An extended approach to the comprehension of virtual reality is developed in the article. Virtual reality is understood not only as a logically possible or cybernetically constructed reality but also as continuous turbulence of potencies of the complex natural and social world we live in, the wandering of complex systems and organizations over a field of possibilities, such a realization of forms and structures in which many formations remain in latent, potential forms, and are in the permanent process of making (...) and multiplying a spectrum of possibilities, lead to the growth of the evolutionary tree of paths of development. It is shown that such an understanding of virtual reality corresponds to concepts and notions developed in the modern science of complexity. The most significant concepts are considered, such as the nonlinearity of time, the relationship of space and time, the uncertainty of the past and the openness of the future, the choice and construction of the future at the moments of passing the bifurcation points. Some cultural and historical prototypes of these modern ideas of virtual reality are given. It is substantiated that the vision of virtual reality being developed today can play the role of a heuristic tool for understanding the functioning and stimulation of human creativity. (shrink)

For those with an interest in the most fundamental components of reality, reflecting on the simplest of things can yield a rich harvest. Consider two buttons, of exactly the same shade of red, one round and made of plastic, the other square and made of wood. Each button is clearly a distinct object in its own right: each is composed of a different portion of matter, each has its own spatial location. But are the buttons completely distinct? It might seem (...) so, but a little reflection can suggest otherwise. Both buttons are the same colour, they are each red. The buttons do not possess merely similar colours, they possess literally identical colours: one and the same colour, a particular shade of red, is found in both objects. This same colour can be also be found in many other objects. Colour, it seems, is not tied down to any specific time or place, in the way ordinary objects are. The same (literally identical) colour can exist at many times and places. And what holds for colour also holds for other shareable characteristics, such as shapes and sizes, and sounds. We are thus led to the (now familiar) distinction between particulars (spatially located objects) and universals (repeatable, multiply-located properties). Plato was no stranger to this line of reasoning, but he found himself driven to take several further steps. He observed that in ordinary life we never encounter a truly perfect circle (or square, or triangle, or straight line), but that we nonetheless have the concept of such a circle. Relying on the (no means absurd) assumption that meaningful terms must have referents – in order to be meaningful at all – he was led to the conclusion that the perfect circle must exist in a non-physical plane of reality, a dimension where perfection is possible. He called this changeless, timeless, realm the world of ‘Forms’. He further reasoned that since ‘circle’ is a universal, all other universals (such as redness) must inhabit this realm also. Resemblances among the familiar objects in the physical world are to be explained in terms of Forms ‘participating’, more or less adequately, in these objects.. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to reveal the peculiarities of the social novel genre content, the traditions of which are rooted in the modern era and transformations under the influence of radical changes in the type of thinking in the postmodern outlook. Postmodern fictional way of thinking is based on the image of the world as a combination of multiplying realities. As the result, the social reality started being perceived as a construction in which complicated-by-intelligence values disappear while (...) elementary routine constructions multiply. Epistemological uncertainty also influenced this result. In conditions of ‘trading reality‘ the intellectuals lose their positions, traditional values destruct, humanities knowledge fades as it doesn’t have any certain market cost, the dream about the social equality vanishes together with the idea of socialism itself. Discourse of possession can not be combined with the discourse of moral. New positions are obtained by the representatives of different subcultures that become the centre of amorphous mass. The modern British social novel represents the social changes, which have occurred owing to the changes of the paradigm of thinking. The absence of socially significant landmarks deprives the British of an impulse to socially significant actions, allows manipulations with masses. The absence of national idea is connected with the painful search of the national identity, which is believed to be the main point in modern literary process. (shrink)

This chapter considers some clearly distinct basic bodies, as with some spatially separate spherical red particles. It suggests that it is in conceiving such clearly spatial bodies as are so spatially separate that we humans may have our clearest conception as to how it is that, all at the very same time, there may be several distinct concrete individuals and not, say, just a single concretism multiply conceived. The chapter explores concrete reality and substantial dualism, sameness and difference of concrete (...) individuals, conception of nonspatial simultaneous souls, Berkeleian idealism, Cartesian dualism, substantial individuals, the hypothesis of spacelike extension, the deflationary approach, a hypothesized dimension far more like space than time, an analogical conception of nonspatial souls, how nonspatial souls might precede even the initial physical embodiment, whether immaterial souls ever change propensitively, a constitutional view of souls, fusional dualism, the mental problems of the many, and the problem of our unconscious quality. (shrink)

In our present early Twenty-First Century epoch, in bold contradistinction with the 1989-91 end of the Cold War and subsequent reassurances of the 90s, that ‘The End of History’ had arrived, the past decade has seen the rise of populism and authoritarian would-be leaders worldwide. Similarly, both nationalism and outright fascism have once again become credible threats, whilst ‘the left’ has largely failed to respond or offer feasible answers to multiplying social problems. This belated and misfiring reaction to capitalism in (...) crisis, simply the year: 2008 will give all that is needed to explain what is being referred to. What has occupied the energies of substantial sections of populations angry at elites seemingly operating as usual and the same limited and fatally flawed system continuing as before. Those individuals and institutions who helped it teeter on the brink of terminal failure, were able to profit from this whilst populations suffered as states socialized debt making society pay with austerity measures. This left a power vacuum to which any adequate response was noticeably lacking. From 2016, and the date bookends the year in which populism and authoritarian leaders ‘first appeared’, the wave of similar populist reaction has continued globally. Part of this has been the contention over what constitutes ‘the truth’ and facts themselves and misinformation, disinformation and ‘fake news’ continue to persist as serious problems. The bigger issue it might be argued is the implication that these methods can be used to attain power, either political or in any other sphere: a secondary and no less alarming problem also covered by this essay. Explicating a materialist analysis of what exactly the problem and threats populism and authoritarianism embody, and ‘where they came from’, the essay is most heavily influenced by the dissident and unorthodox Marxism of the Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute for Social Research). This paper takes as its subject the weapons of Marx and the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory to critically analyze the concept of Ideology Critique, and how Marx and Marxism remain the ‘bad conscience of philosophy’. It also applies takes as its subject the concept of ideology critique to the unnerving predominance of right-wing and authoritarian narratives, still very much vying for political power in 2024. (shrink)

Locke is famed for his caution in speculative matters: “Men, extending their enquiries beyond their capacities and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no sure footing; ‘tis no wonder that they raise questions and multiply disputes”. And he is skeptical about the pretensions of natural philosophy, which he says is “not capable of being made a science”. And yet Locke is confident that “Our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth, (...) that there is an eternal, most powerful and most knowing being; which whether anyone will please to call God it matters not”. His certainty about the existence and attributes of God, I will argue, led him to surprisingly strong convictions about a deep and disputed problem at the intersection of seventeenth century metaphysics and natural philosophy: the absolute reality of space and time. Specifically, he based his absolutist conceptions of space and time on God’s literal omnipresence and eternity. Leibniz probably had Locke in mind when he inveighed in 1716 against “real absolute space, the idol of some modern Englishmen”. And Leibniz was right a decade earlier to voice through his mouthpiece Theophilus the suspicion that, despite Locke’s claim to know nothing about the substance of void space, “there are grounds for thinking you know more about it than you say or believe that you do. Some people have thought that God is the place of objects”. (shrink)

The increasing presence of women, especially university women, in risky alcohol consumption such as Binge Drinking, which is associated with gender-specific biopsychosocial problems, makes it necessary to analyze the variables underlying BD in order to adjust possible interventions more in line with their reality. The motives and expectancies of this pattern of consumption, as well as the consequences derived from it, are some of the variables that are shown to have the greatest weight in the prediction of BD. In the (...) present study we analyze, on the one hand, the performance of these variables among college women with alcohol use, and on the other hand, which of these variables allow us to classify BD. A total of 501 female university consumers of alcohol were assessed. Specifically, they completed a self-report of alcohol consumption, the Expectancy Questionnaire, the Drinking Motives Questionnaire and the Alcohol Consumption Consequences Evaluation. BD female students scored significantly higher on these instruments, except for compliance motives. The logistic regression analysis carried out to estimate the probability of performing BD using the social and conformity motives, the ACCE and positive expectancies correctly estimated have a 3.55-fold increase in the probability of having BD, compared to women classified as low risk by the ACCE. On the other hand, women classified as moderate risk by the ACCE have a 4.77-fold increase in the probability of having BD. In the case of social motives and positive expectancies, their increase multiplies by 1.165 and 1.024, respectively, the probability of having BD. The results of this study highlight the importance of adapting preventive measures to the consequences experienced by BD university students, especially in relation to the social motives and positive expectancies that modulate decision-making when engaging in this pattern of consumption. (shrink)

The race against COVID-19 has been intense and painful and many of us are now looking for a way to move on. We may try to seize a degree of comfort and security by convincing ourselves that we are among the “fittest”—that is, among those who have managed to survive—who can now hope for a “new-normal” time, relatively unscathed. But this isn’t what we should be hoping for. Our world, and ourselves, will never be free of COVID-19 or its insidious (...) effects. COVID-19, like climate change, is a threat multiplier and the challenges it has raised are now indelibly engraved in our vulnerable, interconnected lives. Rather than vainly hoping for a return to an imaginary, erstwhile “normal” what we need is something more fundamental: a new version of hope that embraces a courage to learn what we need to do, to enable us to live a future to which we aspire. Perhaps counter-intuitively, we need to accept that the COVID-19 experience has already changed us deeply and hope that we can learn from this and from the future changes that the pandemic will give rise to. We need to radicalize our responses to the challenges, enabling ourselves to learn new lessons about old but increasingly pertinent topics, such as the realities of human fragility, and inter-connection. (shrink)

Photographic discourse between doxa and paradoxe appearing in 1839 as a technical process of representation of the image, in the amateur and enlightenment middle, Photography will produce a popular speech that will be exclusive for almost three decades: the photographic image is beautiful more perfect it is as an imitation of the reality. Clear and with formal information about time and space. This popular speech includes a short historical information about some authors of technical inventions that improved fixation and circulation (...) image. In the last quarter of that century, as a sensibleness against Industrial making, amateur photographs define an artistic and creative sight supported with a photographic theory, the Pictorialism, that overvalues the creative subject coinciding with new forms of Thought and Art. When Pictorialism is exhausted after the 1st G. War, a new sight which includes the ability of the new camera to mimic cinema effects, the subjective sight will no longer abandon the photographic practice while the photographic literature multiplies itself with the interest of philosophers, thinkers, film makers, psychologists and psychiatrists since the developing of the mass society. In the last quarter of the XX century, with post-modern inspiration, it appears as an international pattern a new History of Photography treated as History of Art, with styles and authors, that still remains. The objective of this work is to distinguish popular and scholarly photographic reading from its origins to the technological revolution that provokes a real crisis through the analysis of its greatest analysts. Taking into consideration our time, a period of numeric change, facing the new computational technology, that work with algoritms, image reading must change, but photographs and analysts repeat analog concept and strategies. (shrink)

In a mixed-methods study of the barriers and facilitators to homeownership for African American women with physical disabilities, self-concept emerged among the primary themes. This article discusses how participants in the study perceived themselves and negotiated how they were perceived by others as multiply marginalized women. Using what I call a feminist intersectional disability framework, I suggest that participants’ relationships to care strongly contributed to their self-concept. The “Strong Black Woman” trope and associated expectations had cultural and material relevance for (...) how they interpreted themselves and were interpreted by others as receivers, managers, and providers of care. The material reality of owning or not owning a home did not reveal significant differences in the self-concepts of homeowners versus nonhomeowners. Rather, it was through conversations about homeownership that this data around self-concept in relationship to care was revealed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Du Bois’s “Afterthought”A Pedagogical Variant for Continental PhilosophyHernando A. EstévezThe Souls of Black Folk is a pedagogical text that echoes continental philosophy’s aim of preparing humankind for the genuine practice of philosophical life through critique. In this text, Du Bois uses pedagogy to expose destructive and oppressive aspects of the Western tradition in its conflicting ideas and practices. In particular, I read Du Bois’s “afterthought” in Souls of Black (...) Folk as a form of critique that is expressly pedagogical, in that it prepares black individuals to play their destined role in this new era of history, and it calls for a continuous rethinking of the politics of higher education. While describing his early academic, political, and intellectual journey, Du Bois alludes to his initial and persistent concern with the impact of education on the formation of black men’s civil subjectivity. According to Du Bois, “My problem then was how, into the inevitable and logical democracy which was spreading over the world, could black folk in America and particularly in the South be openly and effectively admitted; and the colored people of the world allowed their self-government?” (Du Bois [1940] 1983, 29). For Du Bois such a question has sufficient political and social force to de-center the truths produced by the Western tradition as well as the precepts determining individuals’ subjectivity and self-government. Self-governance underlies Du Bois’s pedagogical and political projects as it is responsible for transforming black individuals’ self-perception and their relation to society. Du Bois approaches autonomy and self-governance pedagogically, by awakening individuals’ capacities for them by means of critique, through [End Page 82] questioning the historical basis on which the black race has been determined politically by the Western tradition.Du Bois’s essay Of the Training of Black Men (1902)1 begins by describing three “streams of thought,” which carry within the depth of their ideological flow ideas and ideals about humanity. Each stream has an epistemological and ontological force, which organizes the source of knowledge about the nature of black individuals’ being and existence. The force of the first stream of thought calls for an ethos that could unify humanity by multiplying its wants through worldwide cooperation. The second stream affirms the racism produced by theories explaining the origin of the black race, and the third calls for a civil struggle of black and whitened individuals whose political ideals challenge the presumed universal validity of the first two. Each stream of thought is followed by an afterthought, which questions the epistemological ground for moral and ontological claims of each of the three streams regarding the relationship between black individuals and the world. Du Bois deploys the pedagogical force of the afterthought most effectively in the political strength of the third stream of thought, in the emergence of suspicion. Through suspicion, a different possibility appears for thinking black individuals’ relationship with the world. This suspicion initiates a descriptive and normative analysis by challenging the pedagogical system on which beliefs and ideas about black individuals’ reality and future have been invented. In other words, suspicion dislodges history’s determinism by provoking self-reflection through critique of the Western philosophical tradition.In the words of Du Bois,And last of all there trickles down that third and darker thought—the thought of the things themselves, the confused, half-conscious mutter of men who are black and whitened, crying “Liberty, Freedom, Opportunity—vouchsafe to us, O boastful World, the chance of living men!” To be sure behind the thought lurks afterthought,—suppose, after all, the World is right and we are less than men? Suppose this mad impulse within is all wrong, some mock mirage from the untrue?(Du Bois [1903] 2006, 68; my emphasis)Furthermore, the “afterthought” and its immanent force of suspicion explore other subjective dimensions—the desires, struggles and dreams of the black race—which reveals alternative modes of being in the world.2 The political shift initiated by the afterthought’s critique is capable of opening up new historical categories and reconstructing the arena in which subjectivity occupies a new theoretical framework. The afterthought identifies and supersedes... (shrink)

In this article I think through Black feminism and queer theory to critically analyze toxicology. I focus on toxicology's conception of endocrine-disrupting chemicals, a class of toxicants that can cause epigenetic changes leading to inheritable health issues. I suggest that Black feminist interventions are particularly necessary for the study of toxicants because multiply marginalized populations are disproportionately more exposed to EDCs. The structural preconditions that generate this uneven, racialized, and sexualized toxic body-burden threaten to turn cultural constructions of race and (...) sex into biological realities. My discursive analysis of key scientific texts on toxicology, EDCs, and epigenetics underscores how Eurocentric biases and eugenic logics permeate and co-constitute biochemical matter. I further argue that these texts’ un/articulated norms regarding the human, sexual behavior, and evolutionary fitness undermine the usefulness of toxicological assessments for environmental justice. I close by urging scientist scholar-activists to reconceive the study of toxicants. A Black feminist approach to toxicity, I suggest, would not only situate chemical exposures in their sociopolitical contexts, but also radically revision what it means to be human. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ Cette étude met en perspective le précédent constitué par les travaux précoces du jeune Nietzsche où ce dernier fait valoir la force structurante de la métaphore comme matrice des facultés cognitives. Nous offrons d’abord une brève esquisse des postulats et des acquis des grammaires cognitives associées aux travaux d’Eleanor Rosch, ensuite de George Lakoff et Mark Johnson, ainsi qu’à la notion d’inscription corporelle de l’esprit développée par Francesco Varela. Cet exercice sert de propédeutique à une série de lectures tangentes (...) mobilisant divers angles d’approche appelés à faciliter noter évaluation des contributions de Nietzsche au domaine de la cognition. Les travaux examinés nous situent dans la période contemporaine de la publication de son premier grand ouvrage, La naissance de la tragédie : les notes pour le cours intitulé Présentation de la rhétorique ancienne, prononcé au semestre d’hiver 1872-1873 à l’Université de Bâle, ensuite ses Theoretische Studien, datant de l’été 1873, avec un renvoi aux développements plus tardifs dans le Gai Savoir. La thèse de Nietzsche peut être résumée comme suit : tous les éléments de l’appareil catégorial et du régime conceptuel à l’aide desquels nous appréhendons la réalité, a fortiori la notion de vérité qui en est le garant, sont le « précipité » ou le résidu d’un faisceau de métaphores qui constituent la force structurante des facultés cognitives. Si chez Kant nous n’avons accès qu’aux phénomènes et non au noumène, chez Nietzsche nous n’avons affaire qu’à des perspectives ou des points de vues alors que la réalité nous est monnayée sous forme de vérités qui sont des fictions ou des métaphores usées. Il ressort de cet examen que le tropisme endogène de la langue constitue une force majeure dans l’implémentation d’une conceptualité qui a la vertu d’oblitérer sa préhistoire et de se ménager un statut qui est incessamment implosé par le reflux de l’imagination créatrice nourrie par la force métaphorique qui répond à une impulsion foncière que Nietzsche associe à une « force artiste » qui tend à démultiplier les perspectives dont la généalogie se conjugue à l’exponentiel. ABSTRACT This paper highlights the precedent, managed by the precocious insights of the young Nietzsche who advocated the structuring force of the metaphor as the matrix of cognitive powers. We first provide a short sketch of the postulates and gains of cognitive grammars. We examine the guidelines of the works on cognitive research led by great Eleanor Rosch, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, as well as the concept of embodied mind developed by Francesco Varela. This summary survey is a crash introduction to a series of angular readings from a large array of perspectives on Nietzsche's early contributions to the field of cognition. The works prospected are contemporary of the publication of Nietzsche first great work, "The Birth of the Tragedy", including his notes for the lecture course on rhetoric taught at the University of Basel during the winter semester, in 1872-73, then his "Theoretische Studien", written during summer 1873, with a consideration of later developments in his "Gay Science". The overall thesis advocated by Nietzsche in these works could be summarized as follows: all the elements of the categorical apparatus and the conceptual framework by which we assess reality, a fortiori the notion of truth which vouches for it, are the "precipitate" or the residue of a cluster of metaphors which constitute the structuring force of cognitive powers. The instinct of conservation and a subtle form of dissimulation lead to the elision of the tropic dynamics of language to the benefit of a literalism bound to a structuring amnesia. If for Kant we get access only to phenomena and not to noumenon, for Nietzsche we always deal with perspectives or points of view, whilst reality is traded to us by mean of truths which are mere fictions or worn out metaphors. So we come to acknowledge that the endogenous tropism displayed by language uses constitutes a major force in the implementation of conceptuality, that last one being eager to absorb its own prehistory into oblivion and to endow itself a status which is in close to timelessly imploded by the ebb of creative imagination fuelled by sheer metaphoric force, a spontaneous impulsion that Nietzsche ties to an "artistic force" which tends to multiply the perspectives whose genealogy is driven by an exponential factor. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Knowing the EastPatti M. MarxsenKnowing the East. By Paul Claudel. Translated by James Lawler. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. 136 pp.Fifty years after his death, Paul Claudel (1868–1955) is remembered for many things. Not only was he a major twentieth-century poet and playwright, he was an astute observer of Dutch, Spanish, and Japanese art. Not only was he the brother of sculptor Camille Claudel, he was a (...) diplomat who lived for nearly twenty years in Asia, including a stint as the French ambassador to Japan (1921–1927). When he was elected as a member of the Académie Française in 1946 at nearly 80 years of age he quipped, "For an academic, that is puberty." He died at 87, having lived large in two centuries and on three continents.Following an adolescence marked with indifference toward religion, Claudel experienced a profound conversion to Catholicism during a Christmas night service at Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris at the age of 18. With Christianity at the center of his universe and under the influence of Symbolist poets Rimbaud and Mallarmé, he developed a response to the world that was at once poetic and spiritual. Through his poetry, plays, and essays, he insisted on a fundamental unity between matter and spirit, a harmonious and vast universe into which the human mind could enter. And, at least for him, the point of entry was the portal of the Church. He struggled at times, but never lost sight of his faith. For all this, he is often credited with the revival of French Catholicism in the wake of WWI. After all, if Paul Claudel could take religion seriously and find meaning in it, pourquoi pas the rest of us?The facts of his extraordinary biography form a peculiar background to the recent translation by James Lawler of Claudel's collection of prose poems titled Knowing [End Page 229] the East. First published in 1946 as Connaissance de l'est, these sixty-one texts were written between 1895 and 1905 during Claudel's first visits to China and Japan as a young vice-consul stationed in Shanghai. He was twenty-six and still finding his poetic voice. And though his stance in the world is decidedly Christian, the content of this intriguing work reveals an inner dialogue with Buddhist ideas of interconnection, harmony, the ongoing quest for a higher life condition, and the overwhelming impact of nature in the lives of mere humans.In "Pagoda," Claudel describes a seven-story Chinese pagoda as it "amplifies and multiplies the roof, exaggerates the horned corners that rise with an elegant surge, and turns their curves upward to the sky." This form that "does away with walls" and concentrates on the uplifting roof creates a space where "Buddha, Prince of Peace, dwells inside with all the gods." In this architecture he reads a structuring of physical and spiritual space, a kind of never ending upward movement divided into "the seven mystical heavens." The culminating effect is the heavenly achievement of the unknowable. And so, after going as far as he can go into the world of the spirit, he ends this prose poem with an abrupt return to temporal reality. "I have no more to say of the Pagoda. I do not know its name."Elsewhere, in "The Wanderer," he turns his sense of awe toward nature. "Every tree has its personality, every small beast its role, every voice its part in the symphony," he writes. "As one understands music, so I understand nature, like a detailed narrative of proper names; as my walk and the day advance, so does the elaboration of the doctrine." The "doctrine," it seems, is the idea of dependent origination, the interrelation of all life that springs from a single source. In the last line, he states, "I understand the world's harmony. When will I grasp its melody?"In "The Temple of Consciousness" Claudel climbs "the black rock's vertical wall, and only at this late afternoon hour do I know myself to be on the right track." Below, he observes golden rice fields. Ahead there is an "old stairway overlaid with hoary moss... (shrink)

The Family Health Program is characterized as an important space to develop activities related to Nutrition, once the health community agent is a qualified, potential multiplier when performing these actions. The aim of this study was to conduct a qualifying pilot experiment on food and nutrition for health community agents from a family health unit in Botucatu. Fourteen community agents participated and the course presented the following steps: observation of reality, a survey of perceived necessities, devising the main intervention themes, (...) and course development. The main focus was on existing diseases in the attended community like diabetes, hypertension, obesity, dyslepidemia and other themes related to preventing these diseases, for example, food fiber, water physical exercises, and the appropriate use of diet and light products. Besides these themes, there was also a presentation about the food pyramid and how to transmit recommendations for the visited families. The experience was positive with great interest and knowledge enhancement on the part of health community agents. In case there is a positive impact on the nutritional condition of the community attended by these agents, the Project may be extended to other Family Health units in Botucatu. Furthermore, the study also shows that to prepare such courses, it is crucial a nutritionist participation, because of the contribution this Professional may provide to the work group in which he is inserted. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the role of the architectural concept in the creation and life of the city. Aiming to identify the urban qualities in the concept, I introduce the distinction between the first and the second object of architecture, where the former represents the architectural concept, which then materializes its authenticity in the latter, that is, architecture’s real state. Within this temporal order of architectural creation, the paper focuses on the transition from the first object to the second, in which (...) the (urban) reality is assumed to be altered by producing the architectural concept. In explaining such alteration, I employ the dialectics between concept and context. My main hypothesis is that to define the architectural concept necessarily implies the definition of its context, that is, the representation of its real exteriority. At the urban level, the inevitable particularity of architecture becomes an aesthetic quality, thanks to which the impossible task of de-fining the city is overcome and made irrelevant for reaching the state of (urban) conjunction. With every architectural concept being realized, the urban reality becomes altered, or multiplied. The urban contextualization, in this sense, implies not simple summation, but rather conjunction of at least two different concepts, whose difference, however, originates from the act of fundamental disjunction. To explain this paradox, I employ Hegel’s notion of aufheben, aiming to reconcile the radical architectural opposition between the conceptual and the contextual, in favor of the idea of the multiplicity of realized concepts – that is, second objects of architecture. What in architecture appears as an opposition of concept and context, serves on the urban level to overcome the problem of (contextual) finitude of the city, and then produce a new, positive difference within it. (shrink)

It is, perhaps, time to move beyond the postmodernism debate if only because the challenges it poses cannot be solved from within its terms. In fact, there is every good reason to believe that modernity is ending but the facts of this matter will not be discovered by theory alone. It is, thus, time for social theory to return to original purposes-to write the history of the present. Accordingly, social theory must reread its classics, not to return to origins, but (...) to recognize just how difficult it was for even the best of the modernists to face the reality of modernity's divided and multiplied natures. Thus disabused, it might be possible for social theory to study the present for what it is. (shrink)

Introduction Jamie Allen Time, of all the dimensions readily presented to experience, seems to do so most readily through things. Stuff, in supposed counter-valence to the negentropic resilience of living things, appears to us as that which degrades through time, and demarcates a more technical chronometry of sequential events. Situated outside the rotting of fruit and the ticking of clocks, a “deep time” persists. Like the ultra-hearing of the bat, and the infra-vision of the boa-constrictor, there exist living and non-living (...) agents and entities capable of revealing the fixity and finitude of our own perceptual frames for thinking and understanding. The recordings presented here consist of four extracts of documents made in deep geological repository sites (for the storage of nuclear waste). Here re-presented are the Yucca Mountain Repository; HADES, in Mol, Belgium; Gorleben in Germany and a further recording from Forsmark in Sweden (pretty much inaudible behind a loop of a pop song). These recordings are imagined acoustic amplifications of deep time, just as the astronomer’s telescope is (thought of a certain way), also a time machine. Stars and nuclear waste are unapparent objects of temporal thought. Andy Weir is an artist from London researching effects of deprioritised subjectivity and contemporary art. This project draws on work developing sonic fictions, stealthy earworms, and micropolitical agencies. Prompted for further thoughts about the recordings presented here, he offered up the interspersed discussion included. —JA Yucca Mountain Repository, Nevada, USA by continent I became interested in these sites originally as spaces that allude to a time outside of the human (‘deep time’) as they are designed to store waste ‘without future maintenance’. The very fact of thinking about these spaces or working on them—engineering etc.. (as I’m particularly interested them in a kind of practice rather than just an object of thought), in other words, forces a confrontation with thought of the extinction of humanity. I was interested in this as a production of affect at odds with the expected ‘ironic, can be whatever you like’ interpretive condition of contemporary art (art under the condition of neoliberalism, say, where the individual subject is prioritised as a free autonomous producer of the meaning of the work) When I thought about this a bit though it ran into paradoxes—yes, I could allude to deep time, but in doing so I just allude to its un-representability, drawing attention to the limits of representation and so reaffirming it—I was stuck in a representation/non-representational negative dialectic. In trying to somehow create a figure for deep time I was either reducing it to my description of it, or presenting it as irreducible. HADES Facility, Mol, Belgium by continent I don’t think I’ve escaped this in the work but my response to it was to create a sonic-fiction. This was based on the idea of a viral transmission of the affect of deep time (this is the ‘pyroclastic-soaked chrono-dread’) through receiving apparatuses, transforming the screen into an intercessor or mediating lure for the outside, a site of exposure multiplying virulently through its dissemination, invoking as much as trying to represent these spaces, the sounds as durations of exposure to contagious materials, and fictions as a way of excavating the strangeness of a world opaque to subjective reconfiguration... Testing out I suppose ways that art could start thinking about figuring the reality of ecological crisis. Gorleben Repository, Lower Saxony, Germany by continent While everything remains at the level of fiction I think the work is problematic. It doesn’t really model anything, giving too much authority to either romantic abandonment or the recuperation of romantic abandonment under its description by theory/philosophy, all contained and controlled by me within a fairly limited condition of what art can do. Deep Time Contagion is precisely a materialisation of and transmission of this paradox (i.e. with screen-media can only present deep time as unrepresentable or draw attention to an inability to present it) taking the comfort/panic induced by this paradox as its material. I’m working now on some new projects that take this as a point of departure. Forsmark Repository, Sweden (Robitussin Mix) by continent. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dominus Deus Noster Deus Unus Est:Aquinas on Divine UnityArchbishop Rowan Williams"The Lord our God is one LORD," says the Shema (Deut 6:4), echoed by Christians and Muslims alike. "We believe in one God," the Nicene Creed announces; and the Shahada's "There is no deity but God" affirms the same. But at first sight, Christian theology looks like the outlier here, as St. Thomas obliquely acknowledges when, early in his (...) discussion of the Trinity (Summa theologiae [ST] I, q. 30, a. 1, obj. 1 and ad 1), he quotes Boethius: "That [alone] is truly one in which there is no numeration" (obj. 3). If there is a plurality of relation in God, there is something that can be enumerated, says Thomas. This objection is duly met by distinguishing between "absolute" plurality and the mutually definitory relations of the Trinitarian life which rule out any "composition" in God. But, for this fully to make sense, we must return to Thomas's explicit discussion of divine unity (ST I, q. 11). The present essay attempts a brief examination of how divine unity is understood in this quaestio, in the hope of clarifying an aspect of Aquinas's Trinitarian thought, and also of suggesting ways of developing an implicit theme of some significance for contemporary theology.It is still a textbook commonplace that "Western" Trinitarian theology begins from the divine unity and treats the distinction of the divine persons only in the light of this prior reality. The eloquent polemic of Orthodox theologians like Vladimir Lossky has played a major role in canonizing this supposed opposition. He writes, for example, that Western Trinitarianism treats the relationships of the divine hypostases as "a system of relationships within the one essence: something logically posterior to the essence," with [End Page 555] the distinguishing "relations of origin" (originary fatherhood, generatedness, procession) as "more or less swallowed up in the nature or essence."1 Examples could be multiplied, from Lossky and many others, and from Western theologians influenced by this characterization.2 The very structure of Aquinas's Summa theologiae, with the quaestiones de Deo uno preceding those de Trinitate, is sometimes adduced in support of this analysis of the ambiguities and inadequacies of Thomist Trinitarianism, and of a general Western resistance to the radical personalism of authentic patristic theology.But, polemic apart, what is Aquinas actually saying in his treatment of divine unity, primarily in ST I, q. 11? The four articles of the quaestio deal with whether saying that something is "one" actually tells us anything beyond the postulation of something as a coherent subject/substance; with whether unity and plurality are simply opposed and incompatible notions; with whether it is right to say that God is one, and if so, whether he is maxime unus, one in a unique and unsurpassable sense. Basic to his argument, as we shall see, is something touched on briefly in ST I, q. 30, a. 1, where his response (ad 3) to the Boethian formulation associates divine unity with simplicity—that is, with non-composition:3 affirming the divine unity is, crucially, denying the applicability of certain kinds of discourse in theology. But, as we shall see, part of the abiding importance of Aquinas's discussion is, perhaps unexpectedly, to open the door to a new ontological perspective in which laying out the difference between different senses of "unity" allows for the development of a more systematically relational metaphysics. Related to this is the distinction drawn (especially in ad 2 of [End Page 556] a. 3) between "mathematical" and "metaphysical" unity; one of the problems with a good deal of modern criticism of Western Trinitarianism is a failure to reckon with the diversity of ways in which "unus est" might be used, and St. Thomas is in fact abundantly clear about the senses that must be ruled out in theology—including any sense that would oppose an "individual" essence to "multiple" hypostases, as if the divine essence were itself a sort of numerically identified individual.The ground for this is laid in the first article. If we say that something is "one," we are surely offering a determination of it, specifying one way of... (shrink)

The principal temptation toward substance dualisms, or otherwise incorporating a question begging homunculus into our psychologies, arises not from the problem of consciousness in general, nor from the problem of intentionality, but from the question of our awareness and understanding of our own mental contents, and the control of the deliberate, conscious thinking in which we employ them. Dennett has called this "Hume's problem". Cognitivist philosophers have generally either denied the experiential reality of thought, as did the Behaviorists, or have (...) taken an implicitly epiphenomenalist stance, a form of dualism. Some sort of mental duality may indeed be required to meet this problem, but not one that is metaphysical or question begging. I argue that it can be solved in the light of Paivio's "Dual Coding" theory of mental representation. This theory, which is strikingly simple and intuitive (perhaps too much so to have caught the imagination of philosophers) has demonstrated impressive empirical power and scope. It posits two distinct systems of potentially conscious representations in the human mind: mental imagery and verbal representation (which is not to be confused with 'propositional' or "mentalese" representation). I defend, on conceptual grounds, Paivio's assertion of precisely two codes against interpretations which would either multiply image codes to match sense modes, or collapse the two, admittedly interacting, systems into one. On this basis I argue that the inference that a conscious agent would be needed to read such mental representations and to manipulate them in the light of their contents can be pre-empted by an account of how the two systems interact, each registering, affecting and being affected by developing associative processes within the other. (shrink)

Joseph Carens in his 2013 book Ethics of Immigration argues we should not criminalize undocumented migrants. Instead, we should view them as irregular immigrants who are entitled to some general human rights. This article focuses on Caren's discussion of criminalization in light of recent scholarship by John Marquez and Natalie Cisneros pertaining to the Latina/o border death toll, generalized violence, and discourses on undocumented pregnant migrante females as multiplying rats and anchor babies. This article argues that simply relying on a (...) democratic state model to understand the realities of border militarization is not sufficient because it does not perform some of the explanatory functions performed by other non-ideal theories. By synthesizing the views of Cisneros and Marquez, this article distinguishs thick and thin senses of excessive border enforcement and outlines a notion of the racial/sexual state of expendability as a way of making better sense of these violent realities. (shrink)

Roger Bacon’s On the Multiplication of Species is an attempt to analyze efficient causality in terms of forces that are multiplied from agent to patient. This essay argues that this has significant implications for the traditional distinction between appearance and reality in that Bacon refuses to think efficient cause in terms of some other reality that does not appear and yet is the ground of appearance.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Christian Ethics in a Technological Age by Brian BrockDavid W. GillChristian Ethics in a Technological Age Brian Brock Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2010. 408 pp. $34.00Brian Brock is a lecturer in moral and practical theology at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland, and the author of Singing the Ethos of God: On the Place of Christian Ethics in Scripture (Eerdmans, 2007). Christian Ethics in a Technological [End Page 188] (...) Age was originally Brock’s doctoral thesis at King’s College, London. Brock begins by highlighting and finding wanting the modern practice of “technology assessment” as epitomized in the establishment of the US Office of Technology Assessment in 1972. We live in a world, a milieu, of ever-multiplying new technologies and technological artifacts. “Technology assessment” attempts to evaluate their impacts as thoroughly as possible through scientific, managerial methods. Costs and benefits, benefits and harms, short-term and long-term, near and distant effects: how can we measure what we know and extrapolate to what we need to know?In part 1 Brock engages in some detail the thinking of Martin Heidegger, George Grant, and Michel Foucault on technology. Although Heidegger and Foucault in particular are not ultimate authorities for Brock, his chapters on their work provide a helpful philosophical critique of the inadequacies of today’s narrow managerial approaches to technological assessment. The real problems lie much deeper: in the ways technology reflects and restructures our whole way of thinking about life, materiality, subjects and objects, and means and ends.Having used Heidegger, Grant, and Foucault to unmask the complex reality of technology in the modern era, Brock turns in part 2 to Augustine, Karl Barth, and Bernd Wannenwetsch to try to build a Christian theological ethics of technology and work that will, in the end, provide a richer texture for our interactions with the questions raised by new technologies. In briefest terms, he argues that our questions and judgments about technology should arise within the church gathered for worship rather than within the management team gathered for measurement of effects. It could be said that in the former it is God who questions technology whereas in the latter technology and its servants constitute an implicit challenge to God and the world external to themselves.Brock’s study will be of particular interest to students of his primary six sources: Heidegger, Grant, Foucault, Augustine, Barth, and Wannenwetsch, whose ideas and quotations dominate the pages of this book. Without any doubt Christian Ethics in a Technological Age is a significant work that deserves careful consideration in graduate seminars and among specialists in the field; nonetheless, I have three criticisms. First, the work would have been much stronger if it demonstrated awareness and understanding of the work of Jacques Ellul, Carl Mitcham, Albert Borgmann, and other leading thinkers in this arena. Second, Brock’s writing style (long, complex Germanic sentence structures, eccentric vocabulary choices such as the recurrent use of “purchase”) gets in the way of successful communication—especially with the very managers and technologists he presumably would like to influence. Third, while sympathizing with his rejection of managerial formulas for analysis, some much more concrete and practical counsel on the implications of his position would have been [End Page 189] helpful. How do trust and trustworthiness get reestablished? How does a worshipping congregation hear God’s guidance about its particular engagements with technologies? We have some eloquent statements of the concepts but little by way of illustration or example.David W. GillGordon-Conwell Theological SeminaryCopyright © 2013 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Muitos filósofos utilizaram o jornalismo como meio para expressar suas ideias. Depois da Segunda Guerra Mundial, por exemplo, Sartre, Adorno, Arendt, publicaram em jornais ou concederam entrevistas problematizando aquele evento: seus motivos, consequências e, sobretudo, as formas de evitar outras catástrofes. A partir de 1960, na França, Michel Foucault teve intensificada sua relação com jornais e jornalistas: concedeu entrevistas; participou de debates; publicou informativos e respostas a críticos; e, inclusive, atuou na criação do jornal Libération, em 1972. Quanto aos escritos (...) do autor, conforme Deleuze (1991), as entrevistas de Foucault devem ser consideradas parte da obra do filósofo, destacando a importância do jornalismo para o pensamento do autor: várias delas foram compiladas e publicadas enquanto “formas de expressão” em livros como “Microfísica do Poder” (1977) e na Coleção “Ditos e Escritos” (1994), sendo decisivas para o conjunto da obra foucaultiana. Em sua perspectiva, Filosofia e jornalismo manifestam interesses semelhantes pela “atualidade”, entrecruzando suas práticas, motivo pelo qual se tornou importante dar a necessária atenção ao tema em seus escritos. Assim, este artigo tem como objetivo analisar a relação entre Foucault e o jornalismo de modo a responder como tal relação tem importância para o desenvolvimento e compreensão da filosofia foucaultiana. Palavras-chave: Foucault; Filosofia; Jornalismo; Atualidade; The relationship between Foucaultian Philosophy and Journalism: possibilities to thinking the ‘present reality’ Abstract: Many philosophers have used journalism to expose their ideas. After the Second World War Sartre, Adorno, Arendt published in newspapers or gave interviews about that event: the reasons, the consequences and how to avoid catastrophes. In France since 1960 Michel Foucault increased his relationship with newspapers and journalists: he was interviewed, participated in debates, published newsletters, responded to comments and worked on the project to create the newspaper Libération, in 1972. Considering the texts published in newspapers, Deleuze (1991) said that Foucault’s interviews should be read as part of Foucault’s work. This decision is important to think about the contribution of journalism to Foucault and to his political interventions. Several of these interventions were published as “forms of expression” in the books: “Microfisica del Potere” (Italy, 1977) and in the Collection “Dits et Écrits” (France, 1994) and they were decisive for Foucault’s work. For the author Philosophy and Journalism have similar interests in the present reality: they intertwine their practices and this is a reason to pay attention to this relationship in Foucault’s books. Thus, the present article aims to analyze the relationship between Foucault and journalism and then discuss how this relationship helps in the understanding of Foucault’s philosophy. Keywords: Foucault; Philosophy; Journalism; Present Reality; La relation entre la Philosophie Foucaultienne et le Journalisme: Des possibilités de penser à ‘l’Actualité’ Resumé: De nombreux philosophes ont utilisé le journalisme pour exprimer leurs idées. Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, par exemple, Sartre, Adorno, Arendt ont écrit des journaux ou donné des entretetiens sur cet événement: les raisons, les conséquences et surtout les moyens d’éviter d’autres conflits. En France, depuis 1960, Michel Foucault multiplie les relations avec les journaux: il donne des entretiens, participe à des débats, publie des bulletins, répond aux critiques et participe à la création du journal Libération. En ce sens, Deleuze (1991) a déclaré que ces entretiens doivent être lus dans le cadre de l’œuvre foucaldienne, soulignant l’importance du journalisme pour la pensée de l’auteur. Plusieurs de ces entretiens ont été compilés et publiés comme “formes d’expression” dans des ouvrages tels que “Microfisica del Potere” (Italie, 1977) et “Dits et Écrits” (1994) et ont été importantes pour l’œuvre foucaldienne. Pour Foucault, la philosophie et le journalisme montrent des intérêts similaires pour l’actualité, ils mêlent leurs pratiques, et c’est pourquoi il est important de prêter attention au thème. Ainsi, cet article vise à analyser la relation entre Foucault et le journalisme et tenter de montrer comment cette relation est importante dans le développement et la compréhension de la philosophie de Foucault. Mots clés: Foucault; Philosophie; Journalisme; Actualité; Data de registro: 15/06/2022 Data de aceite: 22/02/2022. (shrink)

The essay is concentrated on emotional affects caused by representation of violence in the case of Russia’s war against Ukraine and beyond. Instant accessibility to first-hand visual information created fertile soil for planting and then multiplying manipulative strategies of one or another political interest. Meanwhile, the demand for shocking content continues to steadily rise because it guarantees popularity, spectacle and even a form of pleasure. This, in turn, supports a very propagandistic version of reality where violence plays a central role (...) in the overall design and transmission of contents, which is driven by shock as an affective medium. Blind Spot, Gradual Loss of Vision and Speck in the Eye represent a body of works by Mykola Ridnyi, address the question of what potential response(s) could be given by artistic interventions understood as a dialectical and critical framework able to face and make visible the problem of dehumanization through violence? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Take My Breath AwayEric Hayot (bio)In the middle of everything—in the middle of everything—here we are. Breathing. Not breathing. Choking on the fumes of the history we inherit: climate change, white supremacy, global pandemic. Waiting for the great exhale.At the dedication of St. Gaudens' Boston monument to the first Black regiment raised in the North to fight in the Civil War, Robert Lowell said, William James "could almost hear (...) the bronze Negroes breathe." Lowell's poem, written some seven decades after the monument's unveiling, at the height of the Civil Rights era, is a bitter record of the country's failure to fulfill the promise of emancipation, of its reluctance to let Black people breathe: "The monument sticks like a fishbone / in the city's throat."The country's throat. Still! Another five decades later!I do not think it is too much to say that the global rise of white nationalism is the echo of the still unresolved civil, legal, and political history of the Americas, the tension between the ideal of a multi-racial democracy and the difficulty that whites would have accepting it. The broader question is whether the fruits of Europe's long period of technological and military dominance can be shared with those whose exploitation and domination helped make that period possible, whether at home—where the resistance to immigration and refugees is basically a resistance to the distribution of the goods of the welfare state to people who are not white—or abroad—where the consequences of climate change will be felt most strongly, and where the understandable demand to continue developing, to access the cars and air conditioning and other goods that allow Europe its immense comfort, confronts the (equally understandable) demand to reduce the use of fossil fuels, the building of factories, and the like. We've had our development, the West says. But you can't have yours. And you can't have ours, either.But you know all this.One effect of the moment is that the global-historical forms of conflict now seem to penetrate down the very marrow of daily life, so that a billion tiny moments or gestures that might in other times have happily [End Page 127] signified only in the small local contexts of their occurrence now instead immediately connect to, or allegorize, the global-historical patterns to which they indubitably also belong. This has the effect of destroying what we were used to thinking of as the "private" or even "local" sphere of our actions. We might think of this as a "politicizing" of the formerly "personal," but this formulation, which is already a half century old (Carol Hanisch's essay with that title was published in 1970), feels sadly out of date, as though it itself had been swallowed up by one of its newer versions, "the local is the global," which in turn has been swallowed up by something even larger: there is no local, no personal, anymore. It is all global, all political.Perhaps the condition of having a personal or local sphere was itself a function of European privilege. In some respects, of course, it was. A Black person at a police traffic stop is not having a merely local experience, but a politically and deeply historically overdetermined one. A trans person at a medical appointment is not just having a private conversation between patient and doctor, but participating (and knows they are participating) in a national and transnational discussion about bodies, gender, sexuality, and so on. The examples can be multiplied.So perhaps it was only ever the white bourgeoisie that got to live the illusion of a life completely separated from history, from structure. And perhaps the world-historical shifts that make such illusions difficult—you are no longer experiencing local flooding or a heat wave, but the effects of climate change; you are no longer able to trust the people you see at the store who don't wear masks, because they belong to a mass movement that hates you and people like you—are good, insofar as they force some of us to live in the reality that everyone else... (shrink)

Bell’s theorem cannot be proved if complementary measurements have to be represented by random variables which cannot be added or multiplied. One such case occurs if their domains are not identical. The case more directly related to the Einstein–Rosen–Podolsky argument occurs if there exists an ‘element of reality’ but nevertheless addition of complementary results is impossible because they are represented by elements from different arithmetics. A naive mixing of arithmetics leads to contradictions at a much more elementary level than (...) the Clauser–Horne–Shimony–Holt inequality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.2 (2002) 187-188 [Access article in PDF] Listening to Foucault Patrick J. Bracken ERICA LILLELEHT'S INTERESTING PAPER combines philosophy, history, service analysis, and social commentary. The philosophical themes are below the surface, implicit rather than explicit. As such the paper echoes the work of Foucault himself. The subjects of his books and other writings ranged from histories of madness and psychiatry, hospitals and medicine, prisons (...) and punishment, to sexuality and ethics. But these were clearly more than histories. In doing what he initially called archaeology and later genealogy, Foucault was writing about different dimensions of how the Western world has come to understand what it is to be human. In Foucault's hands history becomes philosophy. The essence of his work is an invitation to question the project of Enlightenment. However, his interrogation of the legacy of Enlightenment is far from a rejection of reason as has sometimes been claimed. Rather it represents a realization that there are different forms of reason, none of which can claim a place of privilege over others. Foucault challenged the idea that we have to choose to be for or against Enlightenment (Foucault, 1984).Of central concern for him is the idea that knowledge and power imply each other and cannot be separated. This, of course, is anathema to both Marxist and liberal analysts who hold out the idea that truth and ideology are mutually exclusive. The assumption is that if we get the starting point of our analysis right, the truth ("pure and simple") will emerge. For Foucault there are "regimes of truth," discourses through which certain things can be said and statements can be judged as true or false. Such regimes are social products, bound up with the economic, cultural, and political realities of their times. This is not some sort of mindless relativism nor a nihilistic advocacy that, when it comes to knowledge claims, "anything goes." As human beings in an imperfect world we have to struggle continuously toward a better understanding of ourselves and the make-up of this world. As individuals, we have to continue to debate and argue about ideas, facts, and the nature of knowledge. We have to present evidence, argue our case, and prepare to be contradicted as well as supported. This is not in question. Instead, what is involved here is recognition that there is no neutral asocial, acultural, or apolitical vantage point from we can judge the validity of one position over another. Foucault's work nurtures a healthy skepticism of those who claim to have found such a vantage point.Importantly, he rejected the idea that power is always repressive in its nature: working to silence, obscure, and suppress. Particularly in the modern era power is more characteristically productive. Its operations are bound up with the ever-multiplying discourses we produce about ourselves. While increasing scientific knowledge about the human condition appears to represent progress, listening to Foucault means coming to appreciate that things are a great deal more complex. The title of Lilleleht's paper reflects this. At [End Page 187] a time when there is a great deal of talk about "progress" in the area of mental health, her analysis is opportune. Unless we pay attention to the micropolitics of clinical encounters we are at some risk of simply endorsing new forms of professional power. In one light, the psychiatric rehabilitation approach of William Anthony and colleagues appears obviously progressive. It does not depend on the "medical model" and the use of medication and seems genuinely committed to the idea of empowerment. However, with the sort of sensibility engendered through an encounter with Foucault, other issues come into view. Beneath its focus on skills and training we see a very clear normative framework centered on the idea that the person with psychiatric problems should be guided and trained toward fitting in with "his or her particular environment." At stake here is the assumption that the deficit is in the patient. It is he or she who needs to change. Herein lies the issue of power: who is in control of the way in which... (shrink)

This article aims to explore the concept of Heaven and St. Thomas Aquinas I "Summa Theologica" explained the basis of natural law and metaphysics. The philosophy, the I's "Road" was opened on their own, said that the ultimate reality itself; second source that can be raw, such as "Dawson, one two, two three, three things," a phrase below; again , then follow all the rules change. In this regard, I tend to "Heaven", "heaven" statement, basically all things to follow the (...) law is. I focus on is that all things are to follow the law is. As for the man-made law, I tend to be severely criticized, such as saying "Fa Wu Zi-chang, way more than a thief," and the like. Having said that, by Taoism Taoism Taoism and Legalism affect the development of the legislation is still based on natural law is human law theory. Thomas Aquinas's natural law, is given in accordance with the rational nature of God and the law of action, we can see, St. Thomas Aquinas's natural law focused on people, not only contains a real natural , but also ought to include , two related but different. There are words on the surface, natural law is that "people according to their nature are looking for is good." However, the surface should be made, the principle of natural law is: "People should do good to avoid evil." In this paper, to compare the Heaven and the ultimate source of natural law, I inquire of the non-personal God of the Trinity Road and Thomas Aquinas on how chemical and biological weapons or to create things, by the generosity or wisdom and love of order and law generated. Then, on the Heaven and the natural law itself for comparison. Finally, the two can be dealt with through the office, and, and related concepts in Taoism. The basic concern of this paper is to compare Laozi's Heavenly Dao and St. Thomas' natural law for the purpose of bringing them to dialogue. Philosophically speaking, Laozi's concept of Dao means first, the ever self-manifesting and creative Ultimate Reality; second, the Origin giving birth to all things; third, the law of becoming of all things in the universe. For this last meaning, usually Laozi uses the term "Heavenly Dao" to represent laws of nature that all beings in the universe, including human beings , must comply with. As to human laws, he takes a critical position, to the point of saying that "The more legal objects multiply, the more robbers and thieves there will be." Nevertheless, under his influence, Huanglao daoists and legalists have developed their philosophy of positive laws.In Comparison, St. Thomas' natural laws are principles of human action according to human rational nature. The emphasis of St. Thomas is put therefore on the rational nature of human beings, which includes both the aspect of "to be" and that of "ought to be," both being closely related yet distinct. Seen from "to be," the natural law says that all human beings desire goodness by their nature; while as their "ought to be," all human beings should do good and avoid doing evil.This comparative study will focus first on how the generosity of Dao's giving birth to all things in Laozi and the wisdom and love of God in St. Thomas become order and law. Then we will compare Laozi's laws of nature, to which human beings should also live accordingly, with techniques inspired from them, and the principles of St. Thomas' natural laws. We will discuss the possible compatibility and dialogue between St. Thomas thoughts, which are essential to Catholicism , and those of Laozi as followed by lluanlao Daoism and Religious Daoism. (shrink)

Albert Camus déplorait une coupure irrémédiable entre l'esprit de l'homme et un univers n'apportant aucune réponse à sa quête de sens, d'où sa révolte contre l'absurde. Cette attitude est contredite par les sagesses orientales ou ésotériques qui, depuis l'aube des temps, mènent à l'harmonie entre l'être et l'univers. L'histoire humaine comporte une extrême diversité de modes de vision de l'existence, les uns séparateurs, les autres monistes. Dans l'approche du réel, conciliant les voies rationalistes - science, philosophie, etc. - et les (...) voies qui ne font pas appel à la raison - mysticisme, arts, praxis les plus diverses - le suBréalisme nous amène à vivre de façon équilibrée et heureuse l'illusoire divorce entre les mondes "intérieur" et "extérieur". En ce sens, une révolution de la pensée scientifique occidentale marque le XXe siècle : après plusieurs millénaires d'un dualisme dont les pensées d'Aristote et de Descartes sont les plus représentatives, la science évolue vers la complexité et l'unicité, nous donnant à réaliser que tout est relié à tout dans le tout. Intégrant entre autres voies de la connaissance les enseignements de cette révolution, le suBréalisme propose ce fil d'Ariane qui nous achemine vers la vie spirituelle et un nouvel enchantement du monde. Sous la forme de dialogues éclairants et attrayants, François Tard nous invite à pratiquer une philosophie qui sollicite tous les domaines de l'esprit et non plus le seul intellect (sensations, émotions, intuitions, etc.). Dans un style limpide, il fait oeuvre d'initiation philosophique, scientifique et sémantique. Multipliant les citations de grands auteurs, il apporte aux "littéraires" aussi bien qu'aux "matheux" de nombreuses pistes de réflexion, incitant tout un chacun à travailler du cerveau droit autant que du gauche. Un livre vif, empli d'humour, à lire et relire... et faire lire par vos proches. (shrink)

In this collection of her provocative essays on Third World art and culture, award-winning filmmaker and theorist Trinh Minh-ha offers new challenges to Western regimes of knowledge. Bringing to her subjects an acute sense of the many meanings of the marginal, Trinh examines Asian and African texts, the theories of Barthes, questions of spectatorship, the enigmas of art, and the perils of anthropology. In one essay, taking off from ideas raised earlier by Zora Neale Hurston, Trinh considers with astonishment the (...) search by Western "experts" for the hidden values of a person or culture, a process of legitimized voyeurism that, she argues, ultimately equates psychological conflicts with depth , while inner experience is reduced to mere personal feeling. When the Moon Waxes Red is an extended argument against reductive analyses, even those that appear politically adroit. Feminist struggle is heterogeneous. The multiply-hyphenated peoples of color are not simply placed in a duality between two cultural heritages; throughout, Trinh describes the predicament of having to live "a difference that has no name and too many names already." She argues for multicultural revision of knowledge so that a new politics can transform reality rather than merely ideologize it. By rewriting the always emerging, already distorted place of struggle, such work seeks to "beat the master at his own game.". (shrink)

I do not for a moment question the fact that many people have experiences of a special type which may be termed “religious”, The extent to which religious experience may be regarded as a reasonably common phenomenon in present-day Britain is shown clearly by David Hay in his Exploring Inner Space, Harmondsworth 1982. that such experiences often involve reference to something which appears to display a radical unlikeness to all else and that they are therefore in some sense inexpressible. Doubtless (...) the ideas I have put forward about the possible source of such unlikeness and ineffability might suggest models of God which would not find much theological approval, at least within any mainstream theistic tradition, since some sort of pantheism seems inevitably to be implied. But however this might be, the concept of radical unlikeness as it has been analyzed here can, I think, help us towards understanding certain problematic areas in religion quite apart from the issue of intelligibility, which has been the focus of this discussion. To begin with, radical unlikeness suggests a way in which the historical continuity of concepts of the transcendent might be upheld against the discontinuity suggested by the diversity of interpretations through which they have moved. Ancient and modern outlooks on, say, God differ enormously, as indeed do the range of co-temporal accounts at many particular moments. But, by and large, theologians firmly maintain that it is a single and unchanging phenomenon which is being dealt with. Unless we can point to some common element which is both specific enough to create a binding sense of common tradition, yet never completely expressed by any attempt at understanding it within that tradition (thus persistently demanding new attempts to apprehend it), then given the widely differing views of God within, for example, the Christian community, it is difficult to see how we could assume that in fact they all stemmed from the same source and were talking about the same thing. The idea of radical unlikeness could provide an element with just these required characteristics: it could be seen as what all the accounts attempt to net, with varying degrees of adequacy, within their offered interpretations. It could be seen as what remains constant, constantly elusive yet constantly generative of fresh attempts to apprehend it, throughout a history of intra-religious diversity. This sort of explanation could, presumably, be applied to the intra-religious diversity of the non-Christian traditions too.Secondly, radical unlikeness might suggest a possible way of understanding inter-religious diversity in a way which allows that whilst such diversity exists, whilst the differences between religions are real, they are grounded in a similar root-experience. It may, at first sight, seem difficult to continue thinking of the various religious traditions as truly separate phenomena if they are taken as being grounded on experiences whose ineffability stems from the unlikeness of experiencing things as a whole. Here we must stress again that if they are to be considered intelligible, radically unlike experiences cannot be considered completely so - or putting this another way, we cannot more than approach experience of totality. Sense can be given to religious claims of ineffability by suggesting experience of near totality, where we reach the last point on the scale of inclusiveness which complies with the logical criteria demanded of something for it to be possible for us to be aware of it. We might thus attempt an explanation of inter-religious diversity based on the view that Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam etc. acquire their differences from the different elements included in their experience of near totality. Taking totality to be represented by the scale of one to ten, Hinduism might be seen as grounded on experience of 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-9-10, Buddhism on experience of 1-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10 and so on. The resulting dissimilarities are thus centred not on different types of experience, but on different areas of inclusiveness. This is, of course, to suppose that the various religious traditions are all based on the same degree (as opposed to the same elements) of inclusiveness, but it is by no means clear that such a supposition is justified. Continuing with our decimal analogy, might it not be suggested that whilst Christianity stemmed from experience of 2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10, Jainism was founded on a less extensive encounter with the divine (say 4-5-6-7-8-9-10)? It is, however, uncertain how we can compare and evaluate different religious traditions in such a way as to be able to comment on such claims. A definite danger of comparative religion is that by concentrating on establishing and exploring inter-religious likenesses, it may obscure the radical unlikeness of religious phenomena. It should be borne firmly in mind that such likenesses as may be established within comparative studies may not win religious phenomena a place within our understanding comparable to objects of more everyday concern. Statements found in the Old Testament, the Qur'an and the Vedas, for example, may, on occasion, be alike, but at the end of the day such things are often alike only, or chiefly, in so far as they display the same radical unlikeness in relation to the non-religious elements in our outlook.The analysis of radical unlikeness and ineffability which has been advanced might also suggest a way in which certain passages in religious writings could be understood, passages which at first sight can be seriously perplexing. If, for example, to return to the quotation given in the introductory section of this paper, we continue to think of accounts of the nature of Shiva as being attempts to describe some discrete, objective entity, then it is inevitable that either we will share the Puranic writer's puzzlement or that much of what we read about Shiva will appear as the muddled and extravagant thinking thrown up by an uncritical and over-fertile mythological imagination, consisting of little more than a hotch-potch of contradictory elements. But if we see such accounts as attempting to say something about everything, as symbols of near totality stemming from experiences which verge on the holistic, then what we read - with all its ambiguities - may become somewhat more meaningful. Thus W.D. O'Flaherty comments that Shiva “embodies all of life in all its detail at every minute” (Asceticism and Eroticism in the Mythology of Shiva, London 1973, p. 315). Similarly Alain Dani41ou sees Shiva, ultimately, in terms of his being "the supreme state of reality" beyond whom there is only "non-existence" (Hindu Polytheism, London 1964, p. 190).This analysis of ineffability and intelligibility seeks to introduce for debate a possible way of understanding the radical unlikeness which accounts of religious experience apparently attempt to speak about. It does not, however, claim to present an exhaustive treatment of the issues raised, on the contrary, I am conscious of many shortcomings and omissions. For instance, it remains to be seen under precisely what conditions something counts as being an elucidating likeness (presumably all experiences are, for example, temporal, yet temporality alone would not seem to offer a particularly elucidating comparison). Moreover, the degree to which appeal to likeness is allowed operation in actual accounts of religious experience needs to be explored. In addition, the notion of categorizing experiences according to the extent to which they approach a point of total inclusion requires careful clarification. To begin with, according to what criteria could we establish that one experience was more inclusive than another? However, such issues can only be mentioned here, any adequate consideration of them would require a separate paper.In conclusion, I would suggest that to use radical unlikeness and/or ineffability simply as devices by which to halt any process of investigation, proclaiming that the thing in question is not like anything and so is beyond all words, risks making unintelligible and placing beyond all further inquiry an important and extensive area of human experience. As William Alston put it, to label something ineffable in an unqualified way is to shirk the job of making explicit the ways in which it can be talked about. William P. Alston, “ineffability”, Philosophical Review 65 (1956), 522. It is surely more accurate to take ineffability as a “qualifier”I.T. Ramsey, Models and Mystery (Oxford 1964), p. 60. which “multiplies models without end”Ibid. than as an absolute which prevents the construction of any elucidating models. (shrink)

The traditional divide between nature and culture restricts to the latter the use of information. Biosemiotics claims instead that the divide between nature and culture is a mere subdivision within the living world but that semiosis is the specific feature which distinguishes the living from the inanimate. The present paper is intended to reformulate this basic tenet in information-theoretic terms, to support it using information-theoretic arguments, and to show that its consequences match reality. It first proposes a ‘receiver-oriented’ interpretation of (...) semiosis. This interpretation implies that the means for recording, storing and processing information exclusively reside in the living world (extended so as to include the artefacts it produces). Then it may be argued that the main difference between the inanimate world and the living one lies in the fact that the very existence of the latter relies on information, which on the contrary is not relevant to the former. Thus, besides matter and energy, information is an entity irreducible to them which must be taken into account in any attempt for describing and understanding life. Information can interact with the real world only provided it is borne by some physical support: it must be ‘physically inscribed’. Contrary to matter and energy, information can be shared, not necessarily exchanged, so a same information can be borne by a number of distinct supports. Any living thing possesses means for recording, storing and processing information which are necessary for keeping it alive and securing its progeny. In particular, its genome contains hereditary information, can be replicated, and instructs the construction and maintenance of a phenotype. The simultaneous existence of a phenotype and of a genome, where the latter bears the symbolic description of the former, is mandatory for enabling the self-reproduction of an organism. Bearing and using information then endows a living thing with the ability to decrease the physical entropy, hence to act as Maxwell’s demon. Not only its own life is maintained against physical entropy, but its self-reproduction multiplies clones of the demon. Taking information as the entity which differentiates the living from the inanimate also supports Rovelli’s ‘relational’ interpretation of quantum physics. Experimental apparatuses then appear as information-theoretic channels from the inanimate world to a living observer. Besides having its own perspective (as stated by Rovelli), each of these channels has its own horizon because its capacity is necessarily finite. As another consequence, we may assert that the physicists’ quest of a ‘theory of everything’ is doomed to failure since, for lack of considering information as a relevant entity, physicists deny the living world, hence themselves. (shrink)

Karl Jaspers explicitly claims the title of philosophy of ‘existence’, in the special sense of an illumination of the self-conscious being of a unique man facing the problem of transcending his individual, historic situation by real, personal choice even at the risk of teetering on the razor-edge of irrationality. With a wide range of medical and psychological knowledge and a deep philosophical interest he formulates the most systematic analysis of contemporary Existentialism, although paradoxically he denies the possibility of any universal (...) or objective science of being which is radically individual, contingent and ineffable in itself. Though individual human analysis has its limits, it is not a mere psychology but an active engagement of personal choice, which resists all attempt to absorb it in a complete rational scheme or science. The non-rational ‘encompasses’ every category of being, therefore, and philosophy must suffer light from the classic exceptions, particularly Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Of course classic intellectualism has always recognised that reality is never exhausted by any conceptual analysis, but Jaspers pushes this inadequacy almost into an opposition. Hence the methodological difficulty of exposition is multiplied in his case by a doctrinal impossibility of systematic science as opposed to developing self-consciousness. (shrink)

This paper focuses in the panorama and diagnosis that Frochaux outlines in his text L’homme Seul about culture and civilization as distancing of man with respect to nature. Such idea is resumed in his theses “The history is biology engrafted on the geographical.” For the author one of the several consequences of this situation is that such distancing was consolidated and arts were stagnated, just as the progress made profane all the reality and all mystery and holiness vanished from it. (...) The canon disappeared. Reality was divided between the sacred and the profane; profane was all that was conquered by man, sacred all unconquered by man. So history could be perceived as the permanent struggle between sacred and profane. The distancing is promoted by society’s eagerness for material development. Linked with it, progress has generated in us some guilt. Progress implies guilt, as a fatality. For man, distancing from the animal world where was created, is the price that should be paid for becoming the man of today, erected as the centre of all creation. But one could ask watching the ways of the current world: ¿Was not such that was lost more valuable that such that was won? ¿Was that rupture and distancing from the natural and animal world worthy of the society we now have? This betrayal of man to both nature and animals creates him a permanent guilt, guilt that do not disappears despite the progress achieved by him. This guilt is the original guilt. Seeking putting himself above the natural and animal world man believes he is superior. But man has only refined the animal skills and has used them for the destruction of nature and the animal world. All that is animal is extremely multiplied when transformed into human. Man is a synthesis of a little bit of all animals. But no animal species makes war among its own members as man do. Frochaux faces history, economics and arts with all these theses, leaving on us a strong feeling of scepticism. (shrink)

Val Plumwood's criticism of the ecologically irrational p-centric logic of rationalism, which neglects or denies its dependence on all that is not-p, undercutting its own biological base while denying the illness of the culture it has spawned, is juxtaposed with the clinical picture of the linguistic left hemisphere acting without benefit of input from the more real-time-and-space-centered right. Exploring the metaphor suggests that visual gestalts depicting actual relationships might be effective in drawing our industrial culture's collective attention away from its (...) fascination with endless lines of alphabetic characters and abstract numbers multiplying their way toward infinity, bringing it back to reality and ecological rationality. In illustration, ongoing habitat destruction wrought on the ground as humans follow the detached logic of economic rationalism is seen to reflect, rather than the illusion of eternal "growth" conveyed by Cartesian axes, the relentless finitude of fractal geometry's Sierpinski gasket. (shrink)

Conceivability is, I say, prima facie evidence for possibility. Hence, we may count the cost of theories about possibility by listing the ways in which, according to the theory in question, something conceivable is said nonetheless to be impossible. More succinctly we may state a principle, Hume's razor to put alongside Ockham's. Hume's razor says that necessities are not to be multiplied more than necessary. In this paper I count the cost of David Lewis's modal realism, showing that many (...) of the objections are replied to by Lewis only at the cost of multiplying necessities. (shrink)

I reply to Mills's critique of my effort to show the relevance of Rawls's theory of justice for thinking about and responding to racial injustices. Contrary to Mills's claims, my suggestion that the fair equality of opportunity principle can remedy socioeconomic disadvantages caused by the legacy of racial oppression is compatible with Rawls's framework, does not conflate distributive justice with corrective justice, and does not confuse racial injustice with economic injustice. I also raise doubts about Mills's project to radically reconstruct (...) contractarian political philosophy. He seeks to displace ideal theory with nonideal theory by foregrounding the realities of past racial domination. Against this approach, I argue that an ideal theory that abstracts away from these realities is not inherently ideological, useless for corrective justice, or too ideal to guide social reform. And I defend the view that ideal theory is indispensible for nonideal theorizing about racial justice. (shrink)

BACKGROUND: Delusions in schizophrenia are commonly approached as empirical false beliefs about everyday reality. Phenomenological accounts, by contrast, have suggested that delusions are more adequately understood as pertaining to a different kind of reality experience. How this alteration of reality experience should be characterised, which dimensions of experiential life are involved, and whether delusional reality might differ from standard reality in various ways is unclear and little is known about how patients with delusions value and relate to these experiential alterations. (...) This study aimed to investigate the nature of delusional reality experience, and its subjective apprehension, in individuals with lived experience of delusions and a schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis. METHODS: In this qualitative phenomenological study, we recruited individuals with lived experience of delusions and a schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis from two psychiatric-hospital services in Belgium using homogenous sampling. Criteria for participation were having undergone at least one psychotic episode with occurring delusional symptoms, present at least 1 year before participation, on the basis of clinical notes assessed by the attending psychiatrist; a schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis, ascertained through clinical interview by the attending psychiatrist upon admission; being aged between 18 years and 65 years; and having the capacity to give informed consent. Exclusion criteria included worries concerning capacity to consent and risk of distress caused by participation. We did phenomenologically driven semi-structured interviews with the participants to explore the nature of delusional reality experience and their subjective valuation of these experiences. We used interpretative phenomenological analysis, a qualitative method tailored to the in-depth exploration of participants’ first-person perspective, to analyse their accounts. FINDINGS: Between March 2, 2020, and Sept 30, 2020, 18 adults participated in the interview study. The findings suggest that delusions are often embedded in wide-ranging alterations of basic reality experience, involving quasi-ineffable atmospheric and ontological qualities that undermine participants’ sense of the world as unambiguously real, fully present, and shared with others. We also found that delusional reality experience can differ from standard reality in various ways, across multiple dimensions, and that participants are often implicitly or explicitly aware of the distinction between delusional and standard reality. Delusional experience can have an enduring value and meaning that is not fully captured by a strictly medical perspective. INTERPRETATION: Increased awareness and recognition of the distinctive nature of delusional reality experience, in both clinical and research settings, can improve diagnostic accuracy, explanatory models, and therapeutic support for individuals with delusions whose lived realities are not always evident from an everyday perspective. FUNDING: FWO Flanders. TRANSLATION: For the Dutch translation of the abstract see Supplementary Materials section. (shrink)