In Spinoza, what I call (adapting a phrase from J.-L. Nancy) the ‘Being Individual Multiple’ is the multitudo. Its form of life is Democracy, understood as the autonomous and conflictual organization of collective dynamics and not one form of government among others. Combining an original mode of argumentation with a critical discussion of opposing interpretations, I maintain that democracy is the translation into politics of the third and highest kind of knowledge in Spinoza, intuitive science. I argue moreover that (...) the multitudo self-organized in a democracy has the capacity to experiment and express a different rationality with respect to the singular individual. Wisdom and democracy thus converge to give life to something unknown and original in western political modernity. (shrink)

Solitude, is being with other without the other, is being with other, among the masses. Has de integrality of personhood something to loss with social contact? We believe not, we need war words and deeds.

In opposition to any notion of poverty as privation, or ‘bare life’, Negrian discourse poses the problem of poverty as a precondition for innovation and self-constitution, that is, for the critical appropriation of the immeasurable. This appropriation, as depicted in Kairòs, Alma Venus, and Multitudo, occurs in the event of adequation, when the monstrous store of potentia (immanent to poverty) exposes itself to the void in the projection of the ‘to-come’. This essay seeks in turn to resolve a series (...) of vexing questions and problems concerning the function of poverty, love, and the monstrous in the Negrian constitution of reality. (shrink)

According to Arendt and Habermas, the reinterpretation of Aristotle made by Thomas Aquinas, identifying politicus and socialis, has weakened the nature of classical Aristotelian politics by introducing in the polis relations and private interests that the Greeks had reserved for domestic space. Moreover, being the concept of societas in this context naturally Christian, the purpose of society is no longer self-sufficiency and acquisition of natural virtue, which allow us to live together in order to the good life, but requires supernatural (...) virtue given by God in order to achieve the true supreme good. Therefore, the possibility of happiness now refers to eschatology, reason because kings are to be subject to priests, especially the pope, Christ’s representative, whose role is to take care of the highest aim of our existence. However, the application of a pyramidal and hierarchical scheme of spiritual power over the temporal realm is subverted by Juan Quidort of Paris, introducing a «small» shift: the kingdom understood as perfecta multitudo. In this perfect multitude an upward causality is the basis for distinction and non-subordination of the temporal power by the spiritual; at the same time freedom of individuals to choose their leaders is essential. This view undermines the dynastic transmission’s model of power in a kingdom as well as, at the ecclesial level, points to superiority of the General Council in relation to the pope. (shrink)

Spinoza's Ethics is rarely read as a work of political theory. Its formidable geometric structure and its author's commitment to a kind of metaphysical determinism do not seem promising materials from which to fashion a theory of democratic self-government. Yet impressions can mislead. A close reading of the Ethics reveals it to be an impassioned, deeply political book. Its aim is not only to liberate the individualfrom false beliefs and systems of power but also to enable us to act in (...) concert as members of a democratic community. Above all, the work represents a celebration of individuality and the joys of life in all its plenitude. The Ethics provides Spinoza's clearest answer to the question "What is a free people (libera multitudo)? " only briefly alluded to at the end of his unfinished Political Treatise. (shrink)

En este artículo se examina el uso que Spinoza hace del concepto _utilis_. El término utilidad se lo ha apropiado la filosofía utilitarista y liberal, formando juntos una amalgama discursiva y práctica. Spinoza, calificado por algunos intérpretes como pensador liberal, hace uso abundante de los conceptos de utilidad, libertad e individuo. Sin embargo, un examen riguroso basado en la totalidad de su obra nos permite comprender que la utilidad spinozista debe interpretarse desde el valor otorgado a la vida, lo colectivo (...) y afectos como la firmeza y la generosidad. Nuestra conclusión es que lo útil es el fundamento de la sociablidad y, por lo mismo, que el término _multitudo _sintetiza la necesidad ontológica de lo colectivo en la filosofía de Spinoza. (shrink)

Leviathan-Toth, Ernesto Neto’s anti/counter-installation which could be seen hanging from the vaults of the Panthéon in autumn 2006 does not seek to exploit this national memorial as a space in which to stand as an exhibition. It responds to all of its surrounding factors – physical, aesthetic, political, and metaphysical, to attack the representative art whose constitutive-constitutional role in the republic, according to Hobbes, can be seen in Leviathan’s frontispiece. Setting up a sort of Critique et Clinique of Representation in (...) all senses of the term beginning with the short-circuit between politics and aesthetics, Neto’s operation sets its sights on the expansive dis-organisation of the multitude living under the « democratic » regime of contractual representation of which the Panthéon is the temple. It provides a body for the rhizomatic-bioenergetic perversion of the Image of the State-Machine, of the Form-State, by projecting a new infra and supra-organic type of reality which draws its « energy » from the forces of the multitudo dissoluta whose radical and vital recomposition it advocates. This work or non-work, derived from a Brazilian political-aesthetic constructivism which is undergoing redefinition, can now only take place in the context of a practice of displacement which incorporates and is constituted of the spectator-participant. (shrink)

Résumé Leviathan Toth, la contre-“installation” que Ernesto Neto a suspendue aux voûtes du Panthéon à l’automne 2006 n’exploite pas l’espace de ce lieu de mémoire national pour s’exposer («art environnemental»). Il affronte toutes ses coordonnées physiques, esthétiques, politiques, métaphysiques, pour s’en prendre à l’Art de la représentation dont le frontispice du Léviathan montrait, au dire même de Hobbes, le rôle constitutif-constitutionnel pour la République. Mettant en scène une manière de Critique et Clinique de la Représentation dans toutes les acceptions du (...) terme à partir du court-circuit (qui est aussi le circuit le plus court) entre politique et esthétique, l’Opération-Neto vise à la dés-organisation expansive de la multitude vivant sous le régime «démocratique» de la représentation contractuelle dont le Panthéon est le temple. Elle donne corps à la perversion rhizomatique-bioénergétique de l’Image de l’État-Machine, de la Forme-État, en projetant un nouveau type de réalité, infra- et supra-organique, qui tire son «énergie» des forces de la multitudo dissoluta (Hobbes) dont elle propose une radicale re-composition vitale. Cette œuvre/non-œuvre qui relève d’un constructivisme politico-esthétique brésilien que l’on s’attache à redéfinir, ne peut dès lors faire l’«objet» que d’une pratique de déplacement incorporante et constituante du spectateur-participant. (shrink)

O uso diferenciado dos termos multitudo e populus em Espinosa nos remete a problemáticas mais recentes que se referem aos “movimentos de massas", seu controle, sua utilização e sua repressão preventiva. Tomando as 'massas' como objeto de estudo específico, Espinosa recusa tanto a redução da individualidade pelas massas quanto a redução das massas pelo poder, fornecendo-nos assim subsidios para pensar as instituições democráticas.

‘Ergo abolendo rumori Nero subdidit reos et quaesitissimis poenis adfecit quos per flagitia invisos vulgus Christianos appellabat. auctor nominis eius Christus Tiberio imperitante per procuratorem Pontium Pilatum supplicio adfectus erat; repressaque in praesens exitiabilis superstitio rursum erumpebat, non modo per Iudaeam, originem eius mali, sed per urbem etiam quo cuncta undique atrocia aut pudenda confluuunt celebranturque. igitur primum correpti qui fatebantur deinde indicio eorum multitudo ingens haud proinde in crimine incendii quam odio humani generis convicti sunt. et pereuntibus addita (...) ludibria, ut ferarum tergis contecti laniatu canum interirent, aut crucibus adfixi aut flammandi, atque ubi defecisset dies in usum nocturni luminis urerentur. hortos suos ei spectaculo Nero obtulerat et circense ludicrum edebat, habitu aurigae permixtus plebi vel curriculo insistens. unde quamquam adversus sontes et novissima exempla meritos miseratio oriebatur, tamquam non utilitate publica sed in saevitiam unius absumerentur.’ Tac.Ann. 15. 44. (shrink)

In this study, I consider the viability of what is perhaps one of the more “obscure” transcendentals in Aquinas’s work—that is, the concept of multitudo transcendens. This strange notion is mentioned explicitly (as a member of the transcendentia, that is) on four occasions in Aquinas’s oeuvre. Despite its apparent difficulties, i.e., the clear difficulties associated with claiming that ens is really convertible with both unum and multitudo, I suggest that Aquinas’s affirmation of multitudo as a transcendental is (...) a conceptually coherent way of providing a compelling answer to a perennial problem in both ancient and modern philosophy: namely, the logical and metaphysical problem of doing justice to the seemingly equiprimordial notions of “the one” and “the many”—as harmonious perfections rather than competitive notions. (shrink)

What should we do with the ideals of internationalism, the withering away of state and horizontality? Probably start by thinking seriously about them. That is to say, about their conditions of possibility (or impossibility), rather than sticking to the wishful thinking which asserts that for them to happen it is enough to want them. Humanity exists neither as a dust cloud of separate individuals nor as a unified world political community. It exists fragmented into distinct finite wholes, the forms of (...) which have varied considerably throughout history--the nation-state being only one among many, and certainly not the last. What are the forces that produce this fragmentation, engender such groupings and prevent them from being perfectly horizontal, but also lead them to disappear, merge, or change form? It is questions such as these that this book explores, drawing on Spinoza's political philosophy and especially his two central concepts of multitudo and imperium. (shrink)

This article considers two models of the future based on Jacques Derrida's distinction between le futur and l'avenir. The former is related to technology, including political technology, and the latter involves an experience of participation, which allows for the existence not of “the future”, but of “forthcoming”. L'avenir is on the side of direct democracy and unmediated political action. The future and l'avenir are different kinds of time. The future is projective, l'avenir is event driven. The future is predictable; l'avenir (...) refers to what we might call absolute openness. L'avenir is the experience of encountering the other, including in the field of politics. The author believes that Maidan creates a space for this second conception of time, continuing the line of political philosophy coming from Baruch Spinoza and his idea of multitudo and absolute democracy. (shrink)

The paper analyses the relationship between power, utility and right in Spinoza’s political philosophy. It explains utility from the relational character of existence. And it maintains that, when empowered by what is useful, multiple relationality is the ontological basis of positive reciprocity, that is, of man as the most useful thing for man. It examines the mutual dependence between the subjects and the complex arrangement of imperium and multitudo as the cause of both concord and discord since it weaves (...) as much the possibility as the impossibility of a common utility. And it highlights the way Spinoza passes from the relationship between a rational person and civitas to the notion of the multitude qua power that defines the political as a differentiated realm, although not unrelated to the ethical; and to a free multitude as the political figure of common utility that establishes the best imperium. (shrink)

Cicero’s philosophical works put on the scene intellectual debates among members of the Roman élite, displaying a balanced combination of intellectual skills, moral excellence and political expertise. Greek philosophy emerges as an important ally in Cicero's intellectual project, but not _in toto_. This paper deals with ways in which Cicero dismisses a _multitudo _of philosophers who churn out what he considers dangerous and stylistically inferior works. In this way, Cicero contributed to the creation of a “classical” philosophy that still guides (...) modern study of philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Anonymus Defensorium Ockham Ms. Romae, bibl. Angelica 1017 ff. 21r-36r Conspectus siglorum: = addendum censeo [....] = delendum censeo«..» = litterae illegibiles factae sive propter codicis corruptionem deperditae [[..]] = scriptor delevit Y.../ = in margine sive supra lineam inserta (?) = lectio incerta t...-t = corrupta esse videntur I22rl = incipit pagina 22 recto codicis«cCapitulum 15. De novem praedicamentis denominativis> Praedicamenta (adn. in mg.: Capitulo 15) alia a (...) substantia sunt quaedam denominationes substantiae. Denominatur enim substantia a qualitate 'qualis', a quantitate 'quanta', a relatione 'relata', \ab/ actione 'agens', et sic de singulis. Unde sicut conceptus ordinati in praedicamento substantiae sunt univoci, habentes univocam praedicationem de substantia prima, ita conceptus ordinati in praedicamentis accidentalibus sunt conceptus denominativi respectu substantiae, habentes praedicationem denominativam de ipsa—licet possunt esse univoci in suo ordine, et de suis inferioribus univoce praedicari. Est autem (adn. in mg.: Quaestio bona quarta) hic investigandum, utrum secundum multitudinem denominationum de substantia sit multitudo realitatum; ut, sicut sunt denominationes secundum novem genera distinctae, ita res et realitates novem generum distinctae. Quae est utrum novem denominantia substantiam sint dispositiones distinctae realiter a substantia, aut sint 111 Franciscan Studies (54) 1994-1997 112ANONYMUS dispositiones distinctae tantum ratione, sicut Commentator1 innuit. (adn. in ima pag.: Utrum secundum multitudinem denominationum de substantia sit multitudo realitatum, id est utrum novem praedicamenta distinctas habent realitates.) Et ista dubitatio de praedicamentis denominativis consimilis est dubitationi superius2 factae de praedicatis univocis et de correspondentia praedicamentorum et realitatum. Et videtur hie conformiter dicendum sicut de praedictis, scilicet quod multitudo rerum non est secundum multitudinem coneeptuum quiditativorum. Et hoc manifestum est, sumentibus nobis suppositiones has: Primo (adn. in mg.: Prima suppositio) quod substantia habet entitatem propriam. Ex illo sequitur evidenter intentum, nam si praedicamenta denominantia substantiam distinguerentur ab ea realiter, circumscriptis illis realitatibus, nulla remaneret realitas substantiae propria. Si enim substantia materialis haberet [[aliunde figuram puta a qualitate]] aliunde extensionem, puta a quantitate, aliunde figuram, puta a qualitate, aliunde positionem, et ita de alus, istis circumscriptis, quaero quid remaneret pro entitate substantiae? Non apparet quod aliquid, nisi fingas totam realitatem substantiae materialis posse habere esse punctuale et in puncto salvari, quod non capit imaginario. Quia de ratione substantiae materialis et corporeae, quae distinguitur contra immaterialem et incorpoream, est quod habeat partem extra partem.3 Et ita videtur quod substantia materialis erit seipsa quanta, et seipsa terminata, et per consequens seipsa figurata. Seipsa, inquam, et per se, perseitate excludente rem aliam. Secunda suppositio (adn. in mg.: Secunda suppositio) est quod non est contradictio realitatem unam esse, realitate ab ea distincta non existente. Patet, quia non est contradictio nisi affirmetur et negetur idem de eodem,4 implicite vel explicite. Et ista suppositio 1Cf. Averroës In Metaph. V com. 14 (1562) 148EF. 2Cf. supra cap. 11 'De univocis'; cf. cap. 12 (f. 24v): Et manifestum est, quoniam non oportet multitudinem esse in conceptibus, sicut nec multitudo in conceptibus sequitur multitudinem eorum quae sunt in vocibus, necessario sumentibus nobis suppositiones has. 3Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham Summa logicae I c. 44 (OPh I 137): quantitas continua permanens nihil aliud est nisi res una habens partem situaliter distantem a parte. 4Cf. Aristot, De interp. 9, 18a29-30: In his ergo quae sunt et facta sunt necesse est affirmationem vel negationem veram vel falsam esse; Anal. post. 1,11 77a30; Tópica VI,6 143bl6: Nam de omni vel affirmatio vel negatio vera est; Metaph. IV,9 1005bl9- THE DEFENSORIUM OCKHAM1 1 3 concludit similiter intentum. Nam quia contradictio est corpus de genere substantiae (id est substantiam materialem) esse, et non esse quantum (id est non habere partem extra partem); ideo quantitas non est alia res a corpore. Item quia contradictio est magnitudinem esse, et ipsam non esse terminatam et figuratam; ideo figura non est alia res a corpore sive magnitudine. Item quia contradictio est totum esse, et non esse maius parvus distinguerentur specie cum sint plures partes materiae in magno quam in parvo. Solet etiam dici quod magnum et parvum non variant speciem. Istae viae (adn. in mg.: Quod quantitas continua non sit res distincta) non concludunt de quantitate continua, quia non repugnaret sibi unitas; nec ex parte sui, quin scilicet possit habere unitatem formae accidentalis convenientem, nec ex parte subiecti, quin scilicet posset habere subiectum unum. Sed sufficienter videtur convinci quod... (shrink)