Thorough comparison of Immanuel Kant’s and Christian Wolff’s divergent appraisals of the science of psychology reveals various ways in which Kant fundamentally altered the Wolffian philosophical apparatus that he inherited. Wolff conceived of a thoroughgoing interplay between empirical and rational psychology, of combining different sorts of cognition in psychology, and of a mathematical science of the soul, or psychometrics. Kant however rejected each of these particular theses and deemed psychology to be no natural science, “properly so-called.” This chapter details (...) these departures from Wolff, explains their basis, and concretizes an underlying contrast in Kant’s and Wolff’s respective philosophical approaches. Namely, whereas Wolff’s philosophical system is malleable, allowing for the combination of various kinds of cognition and methods, in Kant’s Critical philosophy, everything has its proper, preordained niche. At bottom, it is the unyielding rigor of Kant’s system that results in his pessimistic evaluation of the prospects for psychology. (shrink)

This paper argues that all apparently special forces characteristically reduce to a few fundamental physical forces which conserve energy and operate throughout nature. Consequently, there are probably no special mental forces originating from souls and acting upon bodies and brains in addition to the basic, energy-conserving physical forces. Moreover, physiological and biochemical research have failed to uncover any evidence of forces over and above the basic physical forces acting on living bodies. It is as if all organic processes can (...) be fully accounted for in terms of normal physical forces—that is, as if there are no souls or ethereal doubles interacting with living bodies. -/- 1. The Argument from Fundamental Forces -- 2. The Argument from Physiology -- 3. Conclusion. (shrink)

In this paper, I claim that Kant’s subjective deduction in the first edition of the KrV is to be understood in terms of an investigation of the fundamental force(s) (Grundkraft) of the soul, an investigation essential to Wolffian psychology and much debated throughout Germany in the second half of the 1700’s. I argue that the subjective deduction is indeed presented by means of the exposition of the three-fold syntheses but only insofar as these syntheses are employed as (...) pointers towards each of three original sources of cognition. Only taken as such can we do justice not only to the argument’s unique concern as distinct from that of the objective deduction, but also to its dependence upon the justificatory results of that deduction which was after all Kant’s “primary concern”. (shrink)

In the 1640’s Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes engaged in a philosophically rich correspondence. The most well-known aspect of the correspondence begins with a question Elisabeth asks Descartes about his account of the interaction between soul and body. This objection, often called the ‘problem of interaction’, has received much attention in contemporary scholarship and this attention frequently focuses on the exchange between Elisabeth and Descartes. Following the lead of Descartes himself, the majority of scholars treat the problem of (...) interaction as the core, or even the entirety, of Elisabeth’s objections to Descartes from this stage in the correspondence. In this paper I argue that the driving force of Elisabeth’s objections to Descartes’ account is not the problem of interaction. Rather, Elisabeth’s objections to Descartes fundamentally concern Descartes’ account of the nature of the soul. While Elisabeth clearly offers the problem of interaction, it is only one of several worries each of which is designed to show that Descartes’ account of the soul is insufficient. I argue that Elisabeth raises three distinct problems to Descartes’ account of the nature of the soul: the causal interface problem, the vapors problem and the principal attribute problem. (shrink)

What would Christianity be like without the soul? While most people would expect the Christian bible to reveal a highly traditional opposition of matter and spirit, the spirit forces of the Old and New Testaments are often surprisingly physical, dynamic, and practical, a matter of energy as much as ethics. The Secret History of the Soul examines the forgotten or suppressed models of body, soul, and human consciousness found in the literature, philosophy and scripture of the ancient (...) and classical worlds. It shows how the spirit forces of Homer, Plato, Aristotle, and the Old and New Testaments tended to be quantities not entities, and to be closely bound up with the dynamic physical flux of the human body, rather than cleanly abstracted in some absolute immaterial realm. Forces such as menos and thymos, nephesh, pneuma and dynamis not only blurred the line between body and soul, but were potent and transferable, being used, in New Testament culture, to effect magical cures or bestow magical power. Related to this surprising lack of body-soul dualism is a lack of dualistic afterlife in either Homer or Hebrew scripture, where Hades and Sheol are the sole post-mortem destinations. The Secret History of the Soul restores the living strangeness of a spirit world filled with potent energy and practical magic, in cultures which had not yet glimpsed the abstracted soul of later Christianity. (shrink)

The question as to whether the human soul, in the abundance of its theoretical and practical faculties, possesses a fundamental power which unites them, or combines them, or several or none, was one of the controversial fields of European philosophy between Leibniz and Kant. Johann Nikolaus Tetens has presented an independent solution to this problem. At the same time, Tetens is as far removed from speculative dogmatism as from an empirical psychology of the basic power of the (...) class='Hi'>soul as a self-activity. Tetens formulates, as it were, conditions of the possibility of a knowledge of the human soul, based on experience, without proceeding methodically empirically. (shrink)

In the moment of grief, people need consolation coming from the very core of human existence: living communication with one’s source of being. This communication ensues stories of life-sustaining one’s self-identity and spiritual vitality. When a story of life enlightens one’s experience of grief, it becomes a curative force for one’s soul-healing process. Yet if the life story becomes ineffective, it needs an “editing” process—or a revision—to get a meaning reconstruction that is more compatible with the grief situation. (...) Using a postcolonial ethnography, we evaluate the pastoral care done by Nias Christian Church for people experiencing grief. We will describe a theoretical framework to argue that pastoral care is fundamentally an editing process of the story of life-sustaining the well-being of the human soul. We, then, will describe the Nias tradition on grief. Finally, we will discuss how the church should develop pastoral care interculturally. (shrink)

This article addresses a simple question that has rarely been asked of Kant’s philosophy of nature: why are attraction and repulsion the two fundamental forces of matter? Where proposals can be found in the literature, they are divergent. I provide a new answer, which has strong support from the historical context: Kant pursues a modified version of what I call the ‘reduction method’ that was much debated in the German metaphysical tradition. To this, Kant crucially adds his critical doctrine (...) of regulative ideas, revealing an overlooked way that the Appendix to theCritiqueinforms his philosophy of nature. (shrink)

In the study of the soul between psychology and phenomenology in Edith Stein works it becomes clearer that it is only phenomenology that really comes to gripswith the question of psychic causality by correlating the two moments and it is therefore only phenomenology that can respond to Hume’s objections while yetremaining on his selfsame terrain. It is very important to distinguish between psychology and phenomenology and also to clarify the relationship between psyche and consciousness; there is thus reproposed the (...) distinction already made by Husserl, who stressed that when one sets out to look for the causes that determine psychic life, they must not be sought in life feelings but rather in the „modes” of a life force that is announced in them. All this is indicated here within limits because psychology in itself is undoubtedly not a science of the spirit, though the psychic states, on the other hand, will not be validly understood unless and until one arrives, as is demonstrated in the essay under consideration, at the motivation and therefore the spiritual sphere. We would say that our body is animated by a psyche and further enlivened by the spirit. (shrink)

Ours is an age full of desires but impoverished in its understanding of where those desires lead—an age that claims mastery over the world but also claims to find the world as a whole absurd or unintelligible. In The Vision of the Soul, James Matthew Wilson seeks to conserve the great insights of the western tradition by giving us a new account of them responsive to modern discontents. The western— or Christian Platonist—tradition, he argues, tells us that man is (...) an intellectual animal, born to pursue the good, to know the true, and to contemplate all things in beauty. Wilson begins by reconceiving the intellectual conservatism born of Edmund Burke’s jeremiad against the French Revolution as an effort to preserve the West’s vision of man and the cosmos as ordered by and to beauty. After defining the achievement of that vision and its tradition, Wilson offers an extended study of the nature of beauty and the role of the fine arts in shaping a culture but above all in opening the human intellect to the perception of the form of reality. Through close studies of Theodor W. Adorno and Jacques Maritain, he recovers the classical vision of beauty as a revelation of truth and being. Finally, he revisits the ancient distinction between reason and story-telling, between mythos and logos, in order to rejoin the two. Story-telling is foundational to the forms of the fine arts, but it is no less foundational to human reason. Human life in turn constitutes a specific kind of form—a story form. The ancient conception of human life as a pilgrimage to beauty itself is one that we can fully embrace only if we see the essential correlation between reason and story and the essential convertibility of truth, goodness and beauty in beauty. By turns a study in fundamental ontology, aesthetics, and political philosophy, Wilson’s book invites its readers to a renewal of the West’s intellectual tradition. (shrink)

This Book Brings A Clear And Insightful Presentation Of The Wisdom Of Hinduism In All Its Fundamental Principles.

The fundamental insight that N. Berdyaev obtains in his historiosophical reflections is that history is antinomic and the historical process is catastrophic since it has to end, because “the world cannot exist eternally”. In its global, empirical (objective) dimension, history resembles an absurd comedy “in which nothing ever succeeds”. The idea of history as a long duration (long duree) and permanent progress misses its essence. According to Berdyaev, such history is meaningless, and it has to end. Its true meaning (...) is revealed only in “its end” and “before the face of eternity”. Terrestrial history does not have its epilogue and the final solution in historical time but in celestial history when the boundaries between the immanent and the transcendent world disappear. History is the path to another and different, sublime and spiritual (noumenal) world that lies beyond the boundaries of everything historical. The destiny of man, which lies at the heart of history, assumes a meta-historical goal and a trans-historical solution to the destiny of history in a different, eternal time. To summarize, history has an eschatological meaning. Although there is an unsolvable tragic conflict between the individual human destiny and the destiny of humanity as a whole within the framework of history, Berdyaev, following the entire tradition of Russian religious philosophy, is convinced that the overcoming of that contradiction on the historical level is possible with love as the salvation and the main driving force of the soul and the source of all the spiritual creation of man. (shrink)

Se examina una cuestión fundamental y poco estudiada de la teología política: la relación entre la defensa de la inmortalidad del alma y el mantenimiento del orden público. Se realiza un recorrido histórico por autores como Pietro Pomponazzi y Tomás Moro, que aceptan motivos políticos para defenderla, y David Hume, quien considera que no existe ningún motivo político para mantener dicha relación. Por último, se analizan los argumentos esgrimidos para mostrar que su eficacia está condicionada por la situación histórica. (...) The paper examines a fundamental and little studied issue of political theology: the relationship between the defense of the immortality of the soul and the preservation of public order. It carries out a historical survey of authors such as Pietro Pomponazzi and Thomas More, who resort to political reasons in order to defend it, and David Hume, who feels that there are no political grounds to support such a relationship. Finally, the article analyzes the arguments proposed to show that its efficacy is conditioned by the historical situation. Neste artigo, examina-se uma questão fundamental e pouco estudada da teologia política: a relação entre a defesa da imortalidade da alma e a manutenção da ordem pública. Realiza-se um percorrido histórico por autores como Pietro Pomponazzi e Tomás Moro, que aceitam motivos políticos para defender a imortalidade da alma, e David Hume, que considera não existir nenhum motivo político para manter essa relação. Por último, analisam-se os argumentos discutidos para mostrar que sua eficácia está condicionada pela situação histórica. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION The most remarkable feature of the character of the Persian people is their love of Metaphysical speculation. Yet the inquirer who approaches the extant literature of Persia expecting to find any comprehensive systems of thought, like those of Kapila or Kant, will have to turn back disappointed, though deeply impressed by the wonderful intellectual subtlety displayed therein. It seems to me that the Persian mind is rather impatient of detail, and consequently destitute of that organising faculty which gradually works (...) out a system of ideas, by interpreting the fundamental principles with reference to the ordinary facts of observation. The subtle Brahman sees the inner unity of things; so does the Persian. But while the former endeavours to discover it in all the aspects of human experience, and illustrates its hidden presence in the concrete in various ways, the latter appears to be satisfied with a bare universality, and does not attempt to verify the richness of its inner content. The butterfly imagination of the Persian, flies half-inebriated as it were, from flower to flower, and seems to be incapable of reviewing the garden as a whole. For this reason, his deepest thoughts and emotions find expression mostly in disconnected verses (Ghazal), which reveal all the subtlety of his artistic soul. The Hindu, while admitting, like the Persian, the necessity of a higher source of knowledge, yet calmly moves from experience to experience, mercilessly dissecting them, and forcing them to yield their underlying universality. In fact the Persian is only half-conscious of Metaphysics as a system of thought; his Brahman brother, on the other hand, is fully alive to the need of presenting his theory in the form of a thoroughly reasoned out system. And the result of this mental difference between the two nations is clear. In the one case we have only partially worked out systems of thought; in the other case, the awful sublimity of the searching Vedanta ... (shrink)

Belief in life after death is implicated, for the typical 'Wittgensteinian', with Cartesian dualism, and the latter seen to entail a private inner subject that cannot survive the anti-private language argument. But Descartes does not really suffer from this defect and belief in life after death is not merely a product of 'confused' Cartesian metaphysics. Descartes is presented as an intellectual analogue of the formation of the concept of 'soul' in spiritual contexts. Just as metaphysical reflection forces us to (...) conclude, for Descartes, that we are only contingently flesh and blood beings, so it is only under the condition of recalcitrant experience that exemplary practitioners seem forced to forge a distinction between body and soul, thus revising influentially their view of themselves as single beings both conscious and extended. (shrink)

While there has been a resurgence in Malebranche scholarship in the anglophone world over the last twenty years, most of it has focused on Malebranche’s theory of ideas, and little attention has been paid to his philosophy of mind. Schmaltz’s book thus comes as a welcome addition to the Malebranche literature; that he has given us such a well-researched and carefully argued study is even more welcome. The focus of this work is Malebranche’s split with Descartes on the question of (...) our knowledge of the nature of the mind; the book concentrates specifically on Malebranche’s rejection of the claim that we know the nature of the mind better than we know the nature of body. Schmaltz maintains that Malebranche’s arguments for his position are, for the most part, successful against the Cartesians who opposed him, though he claims—and this is perhaps the central claim of the book—that “Malebranche took his negative thesis concerning our knowledge of the soul to involve not so much a rejection of Cartesianism as an internal correction of it”. While acknowledging that Augustine was “the primary inspiration for [Malebranche’s] view of the ideas that are the objects of perception”, Schmaltz’s interpretation of Malebranche’s theory of the soul “presents it as fundamentally Cartesian”. According to Schmaltz, not only is Malebranche closer to Descartes in this regard than is generally thought, he is closer to him than are many other Cartesians. Part 1 of the book examines Malebranche’s position that while we have certain knowledge of the soul’s existence, we have only confused knowledge of its nature. Part 2 focuses on Arnauld’s objection that if in fact we had no clear idea of the soul, we could not, despite Malebranche’s claims to the contrary, know anything of its immortality, spirituality, or freedom. (shrink)

This paper argues that nonphysical souls would violate fundamental physical laws if they were able to influence brain events. Though we have no idea how nonphysical souls might operate, we know quite a bit about how brains work, so we can consider each of the ways that an external force could interrupt brain processes enough to control one’s body. It concludes that there is no way that a nonphysical soul could interact with the brain—neither by introducing new (...) energy into the physical world, nor by borrowing existing energy from it—without apparently violating one or more basic laws of physics, such as the law of conservation of energy. And despite widespread appeals to quantum mechanics to give interactionism an air of scientific respectability, the essential randomness of quantum processes prohibits the distinctly nonrandom influence that a nonphysical soul must have on brain events in order to control the body, and quantum mechanical uncertainty is not great enough to allow neurons to fire action potentials. -/- 1. Introduction -- 2. How the Brain Works -- 3. Mind-Brain Interaction Mechanisms - 3.1 Opening Sodium Channels - 3.2 Altering Voltage Gradients - 3.3 Synaptic Transmission - 3.3.1 The Presynaptic Neuron - 3.3.2 The Post-Synaptic Neuron - 3.3.3 The Beck and Eccles Models - 3.4 Neuronal Modulation - 3.5 Self-Generation of Action Potentials by Neurons -- 4. Harnessing Energy -- 5. How Many Action Potentials for a Volitional Act? -- 6. Input: From Brain to Nonphysical Mind -- 7. Discussion -- Appendix A: Opening Gates on Membrane Channels - A.1 Directly Opening Gates - A.2 Changing Voltage Across the Membrane -- Appendix B: The Biochemical Approach. (shrink)

The article highlights the conceptual issues related to Kant’s analysis of the soul, a concept of utmost importance for the metaphysics and psychology of German academic philosophy (Schulphilosophie) of the Enlightenment was significantly dependent on the developed and systematically presented philosophical and scientific ideas and concepts of Christian Wolff. Kantian philosophy, its themes, and conceptual language were formed in the crucible of Wolfean discourse, and from the early 1770s in the struggle against it, which led to the emergence of (...) a new, critical philosophy – transcendental idealism, in which the problem of the soul, consciousness, and self-awareness became fundamental. It is this issue that was thoroughly covered in the «Critique of Pure Reason» and other works that were published later, after the first Critique. The article draws attention to Kant’s Lectures, which, on the one hand, demonstrate his critical attitude towards the so-called Wolfians, their metaphysics, and psychology, and, on the other hand, the lecture materials illustrate Kant's new conceptual position, and, what is important, develop, supplement and clarify it. The sources of Kant’s lectures are highlighted, taking into account the fact that we have at our disposal lecture notes, the authors of which are either unknown or, if known, their authorship is still somewhat doubtful, since they are notes that different people have rewritten. The article analyses lecture notes on psychology, the authors of which are more or less well-known, and experts recognize these notes as quite valid. The conceptual content of these lectures allows us to look at Kant’s understanding of the problem of the soul in a somewhat broader context compared to the «Critique of Pure Reason», where this problem is analyzed in connection with the paralogisms of reason and the transcendental deduction of categories. In his lectures on psychology, Kant draws attention to the problem of the interaction of the soul with the human body, the «location of the soul», linking it not so much to the organs of the human body (for example, the head) as to the location of a person as a bodily being in the world makes all acts of consciousness, self-awareness, and sense perception possible. Kant emphasizes the basic importance of such a spatial location of a person for the soul, as something that belongs to a person with a certain integrity, and not a separate organ, to act properly, to perform its cognitive functions. The article analyses the problem of existence, which is important for critical philosophy, its various modalities, and predication, with a special emphasis on the problem of the existence of metaphysical objects - the soul, God, and the world as a whole. (shrink)

This book explores the interrelation of facts and norms. How does law originate in the first place? What lies at the roots of this phenomenon? How is it preserved? And how does it come to an end? Questions like these led Georg Jellinek to speak of the “normative force of the factual” in the early 20th century, emphasizing the human tendency to infer rules from recurring events, and to perceive a certain practice not only as a fact but as (...) a norm; a norm which not only allows us to distinguish regularity from irregularity, but at the same time, to treat deviances as transgressions. Today, Jellinek’s concept still provides astonishing insights on the dichotomy of “is” and “ought to be”, the emergence of the normative, the efficacy and the defeasibility of norms, and the distinct character of what legal theorists refer to as “normativity”. It leads us back to early legal history, it connects anthropology and legal theory, and it demonstrates the interdependence of law and the social sciences. In short: it invites us to fundamentally reassess the interrelation of facts and norms from various perspectives. The contributing authors to this volume have accepted that invitation. (shrink)

Much has been written on Derrida’s and Butler's discussions of Austin’s speech act theory, but one thing at least remains unclear: why does performativity hinge on the notion of “force,” and what “force” are we here talking about? For Austin, the force of the performative signals a performative enforcement, a validating repetition of prior conditions of legitimation: it testifies to the “felicity” or “success” of the performative event.According to Derrida, this articulation between force and success closes (...) off the eventness of the event; it implies an ontological reduction and reconstruction, that is, an appropriation of the event in the form of performative power. However, the performative, if it is to truly produce an event, must exceed prior conditions of validation and transform, in its performance, the conditions of validity it was meant to repeat. Eventness must remain beyond and without power. In this perspective, the article explores the “force” which Derrida describes as “force of the event”: an excessive force in the face of which “performative force” must fail. At bottom undecidable, “the force of the event” suggests the fallibility of force and the force of fallibility. I compare this self-deconstructive notion of force with Butler’s subversive politics of the performative, which theorizes “performative force” as the force of a failure – but a successful failure – to comply with the norm: a non-normative repetition and a reappropriation that forces change, and of which “queer” is at once the example, the model, and the very name. While Derrida’s is an attempt to think the uncanny force of a strange, non-appropriable, non-ontologizable, and perhaps “queer” event or quasi-event, characterized by fallibility and undecidability, Butler’s theory of power and her notion of “performative force” reverse, but fundamentally maintain, Austin’s ontological oppositions between success and failure, legitimacy and illegitimacy, repetition and change. (shrink)

As a continuation of this author’s previous cosmological neuroscience papers on the hypothesized Soul of Multiverse and its possible laws, the present work examined the social aspects of four of these laws. The following key aspects were recognized: (1) Knowing about the cosmic Law of Coexistence in Diversity can let our mind respect not only the endless diversity of human beings but also the cohesive force of space-time in which all are connected. This may help realizing the superiority (...) of cooperation for shared goals over competition for gaining by harming others. (2) Knowing about the cosmic Law of Truth in Complexity can ready our mind to confront the problems of societies with the understanding that these problems are much more complex than generally thought. This may help initiating the needed intellectual renaissance of the 21st century. (3) Knowing about the cosmic Law of Divine - Evil Asymmetry can make our mind appreciate the slight yet sufficient supremacy of divine over evil. This may help restoring faith in the eventual creation of a just society, where social justice is defined as an administrative mechanism providing the right conditions for every human being to accomplish his or her Conscience-led Mission throughout life, while allowing each of these accomplishments to be reciprocated with the gratitude it induced in the involved social systems, small or large, to let equal opportunities in life coexist with due diversity in welcomed, not abused, social recognitions. And (4) knowing about the cosmic Law of Lives to Transcend can empower our mind to build on these advances. This may help moving evolution towards the human species worthy of its origin and destination. (shrink)

The component structures of two distinct neuropsychological systems are described. "System-Y" depends upon "system-X" which, on the other hand, can operate independently of system-Y. System-X provides a matrix upon which system-Y must operate, and, system-Y is transformed by the operations of system-X. In addition these neuropsychological structures reverberate in political history and in the cosmos. The most fundamental structure in the soul, in society, and in the cosmos, has the form of a conical spiral. It can be described (...) mathematically as an harmonic system and mythologically in terms of the birth, marriage and death of the divine-king. ;System-Y corresponds to the neocortex. System-X corresponds to the region below the cortex including the limbic brain. Many of the essential structures of system-Y are captured by Plato's image of the helmsman: orientation, locomotion, manual control and dexterity, visual guidance, verbal command, intention, and volition. System-X on the other hand has been systematically neglected by Western culture, beginning with Plato. ;The dissertation builds upon Yakovlev's distinction between "teleokinesis," "ectokinesis" and "endokinesis." "Teleokinesis" refers to goal-directed action in external space, and belongs to system-Y. Ectokinesis and endokinesis are components of system-X. "Endokinesis" refers to movements within the body. "Ectokinesis" refers to the emotions, which are expressions of endokinesis. The mechanics of ectokinesis is that of an harmonic or vibrational system, as is the mechanics of a musical instrument. ;Within a trance the structure of system-Y is temporarily altered, such that system-X enters the foreground of awareness. Because ectokinesis is analogous to music cultures inspired by trance experience understand the universe in terms of music. The structure of ectokinesis in a trance is that of a conical spiral. Plato inherited the mystical traditions of the ancient Near East but replaced the spiral of emotions with a spiral of ideas , by understanding the axis of the cone as the paradigmatic dimension, and the angular rotation of the spiral as the syntagmatic dimension, of language. Finally I explain how the mythology and political structure of theocratic society imitated the neuropsychological structures of trance experience. (shrink)

Most contemporary philosophers are physicalists. They believe that, in a relevant sense, everything (including tables, clouds, cars, the universe and even our sensations) is ultimately physical. Recently, mainly because of David J. Chalmers' influential work on phenomenal consciousness (Chalmers 1996), some philosophers have started to take property dualism more seriously (the thesis that the mental and the physical are two fundamentally distinct kinds of property). They think that while there are a number of strong arguments for physicalism, the physical sciences (...) might not be able to account for everything in the world. However, very few contemporary philosophers take substance dualism seriously (the thesis that the mental--what Swinburne calls the soul--and the physical are two distinct kinds of substance that interact with each other). (shrink)

Most men experience from time to time a wish to know something about the character of the larger reality in which they live, move, and have their being; something much more fundamental than any department of research classed as “scientific” can provide. And the most incurably practical of us has good reason for cherishing this wish. Metaphysics, i.e. inquiry into the general nature of reality, makes appeal first to the contemplative student interested in knowledge for its own sake, but (...) it has a very noteworthy practical side as well. Few, like Earl Russell, can build the soul”s habitation on a “foundation of unyielding despair”; very many will not take life seriously unless its value, which must be lasting, is high. The problems stated by pessimism have to be solved; our burdens must be shown to be worth taking up strenuously. Religious consolations, once potent, are losing their force, and the danger of social decay has therefore to be countered. Let man suspect seriously that he is a day-fly, flitting about futilely a short while ere it perishes, and, whatever a few wild optimists may counsel, his big battalions are lost to progress. The East is right. (shrink)

Kepler is mainly known among historians of science for his astronomical theories and his approaches to problems having to do with philosophy of science and ontology. This paper attempts to contribute to Kepler studies by providing a discussion of a topic not frequently considered, namely Kepler’s theory of the soul, a general theory of knowledge whose central problem is what makes knowledge possible, rather than what makes knowledge true, as happens in the case of Descartes’s and Bacon’s epistemologies. Kepler’s (...) theory consists of four issues: the theory of the different sorts of soul—that is, the human soul, the animal soul, the vegetable soul, and the Earth soul—concerning their faculties, the differences and the resemblances emerging among them, the relation they maintain with their own bodies and the world, and the distinction soul–world. The paper discusses these issues from a historical perspective, that is, it reconstructs the way they appear in three periods of Kepler’s career: the period prior to the publication of the Mysterium cosmographicum, the period from 1596 to 1611, and the period of the Harmonices mundi libri V. Finally, Kepler’s epistemology is briefly contrasted with Descartes’s and Bacon’s in order to suggest that Kepler’s could be seen as a third way to understand the philosophical origins of Modernity.Keywords: Johannes Kepler; René Descartes; Francis Bacon; Anima; Force; Animism. (shrink)

'The problem of the twentieth-century is the problem of the color-line.' Originally published in 1903, The Souls of Black Folk is a classic study of race, culture, and education at the turn of the twentieth century. With its singular combination of essays, memoir, and fiction, this book vaulted W. E. B. Du Bois to the forefront of American political commentary and civil rights activism. The Souls of Black Folk is an impassioned, at times searing account of the situation of African (...) Americans in the United States. Du Bois makes a forceful case for the access of African Americans to higher education, memorably extols the achievements of black culture (above all the spirituals or 'sorrow songs'), and advances the provocative and influential argument that due to the inequalities and pressures of the 'race problem', African American identity is characterized by 'double consciousness'. This edition includes a valuable appendix of other writing by Du Bois, which sheds light on his attitudes and intentions. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant discusses the problem of the soul in different ways in all of his Critiques. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant points out the limits of the soul in the subject’s understanding. In Critique of Practical Reason, the concept of the soul assists in the regulation of moral issues, and in the Critique of Judgement Kant sees the soul as a creative faculty and the power of the subject which is a force for (...) good if it is used with moderation. The emphasis of the paper is on Kant’s understanding of “the immortal soul” found in the second Critique as a necessary assistance in the appreciation of the moral law. (shrink)

One of the key concepts in modern science is force (F). In present studies on the history of dynamics, Patricius is either completely omitted or only cursorily mentioned. The aim of this text is to show that Patricius’s concept of the soul, as he developed it in his Nova de universis philosophia from 1591, comes close to the modern (i.e. Newtonian) understanding of force. This should support the more general position that one of the most intriguing aspects (...) of Patricius’s philosophy is his contribution to the emergence of modern science. (shrink)

In The Soul of Socrates Nalin Ranasinghe seeks to “reconstruct the uncanny experience of meeting” Socrates, which has been “lost in the verdant groves of academia”, by emphasizing the philosopher’s humanity, playfulness, and resoluteness in the face of modern nihilistic challenges of “fundamentalism” and “rampant materialism”. In so doing Ranasinghe challenges several current factions in Platonic scholarship, including postmodern philosophers who merely “read Plato with a view to displaying their own cleverness and urbanity,” as well as analytical philosophers who (...) “may interrogate the dialogues with the same rigor that they would lavish on a professional colleague, but... fail to see the dramatic unity of a dialogue”. Ranasinghe also sets himself apart from other scholars who “are keenly aware that a Platonic dialogue is as much a dramatic performance as a logical argument,” and yet whose interpretations paradoxically “lead to a very skeptical opinion of Socrates”. Taking his cues from such “giants” as Stanley Rosen, Leo Strauss, and Jacob Klein, Ranasinghe returns to several early Platonic dialogues, including the Republic, Protagoras, Phaedo, and Symposium, in order to “derive a more positive view of the human condition” and of Socrates’ way of life generally speaking. This positive view sees Socrates as a teacher of philosophic eros, which reflects a perennial tension between poros and penia, plenty and need, and is yet at the same time a “transcendental force that attunes the loving soul to the cosmos”. (shrink)

In his new book, Fred Schauer adopts a prototypical approach to the law in order to reestablish the importance of “The Force of Law”, and I strongly support his claim that there are interesting things to be said about the relationship between law and force. One aspect concerns the special kind of force to which the law is related. In the tradition of political philosophy, this kind of force has often been characterized with the state's monopoly (...) on legitimate force. Whereas the essay will support the idea that the law has a monopoly of force, it will challenge the idea that it is its legitimacy that makes it characteristic. It is a monopoly not so much on legitimate, but on ultimate force. The robustness of the force the law is—prototypically—related to, however, should not obscure the fact that the relation between law and force is quite delicate and precarious. Three strategies of the law to manage this fundamental precariousness are pointed out. (shrink)

Commentators usually agree that Locke's discussion of thinking matter is intended to undermine the plausibility of the belief in the existence of the soul. In this paper I argue that, instead of trying to reveal the implausibility of this belief, Locke seeks to rid the concept of the soul of its traditional cognitive and moral functions in order to render references to the soul redundant in philosophical explanations of the nature of human beings and their place in (...) the world. On this reading, the driving force behind Locke's discussion is not a sceptical problem posed by the impossibility of proving the existence of the soul, but the wish to maximize the ability of limited creatures such as ourselves to engage positively with their lives in the here and now. Locke's experience-focused philosophy will here present itself as a position with significant moral implications. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 35.1 (2005) 8-21MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Klossowski's Reading of Nietzsche Impulses, Phantasms, Simulacra, StereotypesDaniel W. SmithIn his writings on Nietzsche, Pierre Klossowski makes use of various concepts—such as intensities, phantasms, simulacra and stereotypes, resemblance and dissemblance, gregariousness and singularity—that have no place in Nietzsche's own oeuvre. These concepts are Klossowski's own creations, his own contributions to thought. Although Klossowski consistently refused to characterize himself as a philosopher ("Je (...) suis une 'maniaque,'" he once said, "Un point, c'est tout!"),1 his work in its entirety was marked by an extraordinary conceptual creation. From this point of view, his Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle can be read as a work in philosophy—at least in the idiosyncratic sense given to this term by Gilles Deleuze, who defined philosophy as the creation or invention of concepts [Deleuze and Guattari 2]. No doubt, Klossowski remains an almost unclassifiable figure—philosopher, novelist, essayist, translator, artist—and attempting to analyze his work through the prism of philosophy may seem to be a reductive approach that belies the complexity of his exceptional oeuvre. Reading Klossowski as a conceptual innovator, however, at least has the advantage of allowing us to chart a consistent trajectory through his difficult and often labyrinthine text, without denying its other dimensions (affective, perceptive, literary, and so on). In what follows, then, I would like to examine three of Klossowski's most characteristic and important concepts—impulses and their intensities, phantasms, and simulacra and their stereotypes—as well as the precise interrelations he establishes among them. Taken together, these three concepts describe what Klossowski terms the tripartite economy of soul, which constitutes the implicit model through which he interprets Nietzsche's thought.1Impulses as Fluctuating IntensitiesKlossowski describes his books on both Nietzsche and Sade as "essays devoted not to ideologies but to the physiognomies of problematic thinkers who differ greatly from each other" ["Postface" 137, emphasis added]. This emphasis on the "physiognomy" of thinkers reflects Nietzsche's insistence on taking the body rather than the mind as a guide for philosophy since the body is a more accessible phenomenon, less surrounded by myth and superstition. "The body and physiology as the starting point," Nietzsche wrote. "Why?... The phenomenon of the body is the richer, clearer, more tangible [End Page 8] phenomenon.... Belief in the body is more fundamental than belief in the soul" [WP §§492, 489, 491]. Klossowski himself, however, when writing of the intensive status of the impulses, frequently makes use of the term "soul" (âme), owing in part, no doubt, to his interest in the theological literature of the mystics, such as Meister Eckhardt and Teresa of Avila. For the mystics, the depth of the soul is something irreducible and uncreated: it eludes the exercise of the created intellect, and can only be grasped negatively.2 Nonetheless, if one can find a similar apophaticism (or "negative theology") in Klossowski, it is related exclusively to the immanent and chaotic movements of the soul's intensive affects, and not to the transcendence of God. What is incommunicable in the soul (or body) are its "impulses"—their fluctuations of intensity, their rises and falls, their manic elations and depressive descents, which are in constant variation.Nietzsche himself had recourse to a highly varied vocabulary to describe what Klossowski summarizes in the term "impulse": "drive" (Triebe), "desire" (Begierden), "instinct" (Instinke), "power" (Mächte), "force" (Kräfte), "impulse" (Reize, Impulse), "passion" (Leidenschaften), "feeling" (Gefülen), "affect" (Affekte), "pathos" (Pathos), and so on.3 Klossowski frequently employs the musical term tonalité to describe these states of the soul's fluctuating intensities—their diverse tones, timbres, and changing amplitudes—which can take on various forms ("aggressiveness, tolerance, intimidation, anguish, the need for solitude, the forgetting of oneself" [NVC 6]). At bottom, what these impulses express are what Klossowski calls the "obstinate singularity" of the human soul, which is by nature noncommunicable; they constitute "the unexchangeable depth" (le fond inéchangeable) or "the unintelligible depth" (le fond unintelligible) of the soul. What makes every individual... (shrink)

Introduction -- The form of happiness -- Affirmation -- Beauty is everywhere -- Love of life -- Fundamental OK -- The uniqueness of each moment -- Taste -- Spontaneity -- The reality of reality -- Healing -- Beauty cures -- Creative expression -- Nature and music -- The invisible ally -- The heart of beauty -- Sharing -- The beauty of the soul -- Good and beautiful -- Aesthetics and biology -- Knowledge -- Mind and beauty -- Revelation (...) -- Hidden resonance -- Trascendence -- Self, nature, and society -- Abuse vs. awe -- Beauty is the opposite of war. (shrink)

이 글은 초기 셸링의 자연철학이 동력학적 자연학임을 근원적 힘들에 관한 논의를 중심으로 해명하는 데 있다. 동력학적 자연학으로서 셸링의 자연철학은 다음과 같은 특성을 지닌다. 1) 운동은 정지로부터 나올 수 있다. 2) 모든 기계론적 운동은 근원적 운동으로부터 파생된 2차적 운동이다. 3) 근원적 운동은 근원적 힘들에서 유래한다. 셸링은 근원적 힘들인 인력과 척력을 통해 물질의 다양성을 양적 운동, 질적 운동, 상대적 운동으로 구성한다. 특히, 질적 운동은 화학적 운동을 통한 동력학의 자유로운 운동이다. 셸링은 자연을 주체로서 간주한다. 다시 말해, 자연은 생산물이 아닌 생산성으로 간주된다. 그러나 자연의 (...) 근원적 개념을 통해서 전체 자연은 생산물과 생산성의 동일성을 통해 규정된다. 동력학적 단계들은 생산물의 이중성과 동일성을 통해 자연의 보편적 범주들인 자기성, 전기성, 화학적 과정으로 전개된다. 이것은 무기적 생산물과 유기적 생산물의 차이를 나타낸다. 무기적 생산물에서 유기적 생산물로의 이행은 생산물에 의한 생산성의 제한으로부터 생긴다. 따라서 생산물의 유기적 형성은 팽창과 수축의 교체에 기인한다. 특히, 개체로서의 유기체는 유기적 생산물로서 감수성, 자극성, 형성충동을 거쳐 형성된다. 동력학적 관점에 의하면, 유기체는 감수성과 자극성의 상호작용, 감수성과 생산력의 상호작용, 자극성과 생산력의 상호작용을 통해 전개된다. 따라서 무기적 자연에서 유기적 자연으로의 이행은 잠세력을 통해 증명된다. 결론적으로 동력학적 자연학으로서의 셸링의 자연철학은 자연전체를 근원적 힘들로부터 설명하기 때문에, 결국 유기체에 연관되면서, 경험과 사변의 경계에서 근원적 힘들에 의한 이중성과 동일성으로 해명된다. (shrink)

While Heidegger privileges the role of language ( logos ) as the condition for being-in-the-world, the fundamental ontology ignores how logos is informed by our bodily comportment to the world as animals. This capacity for logos ultimately depends upon the capacities we share with members of other animal species. Although Aristotle privileges logos as distinctive to the human being, logos also maintains an aporetic relationship to the other capacities of the soul. If we are to reexamine Heidegger’s debt (...) to Aristotle, we might begin by retrieving Heidegger’s interpretation of logos as an ontological problem for distinguishing Dasein from animal life. (shrink)

The spirited part, thumos, plays a complex and often disputed role in Plato's account of the soul. The doctrine of the soul as specifically tri‐partitioned seems to depend on a substantial conception of thumos as fundamental and non‐reducible. Building on John Cooper's contribution in the discussion of the topic, this article aims to show that the role of thumos is characterised by an indispensable, deep‐rooted urge for dignified self‐preservation. The view is supported by Plato's own examples, and (...) discussed with regards to Myles Burnyeat's account of thumos as an essentially social phenomenon. The main claim is that in order to preserve the Platonist idea of thumos as fundamental one should discard Burnyeat's characterisation of thumos as unequivocally social, and instead advocate a view of thumos as concerned with a particular form of self‐preservation, which Cooper's account suggests, but does not fully elaborate. (shrink)

This book examines the success of Frederick Schauer’s efforts to reclaim force as a core element of a general concept of law by approaching the issue from different legal traditions and distinct perspectives. In discussing Schauer’s main arguments, it contributes to answering the question whether force, sanctions and coercion should be regarded as necessary elements of the concept of law, and whether legal philosophy should be concerned at all with necessary or essential properties. While it was long assumed (...) that legal norms are essentially defined by their force, it was H.L.A. Hart who raised doubts about whether law and coercion are necessarily connected, referring to the empowering, or more generally enabling, character exhibited by some legal norms. Prominent scholars following and refining Hart’s argument built an influential case for excluding force as a necessary element of the concept of law. Most recently, however, Frederick Schauer has made a strong case to reaffirm the force of law, shedding new light on this essential question. This book collects important commentaries, never before published, by prominent legal philosophers evaluating Schauer’s substantive arguments and his claims about jurisprudential methodology. (shrink)

A new understanding of Kant’s theory of a priori knowledge and his natural philosophy emerges from Jeffrey Edwards’s mature and penetrating study. In the Third Analogy of Experience, Kant argues for the existence of a dynamical plenum in space. This argument against empty space demonstrates that the dynamical plenum furnishes an a priori necessary condition for our experience and knowledge of an objective world. Such an a priori existence proof, however, transgresses the limits Kant otherwise places on transcendental arguments in (...) the _Critique of Pure Reason_ because it establishes a _material_ transcendental condition of possible experience. This finding motivates Edwards to examine the broader context of Kant’s views about matter, substance, causal influence, and physical aether in connection with the developmental history of his theory of transcendental idealism. Against the backdrop of early modern metaphysics and contemporaneous physical theory, Edwards explicates the origins of the Third Analogy in Kant’s early work on the metaphysics of nature. The argument against empty space presented in the Third Analogy reveals a central aspect of Kant’s transcendental theory of experience that Edwards explains lucidly. By clarifying the epistemological standpoint at issue in the Third Analogy, he shows that the fundamental revisions to which Kant subjects his theory of knowledge in the _Opus postumum_ not only originate in his precritical metaphysics of nature but are developments of an argument central to the _Critique of Pure Reason_ itself. Edwards’s work is important to scholars working in the history of philosophy and the history and philosophy of science, as well as to Kant specialists. (shrink)

Cynthia Willett brings together diverse insights from social psychology, classical and contemporary literature, and legal and justice theory to redefine the basis of the moral and legal person. Feminists, communitarians, and postmodern thinkers have made clear that classical liberalism, with its emphasis on individual autonomy and excessive rationalism, is severely limited. Although she is sympathetic with the liberal view, Willett finds it necessary to go further. For her, attention to the social dimensions of the family and civil society is critical (...) if issues of race, gender, class, and sexuality are to be taken seriously. Interdependency, not autonomy, is of increasing significance in an era of globalization. Willett proposes an alternate normative theory that recognizes the impact of social forces on individual well-being. Citizenship in a democracy should not be defined solely on the basis of rights to autonomy, such as bare rights to property or free speech, she explains. Rather, citizenship should be defined first of all in terms of the rights, responsibilities, and capacities of the social person. It is within the African American tradition of political thought that Willett finds a more useful definition of human identity and political freedom. The African American experience offers a compelling vision of social change and a deeper understanding of what it means to be a social person. By focusing on everyday battles against racism, Willett contends, we can gain valuable insight into the meaning of justice. (shrink)

Sensibility: the indeterminacy of the imagination -- Praxis: the practice of the subject -- Play: the operation of force -- Aestheticization: the transformation of praxis -- Aesthetics: philosophy's contention -- Ethics: the freedom of self-creation.

A groundbreaking examination of Michel Foucault's history of truth. Many blame Michel Foucault for our post-truth and conspiracy-laden society. In this provocative work, Daniele Lorenzini argues that such criticism fundamentally misunderstands the philosopher’s project. Foucault did not question truth itself but what Lorenzini calls “the force of truth,” or how some truth claims are given the power to govern our conduct while others are not. This interest, Lorenzini shows, drove Foucault to articulate a new ethics and politics of truth-telling (...) precisely in order to evade the threat of relativism. The Force of Truth explores this neglected dimension of Foucault’s project by putting his writings on regimes of truth and parrhesia in conversation with early analytic philosophy and by drawing out the “possibilizing” elements of Foucault’s genealogies that remain vital for practicing critique today. (shrink)

The existing research aims to seek the herding effects on stock returns at the industry level in Pakistan Stock Exchange. Moreover, the relationship between stock returns and herding has been studied by taking some macroeconomic and fundamental control variables. Herding is actually imitating other’s behaviour. This phenomenon indicates a situation where the investors follow the crowed and ignores their personal information, despite knowing the correctness of their information. Herd behaviour may drive from fundamental factors leading to efficient markets. (...) However, it may not be associated with fundamental information causing unstable prices. The stock price data of PSX listed companies from 1999 to 2017 have been the point of focus. The underlying herding measure was the cross-sectional absolute deviation, proposed by Chang et al.. The significant analysis technique facilitating the current research is pooled mean group /panel autoregressive distributed lag approach. Findings revealed that some sectors are evident for positive effect of herding on stock returns, whereas some others are witnessed for its negative effects on stock returns, in both long run and short run. As far as the control variables are concerned, they demonstrated both significant and insignificant effects on stock returns in different sectors of PSX. The study has important implications for policymakers. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Plato and Pythagoreanism by Phillip Sidney HorkyGabriele CornelliPhillip Sidney Horky. Plato and Pythagoreanism. Oxford University Press, 2013. xxi + 305 pp. Cloth, $74.Ceci n’est pas un livre sur Pythagore. With these clever and rather playful words, Horky’s book starts its literary journey through a wide range of Pythagorean sources, including Epicharmus, Empedocles, Philolaus, Eurytus and Arquitas, and Pythagorean themes, like numbers, immortality of the soul, limitness/unlimitness, among (...) others.From this explosive incipit, one would think that Horky agrees with Kahn’s almost forty-year-old observation about the fact that new theories of Pythagoreanism are not necessary in our present day and age (1974, 163, n. 6):It’s hard enough to satisfy minimal standards of historical rigor in discussing the Pythagoreans, without introducing arbitrary guesswork of this sort where no two students can come to the same conclusion on the basis of the same evidence. In fact, the direct testimony for Pythagorean doctrines is all too abundant. The task for a serious scholarship is not to enrich these data by inventing new theories or unattested stages of development but to sift the evidence so as to determine which items are most worthy (or least unworthy) of belief.On the contrary, however, Horky’s approach seems surprisingly to direct the reader towards a fundamentally historiographical rather than philological brand of work, that is, one devoted neither exclusively to the exegesis of Pythagorean sources nor even to the theoretical approach of one of the themes that received specific contributions from Pythagoreanism, such as mathematics, cosmology, politics, or the theory of the immortal soul. This is mainly true when one recognizes, from the title on, that the main goal of the book is to try to determine, once and for all, what is the extent of Pythagorean influence on Plato’s thought. Rather an historiographical problem, I would say. And a good one.In order to do so, Horky needs to trace down a sort of history of mathematical Pythagoreanism from a huge variety of informed ancient sources and perspectives. Horky’s approach to the sources is well-grounded, not only in Burkert’s fundamental works, but also in the recent revival in Pythagorean studies which took over ancient philosophy scholarship in the last two decades: Huffmann’s works on Philolaus (1993) and Arquitas (2005); Zhmud (1997) and Kahn (2001) on early Pythagoreans; Riedweg on Pythagoras (2002), among many others. After the publishing of Horky’s book, two sorts of Companions to Pythagoreanism confirm the trend of the revival: Cornelli, McKirahan, and Macris (2013), acts of the On Pythagoreanism seminar held in Brasilia by Archai [End Page 353] UNESCO Chair, and Huffman (2014). Luckily, Pythagorean scholarship has now gotten rid of that old-fashioned scepticism, starting from Zeller’s famous statement that the relevant sources are a “mixture of fables and poetry.” As Horky’s book seems to suggest, the job can be done. And he has definitely proved to be able to force his way through, with both clear philological arguments and refined historiographical hypotheses.Not surprisingly, a work on Plato and Pythagoreanism starts with a chapter on Aristotle: “Aristotle on Mathematical Pythagoreanism in the Fourth Century BCE” (chap. 1). The idea of the chapter is to rely on Aristotle’s distinction between the mathematical and acousmatic branches of Pythagoreanism. While acousmatic Pythagoreans supposedly did not engage in demonstration, the so-called mathematical Pythagoreans engaged in investigations based on mathemata in order to give an account (the reason why of the world they perceived). Horky seems to drive Aristotle’s account to a specific goal: mathematical Pythagoreans would have established some kind of correspondence between numbers and sensibles, and their ontology would have a direct relation to social and political organization.Chapter 2, “Hippasus of Metapontum and Mathematical Pythagoreanism,” is entirely dedicated to the account of the later doxographical tradition on Hippasus, the alleged progenitor of mathematical Pythagoreanism. Avoiding the risk of falling into the “bottomless pit” of research on the Pythagoreans—in Guthrie’s famous words (1962, 146, n. 1)—Horky manages his inquiry boldly and in a quite elegant way. Between the peripatetic systematization and the platonic derivation of Hippasus’ philosophy, Hippasus... (shrink)

"Margaret L. King has put together a highly representative selection of readings from most of the more significant—but by no means the most obvious—texts by the authors who made up the movement we have come to call the 'Enlightenment.' They range across much of Europe and the Americas, and from the early seventeenth century until the end of the eighteenth. In the originality of the choice of texts, in its range and depth, this collection offers both wide coverage and striking (...) insights into the intellectual transformation which has done more than any other to shape the world in which we live today. It is _simply the best introduction to the subject now available_."_ —Anthony Pagden, UCLA, and author of _The Enlightenment and Why It Still Matters_ Contents:_ Chronology, Introduction _Chapter One - Casting Out Idols: 1620–1697_ _Idols, or false notions: _Francis Bacon, _The New Instrument_ _I think, therefore I am: _René Descartes, Discourse on Method _God, or Nature: _Baruch Spinoza, _Ethics_ _The system of the world: _Isaac Newton, _Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy_ _He searched for truth throughout his life: _Pierre Bayle, _Historical and Critical Dictionary_ _Chapter Two - _The Learned Maid: 1638–1740 _A face raised toward heaven:_ Anna Maria van Schurman, _Whether the Study of Letters Befits a Christian Woman_ _The worlds I have made:_ Margaret Cavendish, _The Blazing World_ _A finer sort of cattle:_ Bathsua Makin, _An Essay to Revive the Ancient Education of Gentlewomen_ _I warn you of the world:_ Madame de Maintenon, _Letter: On the Education of the Demoiselles of Saint-Cyr_, and _Instruction: On the World_ _The daybreak of your reason:_ Émilie Du Châtelet, _Fundamentals of Physics_ _Chapter Three - _A State of Perfect Freedom: 1689–1695 _The chief criterion of the True Church:_ John Locke, _Letter on Toleration_ _Freedom from any superior power on earth:_ John Locke, _Second Treatise on Civil Government_ _A white paper, with nothing written on it:_ John Locke, _Essay Concerning Human Understanding_ _Let your rules be as few as possible:_ John Locke, _Some Thoughts Concerning Education_ _From death, Jesus Christ restores all to life:_ John Locke, _The Reasonableness of Christianity, as Delivered in the Scriptures_ _Chapter Four - All Things Made New: 1725–1784_ _In the wilderness, they are reborn:_ Giambattista Vico, _The New Science_ _Without these Names, nothing can be known,_ Carl Linnaeus, _System of Nature_ _All the clouds at last are lifted:_ Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, _The Successive Advancement of the Human Mind_ _A genealogical or encyclopedic tree of knowledge:_ Jean le Rond d’Alembert, _Preliminary Discourse_ _Dare to know! :_ Immanuel Kant, _What Is Enlightenment?_ _Chapter Five - Mind, Soul, and God: 1740–1779_ _The narrow limits of human understanding:_ David Hume, _Anof a Book Lately Published_ _The soul is but an empty word:_ Julien Offray de La Mettrie, _Man a Machine_ _All is reduced to sensation:_ Claude Adrien Helvétius, _On the Mind_ _An endless web of fantasies and falsehoods:_ Paul-Henri Thiry, baron d’Holbach, _Common Sense_ _Let each believe that his own ring is real:_ Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, _Nathan the Wise_ _Chapter Six - Crush That Infamous Thing: 1733–1764_ _This is the country of sects:_ Voltaire, _Philosophical Letters_ _Disfigured by myth, until enlightenment comes:_ Voltaire, _The Culture and Spirit of Nations_ _The best of all possible worlds:_ Voltaire, _Candide_ _Are we not all children of the same God?:_ Voltaire, _Treatise on Tolerance_ _If a book displeases you, refute it! :_ Voltaire, _Philosophical Dictionary_ _Chapter Seven - Toward the Greater Good: 1748–1776_ _Things must be so ordered that power checks power,_ Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu, _The Spirit of the Laws_ _Complete freedom of trade must be ensured:_ François Quesnay, _General Maxims for the Economic Management of an Agricultural Kingdom_ _The nation's war against the citizen: Cesare_ Beccaria, _On Crimes and Punishments_ _There is no peace in the absence of justice:_ Adam Ferguson, _An Essay on the History of Civil Society_ _Led by an invisible hand:_ Adam Smith, _An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations_ _Chapter Eight - Encountering Others: 1688–1785_ _Thus died this great man:_ Aphra Behn, _Oroonoko: or The Royal Slave_ _Not one sins the less for not being Christian: _Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, _Embassy Letters_ _Do you not restore to them their liberty?:_ Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, _Philosophical and Political History of European Colonies and Commerce in the Two Indies_ _Some things which are rather interesting:_ Captain James Cook, _Voyage towards the South Pole, and Round the World_ _The inner genius of my being:_ Johann Gottfried von Herder, _Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Humankind_ _Chapter - Nine Citizen of Geneva: 1755–1782_ _The most cunning project ever to enter the human mind: _Jean-Jacques Rousseau, _Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Human Inequality_ _The supreme direction of the General Will:_ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract _Two lovers from a small town at the foot of the Alps,_ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, _Julie, or the New Heloise_ _Build a fence around your child’s soul:_ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, _Emile, or On Education_ _This man will be myself:_ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, _Confessions_ _Chapter Ten - Vindications of Women: 1685–1792_ _No higher design than to get her a husband:_ Mary Astell, _Reflections on Marriage_ _The days of my bondage begin:_ Anna Stanisławska, _Orphan Girl_ _A dying victim dragged to the altar:_ Denis Diderot, _The Nun_ _Created to be the toy of man:_ Mary Wollstonecraft, _Vindication of the Rights of Woman_ _Man, are you capable of being just?:_ Olympe de Gouges, _Declaration of the Rights of Woman as Citizen_ _Chapter Eleven - American Reverberations: 1771–1792_ _I took upon me to assert my freedom:_ Benjamin Franklin, _Autobiography_ _Freedom has been hunted round the globe:_ Thomas Paine, _Common Sense_ _Endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights:_ Thomas Jefferson and Others, _Declaration of Independence_ _A safeguard against faction and insurrection:_ James Madison, _Federalist No. 10_ _An end to government by force and fraud:_ Thomas Paine, _The Rights of Man_ _Chapter Twelve - Enlightenment's End: 1790–1794_ _A partnership of the living, the dead, and those unborn:_ Edmund Burke, _Reflections on the Revolution in France_ _The future destiny of the human species:_ Nicolas de Condorcet, _A Sketch of a Historical Portrait of the Progress of the Human Mind_ Texts and Studies, Index. 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De anima is the fundamental reference to Aristotle’s theory of the faculties of the soul. Its treatment is abstract and Aristotle refers it to further and more precise explanations. The article considers these indications and shows that one of the main contributions of Aristotle’s biological works to complement De anima centers on the consideration of the relationships between the vegetative and perceptive faculties of the soul and between the perceptive and noetic faculties.

Whereas the Upanishads contain much which is, strictly speaking, of little interest to the historian of Indian thought, the Pre-Upanishadic texts are not completely devoid of passages which are of special importance for anyone who endeavours to trace the origin and oldest form of the main texts of classical Indian philosophy. Too often the difference between Upanishads and Pre-Upanishadic literature has been exaggerated ; too often the philosophical importance of the ritualistic speculations contained in the Brahmanas has been undervalued ; (...) too often these texts have been neglected by the compilers of handbooks. One of those points which have not always received due attention concerns the theoretic foundation of the belief in the possibility of gaining the victory over death and of the efforts to realize this ambition. One of the most important problems in which the Indians have always been interested is the relation between the One and the Many, between this phenomenal world and its source and ground. Already in the Rgveda opinions differ : it has been a divine architect who made the phenomenal world ; it has been an anonymous primeval deity who became a golden germ from which a demiurge was born ; the world has arisen from the impersonal One who desired to create the world, etc. In the course of time these creators and ideas of the original One fused into the great figure of Prajapati, „the Lord of Creatures”. This God, who occupies a central position in the Brdhmawa-texts originally was what he was to remain in popular belief : the deity presiding over biological creation. In the ritualistic speculations of the authors of the Brahmanas he is the Creator, the Father of gods and anti-gods, the origin of creation. In the beginning Prajapati was alone, he was ,all this’, he was the universe in ,concentrated’ and unmanifested form. By way of emanation and self-differentiation he became the manifested universe, including the creatures. After this creative activity he is empty and exhausted, because he has ,entered the universe' or rather transformed himself into the universe. His strength, force and health can however be recovered and restored by means of rites. The world and the creatures which emanated from Prajapati were not perfect ; they were a discontinuum, disintegrated, in the power of death. In order to make life possible and to make the world habitable Prajdpati instituted rites. Prajapati is in the Brahmanas identified with the highest and most general categories ; he is the year, i.e. the complete cycle of time comprising the past and the future, totality and completeness. The year, viewed as an integral structure is the fundamental basis of all that happens. Being also the rite, the sacral act, Prajapati is on the other hand the earthly counterpart of the great cosmic drama. On these two identifications the ritualistic system of these authors is constructed. Among these authorities Sandilya. occupies a prominent place. The mundane events oscillating between the poles of birth and death, of genesis and decay, rites are needed to reintegrate what has become decomposed. They are however also to restore the original unity and totality, to co-ordinate the non-co-ordinated phenomena, to reconstruct Prajapati, to restore his original oneness. The rites reduce, temporarily it is true and with regard to the individual who has them performed, the phenomenal multiplicity to a reintegrated totality, in which the diversity of Prajapati's emanation has been destroyed, and the original unity and oneness has been restored. This theory underlies the structure of the great Fire-altar , by which the sacrificer identifies himself with Prajapati whose original unity is restored. By performing this elaborate ritual the personality of the sacrificer was transformed into a new and divine existence, which was no longer subject to the imperfections proper to this world. That is to say : the sacrificer acquires ,immortality' , he transcends the limits of phenomenal time, he becomes sarva, i.e. safe-andsound, whole. Prajapati-the year will not destroy the man who identifies himself with the totality, with Prajapati-the year, and who has acquired an insight into the meaning of this identification ; that man overcomes disintegration and discontinuity, he gains the victory over death, that is to say : he attains to a sound and complete condition. In the course of time the personal Prajapati and the impersonal Brahman are identified. In the early Upanishads the latter becomes the great fundamental principle. These works resume on the one hand ancient speculations a part of which has been preserved in the Rg- and Atharvavedas, and utilize, on the other hand, the ritualistic theories of the Brdhmawas. The tendency of their authors is however to dissociate themselves from ritualism. Emphasizing the quest for the salvation and spiritual welfare of the individual they go into the problem of the ,Soul' , that is the ,self' or the very core of the personality, which is essentially different from all phenomenal plurality. The hitman is identified with the Punira, the primeval man out of whom the universe arose. It follows that the Atrmn is also cosmic. According to Udddlaka Arum it is the subtle essence of all that exists. All the important potencies in the universe are said to be its manifestations. However, in these works . Htman and Brahman tend to fuse and the great teacher Ydjwavalkya concluded to their being identical. Ordinary men do not understand this identity, but the few who are able to arrive at this highly important insight gain the victory over the imperfections and contingencies of empirical existence. They experience the ecstatic and unanalysable condition of unity, the undifferentiated Plenum or Totality, the ,All'. They know that they are truly Brahman or Sarvam. Now, it is most important to attain to this condition, which implies the victory over death, before one is to die the worldly death. The man who dies without having escaped death will die again and again in the hereafter. Whereas the ritualists attempt to protect themselves from this much feared ,repeated death' by means of rites, especially by the construction of the Fire-altar, the teachers whose words are recorded in the early Upanishads ascribed the delivering power to the esoteric knowledge of the ,under lying theory', to the knowledge of the ritual-cosmic interrelations : the man who knows the relevant speculations will be released. This belief in the redeeming power of the rites and the ,theory' on which they are based was also of special importance with regard to the development of the Karman-doctrine. Thus ritual and spiritual identification with the One which is the Totality, the Primeval Being, the Creator, the Atman enables man by experiencing a transformation to conquer phenomenal time and death. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Psychiatric Practice and the Living Force of the Social in the BiopsychosocialGeorge Ikkos, BSc, FRCPsych (bio) and Giovanni Stanghellini, MD, DPhil (HC) (bio)One of the handful of universally acknowledged founders of his discipline, sociologist Emile Durkheim (1857–1917; see Fournier, 2013) is best known to psychiatrists for his seminal “Suicide: A Study in Sociology” (1897/2002). Arguably, he should have been at least as well known for his last completed (...) work “The Elementary Forms of Religious Life” (1912/1995), the best book of sociology ever written according to some (Bellah, 1995). In this magisterial work, through a comprehensive survey of the anthropological evidence available at the time and fine conceptual analysis, Durkheim came to define from a strictly secular perspective phenomena such as the sacred and the profane, soul and magic, but also “mana” (a penetrating and connecting force) and collective “effervescence” (wild gesticulating, copulating, or aggressing when aboriginal family groups came together). The last two concepts can help us to understand the origin and persistence of the living force of the social in our daily experience, that is, what it is, what it feels like and how it plays itself out in relationships (Ikkos & McQueen, 2019). Although he makes no reference to Durkheim, nor to mana nor effervescence, social anthropologist Ongaro’s welcome ambition is to lift the social out of the shadow of the dominating bio- and psychological in the use of the biopsychosocial model and, thus, bring it to bear as an immediately experienced and enacted living force akin to mana and effervescence in contemporary psychiatric practice.In this commentary, we first review issues relating to the biopsychosocial model, Ongaro’s externalist foundations, and predictive processing and functional neurological, somatic and mental symptoms. We then discuss our formulation of contemporary anorexia nervosa and hysteria as examples of our attempts at enhanced engagement with the social. We conclude by suggesting the work of social historian and cultural critic Walter Benjamin (1892–1940) as a vital resource for better engagement with the social in biopsychosocial practice in the future. [End Page 325]The Biopsychosocial ModelMany find that in current practice the biopsycho-social model is simply the biomedical cloaked in another name (Mohtashemi et al., 2016). Those most expert in it acknowledge doubts about what it is exactly (Bolton, 2022). Most would agree with Ongaro and Williamson that though not yet dead, if it is to survive as a clinical force in practice, it needs clarification and revival (Williamson, 2022). Bolton suggests that “we can make use of the term ‘biopsychosocial model’ as a shorthand for methodological assumptions that causes and/or cures of specific conditions at specific stages, including matters of adjustment and quality of life, will generally—across a wide range of conditions—include biological, psychological and social factors, and interactions between them. The contrast here is with the ‘biomedical model’, which deals with biological factors only” (Bolton, 2022). Bolton then discusses the utility and advantages of his definition of the model specifically in relation to research on the social determinants of disease and on pain. That is fine, as far as it goes, that is, research methodology and clinical theory. Ongaro, however, wants to ensure that the social is understood as a more immediately experienced and directly enacted force in clinical encounters. To achieve his aim, he argues, we need a more balanced and persuasive integration of all three components of the model: bio-psycho-social. In effect what he proposes is to vitalize psychiatry with something related to Durkheim’s ideas of mana and effervescence.Externalist FoundationsIn his first paper, Ongaro argues that he can partly achieve his aims by using the tools provided by our contemporary neuroscience research on “predictive processing” and philosophical theories of “enactivism” (Ongaro, 2024a). In his second paper he reports on his anthropological experience of living for 19 months with the Akha, a group of swidden farmers in highland Laos. Here he investigated how they respond to functional neurological disorders (FNDs), functional somatic symptoms (FSS) (Burton et al., 2020), also to what Western medicine defines as (functional) mental disorders (FMDs) and what the Akha and he sometimes conceive as spiritual... (shrink)

The measurement of force is based on a formal law of additivity, which characterizes the effects of two or more configurations on the equilibrium of a material point. The representing vectors (resultant forces) are additive over configurations. The existence of a tight interrelation between the force vector and the geometric space, in which motion is described, depends on observations of partial (directional) equilibria; an axiomatization of this interrelation yields a proof of part two of Newton's second law of (...) motion. The present results (which were derived from a curious and deep isomorphism between force measurement and trichromatic color measurement) yield a kind of subunit, which needs to be incorporated into more complete axiomatizations of mechanics that would fulfill the Mach-Kirchhoff program. (shrink)