When we hear another person laugh or scream, can we tell the kind of situation they are in – for example, whether they are playing or fighting? Nonverbal expressions are theorised to vary systematically across behavioural contexts. Perceivers might be sensitive to these putative systematic mappings and thereby correctly infer contexts from others’ vocalisations. Here, in two pre-registered experiments, we test the prediction that listeners can accurately deduce production contexts (e.g. being tickled, discovering threat) from spontaneous nonverbal vocalisations, like sighs (...) and grunts. In Experiment 1, listeners (total n = 3120) matched 200 nonverbal vocalisations to one of 10 contexts using yes/no response options. Using signal detection analysis, we show that listeners were accurate at matching vocalisations to nine of the contexts. In Experiment 2, listeners (n = 337) categorised the production contexts by selecting from 10 response options in a forced-choice task. By analysing unbiased hit rates, we show that participants categorised all 10 contexts at better-than-chance levels. Together, these results demonstrate that perceivers can infer contexts from nonverbal vocalisations at rates that exceed that of random selection, suggesting that listeners are sensitive to systematic mappings between acoustic structures in vocalisations and behavioural contexts. (shrink)

Sauter raises interesting points about expressive vocalisations, such as laughing, crying, gasping, etcetera. This reply discusses an expanded research agenda incorporating these. Riemer’s commentary is based on his opposition to nonreferentialist approaches to meaning. My reply seeks to clarify the natural semantic metalanguage (NSM) position on the conceptual status of semantic primes, while urging researchers to consider independently the merits of reductive paraphrase as a heuristic and a corrective to terminological Anglocentrism.

ABSTRACTPosed stimuli dominate the study of nonverbal communication of emotion, but concerns have been raised that the use of posed stimuli may inflate recognition accuracy relative to spontaneous expressions. Here, we compare recognition of emotions from spontaneous expressions with that of matched posed stimuli. Participants made forced-choice judgments about the expressed emotion and whether the expression was spontaneous, and rated expressions on intensity and prototypicality. Listeners were able to accurately infer emotions from both posed and spontaneous expressions, from auditory, visual, (...) and audiovisual cues. Furthermore, perceived intensity and prototypicality were found to play a role in the accurate recognition of emotion, particularly from spontaneous expressions. Our findings demonstrate that perceivers can reliably recognise emotions from spontaneous expressions, and that depending on the comparison set, recognition levels can even be equivalent to that o... (shrink)

The work defines the sigh as a type of breath expressing or communicating specific physical or mental internal states. To investigate the meanings of the sigh, the paper presents analyses of written and oral corpora, finding out that it may express different emotions like boredom or frustration, but also positive meanings like self-encouragement; then it focuses on the use of sighs in political debates. Finally a perception study shows participants’ agreement on the meanings of sighs in terms of valence and (...) arousal. These results lay the bases for future studies to set a clearer distinction between sighs and other vocalisations as well as other effects on its meaning caused by the combination with other body signals like rolling eyes or shaking head. (shrink)

Implantable brain-computer interfaces are being developed to restore speech capacity for those who are unable to speak. Patients with locked-in syndrome or amyotrophic lateral sclerosis could be able to use covert speech – vividly imagining saying something without actual vocalisation – to trigger neural controlled systems capable of synthesising speech. User control has been identified as particularly pressing for this type of BCI. The incorporation of machine learning and statistical language models into the decoding process introduces a contribution to (...) the output that is beyond the user’s control. Whilst this type of ‘shared control’ of BCI action is not unique to speech BCIs, the automated shaping of what a user ‘says’ has a particularly acute ethical dimension, which may differ from parallel concerns surrounding automation in movement BCIs. This paper provides an analysis of the control afforded to the user of a speech BCI of the sort under development, as well as the relationships between accuracy, control, and the user’s ownership of the speech produced. Through comparing speech BCIs with BCIs for movement, we argue that, whilst goal selection is the more significant locus of control for the user of a movement BCI, control over process will be more significant for the user of the speech BCI. The design of the speech BCI may therefore have to trade off some possible efficiency gains afforded by automation in order to preserve sufficient guidance control necessary for users to express themselves in ways they prefer. We consider the implications for the speech BCI user’s responsibility for produced outputs and their ownership of token outputs. We argue that these are distinct assessments. Ownership of synthetic speech concerns whether the content of the output sufficiently represents the user, rather than their morally relevant, causal role in producing that output. (shrink)

This study examines how 8- to 15-month-old Peruvian children1 (N = 18) express pragmatic functions in terms of the modality and referential-specificity level of each communicative behaviour. Results show that pragmatic functions were expressed mainly via the vocal modality, primarily with vocalisations; nevertheless, specific functional patterns were found: declaratives involved more use of words, and imperatives more use of gestures. While older children produced more declaratives and less personal expressions, and more words, there was no significant change of preferred modality (...) with age. Finally, vocabulary size and pragmatic production seem to be associated: children with larger receptive vocabularies produced more declaratives and less personal expressions, while those with larger expressive vocabularies produced fewer personal expressions and more words. This pragmatic approach allows for a more nuanced view of communicative development, with each function exhibiting a specific trajectory. (shrink)

In the present paper we address the old question of respiratory planning in speech production. We recast the problem in terms of speakers’ communicative goals and propose that speakers try to minimise respiratory effort in line with H&H theory. We analyze respiratory cycles coinciding with no speech (i.e. silence), short verbal feedback expressions (SFE’s) as well as longer vocalisations in terms of parameters of the respiratory cycle and find little evidence for respiratory planning in feedback production. We also investigate timing (...) of speech and SFEs in the exhalation and contrast it with nods. We find that while speech is strongly tied to the exhalation onset, SFEs are distributed much more uniformly throughout the exhalation and are often produced on residual air. Given that nods, which do not have any respiratory constraints, tend to be more frequent towards the end of an exhalation, we propose a mechanism whereby respiratory patterns are determined by the trade-off between speakers’ communicative goals and respiratory constraints. (shrink)

What do the relationships observed in the occurrence of various limb, facial, and speech apraxias following left hemisphere damage mean for Corballis's theory? What does the right hemisphere's role in nonpropositional and automatic speech production tell us about the coevolution of right hand preference and speech; how could the possibility that the right hemisphere may be “dominant” for some aspects of speech be accommodated by his theory?

This paper examines Edmund Husserl's revised account of expression in his 1913–1914 revisions of the Logical Investigations. Rejecting the Investigations’ thesis that linguistic meanings are constituted in a distinctive class of essentially non-intuitive meaning intentions, Husserl develops a new conception of empty intention, a new analysis of the intuitively fulfilled discourse and a phenomenology of the indicative tendency. While these revisions have been acknowledged, their motivation, connection, and significance remain under-explored in the existing literature. By comparing the Investigations and the (...) Revisions, this paper shows how these developments fundamentally alter Husserl’s understanding of the relationship between language, thought, and intuition. The revised account of expression illuminates the dynamic interaction of these elements in the process of meaning-making, offering a balanced account of the interplay of presence and absence in our use of words. (shrink)

In recent years, avowal has become increasingly central to the trans practice of gender. In this paper, I argue such avowal-based practices represent an attempt to escape the limitations and vulnerabilities of our bodies. But I also argue that this strategy is costly. For in draining the body of any relation to gender, we risk depriving ourselves of what is most valuable about our lives with gender in the first place.

Mitchell S. Green presents a systematic philosophical study of self-expression - a pervasive phenomenon of the everyday life of humans and other species, which has received scant attention in its own right. He explores the ways in which self-expression reveals our states of thought, feeling, and experience, and he defends striking new theses concerning a wide range of fascinating topics: our ability to perceive emotion in others, artistic expression, empathy, expressive language, meaning, facial expression, and speech acts. He draws (...) on insights from evolutionary game theory, ethology, the philosophy of language, social psychology, pragmatics, aesthetics, and neuroscience to present a stimulating and accessible interdisciplinary work. (shrink)

The question whether facial expression processing may be impaired in Parkinson’s disease (PD) patients so far has yielded equivocal results – existing studies, however, have focused on testing expression processing in recognition tasks with static images of six standard, emotional facial expressions. Given that non-verbal communication contains both emotional and non-emotional, conversational expressions and that input to the brain is usually dynamic, here we address the question of potential facial expression processing differences in a novel format: we test a range (...) of conversational and emotional, dynamic facial expressions in three groups – PD patients ( n = 20), age- and education-matched older healthy controls ( n = 20), and younger adult healthy controls ( n = 20). This setup allows us to address both effects of PD and age-related differences. We employed a rating task for all groups in which 12 rating dimensions were used to assess evaluative processing of 27 expression videos from six different actors. We found that ratings overall were consistent across groups with several rating dimensions (such as arousal or outgoingness) having a strong correlation with the expressions’ motion energy content as measured by optic flow analysis. Most importantly, we found that the PD group did not differ in any rating dimension from the older healthy control group (HCG), indicating highly similar evaluation processing. Both older groups, however, did show significant differences for several rating scales in comparison with the younger adults HCG. Looking more closely, older participants rated negative expressions compared to the younger participants as more positive, but also as less natural, persuasive, empathic, and sincere. We interpret these findings in the context of the positivity effect and in-group processing advantages. Overall, our findings do not support strong processing deficits due to PD, but rather point to age-related differences in facial expression processing. (shrink)

A central feature in contemporary discussions of selfknowledge concerns the epistemic status of mental selfascriptions, such as “I have toothache” or “I believe that p”. The overall project of such discussions is to provide an account of the special status of mental self-ascriptions vis-à-vis other knowledge-claims, including ascriptions of mental states to others. In this respect, two approaches have gained currency in contemporary philosophy. Some authors have focused on the notion of expression, stressing that self-ascriptions are expressions of one’s mental (...) life; whereas others have singled out the notion of transparency as crucial, since self-knowledge involves self-beliefs, and the latter are transparent to one’s available evidence. This critical notice explores one instance of each approach, in order to assess their prospects of success. It concludes that both approaches fail to articulate an account that satisfactorily accommodates the first-person component in the notion of self-knowledge. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that the expression of an emotion is the external bodily manifestation of an internal psychological state. In contrast to this “general view”, this paper presents and discusses an alternative view put forward by Scheler and developed by authors close to the phenomenological tradition. According to the “phenomenological view”, emotional expression is a phenomenon of the lived body. In exploring this view, the paper analyzes four of its main tenets: a) the concept of the lived body as (...) distinct from the physical body; b) the idea that emotional expression functions as a symbol; c) the thesis of the universal grammar of emotions; and d) the distinction between final and expressive movements. In the conclusion, I discuss the value and relevance of the phenomenological view to contemporary research. (shrink)

Expressive writing is life-based writing that focuses on authentic expression of lived experience, with resultant insight, growth and skill-building. For decades, it has been the province of journals, memoirs, poets, and language arts classrooms. Social science research now provides indisputable evidence that expressive writing is also healing.

Expressions of emotion pose a serious challenge to the view that we perceive other people’s emotions directly. If we must perceive expressions in order to perceive emotions, then it is only ever the expressions that we are directly aware of, not emotions themselves. This paper develops a new response to this challenge by drawing an analogy between expressions of emotion and perceptual media. It is through illumination and sound, the paradigmatic examples of perceptual media, that we can see and hear (...) objects around us. Instead of screening these objects from view, however, they enable our perception while being transparent to us. With reference to perceptual constancy and transparency, I show how expressions show up in our experience of emotions in a surprisingly similar way. Given this, we can understand expressions as the media _through_ which we perceive emotions and overcome the above challenge to an otherwise attractive view. (shrink)

Facial expressions of pain may be best conceptualized as an example of an evolved propensity to communicate distress, rather than as a distinct category of facial expression. The operant model goes beyond the evolutionary account, as it can explain how the (facial) expression of pain can become maladaptive as a result of its capability to elicit attention and caring behavior in the observer.

This article has a few goals. The first goal is to discover the development of Semitic pointing systems such as Babylonian Hebrew (both simple and complex), Tiberian Hebrew, Palestinian Hebrew, Samaritan Hebrew, Syriac (both Western [Jacobite] and Eastern [Nestorian]) and Arabic. The second goal is to propose the possible development because of the interaction between those languages in the past. In this article, the comparative method will be used as the methodology. A general observation of these signs and a proposition (...) regarding the possible development amongst those languages will be presented.Contribution: This article traces the synchronic and diachronic development of Semitic languages’ vocalisation systems and proposes a possible development between them. (shrink)

The logics of the modal operators and of the quantifiers show striking analogies. The analogies are so extensive that, when a special class of entities (possible worlds) is postulated, natural and non-arbitrary translation procedures can be defined from the language with the modal operators into a purely quantificational one, under which the necessity and possibility operators translate into universal and existential quantifiers. In view of this I would be willing to classify the modal operators as ‘disguised’ quantifiers, and I think (...) that wholehearted acceptance of modal language should be considered to carry ontological commitment to something like possible worldsConsidered as two languages for describing the same subject matter, modal and purely quantificational languages show interesting differences. The operator variables of the purely quantificational languages give them more power than the modal languages, but at least some of the functions performed by the apparatus of operator variables are also performed, in a more primitive and less versatile way, by actuality operators in modal languages.A final note. Quine has written much on the inter-relations of quantifiers, identity, and the concept of existence. These, he holds, form a tightly knit conceptual system which has been evolved to a high point of perfection, but which might conceivably change yet further.29 He has also dropped hints about the possibility of a simpler, primitive or defective version of the system, in which the quantifiers are not backed up in their accustomed way by the concept of identity. He has dubbed the resulting concept a ‘pre-individuative’ concept of existence, or a concept of ‘entity without identity.’ What would a pre-individuative concept of existence be like? Quine has sometimes suggested that one might be embodied in the use of mass nouns, but the identity concept is used in connection with stuff as well as with things: “is that the same coffee that was in the cup last night?” I would submit that modality provides a better case. In view of the comparative weakness of modal languages, compared to the explicitly quantificational ones Quine takes as canonical, there is surely a sense in which the concept of existence embodied in that disguised existential quantifier, the possibility operator, is a defective one. And as we have seen, one of the differences between modal operators and explicit quantifiers is that modal operators cannot be joined with the identity predicate in the way quantifiers with operator variables can. Surely, then, there is a sense in which ordinary speech, as opposed to the metaphysical theorizing of a Leibniz or a David Lewis, conceives of possible worlds as entities without identity. (shrink)

Natural language provides motivation for studying modal backwards-looking operators such as “now”, “then” and “actually” that evaluate their argument formula at some previously considered point instead of the current one. This paper investigates the expressive power over models of both propositional and first-order basic modal language enriched with such operators. Having defined an appropriate notion of bisimulation for first-order modal logic, I show that backwards-looking operators increase its expressive power quite mildly, contrary to beliefs widespread among philosophers of (...) language and formal semanticists. That in turn presents a strong argument for the use of operator-based systems in the semantics of natural language, instead of systems with explicit quantification over worlds and times that have become a de-facto standard for such applications. The popularity of such explicit-quantification systems is shown to be based on the misinterpretation of a claim by Cresswell, which led many philosophers and linguists to assume that introducing “now” and “then” is expressively equivalent to explicitly quantifying over worlds and times. (shrink)

According to Dewey, we are responsible for our conduct because it is “ourselves objectified in action”. This idea lies at the heart of an increasingly influential deep self approach to moral responsibility. Existing formulations of deep self views have two major problems: They are often underspecified, and they tend to understand the nature of the deep self in excessively rationalistic terms. Here I propose a new deep self theory of moral responsibility called the Self-Expression account that addresses these issues. The (...) account is composed of two parts. The first part answers the question, What is a deep self? Theorists have tended to favor cognitive views that understand the deep self in terms of rationally formed evaluative judgment. I propose instead a conative view that says one’s deep self consists of a distinctive kind of pro-attitude, cares, and I provide an account of cares in terms of their distinctive psychological functional role. The second part answers the question, When does an action express one’s deep self? I criticize the agentially demanding conditions set out in existing views and propose a more minimalist alternative. I show that the Self-Expression account handles issues that bedeviled traditional deep self views, including how to explain moral responsibility for spontaneous, out of character, and weak-willed actions. (shrink)

Many philosophers favour the simple knowledge account of assertion, which says you may assert something only if you know it. The simple account is true but importantly incomplete. I defend a more informative thesis, namely, that you may assert something only if your assertion expresses knowledge. I call this 'the express knowledge account of assertion', which I argue better handles a wider range of cases while at the same time explaining the simple knowledge account's appeal. §1 introduces some new data (...) that a knowledge account of assertion well explains. §2 explains the simple knowledge account's advantage over two of its main competitors. §3 presents a problem for the simple account and offers a solution, which is to adopt the express knowledge account. §4 encapsulates the case for the express knowledge account, and offers a unifying vision for the epistemology of belief and assertion. §5 answers an objection. §6 briefly sums up. Even those who ultimately reject my conclusion can still benefit from the new data presented in §1, and learn an important lesson from the problem discussed in §3, which demonstrates a general constraint on an acceptable account of the norm of assertion. (shrink)

The discourse concerning musical expression hinges on a fundamental analogy between music and language. While the extant literature commonly compares music to language, this essay takes the reverse direction, following Wittgenstein’s approach. The discussion contrasts the theoretical underpinnings of the “music as language” simile with those of the “language as music” simile. The emphasis on characterization, performance, mutual tuning-in relationships, the interaction between language and music, and the open-ended effort to reorient ourselves as we draw in significance challenges the “informing (...) paradigm” that has been paramount across contemporary philosophical theories of musical expression. One of the most promising philosophical avenues that emerges as we move beyond the “informing paradigm” is recognizing the inseparable relationship between musical expression and our power to shape our own language. (shrink)

The French philosopher Renaud Barbaras remarked that late in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s career, “The phenomenology of perception fulfills itself as a philosophy of expression.” In _Tracing Expression in Merleau-Ponty: Aesthetics, Philosophy of Biology, and Ontology, _Véronique M. Fóti_ _addresses the guiding yet neglected theme of expression in Merleau-Ponty’s thought. She traces Merleau-Ponty’s ideas about how individuals express creative or artistic impulses through his three essays on aesthetics, his engagement with animality and the “new biology” in the second of his lecture courses (...) on nature of 1957–58, and in his late ontology, articulated in 1964 in the fragmentary text of _Le visible et l’invisible _. With the exception of a discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s 1945 essay “Cezanne’s Doubt,” Fóti engages with Merleau-Ponty’s late and final thought, with close attention to both his scientific and philosophical interlocutors, especially the continental rationalists. Expression shows itself, in Merleau-Ponty’s thought, to be primordial, and this innate and fundamental nature of expression has implications for his understanding of artistic creation, science, and philosophy. (shrink)

Rigorously studying the inexpressible expression provoked by the silenced testimony of the Holocaust survivor, in Jean-François Lyotard's The Differend, and the religious faithful, in Pseudo-Dionysius' The Divine Names, proves to dissolve the apparent heterogeneity of postmodernism and Neoplatonist Christian mysticism and open radical new lines of dialogue. Expressing the Inexpressible critically evaluates each thinker and tradition, rethinks witnessing, testimony, sublimity, and apophaticism, and then engages them together to forge a new reading of silence and eros.

Kaplan (1999) argued that a different dimension of expressive meaning (“use-conditional”, as opposed to truth-conditional) is required to characterize the meaning of pejoratives, including slurs and racial epithets. Elaborating on this, writers have argued that the expressive meaning of pejoratives and slurs is either a conventional implicature (Potts 2007) or a presupposition (Macià 2002 and 2014, Schlenker 2007, Cepollaro and Stojanovic 2016). We argue that an expressive presuppositional theory accounts well for the data, but that expressive (...) presuppositions are not just propositions to be added to a common ground. We hold that expressives, including pejoratives and slurs, make requirements on a contextual record governed by sui generis norms specific to affective attitudes and their expressions. (shrink)

A substantial amount of recent work in natural language generation has focused on the generation of ‘‘one-shot’’ referring expressions whose only aim is to identify a target referent. Dale and Reiter's Incremental Algorithm (IA) is often thought to be the best algorithm for maximizing the similarity to referring expressions produced by people. We test this hypothesis by eliciting referring expressions from human subjects and computing the similarity between the expressions elicited and the ones generated by algorithms. It turns out that (...) the success of the IA depends substantially on the ‘‘preference order’’ (PO) employed by the IA, particularly in complex domains. While some POs cause the IA to produce referring expressions that are very similar to expressions produced by human subjects, others cause the IA to perform worse than its main competitors; moreover, it turns out to be difficult to predict the success of a PO on the basis of existing psycholinguistic findings or frequencies in corpora. We also examine the computational complexity of the algorithms in question and argue that there are no compelling reasons for preferring the IA over some of its main competitors on these grounds. We conclude that future research on the generation of referring expressions should explore alternatives to the IA, focusing on algorithms, inspired by the Greedy Algorithm, which do not work with a fixed PO. (shrink)

Group agents have been represented as expressive fictions by those who treat ascriptions of agency to groups as metaphorical; as pragmatic fictions by those who think that the agency ascribed to groups belongs in the first place to a distinct individual or set of individuals; and as theoretical fictions by those who think that postulating group agents serves no indispensable role in our theory of the social world. This paper identifies, criticizes and rejects each of these views, defending a (...) strong realist position. (shrink)

The concept of expression in the arts is Janus-faced. On the one hand expression is an author-centered notion: many Romantic poets, painters, and musicians thought of themselves as pouring our or ex-pressing their own emotions in their artworks. And on the other hand, expression is an audience-centered notion, the communication of what is expressed by an author to members of an audience. Typically the word “expression” is used for the author-centered aspect of expression as a whole, and the word “expressiveness” (...) is used for the audience-centered aspect, and I shall keep to this usage. In this paper I shall argue that although expression is closely related to expressiveness, the two concepts are distinct and, in particular, expressiveness cannot be analyzed in terms of expression, as has been recently suggested by Stephen Davies and Jerrold Levinson. Nonetheless, the richest examples of expression in the arts involve both expression and expressiveness. (shrink)

Alterations in the expression of certain genes or in their products can render benign tumor cells metastatic. Experimentally this has been quickly performed by transferring dominantly acting oncogenes such as c‐H‐rasEJ into susceptible cells, but in vivo such a rapid qualitative change in a dominantly acting oncogene occurs only rarely, and progression to highly metastatic phenotypes is thought to occur through a slow stepwise process. Such slow changes can be reversible and need not involve known dominantly acting oncogenes, consistent with (...) clinical observations. An important element of the natural progression of tumors to malignancy may be their ability to circumvent microenvironmental controls that regulate growth and cellular diversity and to evolve into heterogeneous phenotypes, a process that appears to involve mainly quantitative changes in gene expression but which can be rapidly stimulated in cell culture by the introduction of a dominantly acting oncogene. It is proposed that the highly malignant cells that have slowly evolved in vivo with only a few qualitative gene changes have undergone extensive cycles of diversification and accumulation of quantitative changes in the expression of genes that encode products that are related to malignancy and metastasis. Thus, highly malignant cellular phenotypes can arise quickly through specific qualitative changes in critical controlling genes or more slowly by less critical qualitative genetic changes, coupled with cellular diversification and accumulation of quantitative changes in gene expression. (shrink)

The freedom of expression is ‘the great bulwark of liberty’ and a ‘cornerstone upon which the very existence of a democratic society rests.’ It constitutes one of the ‘basic conditions for [a democratic society’s] progress,’ encapsulating ideas that may even ‘offend, shock or disturb.’ In his Rhetoric, Aristotle argues that free speech is of paramount importance, particularly in the form of a ‘robust public discourse as a means to promote citizen awareness and vigilance.’ To this end, freedom of expression is (...) a central tenet of democratic checks and balances as it allows for an ‘informed consent of the governed.’ Despite the recognition of this freedom since classical times, and the repeated proclamations of support by a variety of institutions, such as the Council of Europe, what is demonstrated, hereinafter, is that the freedom of expression is in a state of severe recession (regardless of the ‘openness’ of a society). This has resulted from a set of interrelated challenges, namely, the stark demise of Internet freedom within the general ambit of a widening conceptualization of hate, and the systematic strategy of moderating ‘hateful’ content. Whilst these challenges are inextricably interconnected with the technological revolution of our times, the authors hold that the fragile positioning of the freedom of expression in the framework of the Council of Europe and, particularly, the approach adopted by the major regional human rights court of the world, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), has facilitated the systematic erosion of the central agora of expression, namely, the Internet and its fora. It is argued that the current _status quo_, as described hereinafter, is marked by a corrosion of _parrhesia_ or free speech itself and, also, of _isigoria,_ namely, the equal right of all to free speech. In light of the above, and for purposes of extrapolating on the challenges to this fundamental freedom, this paper will commence with a normative assessment of the legitimacy and impact of restricting the freedom of expression, followed by an overview of its position in the Council of Europe, with a focus on the concept of hate. Further, and emanating from the ECtHR’S position in _Delfi v Estonia,_ on the liability of Internet intermediaries, it will conduct an analysis of the status of speech online, extrapolating on the issue of ‘hate speech’ and the horizontalization of responsibility _vis-à-vis_ content moderation through the structural juxtaposition of private, profit-making companies deciphering on issues of freedom of expression through, inter alia (yet increasingly) the use of Artificial Intelligence. (shrink)

Critics have argued that human-controlled avatar interactions fail to facilitate the kinds of expressivity and social understanding afforded by our physical bodies. We identify three claims meant to justify the supposed expressive limits of avatar interactions compared to our physical interactions. First, “The Limited Expressivity Claim”: avatars have a more limited expressive range than our physical bodies. Second, “The Inputted Expressivity Claim”: any expressive avatarial behaviour must be deliberately inputted by the user. Third, “The Decoding Claim”: users (...) must infer or figure out the expressive meaning of human-controlled avatars’ behaviour through cognitively onerous processes. With the aim of critically assessing all three claims, we analyze data collected through observations of and interviews with expert players of the avatar-based video game League of Legends. Focusing on Daniel Stern’s (2010) notion of vitality, we analyze the participants’ descriptions of seeing and interacting with other avatars during performance. Our analysis shows that the informants experience human-based avatarial interactions as qualitatively different than interactions with bots, that the informants see the movements of other players’ avatars as having different expressive styles, and that the informants actively use and manipulate this avatarial expressivity during performance. The results of our analysis, we argue, provide reasons for loosening or resisting the three claims concerning the limits of avatarial expressivity. (shrink)

Incomplete penetrance and variable expressivity are non‐Mendelian phenomena resulting in the lack of correlation between genotype and phenotype. Not withstanding the diversity in mechanisms, differential expression of homologous alleles within cells manifests as variations in penetrance and expressivity of mutations between individuals of the same genotype. These phenomena are seen most often in dominantly inherited diseases, implying that they are sensitive to concentration of the gene product. In this framework and the advances in understanding the role of microRNA (miRNA) in (...) fine‐tuning gene expression at translational level, we propose miRNA‐mediated regulation as a mechanism for incomplete penetrance and variable expressivity. The presence of miRNA binding sites at 3′ UTR, co‐expression of target gene–miRNA pairs for genes showing incomplete penetrance and variable expressivity derived from available data lend support to our hypothesis. Single nucleotide polymorphisms in the miRNA target site facilitate the implied differential targeting of the transcripts from homologous alleles. (shrink)

Until now post-structuralism and phenomenology are widely regarded as opposites. Contrary to this opinion, I am arguing that they have a lot in common. In order to make my argument, I concentrate on Judith Butler’s poststructuralist concept of performativity to confront it with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological concept of expressivity. While Butler claims that phenomenological theories of expression are in danger of essentialism and thus must be replaced by non-essentialist theories of performativity, I hold that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of expressivity must strictly (...) be understood in anti-essentialist terms. Following this line of interpretation, “expressivity” and “performativity”—as well as phenomenology and post-structuralism—are not opposites but partners in the search for an anti-essentialist gender concept. Consequently, feminist phenomenology turns out to be a non-essentialist approach that combines phenomenological and post-structural insights. (shrink)

Expressives like damn and bastard have, when uttered, an immediate and powerful impact on the context. They are performative, often destructively so. They are revealing of the perspective from which the utterance is made, and they can have a dramatic impact on how current and future utterances are perceived. This, despite the fact that speakers are invariably hard-pressed to articulate what they mean. I develop a general theory of these volatile, indispensable meanings. The theory is built around a class of (...) expressive indices. These determine the expressive setting of the context of interpretation. Expressives morphemes act on that context, actively changing its expressive setting. The theory is multidimensional in the sense that descriptives and expressives are fundamentally different but receive a unified logical treatment. (shrink)

I satisfies its expressive use in the deictic mode. It is the expressive use of any singular term to express thoughts. This requires that the speaker know the positive answer to the question: ‘which individual is being spoken of?’, that is, the term must achieve discriminability of reference for the speaker. Deictic terms require salience if they are to achieve discriminability of reference for the speaker, i.e., it is as the individual made salient that one must identify the (...) referent of a use of a deictic term. It is as the individual made salient that one must identify the referent of a use of I. (shrink)

The book addresses different linguistic and philosophical aspects of referring to the self in a wide range of languages from different language families. It offers an interdisciplinary understanding of expressing the self that comprises philosophy of mind at one end of the spectrum and cross-cultural pragmatics of self-expression at the other.

In the big data era, sequencing technology has produced a large number of biological sequencing data. Different views of the cancer genome data provide sufficient complementary information to explore genetic activity. The identification of differentially expressed genes from multiview cancer gene data is of great importance in cancer diagnosis and treatment. In this paper, we propose a novel method for identifying differentially expressed genes based on tensor robust principal component analysis, which extends the matrix method to the processing of multiway (...) data. To identify differentially expressed genes, the plan is carried out as follows. First, multiview data containing cancer gene expression data from different sources are prepared. Second, the original tensor is decomposed into a sum of a low-rank tensor and a sparse tensor using TRPCA. Third, the differentially expressed genes are considered to be sparse perturbed signals and then identified based on the sparse tensor. Fourth, the differentially expressed genes are evaluated using Gene Ontology and Gene Cards tools. The validity of the TRPCA method was tested using two sets of multiview data. The experimental results showed that our method is superior to the representative methods in efficiency and accuracy aspects. (shrink)

According to an influential view about directed expressive duties (e.g., duties to express gratitude to benefactors, remorse to victims, forgiveness to wrongdoers), these duties do not have rights as their correlates, because they are not demandable and enforceable. The chapter argues that this view is mistaken. Like other directed duties, directed expressive duties are demandable and enforceable. While this does not entail that these duties have rights as their correlates, it does create a strong presumption of this being (...) the case. This shifts the burden of proof from those who hold that expressive duties correlate with rights to those who deny it. (shrink)

Most accounts of the derogatory meaning of slurs are semantic. Recently, Nunberg proposed a purely pragmatic account offering a compelling picture of the relation between derogatory content and social context. Nunberg posits that the semantic content of slurs is identical to that of neutral counterparts, and that derogation is a result of the association of slur use with linguistic conventions of bigoted speakers. The mechanism responsible for it is a special kind of conversational implicature. However, this paper argues that Nunberg’s (...) proposal suffers from technical and conceptual problems regarding the application of the concepts of implicature and convention. It is proposed that the implicature mechanism should be replaced by expressive commitment attribution. The account advocated here preserves crucial insights of Nunberg’s analysis, 25–48, 2013a, Analytic Philosophy 54, 350–363, 2013b; Bolinger Nous, 51, 439–462, 2017), giving them a firmer conceptual basis. It supports a distinction between derogation and offensiveness of slurs that improves on the one proposed by Hom and May, 293–313 2013), and sheds light on puzzling borderline cases: the use of slurs by ignorant speakers and controversies surrounding the status of some words as potentially slurs. (shrink)