Involuntary memory was identified by the pioneering memory researcher Hermann Ebbinghaus more than a century ago, but it was not until very recently that cognitive psychologists began to study this memory phenomenon. This book is the first to examine key topics and cutting-edge research in involuntary memory. Discusses topics such as involuntary memories in everyday life, across the life-span, and in the laboratory; the special ways in which involuntary memories sometimes manifest themselves (...) and a number of theoretical treatments of the topic. Presents innovative research that not only represents the starting point of the study of involuntary memory, but also places it in such broader topics as autobiographical memory, consciousness and memory, aging and memory, implicit and explicit memory, depression, and psychosis. (shrink)

We raise two points about cues, which complicate Barzykowski and Moulin's attempt at a unified model of memory retrieval. First, cues operate differently in voluntary and involuntary contexts. Second, voluntary and involuntary memory can be interconnected, as in cases of chaining.

People remember disgusting stimuli better than fearful stimuli, but do disgust’s memory-enhancing effects extend to involuntary memory? This question is important because disgust reactions occur following trauma, and trauma-related involuntary memories are a hallmark of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms. In two experiments, we presented participants (n = 88 Experiment 1; n = 106 Experiment 2) with disgust, fear, and neutral images during an attention-monitoring task. Participants then completed an undemanding vigilance task, responding any time an (...) image involuntarily came to mind. We measured the frequency and characteristics of these involuntary memories (e.g. emotional intensity) immediately after encoding and over a 24-hour delay (Experiment 2 only). Our main findings were mixed: participants experienced similarly frequent (Experiment 2) – or more (Experiment 1) – disgust as fear involuntary memories. Therefore, when controlling for memory-enhancing confounds (e.g. distinctiveness), in-laboratory disgust memory enhancement does not extend to involuntary memory. Disgust memories were more emotionally intense than fear memories over the 24-hour delay– but not immediately after encoding – suggesting disgust elicits additional consolidation processes to fear. Participants paid more attention towards the disgust images, but the attention did not account for the memory of disgust. In sum, disgust and fear have both similar and distinct cognitive effects. (shrink)

We highlight recent progress in neuroimaging and neuropsychological research on memory mechanisms in the medial temporal lobe that speaks to the involuntary nature of memory retrieval processes. We suggest that evidence form these studies supports Barzykowski and Moulin's proposal that memory signals involved in experiences of familiarity and déjà vu can be generated in the absence of retrieval intentionality.

Autobiographical memory is intimately linked to the self. However, the relation between the self and involuntary recall has been understudied. Theoretically, the more relevant an event is to the self the more accessible the memory should be. In line with this prediction, the present study tested the hypothesis that self-relevance of a stressor modulates involuntary recall. Healthy student participants viewed distressing film clips and were presented with information that defined the main characters as more or less (...) similar to them, or without any information about the characters. In line with predictions, participants in the high self-relevance condition reported more involuntary memories of the film clips after one week compared to participants in the low self-relevance and control conditions. The findings support the theoretical relation between the self and memory accessibility and extend findings from previous research to the domain of involuntary recall. (shrink)

The proposed framework can benefit from integrating predictive processing into the explanation of déjà vu which corresponds to interrupted prediction. Déjà vu is also accompanied by familiarity. However, considerable ambiguity is inherent in familiarity, which necessitates elaboration of this construct. Research findings on involuntary autobiographical memories and déjà vu show discrepancies, and clustering these constructs can be counterproductive for research.

Mental time travel is the ability to mentally project oneself into one’s personal past or future, in terms of memories of past events or projections of possible future events. We investigated the frequency and valence of involuntary MTT in the context of high trait worry. High and low worriers recorded the frequency and valence of involuntary memories and future projections using a structured notebook and completed measures probing individual differences related to negative affectivity. Involuntary future projections were (...) as frequent as involuntary memories. We found a positivity bias for both past and future MTT, in that fewer negative events were reported than positive or neutral ones. This positivity bias was greater for future than for past events. Individual differences related to negative affectivity were positively associated with the proportion of negative events, indicating a reduced positivity bias in individuals with a general tendency to experience negative affect. (shrink)

Barzykowski and Moulin's model proposes that déjà vu and involuntary autobiographical memories are the result of a continuously active memory system that tracks the novelty of situations. Déjà vu would only have episodic content and concern interpretation of prior experiences. We argue that these aspects of the model would gain to be clarified and explored further and we suggest possible directions.

Involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) and déjà vu are phenomena that occur spontaneously in daily life. IAMs are recollections of the personal past, whereas déjà vu is defined as an experience in which the person feels familiarity at the same time as knowing that the familiarity is false. We present and discuss the idea that both IAMs and déjà vu can be explained as natural phenomena resulting from memory processing and, importantly, are both based on the same memory (...) retrieval processes. Briefly, we hypothesise that both can be described as “involuntary” or spontaneous cognitions, where IAMs deliver content and déjà vu delivers only the feeling of retrieval. We map out the similarities and differences between the two, making a theoretical and neuroscientific account for their integration into models of memory retrieval and how the autobiographical memory literature can explain these quirks of daily life and unusual but meaningful phenomena. We explain the emergence of the déjà vu phenomenon by relating it to well-known mechanisms of autobiographical memory retrieval, concluding that IAMs and déjà vu lie on a continuum. (shrink)

Following the precedent set by Dorthe Berntsen’s 2009 book, Involuntary Autobiographical Memory, this paper asks whether the mechanisms responsible for involuntarily recollected memories are distinct from those that are responsible for voluntarily recollected ones. Berntsen conjectures that these mechanisms are largely the same. Recent work has been thought to show that this is mistaken, but the argument from the recent results to the rejection of Berntsen’s position is problematic, partly because it depends on a philosophically contentious view of (...) voluntariness. Berntsen herself shares this contentious view, but the defenders of her position can easily give it up. This paper explains how and why they should. (shrink)

The main objective of this paper was to examine the involuntary nature of music-evoked autobiographical memories. For this purpose, young adults, older adults, and patients with a clinical diagnosis of probable Alzheimer’s disease were asked to remember autobiographical events in two conditions: after being exposed to their own chosen music, and in silence. Compared to memories evoked in silence, memories evoked in the “Music” condition were found to be more specific, accompanied by more emotional content and impact on mood, (...) and retrieved faster. In addition, these memories engaged less executive processes. Thus, with all these characteristics and the fact that they are activated by a perceptual cue , music-evoked autobiographic memories have all the features to be considered as involuntary memories. Our paper reveals several characteristics of music-evoked autobiographical memories in AD patients and offers a theoretical background for this phenomenon. (shrink)

Involuntary autobiographical memories are typically discussed in the context of negative memories such as trauma ‘flashbacks’. However, IAMs occur frequently in everyday life and are predominantly positive. In spite of this, surprisingly little is known about how such positive IAMs arise. The trauma film paradigm is often used to generate negative IAMs. Recently an equivalent positive film was developed inducing positive IAMs . The current study is the first to investigate which variables would best predict the frequency of positive (...) IAMs. Higher levels of positive mood change to the film were significantly associated with the number of positive IAMs recorded in the subsequent week. Results demonstrate the importance of positive emotional reaction at the time of an event for subsequent positive IAMs. (shrink)

Although involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) and déjà vu have important shared characteristics, in this commentary, we focus on potential differences that may question the argument that two phenomena lie on a continuum. We propose that differences in their frequency and autonoetic consciousness could be explained by different types of cues and memory representations involved in experiencing IAMs and déjà vu.

Involuntary autobiographical memories are conscious memories of personal events that come to mind with no preceding attempts at retrieval. It is often assumed that such memories are closely related to current concerns – i.e., uncompleted personal goals. Here we examined involuntary versus voluntary autobiographical memories in relation to earlier registered current concerns measured by the Personal Concern Inventory . We found no differences between involuntary and voluntary memories with regard to frequency or characteristics of current concern-related contents. (...) However, memories related to current concerns were rated as more central to the person’s identity, life story and expectations for the future than non-concern-related memories, irrespective of mode of recall. Depression and PTSD symptoms correlated positively with the proportion of current concern-related involuntary and voluntary memories. The findings support the view that involuntary and voluntary remembering is subject to similar motivational constraints. (shrink)

This study compares involuntary and voluntary autobiographical memories in depressed and never depressed individuals. Twenty depressed and twenty never depressed individuals completed a memory diary; recording their reactions to 10 involuntary and 10 voluntary memories over 14–30 days. Psychiatric status , psychopathology, rumination and avoidance were assessed. For both groups, involuntary memories more frequently lead to strong reactions than voluntarily memories. For both modes of retrieval, depressed individuals reported more frequent negative reactions than never depressed individuals (...) and rated memories as more central to identity with higher levels of rumination and avoidance. Depressed individuals retrieved both positive and negative memories during involuntary retrieval. These findings support the view that involuntary memory retrieval represents a basic mode of retrieval during healthy and disordered cognition, and that during depression, both involuntary and voluntary memories are central to identity and associated with rumination and avoidance. (shrink)

The target article claims that involuntary autobiographical memories and déjà vu are based on the same retrieval processes, although they result in different phenomenological states. Here we argue that the differential engagement of attention at various stages of memory may be one of the determinants of when common retrieval processes give rise to such different experiences.

This commentary supports Barzykowski and Moulin's model, but departs from it on the question of functionality, where IAMs and déjà vu fractionate. The authors seem to say that IAMs are functional, while déjà vu is not. As there is no hard evidence supporting the idea that IAMs are functional, I argue that both phenomena should be viewed as cognitive failures.

Barzykowski and Moulin argue both involuntary autobiographical memories and déjà vu experiences rely on the same involuntary memory retrieval processes but their underlying neurological basis remains unclear. We propose spontaneous neural replay in the default mode network (DMN) and hippocampus as the basis for involuntary autobiographical memories, whereas for déjà vu experiences such transient activation is limited to the DMN.

I strongly support Barzykowski and Moulin in their proposal that common retrieval mechanisms can lead to distinct phenomenological memory experiences. I emphasize the importance of one of these mechanisms, namely the attribution system. Neuropsychological studies should help clarifying the role of these retrieval mechanisms, notably in cases of medial temporal-lobe lesions and cases of dementia.

The continuum between involuntary autobiographical memories and déjà vu, as proposed by Barzykowski and Moulin, can be better defined by considering research on autobiographical retrieval in patients with Alzheimer's disease. Although autobiographical retrieval in patients with Alzheimer's disease can generally be associated with a sense of familiarity, involuntary retrieval can trigger an autonoetic experience of retrieval in these patients.

Barzykowski and Moulin suggest that déjà vu and involuntary autobiographical memories recruit similar retrieval processes. Here, we invite the authors to clarify three issues: (1) What mechanism prevents déjà vu to happen more frequently? (2) What is the role of semantic cues in involuntary autobiographical retrieval? and (3) How déjà vu relates to non-believed memories?

Involuntary memories raise worries for any notion of constitution of memorial experiences and of the relationship between subjectivity, the past, and intentionality. However, this does not mean they are wholly intractable for an intentional analysis of consciousness. To the contrary, if one avoids conflating the will with thetic or express intentional acts, the Sartrean notion of intentionality is well-placed to account for the most salient features of involuntary memories, without resorting to appeals to non-subjective memorial processes in which (...) any sense of implication or investment in the content of involuntary memory seems difficult to locate. To make this case, two steps are taken. The first is to map out a Sartrean phenomenology of memory, by taking into consideration how his notions of intentional consciousness, absence, and lack play out at the level of memory. The second is to examine how the Sartrean model of intentional consciousness appears to be well-adapted to the phenomenal traits most salient to involuntary memories. The upshot of such an examination is a provocative phenomenological position on the nature of the resistance of the past and on doing justice to the past, that is, in regard to how memorial intentionality ought be conceived when involuntary memories contribute to the rule rather than merely being an exception in the experience of the past. (shrink)

We propose that IAM and déjà vu may not share a placement on the same gradient, per se, but the mechanism of cue familiarity detection, and a major differentiating factor between the two metacognitive experiences is whether the resulting inward directed search of memory yields retrieved content or not. Déjà vu may manifest when contentless familiarity detection is inexplicable by the experiencer.

Mental time travel is the ability to mentally project oneself backward in time to relive past experiences and forward in time to pre-live possible future experiences. Previous work has focused on MTT in its voluntary form. Here, we introduce the notion of involuntary MTT. We examined involuntary versus voluntary and past versus future MTT in a diary study. We found that involuntary future event representations—defined as representations of possible personal future events that come to mind with no (...) preceding search attempts—were as common as involuntary autobiographical memories and similar to them regarding cuing and subjective qualities. Future MTT involved more positive and idyllic representations than past MTT. MTT into the distant future/past involved more representations of cultural life script events than MTT into the immediate past/future. The findings are discussed in relation to cultural learning and MTT considered as a higher mental process. (shrink)

External cues and internal configuration states are the likely instigators of involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) and déjà vu experience. Indeed, Barzykowski and Moulin discuss relevant neuroscientific evidence in this direction. A complementary line of enquiry and evidence is the study of inhibition and its role in memory retrieval, and particularly how its (dys)function may contribute to IAMs and déjà vu.

Barzykowski and Moulin link déjà vu and involuntary autobiographical memories to the process of retrieval. They make no reference to Tulving's SPI-model. In this, it is proposed that information is acquired serially (S), stored in parallel (P), and retrieved independently (I). This model offers an alternative, elegant, view of involuntary autobiographical memory retrieval, as well as of déjà vus.

To provide the three-way comparisons needed to test existing theories, we compared (1) most-stressful memories to other memories and (2) involuntary to voluntary memories (3) in 75 community dwelling adults with and 42 without a current diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Each rated their three most-stressful, three most-positive, seven most-important and 15 word-cued autobiographical memories, and completed tests of personality and mood. Involuntary memories were then recorded and rated as they occurred for 2 weeks. Standard mechanisms of (...) cognition and affect applied to extreme events accounted for the properties of stressful memories. Involuntary memories had greater emotional intensity than voluntary memories, but were not more frequently related to traumatic events. The emotional intensity, rehearsal, and centrality to the life story of both voluntary and involuntary memories, rather than incoherence of voluntary traumatic memories and enhanced availability of involuntary traumatic memories, were the properties of autobiographical memories associated with PTSD. (shrink)

Explores the mythology of memory, involuntary memory, and the relation between time and memory in the context of questions prominent in contemporary thought.

Incidental perceptual memory tests reveal priming when words are generated orally from a semantic cue at study, and this priming could reflect contamination by voluntary retrieval. We tested this hypothesis using a generate condition and two read conditions that differed in depth of processing (read-phonemic vs read-semantic). An intentional word-stem completion test showed an advantage for the read-semantic over the generate condition and an advantage for the generate over the read-phonemic condition, and completion times were longer than in a (...) control test, prior to which there was no study phase. An incidental word-stem completion test showed equivalent priming for the read-semantic and read-phonemic study conditions, despite considerable power, and completion times were no longer than control, indicating that retrieval was involuntary, and insensitive to prior conceptual processing. The generate condition produced less priming than the read conditions, but significant priming nonetheless. The results show that priming from generating can be involuntary and suggest that lexical processes are responsible. They are also the first results conjointly showing a crossed double dissociation, a single dissociation, and a parallel effect across memory tests with identical physical retrieval cues. (shrink)

“Involuntary Memory: Marcel Proust and the Poetic Discovery of the Inner Self. An Analysis from the Philosophical Perspective of Walter Benjamin”. In this article, we undertake, from the perspective of Walter Benjamin’s philosophical work, the phenomenon of involuntary memory discovered by Marcel Proust in the writing process –exercise of subjectification– of In Search of Lost Time. In the analysis the following approaches are developed: the relation between oblivion and memory, the poetic discovery of involuntary (...) memory, the conditions for the revelation of mnemic images –images of the inner world–, the recovery of the lost time and of the narration in the novel, and the auratic character of the involuntary memory’s images. (shrink)

Involuntary autobiographical memories are spontaneously arising memories of personal events, whereas voluntary memories are retrieved strategically. Voluntary remembering has been studied in numerous experiments while involuntary remembering has been largely ignored. It is generally assumed that voluntary recall is the standard way of remembering, whereas involuntary recall is the exception. However, little is known about the actual frequency of these two types of remembering in daily life. Here, 48 Danish undergraduates recorded their involuntary versus voluntary autobiographical (...) memories during a day using a mechanical counter. Involuntary memories were reported three times as frequently as voluntary memories. Compared to voluntary memories, they were associated less with problem solving and social sharing and more with day dreaming, periods of boredom, no reasons for remembering and predominantly came to mind during unfocused attention. The findings suggest that involuntary recall is a typical way of accessing the personal past. (shrink)

Autobiographical memory plays a key role in psychological well-being, and the field has been investigated from multiple perspectives for over thirty years. One large body of research has examined the basic mechanisms and characteristics of autobiographical memory during general cognition, and another body has studied what happens to it during psychological disorders, and how psychological therapies targeting memory disturbances can improve psychological well-being. This edited collection reviews and integrates current theories on autobiographical memory when viewed in (...) a clinical perspective. It presents an overview of basic applied and clinical approaches to autobiographical memory, covering memory specificity, traumatic memories, involuntary and intrusive memories, and the role of self-identity. The book discusses a wide range of psychological disorders, including depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, borderline personality disorder and autism, and how they affect autobiographical memory. It will be of interest to students of psychology, clinicians and therapists alike. (shrink)

This paper identifies a form of remembering sufficiently overlooked that it has not yet been dignified with a name. I shall christen it Rilkean Memory. This form of memory is, typically, embodied and embedded. It is a form of involuntary, autobiographical memory that is neither implicit nor explicit, neither declarative nor procedural, neither episodic nor semantic, and not Freudian. While a discussion of the importance of Rilkean memory lies beyond the scope of this paper, I (...) shall try to show that admitting Rilkean memory into our ontology does point us in the direction of a very different conception of the mind and mental processes. (shrink)

This paper investigates the madeleine-memory as a case of pre-reflective experience, from the genesis of its sedimentation into the body. Indeed, I aim to address the question of the literary protagonist Marcel on the roots of his happiness and the genesis of his memories. Until now, the madeleine-memory has been described as bodily and involuntary. In phenomenology, a wide literature has confirmed the relationship between the sense of body ownership and pre-reflective self-awareness. I aim to build upon (...) such a mutual link and show that the pre-reflective roots of the madeleine-memory have to be traced back to the genesis of the involuntary recollections. To this purpose, I will illustrate that the epistemological relationship between the object and the subject plays a relevant role in the way the subject remembers. First, I will present that madeleine-memory is a unique case of bodily memory, by analyzing the main features that characterize it. Secondly, I will analyze the original experience of the madeleine within the phenomenological logic of transcendence in immanence. For this aim, I will rely on the Husserlian notions of “epistemological inadequacy of perception” and “background experiences”. Through these notions, I will show that Proustian involuntary recollections are pre-reflective experiences because previously subjects have pre-reflectively experienced the content of recollections. (shrink)