This series presents issues which are central to 20th-century European thought, but unfamiliar to students of Anglo-American philosophy. In this book the author traces the development of the concept of situation through the work of Gabriel Marcel, Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty.

There are many religions in the human world, and people manifest their religiousness in many different ways. The main problem this paper addresses concerns the possibility of sorting out this complex world of human religiousness by showing that it can be phenomenologically reduced to a few very basic existential attitudes. These attitudes express the main types of ways in which a human being relates to his or herself and the world, independently of the worldview or religion professed by the individual. (...) I use Kierkegaard’s theories of the stages of existence and subjective truth as a model. The theory of the stages of existence provides five basic existential attitudes on the basis of which religious attitudes can develop: spiritlessness, the aesthetic, the ethical, religiousness A, and religiousness B. The theory of subjective truth shows how the concept of truth functions in an ethical and existential sense as the personal truth of an individual engaged in building their religious identity. In turn, I discuss the problem of the relation of Kierkegaard’s philosophy to phenomenology, briefly introduce his concept of subjective truth and the stages of existence, and show how existential attitudes can be transformed into religious ones. I also consider the problem of the demonic as the inverted order of this anthropological and existential model. Finally, I argue that the model developed herein may be useful for further research into the phenomenology of religious attitudes. (shrink)

This paper considers the structure of the ethical subject found in Foucault’s late works on ethics, and gives an account of his two major ethical concepts: “care of the self” and “aesthetics of existence.” The “care of the self,” it is argued, gives Foucault a way of conceptualising ethics which does not rely on juridical categories, and which does not conceive the ethical subject on the model of substance. The “care of the self” entails an understanding of the (...) ethical subject as a process which is always in a relation, specifically in a relation to itself. Using his essay “What is an Author,” it is argued that the subject of the “aesthetics of existence,” like the author of a text, is understood to be fully immanent to the “object” which it is usually considered to be opposed to and separated from. Rather than aiming at a true expression of an “authentic” inner substance, Foucault’s “aesthetics of existence” leads instead to practices of “creativity,” whose form cannot be given in advance. (shrink)

This thesis explores and discusses foundational issues concerning the relationship between phenomenological philosophy and the enactive approach to cognitive science, with the aim of clarifying, developing, and promoting the project of enactive phenomenology. This project is framed by three general ideas: 1) that the sciences of mind need a phenomenological grounding, 2) that the enactive approach is the currently most promising attempt to provide mind science with such a grounding, and 3) that this attempt involves both a naturalization of phenomenology (...) and a phenomenologization of the concept of nature. More specifically, enactive phenomenology is the project of pursuing mutually illuminative exchanges between, on the one hand, phenomenological investigations of the structures of lived experience and embodied existence and, on the other, scientific accounts of mind and life – in particular those framed by theories of biological self-organization. The thesis consists of two parts. Part one is an introductory essay that seeks to clarify some of enactive phenomenology’s overarching philosophical commitments by tracing some of its historical roots. Part two is a compilation of four articles, each of which intervenes in a different contemporary debate relevant to the dissertation’s project. (shrink)

Foucault is typically seen as having rebelled against the previous generation of French philosophy, which was dominated by existential phenomenology, and by Sartre in particular. However, the relationship between these two generations and between these two philosophers is more complex than one of simple opposition. Through a refracted focus on Foucault’s late work on Greco-Roman philosophy and on the themes of the practice of the care of the self and the freedom associated with that practice, I argue that Foucault—whose philosophy (...) is centered around the problematization of site-specific processes of subjectification— is closer to existentialism than he seems. (shrink)

A traditional conception of ontology takes existence to be its proprietary subject matter—ontology is the study of what exists (§ 1). Recently, Jonathan Schaffer has argued that ontology is better thought of rather as the study of what is basic or fundamental in reality (§ 2). My goal here is twofold. First, I want to argue that while Schaffer’s characterization is quite plausible for some ontological questions, for others it is not (§ 3). More importantly, I want to offer (...) a unified characterization of ontology that covers both existence and fundamentality questions (§§ 4-5). (shrink)

José Ortega y Gasset,, Spanish writer, philosopher and revolutionary was noted for his humanistic criticism of modern civilization. His best known work, The Revolt of the Masses earned him an international reputation. In it, he decried the destructive influence of the mass-minded, and therefore mediocre, people, who, if not directed by the intellectually and morally superior minority, encourage the rise of fascism and totalitarianism.

Language is the product of human’s discursive practice. It is bound to bear speakers’ feelings, attitudes and opinions toward events, that is, linguistic subjectivity (LS). However, the phenomenon of linguistic subjectivity (LS) cannot be fully unravelled by the existing single perspective of semantics, pragmatics, philosophy, or cognitive linguistics. To reveal the philosophical attribute and cognitive nature of linguistic subjectivity (LS), a model of integrating embodied philosophy and cognition of linguistic subjectivity (IEPCLS) was constructed, and a philosophical cognitive analysis framework of (...) linguistic subjectivity (LS) was proposed. By integrating the embodiment and non-objectivity of language meaning in embodied philosophy and the speaker’s self-orientation in cognitive linguistics, the philosophical and cognitive existence of linguistic subjectivity (LS) was explored. The concrete realisation paths of the philosophical and cognitive existence of linguistic subjectivity (LS) were investigated on the basis of the framework, and the feasibility of the model and framework was verified by taking discourse constructions as examples. The results show that linguistic subjectivity (LS) is the attribute of speakers as subjects and exists in the speaker’s realistic experience, the speaker’s self, and the speaker’s interaction and perception of the social communication context (SCC). The realisation paths of the philosophical and cognitive existence of linguistic subjectivity (LS) include the speaker’s self-expressions, the speaker’s meaning assignment to social communication context (SCC), and the speaker’s meaning interpretation of social communication context (SCC). The study provides references for interpreting the subjective factors behind discourse. (shrink)

A correct observation to the effect that a does not exist, where ‘a’ is a singular term, could be true on any of a variety of grounds. Typically, a true, singular negative existential is true on the unproblematic ground that the subject term ‘a’ designates something that does not presently exist. More interesting philosophically is a singular, negative existential statement in which the subject term ‘a’ designates nothing at all. Both of these contrast sharply with a singular, negative (...) existential in which the subject term is a name from fiction. I argue that such singular, negative existential statements are false. My account of fictional characters differs significantly from Kripke’s. It is shown that an objection to my account rests on a serious misunderstanding. Finally, a crucial aspect of the account is emphasized. (shrink)

As Emmanuel Levinas states in the preface to Existence and Existents, "this study is a preparatory one. It examines . . . the problem of the Good, time, and the relationship with the other [person] as a movement toward the Good." First published in 1947, and written mostly during Levinas's imprisonment during World War II, this work provides the first sketch of his mature thought later developed fully in Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence. This new (...) edition marks the first time this important work has been made available in an inexpensive paperback edition. Levinas's project in Existence and Existents is to move from anonymous existence to the emergence of subjectivity; to subjectivity's practice, theory and morality; to its encounter with the alterity of the other person. He is concerned here primarily with the time of the solitary subject; time is the inner structure of subjectivity, of the movement of existing. "Levinas's work," says Alphonso Lingis, "contains not only wholly new analyses of the forms of time of the present, the past, the future but also a new conception of the work of time." Beginning with Existence and Existents, then, it is possible to begin tracing the progressive "alterization" of time as it unfolds across the development of Levinas's entire philosophy. As a "preparatory" study, Existence and Existents introduces the major themes and concerns that occupied Levinas throughout his career. This is essential reading for understanding both Levinas's own philosophy and the developments in philosophical thought in the twentieth century. (shrink)

Although the question 'Does psi exist?' has become a recurrent and intransigent problem for psychological science, seen from a historical and social context, there appear to be reasons as to why no determined effort has been made to resolve the question. The sporadic exchanges from parapsychologists and critics appear only to reinforce the status quo: At most, it is agreed that some form of 'anomaly' has been established but there is no consensus about its nature. Yet such a defeatist stance (...) shies away from the long tradition of research into spontaneous phenomena, as well as experimental research with dreams and hypnosis, all of which suggests that, if psi is real, it is not just an anomaly but has true information content and dynamic effects. This work is briefly reviewed and then, since much of the current controversy has centred on the ganzfeld technique, this is used as an example of the issues involved. The ganzfeld induces sleep-onset imagery during which randomly selected film clips are viewed by a sender as a source of psi-mediated information to be incorporated into the imagery. Our current development of the ganzfeld technique, known as the digital autoganzfeld, takes the work beyond 'anomaly status' since it enables real-time recordings to be made of apparently high-quality psi as it enters consciousness. Initial findings from this illustrate the complexity of the phenomena and the need for more adventurous designs in order to stimulate theory development. There is no doubt that technology now exists which would enable us to resolve the issues raised. Whether the area turns out to be a mixture of rampant fraud, artefact and subjective validation or to present genuine phenomena, a resolution of the issue may be seen as having unwanted implications for psychology -- which may be one of the factors explaining why the controversy is left to continue as it is, unresolved. New questions are needed which take into account the natural context in which psi appears to occur, along with the support needed to reach clear answers. (shrink)

Time is analyzed as being those processes by which a system notes the processes which comprise its own existence. The directionality of time is given by the concepts, past, present, and future. To understand the meaning of these concepts, a set of experiments was carried out with four male subjects in which areas of time were expanded or ablated by means of post-hypnotic suggestions. These operations were carried out singly or in combination. The data suggest that the present is primarily (...) associated with stimulus input, the past with the criteria for defining that input as well as the development of response inhibitions and the future with the directionality of that input. Marked personality changes which range from the occurence of catatonic-like states to obsessive types of reaction and manic-like reactions are associated with different combinations of time alterations. Some of the changes are in accord with the serialist position on time of J. W. Dunne. The concept of death is very important both with regard to one’s view of time and how one lives. While it is important to live in the present, the present has no meaning without at least a past or a future. Implications of these findings for psychopathology in general and schizophrenia in particular are considered. (shrink)

It would not be an overstatement to say that Mulla Sadra’s metaphysical system—commonly known as transcendent philosophy or transcendent wisdom (hikmat muta‘aliyyah)—is founded on the fundamentality of existence and the subjectivity of quiddity or whatness. I will begin this essay by drawing a rather simple picture of this principle under the title “A Common Error.” Then I will proceed by explaining its background and the reasoning supporting it, while offering a more detailed elucidation of the problem. The essay will end (...) by examining two recent interpretations that have gone to extremes in describing quiddity’s subjective nature. (shrink)

According to the well–known argument, the traditional conception of existence and predication leads to the infamous paradox of non-existence. For instance, the sentence ‘Pegasus does not exist’ commits us to accept that there is something that does not exist. The easy way out is to analyze existence as a second–order concept expressing that there is at least one instance of some first–order concept. In this article, I argue that the traditional conception of existence and predication does not lead to the (...) paradox of non-existence. Negative existentials are not subject-predicate sentences that select existing beings only to deny them the property of existence. Aristotle’s insistence that being is not a genus, i.e. that being is not a predicate of some subject, is pivotal. Furthermore, Aristotle does not have a uniform conception of existence and predication. According to Aristotle, to be is to be an item in the categorical scheme, and consequently, every predication of some being should be analysable as one of the most general types of predication according to the categorical scheme. However, in the conceptual framework of Aristotle’s philosophy, a different problem of non-existence arises. For instance, ‘Pegasus is thought-about’ might commits us to the claim that Pegasus is a being of some kind. I reconstruct Aristotle’s solution as being satisfactory in the light of his understanding of predication and existence. Moreover, I suggest that a similar puzzle leads many contemporary philosophers to an abandonment of the Quinean concept of existence and predication in favour of a more traditional approach. (shrink)

"Philosophical discussion of the notion of existence, or being, has centered on two main problems which have not always been very clearly distinguished. First, there is the problem of what we are to say about the existence of fictitious objects, such as centaurs, dragons, and Pegasus; second, there is the problem of what we are t o say about the existence of abstract objects, such as qualities, relations, and numbers. Both problems have tempted philosophers to say that there are inferior (...) sorts of existence a s well as the ordinary straightforward sort, and they therefore often suggest that we use the word "being" to cover both kinds but restrict "existence" to "being" of the common, non-fictitious, non-abstract sort. (Sometimes the term "reality" is proposed for "existence" or for "being.") T he problems of fiction and abstraction are different, how ever, for there are both real and fictitious abstractions. For example, the integer between two and four is real, but the integer between two and three is fictitious. On the other hand, there are both concrete and abstract fictions; for example, the winged horse of Bellerophon and the integer between two and three. Accordingly, philosophers have often dealt with the two problems in quite different ways and perhaps ought to do so. While these are the two main problems, there are others, f or example, that of what we are to say of the being of objects which have not yet begun, or have now ceased, to exist. The history of this subject, moreover, has been tangled with theological issues, to which it will be necessary to refer at certain points.". (shrink)

In the context of the contemporary emergence of a “postmodern Kierkegaard,” I take issue with the idea that Kierkegaardian thought involves an anti-essentialist rejection of ontology. I argue that Kierkegaard’s keynote existential analysis is paralleled by, if not tacitly set within, a less developed yet explicit ontology of human being. This “subjective ontology” is at once an ontology of the existing subject and a subjectization of ontology. Thus, the essay has two aims. First, I seek to revive and advance (...) debate concerning the structure of the Kierkegaardian self by tracing something of its dynamic three-fold relational structure and various metaphysical polarities. Spirit, anxiety, and despair need to be understood in their ontological dimensions and not just as existential possibilities. Second, I propose a way of bringing together Kierkegaardian existentiality (the three stages) with his ontology (the three relations). Despite important asymmetries between these two structures, the unity of Kierkegaard’s approach can only be appreciated through viewing them synoptically. (shrink)

Does God exist? What are the various arguments that seek to prove the existence of God? Can atheists refute these arguments? The Existence of God: A Philosophical Introduction assesses classical and contemporary arguments concerning the existence of God: the ontological argument, introducing the nature of existence, possible worlds, parody objections, and the evolutionary origin of the concept of God the cosmological argument, discussing metaphysical paradoxes of infinity, scientific models of the universe, and philosophers’ discussions about ultimate reality and the meaning (...) of life the design argument, addressing Aquinas’s Fifth Way, Darwin’s theory of evolution, the concept of irreducible complexity, and the current controversy over intelligent design and school education. Bringing the subject fully up to date, Yujin Nagasawa explains these arguments in relation to recent research in cognitive science, the mathematics of infinity, big bang cosmology, and debates about ethics and morality in light of contemporary political and social events. The book also includes fascinating insights into the passions, beliefs and struggles of the philosophers and scientists who have tackled the challenge of proving the existence of God, including Thomas Aquinas, and Kurt Gödel - who at the end of his career as a famous mathematician worked on a secret project to prove the existence of God. The Existence of God: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal gateway to the philosophy of religion and an excellent starting point for anyone interested in arguments about the existence of God. (shrink)

Kant said that existence is not a predicate and Russell agreed, arguing that a sentence such as ‘The king of France exists’, which seems to attribute existence to the king of France, really has a logical form that is not reflected in the surface structure of the sentence at all. While the surface form of the sentence consists of a subject and a predicate, the underlying logical form, according to Russell, is the formula given in. This formula obviously has (...) no subjectpredicate form and in fact has no single constituent that corresponds to the verb phrase ‘exists’ in the surface sentence. ∃x∀y The importance of Russell’s analysis becomes clear when we consider ‘The king of France does not exist’. If this sentence would attribute non-existence to the king it should entail that there is someone who does not exist, just as ‘Mary doesn’t like bananas’ entails that there is someone who doesn’t like bananas. Thus the idea that all sentences have subject-predicate form has led some philosophers to the view that there are objects that lack existence. This embarrassing position can be avoided once Russell’s analysis is accepted: if ‘The king of France does not exist’ is formalised as the negation of formula, no unwanted consequences follow. (shrink)

Philosophers and theorists have long been puzzled by humans' ability to talk about things that do not exist, or to talk about things that they think exist but, in fact, do not. _Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence_ is a collection of 13 new works concerning the semantic and metaphysical issues arising from empty names, non-existence, and the nature of fiction. The contributors include some of the most important researchers working in these fields. Some of the papers develop (...) and defend new positions on these matters, while others offer important new perspectives and criticisms of the existing approaches. The volume contains a comprehensive introductory essay by the editors, which provides a survey of the philosophical issues concerning empty names, the various responses to these issues, and the literature on the subject to date. (shrink)

In the multi-faceted trajectory of post-Kantian thought, Schelling—both the person and his philosophy—has always been a controversial figure. Popular historical accounts focus on his precocious interventions as part of the ‘Jena set’, initially building on Fichte's philosophy of the ‘I’, but quickly coming to challenge his predecessor's philosophical dominance. In the crucial period of the late 1790s, Schelling's most notable intervention was to develop a philosophy of nature alongside the Kantian and Fichtean theories of transcendental subjectivity, which caught the attention (...) of Goethe and led to his appointment, at the age of twenty-three, as professor of philosophy at the University of Jena. But Schelling's life and philosophical work continued well beyond this well-documented period, culminating in a late system in which he developed key ideas surrounding freedom, existence, modality and the history of human consciousness that all revolved around a distinction between what he called negative and positive philosophy. This distinction, and his insistence on the need for the development of the latter mode of philosophy, came to challenge some of the core assumptions of the largely rationalist German idealist project and it remains, to this day, perhaps the most powerful alternative to the Hegelian system that rose to dominance already within Schelling's own lifetime, but also well beyond it. (shrink)

This paper considers different views on existent golden mountain problem, the subject of dispute within the framework of the discussion between Alexius Meinong and Bertrand Russell, which took place in the period from 1904 to 1920. Namely, we are talking about Russell’s argument that Meinong’s theory contains a contradiction re­garding different types of existence. According to Russell, it turns out that Meinong thought that the existent golden mountain exists, but it does not exist. The entire dis­cussion was (...) divided into several stages. During the discussion, the conceptions of both authors changed, as well as their attitude to each other’s theories and the formu­lation of the problem. Russell at fiesta thought that it’s wrong to assert that there can be any correct propositions about non-existent objects like the current king of France, the golden mountain, or a round square. At that stage of the discussion the theory of Meinong did not have sufficient tools to clarify its position on this issue. This problem was solved only ten years later, but the problem of the “existing golden mountain” re­mained and was never sufficiently clarified by Meinong. Meinong agreed with Russell that, according to his theory, it follows “The existing golden mountain exists, but does not exist” is correct proposition, but at the same time pointed out that the concept of ‘existence’ is used in a different sense. Commentators and followers of Meinong (Ernst Mally, John Findlay, Dale Jacquette) believed that this refinement did not solve the problem, and therefore offered their own solutions in the framework of the theory of objects.The purpose of this study is to find out whether the methods proposed by them really solve the problem of the existent golden mountain, whether they violate any principles of the Meinong theory, and finally, whether it is possible to solve this problem. (shrink)

The central task which defines the intention of my investigation has to do with a statement and further elucidation of some of the central issues arising in an analysis, description, and interpretation of human existence. My argument throughout will be that human existence must be understood from an historical point of view, and I will seek to delineate the peculiar methodology and distinctive categories of interpretation which are demanded by such an approach. The human self is historical and must be (...) understood through its history. Ever since philosophers have taken history seriously there has been an increasing awareness that any philosophy of human existence, if it is to remain true to the immediately given data, must be rooted in man's concrete, historically lived experience. This development of the historical consciousness has added a new dimension to man's attempt to understand himself in his existence. But it has also posed certain unavoidable questions for the philosopher. Chief among these is the question concerning the relation of history and ontology. Is an ontology of historical existence possible? Wilhelm Dilthey, one of the seminal historical thinkers of the modern age, answered the above question in the negative by arguing that existence, as an historical Erlebnis, is never more than a discontinuous succession of subjectively lived experiences. He thus bequeathed to his historically minded successors the difficult problem of reconciling history and ontology. Does the concrete-historical, by virtue of its particularity and subjectivity, render impossible any rational clarification? Or is the concrete-historical in some sense a bearer of universal structures which define the ontological condition for historical existence as such? This is the problem of our investigation. Stated in its broadest formulation, our question has to do with the possibility of an ontology of human historicity. Are there discernible structures of being which underlie and qualify man's concrete historical actualization? The intention of the author is to show that such an ontology is possible. This will be done by clarifying the methodological procedures and developing the categorial analysis which is required by such a program. (shrink)

The central thesis of Souls Exist is since the idea of God has lost credibility in much of contemporary society, the idea of the soul has suffered a similar fate. In the modern world, the concept of soul is not a meaningful reality for most individuals. The author emphasizes the dehumanizing consequences for those who are not conscious of the existence of their soul and the need for its development. Discussion of the soul's importance is founded on existential realities, not (...) religious myths. The epigraph of Souls Exist is a quotation from St. Augustine in his capacity as a philosopher: "There are only two questions for philosophy; the soul and God." In Souls Exist, this short list is reduced to one. Souls Exist is a metaphysical work and assumes metaphysical consciousness on the part of the readers. The author is an independent philosopher; consequently, the orientation of his writing is neither religious nor academic, but free-spirited and subjective. The issues raised in this work are of great importance for contemporary culture. The initial edition of Souls Exist was published in 1988. This second edition has been extensively revised with an added epilogue that reconsiders the question of God for philosophy. (shrink)

This article deals with the question of existence by considering the way in which phenomenology has faced this issue. To provide an argument against the ontological certainties typical of idealism and realism, I try to show the possibility of a subjective reduction of the question of existence and to highlight the way in which the concept of existence may be “undermined” by this reduction. A prominent place is given to the concept of infinity for radically reassessing the content and scope (...) of the concept of existence. I try to integrate some of the main themes of Husserlian phenomenology without being restrictively committed to it. I include some discussion of foundational mathematics and of quantum physics. (shrink)

The problem of the existence of negative facts as truthmakers for negative propositions was introduced by Bertrand Russell in 1918. In the debate since then, most writers have tended to reject their existence, Russell himself being the most conspicuous exception. Two other strategies have been offered. The first, usually called incompatibilism, actually goes back to Plato, whereas the second, the totality fact theory, was introduced by D. M. Armstrong in 1997. The aim of this paper is to show the problematic (...) character of some of the presuppositions shared by all three of the strategies mentioned above – presuppositions that figure in most of the current discourse on the subject. First, the concept of a negative proposition is not clear: one needs to make a distinction between grammatically negative propositions and “ontologically” negative ones. Second, it turns out that propositions may be ontologically negative in many ways, each of which may call for a different specific analysis with respect to the question of the existence of what would be the corresponding negative facts. Third, at the bottomline, it is shown that we need a concept of the existence or reality of facts that is not derived solely from their function as truthmakers. Such a concept, it is argued, is furnished by a theory that I shall call “ontological consequentialism”. (shrink)

One can only agree with Editor John R. Silber's observation on this little volume that it is "the finest introduction to Jaspers' own comprehensive philosophy...." Overshadowed in this country by the great attention currently given to Heidegger, the importance and power of Jaspers' thought has not yet been appreciated by English-speaking philosophers. Far from being opposed to the natural sciences, Jaspers-who began his intellectual life as a psychiatrist--says that without a grasp of science the philosopher is "like a blind man." (...) The properly philosophical subject matter, however, is the realm that inevitably eludes and "transcends" the scientific approach to man and natural objects. This he calls the "encompassing." The three lectures which compose The Philosophy of Existence, which was written after the publication of the three volumes of Philosophie and the composition of most of Von der Wahrheit, range over the whole of Jaspers' philosophical work. The first lecture concerns "The Being of the Encompassing"; the second, "Truth," which like the Encompassing is a continually receding ideal and so incapable of definitive articulation. The last deals with "reality," an ultimate which is grasped only in "ciphers" or symbols which are always able to be replaced by more adequate symbols. The Introduction and translation by Richard Gradau are marvelously done. The lectures themselves, delivered in 1937, were Jaspers' last public appearance, made shortly after his dismissal from his post at Heidelberg by the National Socialists.--J. D. C. (shrink)

Substance has been a leading idea in the history of Western philosophy. _Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkrantz_ explain the nature and existence of individual substances, including both living things and inanimate objects. Specifically written for students new to this important and often complex subject, _Substance_ provides both the historical and contemporary overview of the debate. Great Philosophers of the past, such as Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke, and Berkeley were profoundly interested in the concept of substance. And, the (...) authors argue, a belief in the existence of substances is an integral part of our everyday world view. But what constitutes substance? Was Aristotle right to suggest that artefacts like tables and ships don't really exist? _Substance: Its Nature and Existence_ is one of the first non-technical, accessible guides to this central problem and will be of great use to students of metaphysics and philosophy. (shrink)

Is it possible to prove or disprove God's existence? Arguments for the existence of God have taken many different forms over the centuries: in The Non-Existence of God, Nicholas Everitt considers all of the arguments and examines the role that reason and knowledge play in the debate over God's existence. He draws on recent scientific disputes over neo-Darwinism, the implication of 'big bang' cosmology, and the temporal and spatial size of the universe; and discusses some of the most recent work (...) on the subject, leading to a controversial conclusion. (shrink)

I argue that Kant's and Frege's refutations of the ontological argument are more similar than has generally been acknowledged. As I clarify, for both Kant and Frege, to say that something exists is to assert of a concept that it is instantiated. With such an assertion one expresses that there is a particular relation between the instantiating object and a rational subject - a particular mode of presentation for the object in question. By its very nature such a relation (...) cannot be the property of an object and thus cannot be included in the concept of that object. Thus the ontological argument, which takes existence to be a part of the concept of the supreme being, cannot, according to Kant and Frege, succeed. A secondary goal of the paper is to illuminate what I take to be an important affinity between Kant's and Frege's views more generally: that Frege's fundamental distinction between the sense and the referent of a proposition echoes, in an important way, Kant's distinction between concepts and the formal principles for their application to experience. (shrink)

Cobb's stated purpose in this book is to inquire into what is distinctive about Christianity and into its claim to finality. Hence half the book is taken up with the explication of other "structures of existence" which antedated or which have paralleled "Christian Existence." For Cobb, the term existence refers to how a subject relates itself to itself and what it is in and for itself. Cobb traces the move from the primitive self, which is not yet conscious of (...) itself as a self, across the threshold to "axial" man who breaks with the primitive mythic age by exhibiting a "seat of existence" or center of consciousness which involves a new role for rationality and which for the first time subordinates the unconscious to the conscious. The particular structures of axial existence which Cobb explores are Buddhist Existence, Homeric Existence, Socratic Existence, and Prophetic Existence. In contradistinction to these, Christian existence emerges as the crossing of a new threshold: it is spiritual existence expressing itself in love. Cobb's efforts to fulfill the second purpose of the book are half-hearted and unconvincing, a fact perhaps consistent with the book's objectivity: it is not Christian apologetics. Cobb's well known Whiteheadianism is only subtly and incidentally evident in this work, although occasionally it is used directly to expand and enrich certain explanations. The print in the book is annoyingly small.--S. O. H. (shrink)

The paper tries to grasp and acquire Karl Jaspers’s philosophical-mental horizons mainly with the terminological and methodological instruments of the musical – primarily symphonic – thematisation. Namely those typically jaspersian tensions and impulses, which in their connections to the Encompassing and to Existence are apparently far from them – turning back (and forth) to the oriental and western meta- physics of Sound and Light. While the “philosophical problems” elevated into themes, now start to inter- weave into spectacle (spectaculum) and – (...) along this – they open up as ciphers. Concomitantly they do not send us – western thinkers – beyond the World, but contrarily, they attach us to the communicative re- sponsibility towards the world, to ourselves respectively to others. (shrink)

What, if anything, is the correlation between the specialized or technical ideas of the philosopher and the rest of his existence? His everyday life outside his philosophical role. In the specialized reality and reality constitution, when employing the discourse and discipline of philosophy, the philosopher subscribe to many things in an explicit manner and he employs a number of implicit things and assumptions that are not stated explicitly. These things concern the different branches, areas and domains of the philosophical discourse, (...) for example metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, ontology, cognition, consciousness, mind, perception, thinking, etc. Is there a relation between these technical 'beliefs' of the philosopher and other, not philosophical areas of his existence? Does and can all of his non-philosophical existence reflect his philosophical beliefs, statements and expressions? Is it possible that the everyday existence or life world of the philosopher can resemble, confirm and express his philosophical ideas? If this is not the case, what are the factors that are involved in such discrepancies? Do they imply a lack of integrity, of wholeness of integration on behalf of the philosopher? What are the causes of such an illogical or surprising lack of compatibility or similarity between these sets of two or more facts? What are the things that we can look for in such a lack of compatibility – things such as the following? - inconsistency, difference, disparity, variance, variation, deviation, divergence, -/- disagreement, dissimilarity, dissimilitude, mismatch, lack of similarity, contrariety, contradictoriness, disaccord, discordance, incongruity, -/- lack of congruence, incompatibility, irreconcilability, conflict, opposition? -/- I illustrate the above by means of four examples. 1 Let us assume that the embodied human person consists of both voluntary and involuntary processes and activities. Do the philosophy of an individual reflect or express these activities or is it completely or partially unrelated to them? Do the voluntary processes and activities or the voluntary aspects of perception, cognition, brain processes and other activities resemble or express the philosophy of a thinker? 2 Some thinkers are seriously concerned about the importance of discourse and dialogue and the equality of all those involved. We find their concern about the ideal discourse and dialogue described in their written work and talks, but to what an extend do their own discursive and dialogical actions and behaviour reflect the ideal situation they preach? 3 Ethics and morality can be find in and are emphasized in all sorts of disciplines, of course they are major subjects in providing ways to live off for philosophers and we even find institutions devoted to their teaching and investigation. Do the lives, the lived morality and ethics of those individuals who preach the ideals of ethics or ethical ideals reflect the ideals they preach and that provides them with ways to earn a living? Or, is it the case that morality and ethics are merely faked by those individuals living off their preaching of ethics? And, that they merely employ the values, norms, customs and attitudes of a culture, sub-culture, community, group or another social grouping? In other words are the preachers of ethics really more ethical than the rest of the community and society? 4 When the philosopher expresses his ideas by means of all sorts of philosophical tools he is aware of the fact that he employs them, or at least aware of some of them being intentionally employed by him while he is unaware of others that he employs. Do the tools the philosopher employs to theorize (identify problems, the nature of the questions he asks, the nature of his ways of questioning, the assumptions he makes, the forming and testing of hypotheses, the making of generalizations, etc) or philosophize (perceive things, think, think about things, reason, argumentation etc) resemble what he beliefs, asserts and says about thinking, perception, cognition, understanding, subjects, objects, relationships between subjects and objects and other features and processes of epistemology? In short – does the lived philosophy, ontology, epistemology, ethics etc of the philosopher resemble, represent, confirm, substantiate, back, endorse, support, authenticate and corroborate the ideas, assertions and speculations that are expressed by the statements his philosophy or philosophizing consist of? Does he walk the walk of his talk? Are they similar and identical, the same things and merely expressions of the same things in different mediums? (shrink)

REVIEW (1): "Jeff Kochan’s book offers both an original reading of Martin Heidegger’s early writings on science and a powerful defense of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) research program. Science as Social Existence weaves together a compelling argument for the thesis that SSK and Heidegger’s existential phenomenology should be thought of as mutually supporting research programs." (Julian Kiverstein, in Isis) ---- REVIEW (2): "I cannot in the space of this review do justice to the richness and range of Kochan's (...) discussion [...]. There is a great deal in this foundational portion of Kochan's discussion that I find tremendously interesting and engaging [...]." (David R. Cerbone, in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science) ---- REVIEW (3): "Science as Social Existence will be of interest not only to Heidegger scholars but to anyone engaged in science and technology studies. [...] This is an informative and original book. Kochan should be praised for his clear, pleasant-to-read prose." (Michael Butler, in CHOICE). (shrink)

In ‘What’s Wrong with Colonialism,’ Lea Ypi argues that the wrong of colonialism can be expressed as procedural wrongs, not as wronging territorial rights. On her view, colonial practices went wrong in two ways: they forced residents into political associations, and the terms of the political association were not established through equal and reciprocal negotiations. I argue that because Ypi’s account successfully side-lines all but essential claims to territory, her theory ends up being vulnerable to an objection it means to (...) avoid. Historical residents may be subject to unequal treatment under newly formed political associations because their historical patterns of land use are not considered to have any independent moral weight. My analysis does not rely on any appeal to property or territorial rights. Instead, I appeal to pre-existing obligations holding between residents. (shrink)

This groundbreaking volume investigates the most fundamental question of all: Why is there something rather than nothing? The question is explored from diverse and radical perspectives: religious, naturalistic, platonistic and skeptical. Does science answer the question? Or does theology? Does everything need an explanation? Or can there be brute, inexplicable facts? Could there have been nothing whatsoever? Or is there any being that could not have failed to exist? Is the question meaningful after all? The volume advances cutting-edge debates in (...) metaphysics, philosophy of cosmology and philosophy of religion, and will intrigue and challenge readers interested in any of these subjects. (shrink)

This article aims to explain the reception and reassessment of Aristotle’s philosophy of time during the first century BCE by Pseudo-Archytas, a thinker who exercised great influence over and laid the groundwork for Neopythagorean and Neoplatonist philosophies of nature. The article scrutinizes Pseudo-Archytas’ theory by examining his solution to the paradox of time’s existence. Through a comparative analysis of Aristotle’s and Pseudo-Archytas’ discourse, it seeks to demonstrate that their theories, despite apparent similarities (associated with their overall approach to the (...) class='Hi'>subject matter, the terms utilized in discourse, etc.), exhibit different philosophical underpinnings and are in many ways antithetical. (shrink)

Quality and service improvement (QSI) research employs a broad range of methods to enhance the efficiency of healthcare delivery. QSI research differs from traditional healthcare research and poses unique ethical questions. Since QSI research aims to generate knowledge to enhance quality improvement efforts, should it be considered research for regulatory purposes? Is review by a research ethics committee required? Should healthcare providers be considered research participants? If participation in QSI research entails no more than minimal risk, is consent required? The (...) lack of consensus on answers to these questions highlights the need for ethical guidance. Three distinct approaches to classifying QSI research in accordance with existing ethical principles and regulations can be found in the literature. In the first approach, QSI research is viewed as distinct from other types of healthcare research and does not require regulation. In the second approach, QSI research falls within regulatory guidelines but is exempt from research ethics committee review. In the third approach, QSI research is deemed to be part of the learning healthcare system and, as such, is subject to a different set of ethical principles entirely. In this paper, we critically assess each of these views. While none of these approaches is entirely satisfactory, we argue that use of the ethical principles governing research provides the best means of addressing the numerous questions posed by QSI research. (shrink)

This chapter explores critically ethical concerns arising from forms of suffering to which domesticated nonhuman animals are subjected in scientific instruction and research and within the industrial-factory-farm-food complex, as well as other contexts. Consideration is given to the views of Arthur Schopenhauer on suffering, René Descartes’s designation of ontological differences between human and non-human animals, and Donna Haraway’s reconfiguration of the relationship between human and nonhuman animals in scientific laboratory settings. Proceeding from a discussion of David Benatar’s “antinatalist” views the (...) focus of analysis is on the forms of suffering imposed on domesticated nonhuman animals by humans. In response to ethical concerns raised about the suffering inflicted on nonhuman animals in the course of scientific research, scientists have sought a “solution” in the form of genetically engineered nonhuman animals whose responses to painful stimuli are presented as modulated to reduce pain. This reductive conceptualization of suffering reduces the complexity of suffering to physical sensation alone and does not engage with the ethical issues involved. Drawing on the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Albert Schweitzer the chapter concludes that an ethical solution to the complex issues explored lies in refraining from exposing nonhuman animals to pain and suffering. (shrink)

The main focus of this book lies in analyzing singular negative existential statements such as “Sherlock Holmes does not exist”. Chakrabarti’s goal is to preserve the idea that this is a subject-predicate statement involving a singular denial about a particular individual, without committing himself to an unwanted ontology of Meinongian, imaginary, or other nonexistent objects, and without resorting to any kind of free logic.

"The objective of this book is to review the complex of issues in Soren Kierkegaard's concept of existence. It is evident that for Kierkegaard existence is always composed of three elements: namely, the subject, freedom, and the ethical. In the process of clarifying the relation between these three elements in the different stages of existence, the course of the development the individual must go through in order to become the single individual is described. "The study falls into four parts. (...) The first section describes the levels in existence on which as person attempts by his own powers to actualize the ethical ideals; in this stage the center of gravity for a person's effort still lies within the bounds of immanence. The second section describes a person's ethical and religious growth as it develops in relation to a transcendent power, whose highest expression is Christ as the revelation of God. The third section discusses the issues in existence that Kierkegaard himself designated as the most difficult of all for human thought. The last section points to the highest existential position to which philosophy in the broader sense and Christianity respectively can take a person. Kierkegaard utilizes these positions as a standard for evaluating existence within immanence and for Christian existence. (shrink)

From the Introduction:The present essay provides an introduction to the treatment of human existence and individuality in Marxist thought. The work will be primarily concerned with two related topics: the evaluation by Marxists of individual emancipation and their assessment of subjective factors in social theory. By taking up these taking up these topics within a systematic and historical framework, I hope to generate some fresh light on several familiar issues. First, I pursue a reading of Marx focused on his treatment (...) of subjectivity, individuation, and related methodological and practical matters; second, I apply this interpretation to analyzing the dispute between Marxist orthodoxy and heterodoxy over such matters as class consciousness and the philosophy of materialism; finally, I employ this historical context to clarify the significance of "existential Marxism," Maurice Merleau-Ponty's and Jean-Paul Sartre's contribution to Marxist thought. (shrink)

One of the newest research areas in moral philosophy is moral phenomenology: the dedicated study of the experiential dimension of moral mental life. The idea has been to bring phenomenological evidence to bear on some central issues in metaethics and moral psychology, such as cognitivism and noncognitivism about moral judgment, motivational internalism and externalism, and so on. However, moral phenomenology faces certain foundational challenges, pertaining especially to the existence, describability, and importance of its subject matter. This paper addresses these (...) foundational challenges, arguing that moral experiences – in the phenomenal, what-is-like sense of the term – exist, are informatively describable, and are central for the concerns of moral philosophy at large. (shrink)

According to the account of artifacts developed by Lynne Rudder Baker, artifacts have a certain “proper function” essentially. The proper function of an artifact is the purpose or use intended for the artifact by its “author(s)”, viz., the artifact’s designer(s) and/or producer(s). Baker’s account therefore traces the essences of artifacts back indirectly to the intentions of an artifact’s original author (e.g., its inventor, maker, producer or designer). Like other “author-intention-based” accounts (e.g., those defended by Amie Thomasson, Simon Evnine, and others), (...) Baker’s treatment, or so I have argued, is subject to the concern that, when stated in its most general form, human creative intentions are not nearly as powerful and discriminating as proponents of author-intention-based accounts make them out to be (see Kathrin Koslicki, Form, Matter, Substance, Oxford University Press, 2018, Chapter 8). When Baker responds to a version of this objection launched against her account by Theodore Sider and Dean Zimmerman, she proposes that we cannot simply think things into existence for which “our conventions and practices do not have a place” (Lynne Rudder Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism, 2007, p. 44). For example, I cannot, according to Baker, make up the word, “bonangle”, apply it to a piece of driftwood and thereby succeed in bringing into existence a new artifact, viz., a bonangle, merely by thinking to myself “It would be nice if the world contained bonangles; I hereby make that piece of driftwood a bonangle”. In order for this response to be effective, however, more needs to be said about how our conventions and practices support the creation of some artifacts and artifact kinds, while disallowing the attempted creation of others. In this paper, I examine the effectiveness of Baker’s response in addressing the challenges posed by the inclusion of artifacts in Baker’s practical realist ontology. (shrink)

Early analytic philosophers like Carnap, Wittgenstein and Ryle regarded ontology as a branch of metaphysics that is either trivial or meaningless. But at present it is generally assumed that philosophy can make substantial discoveries about what kinds of things exist and about the essence of these kinds. My paper challenges this ontological turn. The currently predominant conceptions of the subject, at any rate, do not license the idea that ontology can provide distinctively philosophical insights into the constituents of reality. (...) I distinguish four main sources of analytic ontology—Strawson's descriptive metaphysics, Kripke's realist semantics, the Austro-Australian truth-maker principle, Quine's naturalistic conception of ontology—and indicate briefly why the first three do not rehabilitate ontology. In the remainder, I concentrate on the most influential and promising position. Quinean ontology seeks to bring out and reduce the ontological commitments of our best scientific theories through logical paraphrase. Against this programme, I argue that Quine's conception of ontological commitment is inadequate, and that his logical paraphrase cannot contribute to the exploration of reality, but at most to the clarification of our conceptual framework. (shrink)

On peut distinguer, dans l'histoire du marxisme contemporain, deux tendances qui n'ont cessé de se confronter sous des formes plus ou moins radicales et qui tiennent à deux lectures apparemment inconciliables de l'oeuvre de Marx. La première, selon laquelle le marxisme se résorbe essentiellement en une théorie scientifique , en une sociologie . Cette tendance trouve son expression culminante dans l'althussérisme, dans le primat des relations constitutives de la structure sociale sur les individus-sujets. La seconde, qui veut que le marxisme (...) soit d'abord et avant tout un humanisme et/ou une philosophie de la praxis, tout travail théorique se trouvant subordonné à sa visée historico-pratique : celle de l'instauration de rapports sociaux dans lesquels seraient abolis les rapports d'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme. Poser la question de l'existence d'une éthique marxiste, c'est tenter de résoudre théoriquement cette épineuse dichotomie entre l'objectivisme des « déterminations » sociales des représentations de conscience morales et la capacité des individus-sujets de produire un ordre social, d'orienter le développement historique conformément à ces représentations . Pour un matérialiste, n'y a-t-il pas là une contradiction interne au marxisme? L'auteur de l'article a tenté de faire voir, à travers quelques propositions sommaires, comment une telle contradiction peut être dépassée.In the history of contemporary Marxism one can distinguish two conflicting tendencies which continue to confront each other in a more or less radical manner, and which give rise to two apparently irreconcilable readings of Marx's work. The first is that by which Marxism is essentially absorbed into a scientific theory , into a sociology. This tendency finds its ultimate expression in 'althussérisme', in the primacy of the constituent relations of the social structure involving individual subjects. In the second, which sees Marxism as essentially humanist and/or a philosophy of praxis, all theoretical work is subordinated to the practical-historical aim, that of establishing social relations in which the exploitation of persons by persons will be done away with. To ask whether a Marxist ethic exists is an attempt to resolve theoretically this thorny dichotomy between the objectivism of the social determinants of the prescriptions of moral conscience, and the capacity of individual subjects to produce a social order to orient historical development in accordance with these prescriptions. For a materialist, is there not here an apparent contradiction within Marxism? The author has attempted to clarify, by means of a few succinct propositions, how such a contradiction may be resolved. (shrink)

Can we believe that there are non-existent entities without commitment to the Meinongian metaphysics? This paper argues we can. What leads us from quantification over non-existent beings to Meinongianism is a general metaphysical assumption about reality at large, and not merely quantification over the non-existent. Broadly speaking, the assumption is that every being we talk about must have a real definition. It’s this assumption that drives us to enquire into the nature of beings like Pegasus, and what (...) our relationship as thinkers is to them. However, I argue this assumption only holds if you think your language, and in particular that aspect of it to do with referring to entities works in a specific way. This is the specific way generally assumed by the discipline called ‘Semantics’. I sketch out an alternative, call it global expressivism, in which talk of referring is given an expressivist, speech-act theoretic treatment. If we accept that our talk of the non-existent works as the global expressivist tells us it does, then the question of the metaphysical nature of non-existent entities is utterly void. You might say that Pegasus is empty of any metaphysical nature. Since the non-existent lacks any metaphysical nature, the metaphysics of the non-existent, Meinongianism, as a form of inquiry, lacks a subject matter, despite the fact that we talk happily, and indeed unavoidably, of the non-existent. (shrink)

Despite recent efforts, little research has been done concerning the issue of medical ethics in Georges Canguilhem’s work. This is mainly due to the critical position the author takes regarding the humanistic medicine practices that began to proliferate after World War II. However, we hold that the medical philosopher´s insights do contribute to the field of medical ethics, since they rescue the patients’ individuality, which is highly valued in today´s person centered medicine: over the “objectifying” rationality of modern medicine. We (...) also propose that Canguilhem poses an “interactive” understanding of human life that goes beyond a reductionistic vision of life and which allows the development of an ethical subject capable of producing new norms. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss a number of different relationships between two kinds of obligation: those which have individuals as their subject, and those which have groups of individuals as their subject. I use the name collective obligations to refer to obligations of the second sort. I argue that there are collective obligations, in this sense; that such obligations can give rise to and explain obligations which fall on individuals; that because of these facts collective obligations are not (...) simply reducible to individual obligations; and that collective obligations supervene on individual obligations, without being reducible to them. The sort of supervenience I have in mind here is what is sometimes called ‘global supervenience’. In other words, there cannot be two worlds which differ in respect of the collective obligations which exist in them without also differing in respect of the individual obligations which exist in them. (shrink)