In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:740 BOOK REVIEWS Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition. By STEPHEN GERSH, Publications in Medieval Studies, No. 23, edited by Ralph Mcinerny. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986. Vol. I: Pp. xx+ 413. Vol. II: Pp. xviii+ 500. $75 (cloth). In his new book Stephen Gersh pursues an ambitious and worthy goal: to provide an encyclopedic survey, from Cicero to Boethius, of the Platonists who (...) wrote in Latin and wern the primary sources for the diffusion of Platonic doctrine in the Christian Middle Ages. Those interested in the subject will be delighted to learn that this study, despite its massive scale, is actually an introduction to a large project -the hiSJtory of the mediev1al Platonic tradition, especially in the eighth, ninth and eleventh centuries. These volumes (in conjunction with the succeeding volumes) will be of great interest both to medievalists and to historians of philosophy in late antiquity. The introduction addresses several important historical questions, the most important of which is the relationship between Plato and later Platonism. Like may historians of late antique and medieval philosophy Gersh sees the Middle Platonists and Neoplatonists as much more faithful followers of Plato.than most scholars of ancient philosophy would concede. His argument for the rapprochement of Plato and later Platonists follows the tradition of eminent scholars like Festugiere and de Vogel; in the end he rejects, justifiably I think, a rigid distinction hetween Platonic doctrine on the one hand and the uncritical, syncretistic Platonism of the Neoplatonists on the other in favor of the view that later Platonists made explicit doctrine out of the implicit statements and casual remarks of Plato. My only complaint is with Gersh's procedure: anyone unfamiliar with the stormy debates on the issue of Neoplatonic fidelity to Plato will finish his discussion with little awareness of the serious problems of interpretation that will perhaps always remain. Another question raised is: Which thinkers should be discussed? Though he clearly recognizes the significant role played by patristic writers in transmitting Platonic doctrine to the Middle Ages, Gersh chooses to limit the study to pagan sources or those, like Boethius, who write in the pagan philosophical tradivion. The strategy is certainly valid, given the great dependence of the Fathers on the indirect tradition, but more extensive consideration of their _widely varying attitudes towards the assimilation of Platonism into Christian philosophy would have ·been desirable. Significant difficulties are sidestepped when Christian writers are classified under the rubrics of ' Christian Middle BOOK REVIEWS 741 Platonic' and 'Christian Neoplatonic '. Under the latter Gersh includes Augustine despite the fact that in many respects-e.g. on the ineffability of the First Principle, rigorous application of negative theology, and the status of the intelligible world-Augustine's views are much closer to Middle Platonism than to Neoplatonism. This is often true of the Greek Fathers as well, despite their closer familiarity with Plotinian texts. A more precise demarcation of the lines of influence is required here. The study is divided into chapters devoted to exposition of the views of the major Latin writers who served as sources for medieval writers (approximate length of chapters fa noted in parentheses ) : Cicero (100), Seneca (40), Gellius (15), Apuleius (15), the Latin Asclepius (60), Calcidius (70), Macrobius (105), Martianus Capella (50), Boethius (70), several excursuses on minor authors, and an appendix on Varro (30). The size and quality of several chapters make them among the most important studies in English of their subjects, especially in the cases of Cicero, Apuleius, Calcidius, Macrobius, and the Latin Asclepius. Each section is arranged roughly in the same manner: an introductory footnote (often running to several pages) which provides in exhaustive detail the bibliography on an author's influence in the Middle Ages; an account of the author's dates, works, and influences on him; and finally an exposition of central doctrines, the heart of each chapter. To organize this extensive doxographical tour Gersh explains how each writer treats the same metaphysical themes: the relation of macrocosm to microcosm and of transcendence to immanence ; the nature of the first and second principles; the theory of forms; and the nature of the soul. If one wishes to ascertain the... (shrink)

In his introduction, Loriaux cites a passage from Etienne Gilson's L'être et l'essence, p. 30, in which Plato is represented as the typical "essentialist" thinker; i.e., a thinker who, when he talks about "being," is really talking about "essences." It is Loriaux's main contention that when Plato talks about being, or οὐσία, he refers to "the intelligible Form explicitly considered as Being and as existing in itself". It is important to see just what the issue is. It is not whether (...) Plato means, when he says "being," what the rest of us would call "essence;" he clearly thinks of whatever it is he is thinking about, just as "being." The question is whether, from his account of it, it is such that, in the light of later distinctions, we should have to call it "essence." This is the question which after an exhaustive study of the relevant dialogues Loriaux answers in the negative. (shrink)

The term "Middle Platonism" is used as a classification of those who professed some form of Platonic philosophy between the end of the third Academy and the beginning of "Neoplatonism". The evidence which survives concerning the "Middle" Platonists is not on the whole of great philosophical interest, but has been given increasing attention in recent years for the reason that the Middle Platonists are to some extent heirs to the Academy and ancestors to Neoplatonism. Middle Platonism is also of interest (...) to intellectual historians as an important intellectual force in the literary and religious life of the Roman Empire. For an introduction to Middle Platonism, the English-speaking non-expert has had to turn to Merlan’s rather compressed account in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy. He now will be able to avail of Dillon’s detailed and compendious survey. (shrink)

Chez les commentateurs platoniciens de l’époque impériale, l’un des problèmes majeurs liés à la théorie des Idées concernait le domaine d’application de cette doctrine. L’exégèse de la première partie du Parménide de Platon donnait occasion à diverses discussions sur ce sujet. Le Commentaire de Proclus sur le Parménide est sans doute la plus précieuse source qui soit parvenue de l’Antiquité jusqu’à nous pour la reconstitution de ces débats. Alors que la grande majorité des commentateurs anciens étaient convaincus que les Idées (...) ont un domaine assez restreint, le Commentaire de Proclus nous révèle l’existence d’une lecture alternative, selon laquelle il y a des Idées de « toutes choses ». Proclus relie cette interprétation alternative en particulier à l’existence des Idées de choses mauvaises et d’individus, probablement parce que ces deux classes d’objets étaient vraiment les dernières choses dont un platonicien orthodoxe voudrait admettre des Idées. Amélius est le seul néoplatonicien connu pour avoir soutenu l’existence des Idées de choses mauvaises. Dans cet article j’essaie de montrer que, selon toute vraisemblance, Amélius est également la cible de la réfutation des Idées d’individus par Proclus dans son Commentaire. La conclusion qui s’ensuit naturellement est qu’Amélius était très probablement l’un de ces philosophes qui, d’après Proclus, admettaient des Idées « de toutes choses ». (shrink)

Aristotle's criticism of Platonic Forms in the Metaphysics has been a major source for the understanding and developments of the theory of Forms in later Antiquity. One of the cases in point is Aristotle's argument, in Metaphysics I 9, 990b22-991a2, against Forms of non-substances. In this paper, I will first provide a careful analysis of this passage. Next, I will discuss how the argument has been interpreted - and refuted - by the fifth-century Neoplatonists Syrianus and Proclus. (...) This interpretation has played an important role in the broader context of the Neoplatonic debates on the range of Plato's theory of Forms, which was one of the traditional problems discussed about the Forms in later Platonism. (shrink)

Syrianus, originally from Alexandria, moved to Athens and became the head of the Academy there after the death of Plutarch of Athens. Syrianus attacked Aristotle in his commentary on Books 13 and 14 of the "Metaphysics", just as his pupil Proclus was to do later in his commentaries on Plato. This is because in "Metaphysics 13-14", Aristotle himself was being thoroughly polemical towards Platonism, in particular against the Academic doctrine of Form-numbers and the whole concept of separable number. In reply, (...) Syrianus gives an account of mathematical number and of geometrical entities, and of how all of these are processed in the mind, which was to influence Proclus and all subsequent Neoplatonists. (shrink)

In Finite and Infinite Goods, Robert Adams brings back a strongly Platonistic form of the metaphysics of value. I applaud most of the theory’s main features: the primacy of the good; the idea that the excellent is more central than the desirable, the derivative status of well-being, the transcendence of the good, the idea that excellence is resemblance to God, the importance of such non-moral goods as beauty, the particularity of persons and their ways of imitating God, and the use (...) of direct reference theory in understanding how “good” functions semantically. All of these features I wholeheartedly endorse and use in different ways in my own theory. Throughout his book Adams is generous to competing points of view, and his thoroughness and attention to detail make his presentation persuasive without the defensive quality of so much philosophical polemic. With this book, Christian neoplatonism has emerged in a sophisticated contemporary form. (shrink)

This book founds an other Platonist beginning by repositioning Plato and Neoplatonism in Heidegger's history of metaphysics. This beginning begins with Plato and culminates in Heidegger. By revisiting Heidegger's interpretation of Plato and retrieving Neoplatonist approaches to non-discursive thinking, the other beginning that has hitherto remained dormant within the history of thought is established. The author re-thinks Heidegger's attribution of the collapse of truth (alētheia) to Plato by recovering the dialogues' deep topography, myths and inspired expression. The re-interpretation of Plato (...) is then linked to Neoplatonism, where significant parallels with Heidegger emerge. The book thoroughly and consistently explores the non-discursive thinking of Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus with Heidegger's poetic thinking. (shrink)

In his study of this neglected tradition, Stephen Gersh presents a thorough analysis of early medieval Platonism. His central interest is the transmission of Greek philosophy to the West. He argues against any significant direct transmission of Platonic texts; for instance, the translations by Aristippus are late and uninfluential, and even the partial translation of the Timaeus by Calcidius is so overwhelmed by the accompanying commentary that one cannot truly speak of an unmediated, "direct" transmission. Thus, Gersh focuses on the (...) various indirect routes by which knowledge of Plato and his thought journeyed to the West. (shrink)

A new edition containing slight revisions and new appendices extending the debates opened in the original book. Drawing on a comprehensive knowledge of ancient texts and recent research, Merlan argues for a tighter connection between Platonism and Neoplatonism. Heracleides, Hermodorus, Iamblichus, Posidonius, Speusippus, and Xenocrates are all carefully treated.--R. C. N.

An argument for the historical continuity of Neo-Platonism and the Early Academy, resting principally on the positions held by 1) Posidonius on the relation between the soul and mathematics, 2) Speusippus on the relation between the One and the material principle, and 3) Boethius on the relation between degrees of being and degrees of knowledge. There is also an analysis of the elements of Neo-Platonism in Aristotle's metaphysics. A scholarly and readable book, certain to be controversial.--A. R.

The volume contains a collection of papers presented at the International Symposium, which took place in Hvar, Croatia, in 2006. In recent years there has been an upsurge of interest in the study of Plato, Platonism and Neoplatonism. Taking the position that it is of vital importance to establish an ongoing dialogue among scientists, artists, academics, theologians and philosophers concerning pressing issues of common interest to humankind, this collection of papers endeavours to bridge the gap between contemporary research in Platonist (...) philosophy and other fields where insights gained from the study of Plato and Platonist philosophy can be of consequence and benefit. Authors: Werner Beierwaltes, Luc Brisson, Amber Carpenter, John Dillon, Jonathan Doner, Franco Ferrari, Francesco Fronterotta, F.A.J. de Haas, Aaron Hughes, Byron Kaldis, Daniel Kolak, Thomas Leinkauf, Dionysis Mentzeniotis, Jean-Marc Narbonne, Giannis Stamatellos, Vladimir Stoupel, Patrick Quinn, Jure Zovko and Marie-Élize Zovko. (shrink)

This dissertation shows that Proclus provides a consistent reading of Plato's late dialogues, and develops a three level ontology which stands on its own. By augmenting the reserve of Platonist philosophy with Post Platonic developments of Greek mathematics and astronomy and physics, at points where Platonism ceased to provide operating principles, Proclus, reached for formulations which went beyond Plato. His own metaphysics, though sometimes obscured by theurgic allusions, grounds Being in an infinite One. ;One of the problems that Proclus attempts (...) to solve through the posit of three infinities, is that an iterative potential infinity, seen in the interval structure of the physical world, could divide to oblivion if uncolonized by Principle. The 'One Being', which brings Limit and noetic sameness, is itself entrapped in Self Reflexivity. An infinity of a third kind, one beyond all Limit and Unlimit is posed to solve this problem. This is Proclus' NeoPlatonic solution to the fact that Being alone, albeit under the rule of intellect, cannot guarantee itself. ;Platonism assumes a "universe" i.e. One grounding Many, which predetermines the place of all structure. $\rm A\nu\lambda o\gamma\iota\alpha$ is a principle of substitution which governs the visible cosmos and makes it comprehensible by mathematical formulations. Plato's emphasis on the self same as the epitome of Being, with circularity as the highest form for thought, helps Proclus provide a consistent account of: Creation ; Infinity as a Simultaneous Whole ; Soul and Nous, Dialectic is valorized over other forms of thought as most like $$ the eternal truth and a means to assimilation. Procession and reversion forms a circle which demonstrates a metaphysical successor of cosmic revolutions found to exist as the heavenly bodies carry out their noetic patterns. ;Finally Eternity encapsulates Time; but again its infinite circularity is only recouped by a One beyond all Limit which can carry out the Providence of a final cause. (shrink)

One of the aims of the Neoplatonists is to demonstrate that ancient Presocratic thought is, in fact, a Preplatonic thought. According to the Neoplatonists, Presocratics, who were not far from the truth, employed an inaccurate and ambiguous language, whereas Plato spoke about the truth in a more appropriate and clear way. That is why the Presocratics are not necessarily erroneous and their theoretical originality and their terminology can be incorporated into the Neoplatonic philosophy. I would like to show how some (...) Presocratic theories are embedded in the Neoplatonic metaphysical system of the three Hypostases. Regarding the One and the Intellect, Plotinus, Proclus and the Anonymous Author of the Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy read and employ some Presocratic texts in order to harmonize the Platonic and the Presocratic accounts. Although the Neoplatonists see themselves as continuing the Greek philosophical tradition started by the Presocratics, their interpretation of Presocratic thought illustrates the birth of exegetic philosophy which is able to apply ancient concepts and predicates to its own metaphysical theory. (shrink)

In this study, we investigate the way in which Damascius describes the relation of the ‘forms’ with the ‘parts’ and the ‘elements’ in his treatise De Principiis, in which he utilizes aspects of the Pre-Socratic natural philosophy as well as Aristotle’s Physica. We also shed light on the epistemological terms and conditions of his analysis. From a methodological point of view, we follow the categorical schemas found in the text, which reflect the philosopher’s general positions with respect to the (...) formation of the natural world, through which a particularly advanced and mathematically expressed natural science for studying the structures of the universe is revealed. Considering that Damascius’ main research goal is to analytically describe the general archetypical categories of the sensible world, the greatest conclusion that we draw is that the formation of the natural world came from the activation-composition of the ‘elements’, that is, the material projections, in their separations, of the productive manifestations of the metaphysical archetypal Ideas. (shrink)

To put one of Jordan's central thoughts briefly, forms or relations through the act become "clots" or plexus, i.e., intertwinings, and thus concrete things. Jordan has several descriptions of the act, the perfect act, the creative act, the cosmic act, the integrative act, the subjective act, and the intelligent act. Of these the integrative act is the most important metaphysically, and has many of the characteristics of the other acts.

This article focuses on the reception of Aristotle’s Categories by the first three representatives of Greek Neoplatonism: Plotinus (204/205–270 CE), Porphyry (ca. 234–ca. 305 CE), Iamblichus (ca. 242–ca. 325 CE). The first section argues that Plotinus’ acquaintance with Aristotle’s treatises marked a fresh start vis-à-vis the previous Platonist tradition. Aristotle’s views, arguments and vocabulary are ubiquitous in Plotinus writings (the Enneads) and they must be considered an essential part of his philosophical project. Plotinus, however, does not share some of Aristotle’s (...) key theories and is critical of them. The second section focuses on Plotinus’ discussion of Aristotle’s Categories in the tripartite treatise On the Genera of Being (6.1–3). There he rejects the Peripatetic division into ten categories as providing an incomplete account of the genera of being that unduly omits “those which are most authentically beings”, i.e. Plato’s separate Forms. While drawing on earlier Platonist objections to Aristotle, Plotinus’ approach is original insofar as he criticizes Aristotle and his followers not only for omitting intelligible beings in the division of categories, but also for being unable, for this very reason, to work out an adequate division of sensible beings themselves. The third section is devoted to Porphyry, a student of Plotinus’ and the editor of his works. Porphyry worked intensively on Aristotle’s Categories, which he regarded as an introduction not only to logic, but to philosophy as a whole. Unlike Plotinus, Porphyry aimed to integrate Aristotle into Platonism and his engagement with the Categories was a key part of his project after Plotinus’ in-depth criticism. Porphyry’s approach is connected to his view of the subject-matter of the Categories, which he sees as focusing on words insofar as they signify beings, and not on beings as such. The fourth section focuses on some parallels between Plotinus’ Genera of Beings and Porphyry’s works, which may reflect the debate within Plotinus’ school. The fifth section focuses on Iamblichus of Chalcis. Both in theology and in the interpretation of Aristotle’s Categories, Iamblichus aimed to both continue and supplant Porphyry’s work. While Plotinus criticizes Aristotle’s categories for omitting intelligible beings, and while Porphyry accepts Aristotle’s categories insofar as they focus on words signifying sensible things, Iamblichus incorporates his Neoplatonist and Pythagorizing metaphysics into the interpretation of the Categories. (shrink)

The nineteen essays that form this pioneering volume of comparative philosophy represent an exchange of ideas among specialists in Neoplatonism and specialists in Indian thought. These scholars have examined concepts and assertions that appear to be common to both philosophical traditions, as well as the possible historical influence of Indian sources upon late Greek philosophy, and specifically upon the Alexandrine Platonists. While most of the essays refer to Hinduism, several of them contain general surveys.

A key figure in the history of Aristotelianism, Porphyry (AD 232/3 - c. 305) was born in Tyre and was a student of Longinus' in Athens and of Plotinus' in Rome. In his commentary on the Categories, Porphyry provided an authoritative interpretation of a notoriously controversial work. Commentators on Aristotle had disagreed fundamentally over whether the Categories was a work of logic, concerning simple terms or the simple concepts they represent, or a metaphysical work addressing the classification by genera of (...) simple entities or concepts. Approaching the Categories as the first of Aristotle's works in logic, Porphyry adopted an earlier Peripatetic view of the Categories as being concerned principally with terms or linguistic items, which he calls "predicates." He successfully defended the Categories against Plotinus, arguing that while it seemed to attack orthodox Platonism by denying the separation of forms and the ontological priority of the universal, it was in fact entirely compatible with Platonism. Because of Porphyry's intervention, the Categories came to serve as a basic textbook of logic for subsequent Neoplatonist teaching. His commentary influenced the Arabic tradition, and Boethius drew heavily on it as well. The full text of Porphyry's commentary was lost, but the extant version is available here in Steven K. Strange's new translation. Ancient philosophers, historians of philosophy, classicists, and medievalists will welcome its appearance in English. (shrink)

Anicius Manlius Seuerinus Boethius has been regarded one of the major sources of Platonism in the Middle Ages, and the influence of different Platonists on his thought has been widely discussed. In his Aristotelian commentaries, however, Boethius rejects Platonists’ opinions while saying that Aristotle and Plato essentially agree. Boethius may have intended to show the agreement he saw, but did not provide any explanation in his works. In this article, I consider how Boethius could have seen such an agreement. While (...) reexamining past remarks about Platonism in Boethius, I conclude that he adopts Porphyry’s view that Aristotelian logic functions as a step toward the metaphysical appreciation of the universe, which Platonists consider to be the most essential form of philosophy. However, Boethius follows Iamblichus in holding that the highest level of metaphysical appreciation involves mathematization. (shrink)

Rationalism, Platonism and God comprises three main papers on Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, with extensive responses. It provides a significant contribution to the exploration of the common ground of the great early-modern Rationalist theories, and an examination of the ways in which the mainstream Platonic tradition permeates these theories. -/- John Cottingham identifies characteristically Platonic themes in Descartes's cosmology and metaphysics, finding them associated with two distinct, even opposed attitudes to nature and the human condition, one ancient and 'contemplative', the (...) other modern and 'controlling'. He finds the same tension in Descartes's moral theory, and believes that it remains unresolved in present-day ethics. -/- Was Spinoza a Neoplatonist theist, critical Cartesian, or naturalistic materialist? Michael Ayers argues that he was all of these. Analysis of his system reveals how Spinoza employed Neoplatonist monism against Descartes's Platonist pluralism. Yet the terminology - like the physics - is Cartesian. And within this Platonic-Cartesian shell Spinoza developed a rigorously naturalistic metaphysics and even, Ayers claims, an effectually empiricist epistemology. -/- Robert Merrihew Adams focuses on the Rationalists' arguments for the Platonist, anti-Empiricist principle of 'the priority of the perfect', i.e. the principle that finite attributes are to be understood through corresponding perfections of God, rather than the reverse. He finds the given arguments unsatisfactory but stimulating, and offers a development of one of Leibniz's for consideration. -/- These papers receive informed and constructive criticism and development at the hands of, respectively, Douglas Hedley, Sarah Hutton and Maria Rosa Antognazza. (shrink)

This article argues that Ralph Waldo Emerson employs metempsychosis (reincarnation or the transmigration of the soul into successive bodies) as a figurative template for human consciousness. Mapping various traditions from Hinduism, Pythagoreanism, Platonism, and Neoplatonism onto the vastness of the geological and biological records, Emerson translates metaphysics for modernity: he depicts the soul's journey through the chronological sequence of history as a poetic process that culminates in a tenuous form of self-knowledge.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late AntiquityMichael F. WagnerDominic J. O'Meara. Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. Pp. xi + 249. Cloth, $55.00.Porphyry tells of Plotinus's failed petition to emperor Gallienus to (re)establish a "city of philosophers" conformed to Plato's laws, named Platonopolis (Vit. Plo.12). O'Meara here articulates primary themes and developments in philosophical political thought in the classical Neoplatonic period, from Plotinus's (...) day in the mid-third century into the sixth century. Concurrently, he addresses head on "the conventional view that the Platonist philosophers of Late Antiquity had no political philosophy" (3). This view exemplifies the more general perspective that the Neoplatonists were simply disinterested in this-worldly affairs in lieu of "an immaterial world... our true 'homeland,' where we can at last attain the good we desire" (3). Consequently, O'Meara provides both a unique study of an important [End Page 205] topic and a compelling case for a more complete, balanced understanding of Neoplatonic other-worldly-ness. O'Meara's study covers key figures from four main groups of (neo)Platonists: Plotinus and his students; the schools in Syria and Asia Minor inspired by Iamblichus; the Athenian school (Plutarch, Proclus, Damascius et al.); and the Alexandrian school (Hyapatia, Philoponus, Olympiodorus et al.). He organizes his investigation (chapters) into three Parts.The pivotal concept in O'Meara's two-pronged endeavor is divinization - "assimilation and unification, as far as possible, to god" (31, Proclus) - a concept whose meaning for classical Neoplatonists ranges from "becoming a god" to "imitating some form of divine life, in one way or another" (31). Part I focuses on the Neoplatonists' shared association of a human soul's divinization with virtue-osity [my jargon], beginning with Plotinus's distinction between political virtue(s) and purification—or purificatory virtue(s). O'Meara emphasizes the relevance of the resulting "scale of virtues" to a life of continued activity—for example explicating Plotinus's denial that a "purified" soul is somehow exempt from the rightness-of-acting expected of the politically virtuous soul: rather, "reaching higher principles and different measures he will act [directly, immediately] according to these" (43, En. I,2,7).Another organizing theme as O'Meara's investigations proceed beyond Plotinus is the significance of the increasing complexities of particular Neoplatonic metaphysical systems, and so also of their moral systems - e.g. their "scales of virtue." Part I also articulates related attempts (beginning with Porphyry and Iamblichus) to articulate programs of moral and philosophical study - i.e. a related "scale of sciences." Of special note here are proposals by some Neoplatonists to divide the "practical sciences" associated on this scale with political virtuousness into legislative science(s) and judicial science (56). Implicit in the Neoplatonic scale(s) of virtue(s) was the thesis that as one progresses towards divinization "lower" virtue-osity is not transcended in the sense of lost or dismissed but rather it is included or incorporated into a higher form. Arguably, "lower" sciences are likewise not merely aids or stepping-stones towards something "higher," but genuine topoi of study and knowledge in their own right.Part II is the true heart of O'Meara's outstanding scholarly and philosophical inquiry. Here is where he fulfills his intent to discern a substantive tradition of political philosophy and to articulate its key themes and concepts. Though he associates this part of his investigation with Plato's conceit of the philosopher's return to the cave, he immediately parses this "descent" as a "divinization of political life through philosophy" (71). He articulates various Neoplatonists' approaches to questions inspired by Plato's cave allegory—e.g. Is the philosopher socially obligated to "return"? Could s/he then still be happy? (His investigation here does seem to overlook Neoplatonic conceptions of choice, volition, or will as these might pertain to such questions.) O'Meara recognizes, however, that the more fundamental link between Neoplatonic metaphysics and Neoplatonic ethical-political thought derives from Plotinus's conception "of fecundity, of an [overflowing] abundance" (74) in his highest One, and so in a soul assimilated to It. In Proclus's formulation: "that which... (shrink)

From Gerdil to Marugi: Malebranchean Revival and Lockean Readings. For the Cardinal Gerdil, the only philosophical reflection able to combine aspects of Post-Cartesian philosophy with Augustinian Platonism and to provide an explanation of the spirituality of the soul and of the philosophically plausible and pragmatic mind-body interaction in an apologetic reflection on religion was the philosophy of Malebranche. Committed to the defence of the immortality of the soul and the vision of all things in God which found favour in English (...) neo-Platonic thinking, Gerdil becomes one of the protagonists of Italian culture engaged in the European philosophical debate developed against Lockean reason and in defence of Neoplatonism and Cartesianism. To form an emblem of rationalistic rationalism and materialism in metaphysics and religion was a task of certain Italian thinkers, including Muratori, Francesco Zanotti, Marugi and Francesco Soave, and in particular Cardinal Gerdil. (shrink)

This volume examines the historical end of the Platonic tradition in relation to creation theories of the natural world through the Neoplatonist philosopher Proclus' (412-485) elaboration of an investigation of Plato's theory of metaphysical archetypal Forms. Proclus proceeds to a systematic construction of this theory and grounds it in ontological monism. He presents the Forms as constructing, through their combinations, the presuppositions for the creation of the natural world, in such a way that it functions in an orderly (...) and harmonious way, showing the natural world is not produced by chance or means of automatizations, but on the basis of a teleological planning. This volume also reflects Proclus' dealing with the topics of objective reality and the nature of the "universals.". (shrink)

"Anyone interested in Simone Weil will want, and need, to read this superb collection." —Diogenes Allen, Princeton Theological Seminary “These essays—some written by leading specialists in Simone Weil's thought, others by prominent theologians and philosophers of religion—are especially valuable not only for elucidating Weil's reading of Plato but also for showing what one or another form of Christian Platonism can mean for us today.” —James A. Wiseman, O.S.B., Catholic University of America "This remarkable and penetrating collection of essays on Simone (...) Weil's religious philosophy illumines the living intersection between serious metaphysics and ethics. The authors carefully examine this relation that much post-modern reflection has until now only skimmed, but that Weil herself managed to embrace with breathtaking intellectual discipline and self-giving. The book is a bracing testimony to the deep moral consequences of classical ontology and its challenging Christian reorientation." —The Rev. Dr. Ephraim Radner, Ascension Episcopal Church, Pueblo, Colorado In this book a group of renowned international scholars seek to discern the ways in which Simone Weil was indebted to Plato, and how her provocative readings of his work offer challenges to contemporary philosophy, theology, and spirituality. This is the first book in twenty years to systematically investigate Weil’s Christian Platonism. (shrink)

The commentary on Plato's Republic by Proclus (d. 485 CE), which takes the form of a series of essays, is the only sustained treatment of the dialogue to survive from antiquity. This three-volume edition presents the first complete English translation of Proclus' text, together with a general introduction that argues for the unity of Proclus' Commentary and orients the reader to the use which the Neoplatonists made of Plato's Republic in their educational program. Each volume is completed by a Greek (...) word index and an English-Greek glossary that will help non-specialists to track the occurrence of key terms throughout the translated text. The second volume of the edition presents Proclus' essays on the tripartite soul and the virtues, female philosopher rulers, and the metaphysics and epistemology of the central books of the Republic. The longest of the essays in Volume II interprets the nature and significance of the 'marriage number' whose miscalculation leads to the degeneration of the ideal city-state. (shrink)

This volume dispels the idea that Platonism was an otherworldly enterprise which neglected the study of the natural world. Leading scholars examine how the Platonists of late antiquity sought to understand and explain natural phenomena: their essays offer a new understanding of the metaphysics of Platonism, and its place in the history of science.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 131-132 [Access article in PDF] Christia Mercer. Leibniz's Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xiii + 528. Cloth, $80.00. Christia Mercer's massive study is aimed at unearthing the hidden roots of Leibniz's metaphysics by placing the German philosopher back in the intellectual context within which his thought first took shape. In so doing she stresses (...) the fundamental importance of Leibniz's early years for the development of his philosophy. In particular she convincingly argues for the key role played by Leibniz's early exposure to the thought of eclectic thinkers (including his teachers) who were trying to build a new philosophical synthesis centered around the key tenets of Christian theology and combining elements of Aristotelianism, Platonism, and (in at least some cases) the new mechanical philosophy of nature.One of Mercer's central theses is that the methodological and metaphysical commitments that Leibniz developed during his youth formed the bedrock of his mature philosophy (23). More precisely, her bold claim is that Leibniz's core metaphysics (including the complete concept account of substance) was constructed in 1668-71, re-examined and slightly developed in 1672-79, and then used for the rest of his long philosophical career (18, 470). The key inspirational forces driving the development of Leibniz's philosophy, in her view, had even earlier origins. In the mid-1660s Leibniz did not yet have a fully formulated metaphysics; but he already possessed very definite philosophical objectives which were to guide the development of his metaphysics and form the unstated assumptions underlying his mature thought (40). Mercer identifies these unstated assumptions as a "Metaphysics of Method," a "Metaphysics of Substance," and a "Metaphysics of Divinity," all of which she finds fully developed in his early thought (468-9).According to Leibniz's "Metaphysics of Method" (examined in part I), there exists a truth beneath the prominent philosophical schools which can and ought to be discovered. This conciliatory methodology was Leibniz's answer to the political, religious, and philosophical chaos around him. He was deeply convinced that his brilliantly original eclectic metaphysics would provide the foundation of philosophical, theological, and even political peace. Leibniz's "Metaphysics of Substance," Mercer argues in part II, melded an Aristotelian approach to substance with a mechanical physics and originated at the very outset of his intellectual carrier in an attempt to solve specific theological problems (e.g., those of the incarnation and resurrection). Platonism in turn offered the material for Leibniz's "Metaphysics of Divinity" (explored in part III), that is, for his conception of the relationship between God and creatures. The fourth and final part of Mercer's book takes her analysis of Leibniz's writings up to 1679 and describes the laying of the foundations of his mature metaphysics. She concludes not only that Leibniz proposed the doctrine of pre-established harmony prior to his departure for Paris in March 1672, but also, more generally, that the other tenets of Leibniz's mature thought, including his theory of truth, grew naturally out of his early metaphysics (see, in particular, 2, 15-8, 47, 52, 169-70, 250-2, 300-1, 472).Throughout the book Mercer describes her interpretation as "startling," "unfamiliar," "dramatic," and "surprising," and fears that "readers may balk" at her conclusions since "so much of Leibniz's thought has escaped us for so long" (see, for instance, 1, 9, 471). Some readers may feel, on the contrary, that she has underestimated the extent to which several of her central theses—such as the importance of the earliest stages of Leibniz's philosophical development in general and of eclecticism, theological problems, and Platonism, as well as Aristotelianism within that development in particular—are already reflected in the [End Page 131] best recent traditions of international Leibniz scholarship. But her book undoubtedly breaks new ground and remains an important contribution to an exciting field which cannot and will not be ignored. While international Leibniz scholarship may not absorb some of this book's more... (shrink)

"The studies collected in this book are all concerned with aspects of the Platonic tradition, either in its own internal development in the Hellenistic age and the period of the Roman Empire, or with the influence of Platonism, in one or other of its forms, on other spiritual traditions, especially that of Christianity." [Book jacket].

Draft version of essay. ABSTRACT: Benjamin Whichcote developed a distinctive account of human nature centered on our moral psychology. He believed that this view of human nature, which forms the foundation of “Cambridge Platonism,” showed that the demands of reason and faith are not merely compatible but dynamically supportive of one another. I develop an interpretation of this oft-neglected and widely misunderstood account of human nature and defend its viability against a key objection.

Introduction -- What is platonism? -- Schleiermacher's pedagogical interpretation of Plato -- What's wrong with the current debate -- The romantic rediscovery of Plato's ineffable ontology -- Conclusions: Ineffability and dialogue form -- Untying Schleiermacher's gordian knot -- Metaphysical ineffability : the argument from language and human finitude -- Spiritual ineffability: the argument from self-transformation -- Existential ineffability : the argument from life choice -- Platonism reconsidered -- The context of Heidegger's interpretation of Plato -- What it all means and (...) why it matters -- Stage one: the realm of shadows -- Stage two: the fire -- Stage three: the realm of light -- The good : Heidegger's Plato is the later Heidegger -- Stage four: the return to the shadows -- The virtues of heidegger's plato -- Heidegger's crisis and opportunity -- Setting the stage -- Heidegger's crisis -- Understanding Heidegger's crisis : Nietzsche -- Heidegger as reformed madman -- Revolutionary thinker or utopian social engineer -- The Greeks and university reform -- Theoria and fundamental ontology -- A community of similarly striving researchers -- University reform and nihilism -- Back from Syracuse : four reasons to rethink Heidegger's politics -- The ontological problem -- The epistemological problem -- The moral problem -- The political problem -- What was plato doing in Syracuse -- Back from Syracuse or Eros Tyrannos -- How Heidegger should have read Plato -- Plato anticipate Heidegger's critique of technology -- Plato's problems with periclean Athens -- Alcibiades as embodiment of periclean Athens -- Alcibiades as inverted image of Socrates -- Conclusions: What Heidegger missed. (shrink)

Forms and Concepts is the first comprehensive study of the central role of concepts and concept acquisition in the Platonic tradition. It sets up a stimulating dialogue between Plato s innatist approach and Aristotle s much more empirical response. The primary aim is to analyze and assess the strategies with which Platonists responded to Aristotle s (and Alexander of Aphrodisias ) rival theory. The monograph culminates in a careful reconstruction of the elaborate attempt undertaken by the Neoplatonist Proclus (6th (...) century AD) to devise a systematic Platonic theory of concept acquisition.". (shrink)

A problem for Aristotelian realist accounts of universals (neither Platonist nor nominalist) is the status of those universals that happen not to be realised in the physical (or any other) world. They perhaps include uninstantiated shades of blue and huge infinite cardinals. Should they be altogether excluded (as in D.M. Armstrong's theory of universals) or accorded some sort of reality? Surely truths about ratios are true even of ratios that are too big to be instantiated - what is the truthmaker (...) of such truths? It is argued that Aristotelianism can answer the question, but only a semi-Platonist form of it. (shrink)

How does a school of thought, in the area of philosophy, or indeed of religion, from roots that may be initially open-ended and largely informal, come to take on the features that later mark it out as distinctive, and even exclusive? That is the theme which is explored in this book in respect of the philosophical movement known as Platonism, stemming as it does from the essentially open-ended and informal atmosphere of Plato's Academy. John Dillon focuses on a number of (...) key issues, such as monism versus dualism, the metaphysical underpinnings of ethical theory, the theory of Forms, and the reaction to the Sceptical 'deviation' represented by the so-called 'New Academy'. The book is written in the lively and accessible style of the lecture series in Beijing from which it originates. (shrink)

This is the second volume of a two-volume survey of the long and complicated controversy which took place in Antiquity over whether the world in Plato's Timaeus is generated or is eternal. In the first volume, Baltes traced this controversy from its beginnings in Aristotle's criticism of the Tim., through Middle Platonism, up to Neoplatonism, setting aside Proclus however for separate treatment which he now provides in this second volume. This arrangement seems inevitable, since Proclus's discussion of the issue, in (...) his enormous Commentary on the Timaeus, is by far the fullest which has reached us from Antiquity and could hardly have been covered adequately in the first volume. Baltes's analysis of Proclus's treatment of the issue takes the form of a detailed commentary on those sections of Proclus's Commentary having to do with the some twenty-eight texts in the Timaeus which are relevant. Baltes attempts to sort out the train of thought in Proclus's comments, and brings out both Proclus's debt to Porphyry's Commentary on the Timaeus and Proclus's disagreements with Porphyry. In a Conclusion which is too brief to take full advantage of his commentary on Proclus, Baltes makes some useful points about the character of Proclus's Commentary, accounting convincingly for its repetitive quality and its mixing of philological with philosophical exegesis. As an appendix, Baltes gives in German translation eighteen arguments for the eternity of the world which derive from a lost work by Proclus and which are preserved in several Arabic Medieval translations and in John Philoponus's De aeternitate mundi. Baltes's two volumes constitute a valuable historical survey of a major and long-lived controversy in Greek philosophy and we might wish that, if he has the courage, he might complete his survey with a study of the controversy as it was renewed by Philoponus and Simplicius in a polemic less tied to the interpretation of the Timaeus and which anticipated, as G. Verbeke has suggested, the eternity of the world controversy in the Latin West in the thirteenth century.--Dominic O'Meara, Catholic University of America. (shrink)

"The origins of what might be called 'the dynamic relation between metaphysics and hermeneutics' and which forms the primary subject matter of the present volume are buried in the mists of history. Nevertheless, the phenomenon is fully visible at the point where the Stoic allegorical technique that had developed during the Hellenistic era of antiquity was adopted by the Platonists. How much further back the twofold root of metaphysics and hermeneutics can be traced remains an open question, given that (...) the problem itself is of a hermeneutical and perhaps even metaphysical nature, and given that we can never escape from this circularity. The thirteen essays in this volume all in various ways to the understanding of the chosen topic. When the first essays were written, the topic itself was only partially articulated, whereas some of the later pieces were composed with a more conscious awareness of its ramifications. For this reason, it seemed best to supplement the original texts with an introduction that is more fully developed than would normally be the case with a collective volume and indeed adopts a certain meta-critical stance"--. (shrink)

Predication is an indisputable part of our linguistic behavior. By contrast, the metaphysics of predication has been a matter of dispute ever since antiquity. According to Plato—or at least Platonism, the view that goes by Plato’s name in contemporary philosophy—the truths expressed by predications such as “Socrates is wise” are true because there is a subject of predication (e.g., Socrates), there is an abstract property or universal (e.g., wisdom), and the subject exemplifies the property.1 This view is supposed to be (...) general, applying to all predications, whether the subject of predication is a person, a planet, or a property.2 Despite the controversy surrounding the metaphysics of predication, many theistic philosophers—including the majority of contemporary analytic theists—regard Platonism as extremely attractive. At the same time, however, such philosophers are also commonly attracted to a form of traditional theism that has at its core the thesis that God is an absolutely independent.. (shrink)

According to a common presentation, Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics is the view according to which the entities with which mathematics is concerned, numbers, are abstract objects which exist independently of the mind. The latter feature, in particular, is alleged to secure the “realist” component of mathematical Platonism. Surprisingly enough, however, this characterization of Platonism is not normally paired with a philosophical explanation of the implicated notion of mind-dependent existence. Since there seems to be more than one metaphysically relevant (...) sense in which an entity may be said to depend on the mind, this is not a minor lack; for not every such sense seems to be relevant to the realism issue. This paper is aimed to fill this gap, and to provide the Platonist with a conceptual analysis of the realism-relevant sense in which her claim that numbers exist mind-independently should be understood. Result of this analysis will also be the conclusion that Non-Gödelian Platonism, a view recently proposed by J. Divers and A. Miller, should not be really regarded as a form of Platonism. (shrink)

Resumo O autor começará por examinar a noção de participação, tal como é aplicada por Platão, primeiro à distinção gramatical entre identidade e predicação e depois às questões metafísicas acerca de sujeitos reais, sendo eles indivíduos contáveis, de um “material” subjacente, ou Formas que aparecem mais ou menos reconhecíveis na nossa experiência. Mesmo os materialistas modernos admitem uma distinção entre a realidade tal como ela “é” e tal como “aparece”. Surge então a questão, mais ainda para os modernos do que (...) para Platão, sobre a possibilidade de conhecer algo do mundo “tal como ele é” além de como “aparece”. O autor conclui, sugerindo a hipótese de um conhecimento “participativo”, de um tipo agora associado ao pensamento “right brain” em vez de “left brain”. Termina reiterando que podemos conhecer a realidade como ela é “a partir do interior”, uma vez que nela estamos inseridos. Palavras-chave: formas, matéria, participação, Plotino, predicaçãoA brief examination of the notion of participation, as it is applied by Plato first to the grammatical distinction between identity and predication, and then to metaphysical questions about the real subjects, whether these are countable individuals, an underlying “stuff”, or the Forms that appear more or less recognizably in our experience. Even modern materialists admit a distinction between the world as it appears, very variously, to us, and the world “as it is”. The question then arises, for moderns even more than for Plato, how we could hope to know anything of the world “as it is”, apart from its appearance to us and others. I conclude by gesturing toward the possibility of “participatory” knowledge, of a kind now associated with “right brain” rather than “left brain” thinking. We can know what reality is “from the inside”, since we ourselves are inside it. Keywords : Participation, predication, Forms, Matter, Plotinus. (shrink)

Plato's Tim. 90b1-c6 describes a pathway to the soul's salvation via the study of the heavens. This paper poses three questions about this theme in Platonism: 1. The epistemological question: How is the paradigmatic function of the visible heavenly bodies to be reconciled with various Platonic misgivings about the faculty of perception? 2. The metaphysical question: How can »assimilation« to the motions of bodies in the realm of Becoming provide for the salvation of souls when souls are »higher«- a mid-point (...) between Being and Becoming? 3. The psychological question: What can it mean for an incorporeal soul to utilise the motions of a body for an ethical and cognitive paradigm? And provides an account of how Proclus and some of his fellow Neoplatonists answered these questions. (shrink)

Much of contemporary research concerning the Platonic schools of late antiquity is philological and historical in approach. This research is needed, since late antiquity is a period that has long been neglected in the historiography of philosophy, which means that many facts and documents still await examination and publication in reliable form. Much rarer is a philosophical approach to Neoplatonism based on sound historical knowledge rather than on the cliches that until recently have masked ignorance. Such an approach is proposed (...) in the present book, whose important task it is to analyze the logical and metaphysical structures that constitute Neoplatonic philosophy. Lloyd brings together and develops ideas he has explored over many years. He takes account of a very wide range of thinkers. Plotinus, Porphyry, and Proclus play a major role, of course. But many others are also considered: Simplicius, Philoponus, Damascius, Elias--the list extends to include Neoplatonists of the Byzantine period. While allowing for the differences between these philosophers, Lloyd successfully shows how they share and elaborate on certain theories which he examines systematically, bringing out the difficulties and dilemmas that these theories often contain. One might compare his approach with that of S. Gersh, whose interests however are not exclusively philosophical, and who, like Lloyd, stresses the importance of Aristotelian ideas in the constitution of Neoplatonic philosophy. (shrink)

The papers which constitute this volume, and which were first presented at a Conference in 1978 at the Catholic University of America, are arranged chronologically according to the five periods in which Neoplatonism confronted Christianity: Patristic, Later Greek and Byzantine, Medieval Latin, Renaissance, and Modern. Its editor suggests, in his valuable "Introduction", that the papers fall also into three groups in line with their contents. The first group concerns Christian thinkers who knew and used specific Neoplatonic texts and includes the (...) following: H. D. Saffrey, "New Objective Links Between the Pseudo-Dionysius and Proclus"; J. Dillon, "Origen's Doctrine of the Trinity and Some Later Neoplatonic Theories"; J. Pépin, "The Platonic and Christian Ulysses"; M. T. Clark, "A Neoplatonic Commentary on the Christian Trinity: Marius Victorinus"; J. O'Meara, "The Neoplatonism of Saint Augustine"; G. H. Allard, "The Primacy of Existence in the Thought of Eriugena"; C. Fabro, "The Overcoming of the Neoplatonic Triad of Being, Life and Intellect by Thomas Aquinas"; B. McGinn, "Meister Echkart on God as Absolute Unity"; E. Bieman, "Triads and Trinity in the Poetry of Robert Browning"; M. Rose, "The Christian Platonism of C. S. Lewis, J. R. R. Tolkien and Charles Williams.". (shrink)

The author’s thesis is that the Platonism which has had most influence on religious thought represents a Plato dimidiatus. “There are important aspects of Plato’s philosophy which have not been and yet could be applied in an important way to religion…”. In philosophy Plato is not only the objective idealist for whom the ideas alone have true existence. He is also the metaphysical realist for whom the sensible is no less objectively real than the intelligible. In religion he is not (...) only the heir of Orphic and Dionysiac enthusiasm, with its transcendental emphasis and its infinite intent. He is also the inheritor of the traditional Greek Olympic and Chthonic gods, with their regard for the natural and the significance of the finite. Aristotle alone preserved this second strand in Plato’s thought. Philo, the founder of Neoplatonism, and his successor Plotinus successively depressed his naturalism in favour of an exaggerated emphasis on the supernatural. It is the second alone which has since passed as Platonism. Even the 13th century discovery of Aristotle was the discovery of a Neoplatonically interpreted Aristotle. (shrink)

Metaphysics is usually understood as the investigation of being qua being and of its ultimate categories. Given this characterization, it may be hard to grasp why anyone might wish to oppose metaphysics, why anyone might claim that metaphysics ”leads the philosopher into complete darkness” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p.18)? What could be so misleading about the investigation of the most abstract vestiges of being? One source of disparagement towards metaphysics, of course, stems from the relativist conviction that there is no absolute being, (...) and hence nor are there any ultimate categories of being. Another ‘reason’ for some philosophers of this century (notably Carnap) to reject metaphysics appeared to consist in their reinterpretation of the word ”metaphysics”, in effect, simply as ”nonsensical philosophy”. However neither of these reasons seems to be the Wittgensteinian one. The way I propose to envisage this reason takes us back to Plato with his distinction between Being and Becoming (echoed, in one or another form, within the conceptions of so many subsequent philosophers). It is the distinction between the ‘higher’ realm of ideas with its crisp, eternal truths, and the ‘lower’ realm of appearances in which anything appears only as a fuzzy and transient reflection of something from the higher realm. The original message harbored in this Platonistic picture is clearly that the vast and hardly graspable flux of appearances shelters something firm and invariable, something potentially fully capturable by human reason which can then use it as a prism to comprehend and understand the everchanging phenomena. However, as I will claim, the picture of a ‘higher’ reality behind phenomena is dangerous in that it can delude a philosopher into feeling that he can solve empirical questions by a quasiempirical investigation of a non-empirical realm: a ‘metaphysical reality’. (shrink)

Aristotle and Other Platonists is a remarkable work in terms of what is established and how its arguments are developed. Gerson’s meticulous and sensitive examinations of original texts of Plato and Ar-istotle, along with their central commentary traditions and more recent interpretations, offer nuanced insights into the intended meanings of each relevant text. Gerson attempts “ in part to achieve a richer understanding of Platonism by showing why Neoplatonists took Aristotle to be an authentic collaborator in its development and explication”. (...) He also endeavors to confirm that Aristotle was often “ actually analyzing the Platonic position and making it more precise, not refuting it,” and “ criticizing philosophers other than Plato or deviant versions of Platonism”. (shrink)

Aristotle ends Metaphysics books M–N with an account of how one can get the impression that Platonic Form-numbers can be causes. Though these passages are all admittedly polemic against the Platonic understanding, there is an undercurrent wherein Aristotle seems to want to explain in his own terms the evidence the Platonist might perceive as supporting his view, and give any possible credit where credit is due. Indeed, underlying this explanation of how the Platonist may have formed his impression, we discover (...) Aristotle's own understanding of what we today might call the mathematical structure of nature. Mathematicals are, to Aristotle, abstractions of order, symmetry, and definiteness, which are in turn aspects of the formal cause of goodness and beauty. This is a lens through which an Aristotelian could view modern mathematical physics as an important aspect of natural philosophy, and which is foundational for an Aristotelian philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Dans le cadre de sa théorie de la production des figures géométriques par projection des raisons innées, Proclus est le premier à assimiler la phantasia (imagination) au nous pathetikos (intellect passif) évoqué furtivement par Aristote en De Anima III,5. Tout en maintenant cette assimilation, Ammonius (ré)intègrera la notion d’ epinoia dans le processus d’abstraction, statut de la chose abstraite du monde sensible. L’introduction de cette notion provoquera une certaine confusion chez les commentateurs ultérieurs qui, tout en gardant l’assimilation de Proclus, (...) n’hésiteront pas à faire de la phantasia la faculté intellective permettant d’abstraire les formes de la matière en étroite collaboration avec l’intellect actif, de séparer les accidents d’un substrat et de composer des êtres et formes sans substrat. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Louis Agassiz and the Platonist Story of Creation at Harvard, 1795-1846David K. NartonisIn 1846, naturalist Louis Agassiz took Harvard College by storm with his idealist approach to nature. In his initial lectures, repeated in New York the following year, Agassiz announced, "We have that within ourselves which assures us of participation in the Divine Nature and it is a particular characteristic of man to be able to rise in (...) that way above material Nature, and to understand intellectual existences." He then made it clear that by intellectual existences he meant a divine plan of creation. "What naturalists intend when they speak of what they call 'types'... may be easily understood by comparison. We all know that architects construct our dwellings according to plans conceived by them before the erection of the edifice."1 There is no doubt that Agassiz valued the careful collection of observational data. "It has only been step by step that man has acquired an insight into this plan."2 But his empiricism, if that is the right term, was entirely subordinate to apprehension of divine ideas, which alone deserved to be called science. In one recent account, The Metaphysical Club, which contains an excellent discussion of Agassiz's American career, author Louis Menand accurately describes this dual emphasis on observation and intuition. But Menand leaves unstated the problem of [End Page 437] Agassiz's welcome at Harvard, attributing his instant popularity to force of character.3A fuller explanation of Agassiz's welcome is to be found in the Scottish textbooks that dominated the Harvard philosophy curriculum prior to his arrival.4 Like Agassiz, textbook authors Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart, and Thomas Brown recognized observation and intuition as twin sources of human knowledge. According to them, we observe our own moral tendencies and interpret them in the light of intuited ethical principles that even God must obey. Similarly, we observe nature and interpret its workings with the aid of intuited principles of common sense.5 There is no doubt that this dual emphasis on observation and intuition was entirely consistent with Agassiz's idealist biology. But his definition of species and genera as intellectual existences in the divine mind was not to be found in the official Scottish texts. In fact, Dugald Stewart, who governed the philosophy curriculum after 1820, insisted that there are "no existences in nature corresponding to general terms, and the objects of our attention in all our general speculations are not ideas but words."6 This was "long misunderstood by philosophers, who imagined that a generic word expresses an actual existence distinct from the individuals of which the genus is composed."7 Similarly, Thomas Brown lamented, "One fundamental error... as long as it retained its hold of the understanding, must have rendered all its energies ineffectual, by wasting them in search of objects, which had no real existence... I allude to... the various orders of universals."8 In this one respect, Stewart and Brown were in agreement with Alexander Pope when he counseled his many American readers "presume not God to scan" and ridiculed those who would "soar with Plato to th' empyreal sphere."9But Harvard students and faculty were also reading books that promoted the intellectual existences that Agassiz saw behind nature and the Scots did [End Page 438] not. Chief among these books were Plato's Works (ca. 360 BCE), Philo's De Opificio Mundi (20 BCE to 50 CE), Ralph Cudworth's The True Intellectual System of the World (1678), and John Norris's An Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intellectual World (1701–04). These combined with such widely popular literature as John Milton's Paradise Lost (1668) and the prose works of Samuel Coleridge to form a kind of unofficial curriculum that ultimately made Agassiz's idealist view of nature especially welcome at Harvard.10 Modest at first, Harvard interest in intellectual existences bloomed with the appearance of books by Romantic writers on campus. In order to illustrate this long development, I will bolster my explanation with data from Harvard College library borrowing records—handwritten lists of the books borrowed by each library user during a one- or two-year period... (shrink)