Cahill strives fo harmonize a neo-Thomist understanding of natural law-that there is "an objective moral order, knowable by reason, that yields universal moral laws by which all human persons and communities should abide" (3)-with a more particularistic... (shrink)

The contrast, often painted in simplistic colours, between Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X as civil rights campaigners bolsters an erroneous reading of the freedom struggle of African-Americans, leaving the impression that the resort to violence and self-defence propounded by Malcolm X was a purely circumstantial departure from the general strategy of the civil rights movement. In fact, both of them reflected long on the capacity of violence and a contrario of non-violence to bring about political and social transformation (...) in the context of the extreme brutality and oppression being suffered by African-Americans. Their dilemma stemmed from an old intellectual tradition of the America of the slave period. Well before the ideas of Gandhi won over the African-American elite, and even before Henry David Thoreau laid the theoretical basis for civil disobedience, African slaves gave thought to the legitimacy and effectiveness of violence to amend their situation. The importance of the non-violent movement in the United States and the historical significance of Martin Luther King cannot be understood unless a true measure is taken of the anti-slavery struggle. While within the religious domain, the Black Church played a major role in dissuading violence, secular thought in favour of legitimate forceful rebellion also found itself confronted by a counter-argument which advanced the power of social change and resistance to injustice that non-violence could effect. This article particularly addresses the challenges to their consciences that confronted the militants of non-violence in their campaign for the abolition of slavery and notably those facing the central figure of that struggle, the former slave become the apostle of liberation, Frederick Douglass. (shrink)

Celebrated today for his groundbreaking work in logic and the foundations of mathematics, Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) was best known in his own time as a leader of the reform movement in his homeland (Bohemia, then part of the Austrian Empire). As professor of religious science at the Charles University in Prague from 1805 to 1819, Bolzano was a highly visible public intellectual, a courageous and determined critic of abuses in Church and State. Based in large part on a carefully argued (...) utilitarian practical philosophy, he developed a non-violent program for the reform of the authoritarian institutions of the Empire, which he himself set in motion through his teaching and other activities. Rarely has a philosopher had such a great impact on the political culture of his homeland. This volume contains a substantial collection of Bolzano's writings on ethics and politics, translated into English for the first time. It includes a complete translation of the treatise On the Best State, his principal writings on ethics, an essay on the contemporary situation in Ireland, and a selection of his Exhortations, dealing with such topics as enlightenment, civil disobedience, the status of women, anti-Semitism and Czech-German relations in Bohemia. It will be of particular interest to students of central European philosophy and history, and more generally to philosophers and historians of ideas. (shrink)

'those who say that religion has nothing to do with politics do not know what religion means' Mahatma Gandhi was a profound and original thinker as well as one of the most influential figures in the history of the twentieth century. A religious and social reformer, he became a notable leader in the Indian nationalist movement, made famous for his advocacy of non-violent civil resistance. His many and varied writings are essentially responses to the specific challenges he faced, and they (...) show his maturing ideas and political will, as well as his spirituality and humanity, over several decades. This new selection demonstrates how his thinking was truly radical, dealing with problems from the roots upwards: in the lives of individuals, of societies, and of political structures. It underlines the supreme importance of non-violence, and Gandhi's unique and unrealized vision of a new India after the departure of the British. (shrink)

Battlefields have a particular hold on the imagination, inviting those who visit them to make conscious links between physical places and what is known to have happened there. People may align themselves with one or other of the protagonists and celebrate or regret a victory or defeat. Beyond the partisan, however, there is also the human response; reflections, perhaps, on the horror of war and its futility, the harm done to civilians, the affront to civilized values and the betrayal of (...) non-violent ways to resolve conflict. Beneath or alongside these reactions sits the possibility for moments of affect, responses that are not immediately expressible but which are deeply felt, physical, visceral. The Battle of Towton took place on 29 March 1461, during the Wars of the Roses. This was a typical late medieval battle, fought mainly hand-to-hand, and has the unpleasant distinction of being widely believed to be the bloodiest battle ever fought on English soil. But what does it mean to people now? Emplo.. (shrink)

Although violence has always been in governments’ toolkit against civil society organizations (CSOs), there has been a global trend where governments set legal and logistical barriers to non-violently repress CSOs, especially INGOs (International Non-Governmental Organizations) since the mid-2000s. During this period, states present variations in CSO repression, ranging from moderate regulation to violent expulsion. Why do countries vary the repression? I argue that different levels of repression are based on governments’ perceived repression effectiveness in reducing INGOs’ threats. For better illustration, (...) I propose the effectiveness-perception framework, where repression effectiveness comes from the interaction between regime type and local trust in INGOs, while the perception of effectiveness is rooted in the domestic political structure. To conduct empirical tests, I create a latent variable, local trust, to measure threats of INGOs conditional on local communities. Relying on the sample from 1996 to 2012, I find that consolidated democracies and autocracies, compared to middling countries, are more likely to adjust the repression levels based on local trust in INGOs. I expect the finding to produce some strategy-relevant insights for INGOs’ survival in the current political environment. (shrink)

Background Non-violent resistance which has involved healthcare workers has been instrumental in securing a number of health-related gains and a force in opposing threats to health. Despite this, we know little about healthcare workers who have engaged in acts of non-violent resistance. Research aim Amongst a sample of healthcare workers who had engaged in acts of resistance this study sought to explore their understanding of non-violent resistance and how or whether they felt healthcare workers made a distinct contribution to such (...) action. Research design Cross-sectional survey Participants and research context Healthcare workers (doctors, nurses, academics and others) from the UK and Europe who had engaged in acts of non-violent resistance. Ethical considerations Ethical approval for this study was granted by the University of Greenwich Human Research Ethics Committee (UREC/20.5.6.11). Findings/results Most participants spoke about the nature of non-violent resistance, its oppositional, didactic and symbolic functions and the role of violence or harm. While most people understood non-violent resistance as a public, oppositional and collective act, many identified more subtle everyday acts in the workplace that undermined policy or procedures they saw as harmful. When asked about distinctions in non-violent resistance carried out by healthcare workers, most participants referred to their standing in society, noting that healthcare works were a trusted and authoritative source. Some identified an ethical imperative to act while others identified the risks that came with such action, noting their accountability and responsibility they had to patients. About a quarter of participants felt that such action was no different to others carrying out non-violent resistance or dependent on the issue or nature of the action. Conclusions These findings speak to the complex and multifaceted nature of non-violent resistance. Additionally our findings suggest healthcare workers have a distinct role to play in leading and supporting non-violent actions. (shrink)

In this chapter, I propose a minimal construal of philosophical health that contains two core elements: variegated coherence and intentional directedness at a trans-subjective good. Combining elements from the works of Iris Murdoch and Marshall Rosenberg, I sketch a practice I dub non-violent just communication and argue that it promotes philosophical health as per the minimal construal and that we can derive from it a principle of philosophical health to complement the list of five principles of philosophical health that have (...) been proposed by Luis de Miranda. I then show that the practice of non-violent just communication promotes what Miranda Fricker has characterized as hermeneutic virtue and testimonial sensibility and, finally, suggest that my minimal notion of philosophical health is a useful tool to contrast various conceptions of philosophical counselling. (shrink)

It is commonly accepted that recourse to war is justifiable only as a last resort. If a situation can be resolved by less harmful means, then war is unjust. It is also commonly accepted that violent actions in war should be necessary and proportionate. Violent actions in war are unjust if the end towards which those actions are means can be achieved by less harmful means. In this article, I argue that satisfaction of the last resort criterion depends in part (...) upon the likelihood of success of non-violent alternatives to war, and that the actual and potential effectiveness of non-violent resistance means that the last resort criterion of the jus ad bellum and the proportionality criterion of the jus in bello are harder to satisfy than is often presumed. (shrink)