Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If the answer to these questions is no, then in what areas do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? This book struggles with these questions, and arrives at distinctly different answers.".

The difficulty of a dilemma is often due to the pattern of one's desires: the way in which your wants for different things are related to one another. When one sees how many patterns desires can take one begins to appreciate the real difficulty of decision making. But one also begins to see that dilemmas are not all unfortunate and insoluble traps. There are good and not so good strategies for dealing with them. In dealing with the resulting dilemmas the (...) strategy may find ways of reducing them to more comparable desires, or it may not. Desires of each kind are often fairly easy to compare among themselves. Qualified trumps are a form of incomparable desire. This chapter gives simpler examples of this desire. In some cases, it is much less obvious how a conflict between first and second order desires should be resolved. The chapter discusses such case. (shrink)

Are interpersonal comparisons of desire possible? Can we give an account of how facts about desires are grounded, that underpins such comparisons? This paper supposes the answer to the first question is yes, and provides an account of the nature of desire that explains how this is so. The account is a modification of the interpretationist metaphysics of representation that the author has recently been developing. The modification is to allow phenomenological affective valence into the “base facts” on (...) which correct interpretation is grounded. To use this extra resource within that theory to vindicate interpersonal comparisons, we will need to appeal rational connections between level of valence and level of desire, which this paper sets out and examines. (shrink)

Family life and one's career are incomparable values for him/her. The whole topic of incomparability of desires is veiled in confusion and controversy. Some people deny that there are any incomparable desires. This chapter explains meaning of incomparability, discusses incomparability as a fact of life that many of the desires are incomparable, and also examines why incomparability makes an enormous difference to decision‐making what patterns of incomparability the desires exhibit. The first dimension of incomparability is depth: how (...) much thought and how many comparisons with other wants the inability to choose will survive. Another dimension is generality, whether the incomparability concerns just individual wants or also the values that usually underlie them. The significance of some patterns of incomparability becomes clearer if one add another ingredient to the brew: the influence of beliefs on desires. The chapter considers an example to illustrate this influence. (shrink)

Family life and one's career are incomparable values for him/her. The whole topic of incomparability of desires is veiled in confusion and controversy. Some people deny that there are any incomparable desires. This chapter explains meaning of incomparability, discusses incomparability as a fact of life that many of the desires are incomparable, and also examines why incomparability makes an enormous difference to decision‐making what patterns of incomparability the desires exhibit. The first dimension of incomparability is depth: how (...) much thought and how many comparisons with other wants the inability to choose will survive. Another dimension is generality, whether the incomparability concerns just individual wants or also the values that usually underlie them. The significance of some patterns of incomparability becomes clearer if one add another ingredient to the brew: the influence of beliefs on desires. The chapter considers an example to illustrate this influence. (shrink)

This chapter describes just one of the many attributes that a worthwhile life can have, one which connects both with the experience of the satisfyingness of life and with the dilemma‐managing strategies. Several of the dilemma‐managing strategies link choices to the overall pattern of the decision‐maker's life. All of these strategies resolve dilemmas by relating the incomparable desires that produce them to more nearly comparable preferences for kinds of lives. These strategies could be crudely summarized as: take the option (...) which will give him/her the better life. Or rather, they could be summarized this way if one accepts that lives are good when they conform to plans. In the chapter, the author argues that the sense of the satisfyingness of one's life need not come from any plan or pattern to it. In all of his examples, life has been organized by its connection with a single object of concern. (shrink)

This chapter discusses four ways in which the question of the price of a choice can arise: one trivial, one about risk, one awful, and one moral. It is very hard to compare the awfulness of a choice to the desirability or undesirability of the things one is choosing between. The undesirability of having to choose between loyalty to the child and opposition to terrorism seems to be incomparable both to the loyalty and to the opposition. The final decision (...) is made with the valuation one would use if forced to make a choice between all the options, and along the way to this final decision one discards less trusted valuations. The chapter also considers agenda‐manipulating strategies. They deal with a decision‐making situation by structuring the comparisons that are to be made in order to think it through. Agenda‐manipulation will arise naturally in many dilemma‐managing strategies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Il Mostro e il sapiente: Studi sull'erotica grecaEva CantarellaRiccardo Vattuone. Il Mostro e il sapiente: Studi sull'erotica greca. Studi di Storia 11. Bologna: Pàtron, 2004. 345 pp. 15 black-and-white figs. Paper, €24."Il mostro e il sapiente" (the monster and the wise man), referred to in the title of Riccardo Vattuone's book, are, respectively, the loathed figure of the modern pedophile and an elected official who stands almost as (...) a symbol of wisdom, the great Athenian legislator Solon. Each of them, as Vattuone observes in the introduction, "loves" boys. No one, however, has ever for this reason considered the wise man Solon to be a monster, as today's media tend to view the modern pedophile. Thus it is clear from the title and made explicit in the foreword (7–10) that Vattuone is not merely interested in the past. As he repeats several times, "It is the past that puts the most significant questions to the contemporary age, and not vice-versa" (9, and passim). In this case, the past that interrogates the present is the pederastic relationship, and the question that this has asked Vattuone is whether or not there is a relationship between so-called Greek love and modern pedophilia. According to Vattuone, from the nineteenth century on, the immense quantity of literature about the pederastic relationship oscillates between radical condemnation and attempts to defend the past by "distancing it" (8). Il Mostro e il sapiente, he declares, was written to get away from this "ideological hypocrisy" and to dispel, if possible, "the suspicion that behind the contemporary pedophile there lurk the worst vices, the most obvious repressions of Western culture... and that that person is a creation of the system, constructed as a scapegoat for the unspeakable Other" (9).The following eight chapters are therefore dedicated to this objective. In the first, "Osservazioni preliminari: i crimini di Solone" (Preliminary Observations: the Crimes of Solon), Vattuone begins with an epigram of Straton (AP 12.246) to contest—in my opinion correctly—the reading of pederasty that he calls "anesthetic," according to which the pais would have experienced his relationship with the adult as a kind of social obligation, without feeling desire or pleasure. It is not only the adult that loves and desires, says Vattuone. Pederasty implies reciprocity of affection. On this point, as I observed years ago, I believe it very likely that Vattuone is approaching the truth. (See E. Cantarella, Bisexuality in the Ancient World [2d ed., Yale University Press, 2002], xii–xiii, and, at greater length, "A proposito di C. Calame, L'Amour en grece," Annales ESC 1999.)The second chapter, "Pais kalos. Una bellezza incomparabile" (Pais Kalos. An Incomparable Beauty), argues, correctly, against the idea that the boy's attractions depend on his resemblance to a woman. The scarce contact that Greek [End Page 461] men had with women has nothing to do with the reasons for which the paides from the age of approximately twelve to seventeen years were irresistible to the Greek man. Though their face and gaze might be soft, their body structure and ethos were virile. Pederasty was a relationship between males, among other things allowed and culturally valued only within the age limits to which an ample and exhaustive part of the chapter is dedicated.The third chapter, "Eros, un 'dovere' sociale?" (Eros, a Social "Duty?"), goes into the erotic aspect of the relationship, dedicating ample space to the problem of the so-called origins of pederasty. The Greeks considered that pederasty originated with a crime (the rape of Chrysippus), and modern scholars, according to Vattuone, have followed this line of thinking, concentrating their efforts on the attempt—this is a leitmotif of the book—to save the Greeks from accusations of immorality and perversion. A long section of criticism follows, attacking hypotheses of the historic-psychoanalytic type and those that link the social role of pederasty to "rites of passage," with the objective, according to Vattuone, of distancing it from us and the present world. I do not agree, however. As I have pointed out elsewhere, to connect a sexual relationship with a rite does not necessarily... (shrink)

The works of Gilles Deleuze -- on cinema, literature, painting, and philosophy -- have made him one of the most widely read thinkers of his generation. This compact critical volume is not only a powerful reappraisal of Deleuze's thought, but also the first major work by Alain Badiou available in English. Badiou compellingly redefines "Deleuzian, " throwing down the gauntlet in the battle over the very meaning of Deleuze's legacy. For those who view Deleuze as the apostle of desire, (...) flu, and multiplicity, Badiou's book is a deliberate provocation. Through a deep philosophical engagement with his writings, Badiou contends that Deleuze is not the Dionysian thinker of becoming he took himself to be; on the contrary, he is an ascetic philosopher of Being and Oneness. Deleuze's self-declared anti-Platonism fails -- and that, in Badiou's view, may ultimately be to his credit. "Perhaps it is not Platonism that has to be overturned, " Badiou writes, "but the anti-Platonism taken as evident throughout this entire century." This volume draws on a five-year correspondence undertaken by Badiou and Deleuze near the end of Deleuze's life, when the two put aside long-standing political and philosophical differences to exchange ideas about similar problems in their work. Badiou's incomparably attentive readings of key Deleuzian concepts radically revise reigning interpretations, offering new insights to even the veteran Deleuze reader and serving as an entree to the controversial notion of a "restoration" of Plato advocated by Badiou -- in his own right one of the most original figures in postwar French philosophy. The result is a critical tour de force that repositions Deleuze, one of the mostimportant thinkers of our time, and introduces Badiou to English-speaking readers. (shrink)

In contrast with some recent theories of infinitesimals as non-Archimedean entities, Leibniz’s mature interpretation was fully in accord with the Archimedean Axiom: infinitesimals are fictions, whose treatment as entities incomparably smaller than finite quantities is justifiable wholly in terms of variable finite quantities that can be taken as small as desired, i.e. syncategorematically. In this paper I explain this syncategorematic interpretation, and how Leibniz used it to justify the calculus. I then compare it with the approach of Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis, (...) as propounded by John Bell. I find some salient differences, especially with regard to higher-order infinitesimals. I illustrate these differences by a consideration of how each approach might be applied to propositions of Newton’s Principia concerning the derivation of force laws for bodies orbiting in a circle and an ellipse. “If the Leibnizian calculus needs a rehabilitation because of too severe treatment by historians in the past half century, as Robinson suggests (1966, 250), I feel that the legitimate grounds for such a rehabilitation are to be found in the Leibnizian theory itself.”—(Bos 1974–1975, 82–83). (shrink)

In this article, we study logics of unknown truths and false beliefs under neighborhood semantics. We compare the relative expressivity of the two logics. It turns out that they are incomparable over various classes of neighborhood models, and the combination of the two logics are equally expressive as standard modal logic over any class of neighborhood models. We propose morphisms for each logic, which can help us explore the frame definability problem, show a general soundness and completeness result, and (...) generalize some results in the literature. We axiomatize the two logics over various classes of neighborhood frames. Most importantly, by adopting the intersection semantics and the subset semantics in the literature, we extend the results to the case of public announcements, which gives us the desired reduction axioms and has good applications related to Moore sentences, successful formulas and self-refuting formulas. Also, we can say something about the comparative merits of the intersection semantics and the subset semantics. (shrink)

The question of freedom in the modern German tradition is not just a metaphysical question. It concerns the status of a free life as a value, indeed, as they took to saying, the “absolute” value. A free life is of unconditional and incomparable and inestimable value, and it is the basis of the unique, and again, absolute, unqualifiable respect owed to any human person just as such. This certainly increases the pressure on anyone who espouses such a view to (...) tell us what a free life consists in. Kant’s famous answer is “autonomy,” where this means first or minimally freedom from external constraint, coercion and intimidation (“thinking for yourself”), but even more importantly, being in a certain specific sort of self-relation. I can only be said truly to be “ruling myself” when the considerations that determine what I do are reasons. But if, finally, in exercising reason I am merely rationally responsive to inclinations and desires and aversions, I am letting such contingent impulses “rule” my life, however strategically rational or hierarchically ordered my plans for satisfaction turn out to be. So, Kant concludes, I am only truly autonomous, self-ruling, when the one consideration of importance (that is, normatively authoritative) in what I do is, as he says so frequently if still mysteriously, the “ form of rationality” as such. The more familiar name for such a necessary condition of autonomy is the Categorical Imperative. To make clear that this subjection to the “form” of rationality counts as autonomy, Kant also insists that this moral law be understood as “self-legislated,” that we must be able to regard ourselves as its “author,” and that we are bound to such a law because we bind ourselves to it. (shrink)

Il est communément porté au crédit de saint Thomas d’Aquin d’avoir renouvelé et enrichi la compréhension de la personne grâce à la notion jusqu’alors inédite de « relation subsistante ». Le présent article se propose de replacer cette découverte dans sa perspective propre, celle d’un théologien chrétien qui, sans prétendre épuiser conceptuellement un mystère reçu dans la foi, s’efforce néanmoins de rendre raison de la distinction réelle des personnes divines au sein de l’indivise Trinité. On examine d’abord comment saint Thomas (...) a su reprendre, éclairer et nouer par intégrations successives chacun des éléments de la célèbre définition de la personne léguée par Boèce. On est alors en mesure de suivre pas à pas la démarche d’analogie, aussi rigoureuse qu’audacieuse, qui permit à l’Aquinate de discerner, dans cette ratio commune et si humaine de la personne, l’éclat incomparable d’un nom divin. Mais, si l’on désire approcher de plus près le distinctif propre de la personne en Dieu, il n’est d’autre voie que de pénétrer dans la révélation trinitaire qui oblige et qui seule autorise à transcender la frontière du relatif et de l’absolu pour penser enfin, avec Thomas, la « relation comme subsistante », prérogative unique et bienheureux secret de la tripersonnalité divine.Thomas Aquinas is often given credit for having renewed and enriched the concept of personhood, thanks to the previously unheard of notion of « subsisting relation ». This paper proposes to place this discovery in its proper perspective, that of a Christian theologian who, without pretending to exhaust conceptually a mystery received in faith, endeavors nevertheless to provide an account of the real distinction between the divine persons of the undivided Trinity. We begin with an examination of how St. Thomas was able to take up, clarify and shape by successive integrations the famous definition of personhood left by Boethius. This places us in a position to follow step by step the analogical approach, as rigorous as it is audacious, that allows Aquinas to discern, in this common and so human ratio of « person », the incomparable radiance of a divine name. Yet if one desires to draw nearer to the distinctiveness of personhood in God, there is no other way than to penetrate divine revelation, which requires and which alone authorizes transcending the frontier between the relative and the absolute, to think finally, with Thomas, about « relation as subsistent », a unique prerogative and happy secret of the divine tri-personality. (shrink)

of the tension between universality and singularity in the constitution of political community. Politics for Derrida refers to demands for universal justice, while friendship stands in for demands to recognize the incomparable uniqueness of each person. Derrida develops the incompatibility between these demands to its furthest extreme while arguing that democracy paradoxically requires meeting the demands of both claims. The result is a democracy that is never achieved but always present only in the form of a desire for (...) democracy. This article evaluates Derrida’s position that political community is simultaneously impossible and necessary in light of similar proposals by Judith Butler and Luce Irigaray. It also asks whether the political community Derrida imagines is one in which women’s desires are represented. Key Words: Derrida • friendship • Irigaray • politics • sexual difference. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kantian Ethics and Economics: Autonomy, Dignity, and CharacterIvan A. BoldyrevMark D. White. Kantian Ethics and Economics: Autonomy, Dignity, and Character. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011. Pp. xi + 270. Cloth, $55.00.This remarkable book provides a new ethical perspective for economics based on Kantian ethics of autonomy and dignity. There are two main messages in it that I find particularly important. First, Mark White derives from Kant the (...) idea of irreducible moral principles that govern the behavior of economic agents independently of welfarist and, more generally, consequentialist concerns. These principles of duty and the “incomparable worth” (21) of human dignity, as well as justice or rights, may not be economically traded off against some other motivations; hence, they simply evade economic reasoning altogether.Second, White endorses a version of libertarian Kantianism that treats people as individuals in essence (“autonomous”) and social in orientation (respecting the rights and the choices of the others). In discussing individualism, White attacks the conventional wisdom of economics and claims that preferences alone do not account for the identity of individuals [End Page 298] in space and time, although their unique characters do. Persons should be given free choice (absent in deterministic rational-choice models) and hence responsibility for their choices that incorporates the social factors in decision-making. However, White never mentions the almost insurmountable difficulties associated with fleshing out the truly individual features of a given person. Although he allows for a person’s identity and character changing over time, he does not recognize that character itself is in many respects a social construction.White criticizes paternalistic economic policies that suggest manipulating choice environments in order to follow the “true” preferences of the individuals. Instead, real consent, as satisfying both relevant preferences and principles (e.g. rights and human dignity), is, in his view, the sole criterion for justifying particular policy measures—not Pareto-efficiency or Kaldor-Hicks compensation. Economists’ obsession with efficiency leading to the misconceived notions such as “efficient level of crime” or “manageable level of terrorism” is also severely criticized.For White, the most popular formalistic version of the categorical imperative is less important than the other two—prohibiting treating other people simply as means and instituting the “Kingdom of Ends.” Formalism is reserved merely for the negative evaluation of actions and providing strict perfect duties that give clear guidance concerning what should not be done. White’s “Kantian-economic” model of decision-making incorporates perfect duties as constraints, and imperfect (positive) duties as preferences. He also stresses that for Kant, duties derived from the imperative depend on empirical knowledge, the context of decision-making, and judgment as a unique personal interpretation of the moral law. He further emphasizes the intersubjective role of Kantian morality: moral law should be universalizable to all rational persons (the “Kingdom of Ends” formula of the imperative), whereas rationality means not just following the patterns of behavior developed in the preference-oriented choice model, but rather acting on one’s beliefs and desires or choosing not to follow them, thus exhibiting genuine autonomy.The new and important contribution to the discussion is an explicit treatment of will as an inner faculty that, together with judgment, constitutes a person’s character or “self,” and helps to overcome the mere inclination to follow duty. Will is the missing link between decision and action and should be “well-trained” for bringing about true morality.The book is clearly written, and the author has upheld the interdisciplinary appeal of the topic, demonstrating an outstanding knowledge of the vast literature on ethics (both Kantian and not) and economics. White’s emphasis on the irreducibility of moral principles is absolutely relevant for current economic and political debates. However, some reservations are in order.There is an ambiguity concerning the status of his analysis. If in its positive aspect White’s recommendations for economists is to accept the Kantian vision of morality, then almost no arguments are given for this, and his modifications of the standard choice model are introduced in an ad hoc manner, just to reconcile it with the Kantian framework. Are an individual’s decisions to act on principles and to overcome mere inclinations really... (shrink)

The changes in technology applied by industry, whose rhythm has been ever accelerating in the course of the last decades, have destabilized institutions in western societies: they change the meaning of these institutions, and modify their efficacity, without our collective awareness, and without our jettisoning the ballast of inertia and social anachronism. The techniques of industrialization which incomparably endow the great nations and national empires, and which the infant nations desire with a sure instinct, give rise to profound contradictions (...) in the traditional doctrine and practice of national sovereignty. (shrink)

In contrast with some recent theories of infinitesimals as non-Archimedean entities, Leibniz’s mature interpretation was fully in accord with the Archimedean Axiom: infinitesimals are fictions, whose treatment as entities incomparably smaller than finite quantities is justifiable wholly in terms of variable finite quantities that can be taken as small as desired, i.e. syncategorematically. In this paper I explain this syncategorematic interpretation, and how Leibniz used it to justify the calculus. I then compare it with the approach of Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis (...) (SIA), as propounded by John Bell. Despite many parallels between SIA and Leibniz’s approach —the non-punctiform nature of infinitesimals, their acting as parts of the continuum, the dependence on variables (as opposed to the static quantities of both Standard and Non-standard Analysis), the resolution of curves into infinitesided polygons, and the finessing of a commitment to the existence of infinitesimals— I find some salient differences, especially with regard to higher-order infinitesimals. These differences are illustrated by a consideration of how each approach might be applied to Newton’s Proposition 6 of the Principia, and the derivation from it of the v2/r law for the centripetal force on a body orbiting around a centre of force. It is found that while Leibniz’s syncategorematic approach is adequate to ground a Leibnizian version of the v2/r law for the “solicitation” ddr experienced by the orbiting body, there is no corresponding possibility for a derivation of the law by nilsquare infinitesimals; and while SIA can allow for second order differentials if nilcube infinitesimals are assumed, difficulties remain concerning the compatibility of nilcube infinitesimals with the principles of SIA, and in any case render the type of infinitesimal analysis adopted dependent on its applicability to the problem at hand. (shrink)

Practical conflicts pervade human life. Agents have many different desires, goals, and commitments, all of which can come into conflict with each other. How can practical reasoning help to resolve these practical conflicts? In this collection of essays a distinguished roster of philosophers analyse the diverse forms of practical conflict. Their aim is to establish an understanding of the sources of these conflicts, to investigate the challenge they pose to an adequate conception of practical reasoning, and to assess the degree (...) to which that challenge can be met. These essays will serve as a major resource for students of philosophy but will also interest students and professionals in related fields of the social sciences such as psychology, political science, sociology and economics. (shrink)

Abstract In this article we develop a relational understanding of sociality, that is, an account of social life that takes relation as primary. This stands in contrast to the common assumption that relations arise when subjects interact, an account that gives logical priority to separation. We will develop this relational understanding through a reading of the work of Martin Buber, a social philosopher primarily interested in dialogue, meeting, relationship, and the irreducibility and incomparability of reality. In particular, the article contrasts (...) Buber’s work with that of poststructuralist theorists who take as their starting point the deconstruction of the Hegelian logic of binary oppositions. Deconstruction understands difference as the excess that undoes the binary, but Buber, we argue, shows how difference derives from the primacy and ontological undefinability of relation. Relational logic does not exclude the logic of separations and oppositions: relation is the primal ground that makes separations possible. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-13 DOI 10.1007/s11841-011-0278-9 Authors Andrew Metcalfe, School of Social Sciences and International Studies, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia Ann Game, School of Social Sciences and International Studies, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia Journal Sophia Online ISSN 1873-930X Print ISSN 0038-1527. (shrink)

Rapid Automatized Naming (RAN) is considered a universal marker of developmental dyslexia (DD) and could also be helpful to identify a reading deficit in minority-language children (MLC), in which it may be hard to disentangle whether the reading difficulties are due to a learning disorder or a lower proficiency in the language of instruction. We tested reading and rapid naming skills in monolingual Good Readers (mGR), monolingual Poor Readers (mPR), and MLC, by using our new version of RAN, the RAN-Shapes, (...) in 127 primary school students (from 3rd to 5th grade). In line with previous research, MLC showed, on average, lower reading performances as compared to mGR. However, the two groups performed similarly to the RAN-Shapes task. On the contrary, the mPR group underperformed both in the reading and the RAN tasks. Our findings suggest that reading difficulties and RAN performance can be dissociated in MLC; consequently, the performance at the RAN-Shapes may contribute to the identification of children at risk of a reading disorder without introducing any linguistic bias, when testing MLC. (shrink)

This introductory article describes the phenomena of incommensurability and incomparability, how they are related, and why they are important. Since incomparability is the more significant phenomenon, the paper takes that as its focus. It gives a detailed account of what incomparability is, investigates the relation between the incomparability of values and the incomparability of alternatives for choice, distinguishes incomparability from the related phenomena of parity, indeterminacy, and noncomparability, and, finally, defends a view about practical justification that vindicates the importance of (...) incomparability — assuming it exists — for practical reason. (shrink)

Two competing accounts of value incomparability have been put forward in the recent literature. According to the standard account, developed most famously by Joseph Raz, ‘incomparability’ means determinate failure of the three classic value relations ( better than , worse than , and equally good ): two value-bearers are incomparable with respect to a value V if and only if (i) it is false that x is better than y with respect to V , (ii) it is false that (...) x is worse than y with respect to V and (iii) it is false that x and y are equally good with respect to V . Most philosophers have followed Raz in adopting this account of incomparability. Recently, however, John Broome has advocated an alternative view, on which value incomparability is explained in terms of vagueness or indeterminacy . In this paper I aim to further Broome’s view in two ways. Firstly, I want to supply independent reasons for thinking that the phenomenon of value incomparability is indeed a matter of the indeterminacy inherent in our comparative predicates. Secondly, I attempt to defend Broome’s account by warding off several objections that worry him, due mainly to Erik Carlson and Ruth Chang. (shrink)

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 4, Page 347-371, November 2022. We sometimes have to choose between options that are seemingly incomparable insofar as they seem to be neither better than, worse than, nor equal to each other. This often happens when the available options are quite different from one another. For instance, consider a choice between prioritizing either criminal justice reform or healthcare reform as a public policy goal. Even after the relevant details of the goals and (...) possible reforms are filled in, it is plausible that neither goal is better than, worse than, nor equal to the other. Such seemingly incomparable options present a problem for rational choice since it is unclear how an agent might rationally choose between them. What we need are some principles to help govern rational choice when faced with seemingly incomparable options. I here present three such principles. While each principle is individually compelling, I show that they are jointly incompatible. I then argue that the correct response to this inconsistent triad is to reject the principle that rationally censures performing a sequence of choices one knows will result in a suboptimal outcome. The upshot is that when seeming incomparability is involved, an agent can money pump themselves without being less rational for it. (shrink)

John Broome has argued that incomparability and vagueness cannot coexist in a given betterness order. His argument essentially hinges on an assumption he calls the ‘collapsing principle’. In an earlier article I criticized this principle, but Broome has recently expressed doubts about the cogency of my criticism. Moreover, Cristian Constantinescu has defended Broome’s view from my objection. In this paper, I present further arguments against the collapsing principle, and try to show that Constantinescu’s defence of Broome’s position fails.

Background: Psychiatric nurses are regularly confronted with the uses and effects of control interventions such as mechanical restraints. Although there are evident tensions in the literature regarding the use of mechanical restraints, very little research has focused on the lived and embodied experience of their use, whether from the patient’s perspective or the perspective of nursing staff responsible for their application. Research aims: (1) to gain access to the bodily phenomenon of being placed in mechanical restraints; (2) to give voice (...) to the intimate experiential understanding of this experience; and (3) through phenomenological interpretation, to understand the subjective processes and meaning-making of this experience. Research design: For this research, we adopted a distinctly ethics-oriented application of the methodology known as interpretative phenomenological analysis, that is, the interpretive dimension of the research focused on ethical practice in mental healthcare – one that is informed by experiential accounts of the lived body. Participants and research context: A total of 40 in-depth semi-structured, nondirected interviews with both nurses (n = 21) and patients (n = 19) we conducted to meet the aims of this article. Participants were recruited from an inpatient psychiatric unit of a Canadian general hospital. Ethical considerations: The research received research ethics board clearance from both the hospital where the study took place and the University of Ottawa. Findings: The comparative analysis is presented under the following headings: (1) context of care, (2) meaning of quality of care, (3) emotional reactions and nurse–patient relationship, (4) meeting the needs and (5) need for alternatives. Discussion/conclusions: The research findings are discussed in light of current literature and implications for practice. (shrink)

This article discusses the possibility of a rationally justified choice between two options neither of which is better than the other while they are not equally good either (‘3NT’). Joseph Raz regards such options as incomparable and argues that reason cannot guide the choice between them. Ruth Chang, by contrast, tries to show that many cases of putative incomparability are instead cases of parity—a fourth value relation of comparability, in addition to the three standard value relations ‘better than’, ‘worse (...) than’ and ‘equally good as’. It follows, she argues, that many choice situations in which rationally justified choice seems precluded are in fact situations within the reach of practical reason. This article has three aims: (1) it challenges Chang’s argument for the possibility of parity; (2) it demonstrates that, even if parity would exist, its problematic implications for practical reason would not differ from those of Raz’s incomparability; (3) it discusses the underlying cause of hard cases of comparison: the fact that none of the three standard value relations applies (‘3NT’). It will be shown that the problematic implications for the rational justification of the choice are due to 3NT itself, irrespective of whether 3NT is explained as incomparability or parity. (shrink)

This chapter presents arguments for two slightly different versions of the thesis that the value of persons is incomparable. Both arguments allege an incompatibility between the demands of a certain kind of practical reasoning and the presuppositions of value comparisons. The significance of these claims is assessed in the context of the “Numbers problem”—the question of whether one morally ought to benefit one group of potential aid recipients rather than another simply because they are greater in number. It is (...) argued that many of the popular approaches to this problem—even ones that avoid the aggregation of personal value—are imperiled by the incomparability theses. -/- . (shrink)

In support of a recent conjecture by Nielsen (1999), we prove that the phenomena of ‘incomparable entanglement’— whereby, neither member of a pair of pure entangled states can be transformed into the other via local operations and classical communication (LOCC)—is a generic feature when the states at issue live in an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space.  2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Epistemologists are interested in what makes beliefs well justified. Even before considering competing theories of epistemic justification, however, we should ask what sort of valuational structure we are trying to explain. If, as far as epistemic justification is concerned, beliefs are like bank accounts, then all beliefs are comparable: just as in any bank account there must be more, less, or as much money as in any other, one belief must be better, worse, or as good as any other. Contemporary (...) epistemologists take for granted the assumption that beliefs are comparable in the same way that bank accounts are comparable: bank accounts have balances, sprinters have personal bests for the 100-meter dash, and beliefs have degrees of justifiedness. Alternatively, we could understand the justificatory status of a belief to be more like the expensiveness of a restaurant. Consider a concept of restaurant expensiveness on which the expensiveness of a restaurant is determined by the range of prices for meals at that restaurant. If meals at Restaurant A are $25 to $50 and meals at B are $10 to $20, then A is more expensive than B. Restaurant C, however , is neither more nor less expensive than A. Nor is it equally expensive, for there are restaurants that are more expensive than C that are not more expensive than A . Some evaluative concepts, like this concept of restaurant expensiveness, do not reduce values to single numbers. If epistemic justification is like this, then there may be pairs of beliefs such that neither is better justified than the other, but nor are they equally well justified. Such beliefs would be incomparable. While incomparability is familiar in the ethics literature, it has not previously been explored in epistemology. I discuss the implications of allowing for incomparability in epistemology, both for theories of epistemic justification and theories of knowledge. (shrink)

The incomparability of alternatives is thought to pose a problem for justified choice, particularly for proponents of comparativism better than,worse than,equally good,roughly equalon a par. namely, rejection of the transitivity of the relation In this paper, I argue that proponents of comparativism need not incur this cost. I defend the possibility of justified choice between incomparable alternatives on grounds that comparativists can accept. The possibility of incomparability has been met with resistance, in part because of the intuitive appeal of (...) comparativism. By defending the possibility of justified choice between incomparable alternatives on grounds that comparativists can accept, this paper supports further inquiry into the subject of incomparability. (shrink)

The _Principle of Indifference_ was once regarded as a linchpin of probabilistic reasoning, but has now fallen into disrepute as a result of the so-called _problem of multiple of partitions_. In ‘Evidential symmetry and mushy credence’ Roger White suggests that we have been too quick to jettison this principle and argues that the problem of multiple partitions rests on a mistake. In this paper I will criticise White’s attempt to revive POI. In so doing, I will argue that what underlies (...) the problem of multiple partitions is a fundamental tension between POI and the very idea of _evidential incomparability_. (shrink)

We establish Hjorth's theorem that there is a family of continuum-many pairwise strongly incomparable free actions of free groups, and therefore a family of continuum-many pairwise incomparable treeable equivalence relations.

This paper explores the possibility of incomparability. It first focuses on a challenge to the small-improvement argument for incomparability and then turns to some seemingly more promising, “huge-improvement” variations on the argument. After considering an important complication, it is argued that, whether or not options can be strictly incomparable, there is room for cases beyond not just classic cases of trichotomous comparability but even beyond cases involving options that, though not trichotomously comparable, are still comparable as both positive, or (...) both negative, or, even if indeterminate, both fairly neutral. In the relevant further cases, at least one option that combines a positive feature and a negative feature is not positive, negative, neutral, or even fairly neutral. To the extent that comparability is revealed as applicable in such cases, skepticism about incomparability can persist, but its significance is reduced by the revelation of how little comparability requires. (shrink)

In earlier papers (Lindström & Rabinowicz, 1989. 1990), we proposed a generalization of the AGM approach to belief revision. Our proposal was to view belief revision as a relation rather thanas a function on theories (or belief sets). The idea was to allow for there being several equally reasonable revisions of a theory with a given proposition. In the present paper, we show that the relational approach is the natural result of generalizing in a certain way an approach to belief (...) revision due to Adam Grove. In his (1988) paper, Grove presents two closely related modelings of functional belief revision, one in terms of a family of "spheres" around the agent's theory G and the other in terms of an epistemic entrenchment ordering of propositions. The "sphere"-terminology is natural when one looks upon theories and propositions as being represented by sets of possible worlds. Grove's spheres may be thought of as possible "fallback" theories relative to the agent's original theory: theories that he may reach by deleting propositions that are not "sufficiently" entrenched (according to standards of sufficient entrenchment of varying stringency). To put it differently, fallbacks are theories that are closed upwards under entrenchment The entrenchment ordering can be recovered from the family of fallbacks by the definition: A is at least as entrenched as B iff A belongs to every fallback to which B belongs. To revise a theory T with a proposition A, we go to the smallest sphere that contain A-worlds and intersect it with A. The relational notion of belief revision that we are interested in, results from weakening epistemic entrenchment by not assuming it to be connected. I.e., we want to allow that some propositions may be incomparable with respect to epistemic entrenchment. As a result, the family of fallbacks around a given theory will no longer have to be nested. This change opens up the possibility for several different ways of revising a theory with a given proposition. (shrink)