Oxford Legal Philosophy publishes the best new work in philosophically-oriented legal theory. It commissions and solicits monographs in all branches of the subject, including works on philosophical issues in all areas of public and private law, and in the national, transnational, and international realms; studies of the nature of law, legal institutions, and legal reasoning; treatments of problems in political morality as they bear on law; and explorations in the nature and development of legal philosophy itself. The series represents diverse (...) traditions of thought but always with an emphasis on rigour and originality. It sets the standard in contemporary jurisprudence.This book shows that civil disobedience is generally more defensible than private conscientious objection.Part I explores the morality of conviction and conscience. Each of these concepts informs a distinct argument for civil disobedience. The conviction argument begins with the communicative principle of conscientiousness. According to the CPC, having a conscientious moral conviction means not just acting consistently with our beliefs and judging ourselves and others by a common moral standard. It also means not seeking to evade the consequences of our beliefs and being willing to communicate them to others. The conviction argument shows that, as a constrained, communicative practice, civil disobedience has a better claim than private objection does to the protections that liberal societies give to conscientious dissent. This view reverses the standard liberal picture which sees private 'conscientious' objection as a modest act of personal belief and civil disobedience as a strategic, undemocratic act whose costs are only sometimes worth bearing.The conscience argument is narrower and shows that genuinely morally responsive civil disobedience honours the best of our moral responsibilities and is protected by a duty-based moral right of conscience.Part II translates the conviction argument and conscience argument into two legal defences. The first is a demands-of-conviction defence. The second is a necessity defence. Both of these defences apply more readily to civil disobedience than to private disobedience. Part II also examines lawful punishment, showing that, even when punishment is justifiable, civil disobedients have a moral right not to be punished. (shrink)

With the transition from a one-person psychology of instinctual needs to a two-person psychology of relational needs, the metapsychological focus tends to shift from instinct theory to emotion motivation and systems theory, and, accordingly, familiar concepts have to be rethought. In this article, the superego is reconceptualized as a psychic regulation system for self-evaluation, comprising the capacity for empathy, the proneness to experience self-conscious emotions, such as shame, pride, and guilt, and the capacity for moral reasoning. This new conceptualization provides (...) useful tools for addressing the actual functioning of the conscience in clinical psychoanalysis. Affective neuropsychoanalysis can make important contributions to this rethinking of the superego. It also brings clinical practice and psychoanalytic metapsychology closer to empirical research beyond the scope of clinical psychoanalysis. The new model offers ample opportunities for integrating affective neuroscience into the functioning of the conscience. (shrink)

In this paper1 I shall present not just the conscience of Huckleberry Finn but two others as well. One of them is the conscience of Heinrich Himmler. He became a Nazi in 1923; he served drably and quietly, but well, and was rewarded with increasing responsibility and power. At the peak of his career he held many offices and commands, of which the most powerful was that of leader of the S.S. - the principal police force of the (...) Nazi regime. In this capacity, Himmler commanded the whole concentration-camp system, and was responsible for the execution of the so-called ‘final solution of the Jewish problem’. It is important for my purposes that this piece of social engineering should be thought of not abstractly but in concrete terms of Jewish families being marched to what they think are bath-houses, to the accompaniment of loud-speaker renditions of extracts from The Merry Widow and Tales of Hoffman, there to be choked to death by poisonous gases. Altogether, Himmler succeeded in murdering about four and a half million of them, as well as several million gentiles, mainly Poles and Russians. The other conscience to be discussed is that of the Calvinist theologian and philosopher Jonathan Edwards. He lived in the first half of the eighteenth century, and has a good claim to be considered America’s first serious and considerable philosophical thinker. He was for many years a widely-renowned preacher and Congregationalist minister in New England; in 1748 a dispute with his congregation led him to resign (he couldn’t accept their view that unbelievers should be admitted to the Lord’s Supper in the hope that it would convert them); for some years after that he worked as a missionary, preaching to Indians through an interpreter;, then in 1758 he accepted the presidency of what is now Princeton University, and within two months died from a smallpox inoculation. Along the way he wrote some first-rate philosophy: his book attacking the notion of free will is still sometimes read.. (shrink)

Should a prosecutor throw a case to avoid keeping men he thinks are innocent in prison? The startling case of justice gone awry in the Palladium nightclub murder raises new questions about the role that conscience should play in lawyers ethics, when conscience presses one way but professional rules press the other.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Conscience and Calling: Ethical Reflections on Catholic Women's Church Vocations by Anne E. PatrickMary M. Doyle RocheConscience and Calling: Ethical Reflections on Catholic Women's Church Vocations Anne E. Patrick NEW YORK AND LONDON: BLOOMSBURY T&T CLARK, 2013. 197 PP. $24.95In Conscience and Calling, Anne Patrick weaves together insights into women's moral agency, vocational discernment, and historical narratives of religious women's engagement with clerical authority. Taking up (...) James Gustafson's question, "What is God enabling and requiring us to be and to do?" she offers a nuanced view of virtuous discernment and action in the context of the "ecclesial oppression" of women. Patrick asks, "What is correct 'church practice' for female moral agents in view of the institutionalized injustice toward women in Catholicism?" (59).Chapter 1 begins with cases of conflict between women's religious congregations and clerical leadership. In the first case, Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary protested intolerable living conditions at a parish in Brooklyn, New [End Page 201] York, in 1939. When repeated requests for heat fell on the pastor's deaf ears, the sisters requested to leave the parish and were told that they would then also have to leave another thriving ministry in the diocese. The sisters acquiesced to this decision in a spirit of obedience and did not publicize the real reason for their departure. Fifty years later in Miami, Florida, when another conflict arose, the sisters involved discerned a very different response to injustice, one marked by concern for "justice, honesty, and personal responsibility." The model of a "good sister" had shifted from an emphasis on obedience and institutional loyalty toward shared responsibility for ministry and leadership.Chapter 2 surveys the landscape of women's engagement with the Church and its structures of leadership and adapts H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture to sketch five "types": women against the Church; women content with the Church; women above the Church; women and Church in paradox; and women transforming Church. Patrick proposes the transformationist model as the approach that most adequately meets the challenges that women face in the Church today; she calls on those who adopt this approach to live in creative tension with the Church and with those who follow the other models, to espouse justice and mutuality in organizational structures, and to be self-critical. Chapter 3 recounts the history of the National Assembly of Religious Women through this transformational lens.Chapter 4 proposes a "framework for love" that builds on Margaret Farley's ethic of commitment to envision an ethic of vocation that elicits "active receptivity," values the contributions of institutions, practices egalitarianism, and keeps justice and love in dialectical relationship. The "myth" of vocation (the notion that vocation is a "thing" to be discovered and pursued, like one's destiny or soul mate) is balanced by the "mystery" of vocation that engages ongoing, lifelong discernment. Controversial cases involving women religious illustrate this kind of discernment and women's striving to live justly and faithfully. The final chapter, "Vocation in a Transformed Social Context," recounts the Vatican Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith's visitation of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious, a case that has changed the landscape for women's discernment once again. Patrick calls the Church to live out its rhetorical commitment to the dignity of women by opening all church ministries so that women might serve and lead.Conscience and Calling tells an important story about how women religious have discerned the signs of the times and imagined new vocations in the Church and the world. Though the focus here is on women in the American Catholic Church, Patrick's contribution should pave the way for sharing religious women's stories in the global context to further enrich a Christian vision of virtue and vocation for those navigating ecclesial politics and practicing ministry in particular. [End Page 202]Mary M. Doyle RocheCollege of the Holy CrossCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

This examination of a fundamental but often neglected aspect of the intellectual history of early modern Europe brings together philosophers, historians and political theorists from Great Britain, Canada, the United States, Australia, France and Germany. Despite the diversity of disciplines and national traditions represented, the individual contributions show a remarkable convergence around three themes: changes in the modes of moral education in early modern Europe, the emergence of new relations between conscience and law (particularly the law of the state), (...) and the shared continuities and discontinuities of both Roman Catholic and Protestant moral culture in relation to their medieval past. (shrink)

The ability of nurses to act as moral agents in accordance with their conscience is both an essential human freedom and an important part of professional ethics. Recent developments in Canada related to Medical Assistance in Dying have revealed new and important challenges related to conscientious objection – challenges that may require rethinking of how nurses do professional ethics. Notably, the inclusion of a personalist bioethical approach is needed to introduce and explicate what conscience is for nurses to (...) be able to apply it to nursing practice. In this article, we explore the importance of conscience and conscientious objection as ethical concepts to support nurses in addressing issues of conscience amid ethically challenging situations. We discuss how a personalist basis for conscience can support nurses to inclusively engage with one another across diverse moral perspectives. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:February 19, 2011 (11:48 am) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3002\russell 30,2 040 red.wpd 168 Reviews A CONSCIENCE IN ACTION Chad Trainer 1006 Davids Run Phoenixville, pa 19460, usa [email protected] Reiner Braun, Robert Hinde, David Krieger, Harold Kroto, and Sally Milne, eds. Joseph Rotblat: Visionary for Peace. Weinheim, Germany: Wiley-vch Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, 2007. Pp. xiv, 355. isbn 978-3-527-40690-6 (hb). us$60. People who detest barbarism start to act in a barbaric (...) way. This is the insanity of war. (zJoseph Rotblat, p. 168) Bertrand Russell’s famous 1954 bbc broadcast “Man’s Peril” concerned humanity ’s fate in an era of nuclear weaponry. Soon after this event, it occurred to Russell that a further course of action would be to persuade prominent scientists from both sides of the Iron Curtain to sign a statement emphasizing the importance of joint action in addressing the spectre of a world in which there was availability of and even will to use nuclear armaments. He sent a draft of his petition to Albert Einstein for approval. Shortly thereafter, on a Xight from Rome to Paris, Russell heard the pilot’s announcement that Einstein had February 19, 2011 (11:48 am) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3002\russell 30,2 040 red.wpd Reviews 169 1 Rotblat was the recipient of the 1983 Bertrand Russell Society Award (McCoy, Visionary for Peace, p. 205, and Rotblat’s c.v., ibid., p. 346). died. Upon arriving at his Paris hotel, Russell found a letter from Einstein agreeing to sign Russell’s statement. In his autobiography, Russell reports: “This was one of the last acts of his [Einstein’s] public life.” Joseph Rotblat (1908–2005)1 met Russell in 1954 at a dinner-discussion given by the bbc on the results of the Bikini test and the future of nuclear weapons. Rotblat went on to become an adviser to Russell on the details of nuclear weapon science and was subsequently recruited by the latter to sign the same document Einstein had. Rotblat chaired the press conference on 9 July 1955 at Caxton Hall in London, presenting the world with what became known as the Russell– Einstein Manifesto. Rotblat was the Manifesto’s youngest and, until his death in 2005, the last surviving signatory. Although Rotblat was not a Nobel Laureate, Russell predicted, correctly, that he would eventually become one. In reference to Rotblat and his activities, Russell remarked: He can have few rivals in the courage and integrity and complete self-abnegation with which he has given up his own career (in which, however, he still remains eminent) to devote himself to combatting the nuclear peril as well as other, allied evils. If ever these evils are eradicated and international aTairs are straightened out, his name should stand very high indeed among the heroes. (Auto. 3: 77–8) Joseph Rotblat: Visionary for Peace is a compilation of tributes to the late Joseph Rotblat published by Wiley-vch. It features no less than 45 contributors. The volume is a celebration of one of the truly great activists for nuclear disarmament. It also features as an 84-page appendix eight of his most historic writings. There is also a new photograph of Russell (p. 89). As justly famous as Rotblat is for his eTorts to prevent nuclear war, though, his distinction in this arena tends to eclipse his other impressive achievements, most notably those in nuclear and medical physics. Joseph Rotblat: Visionary for Peace is valuable for the attention it draws to both the more and less famous aspects of his legacy. In the present reviewer’s opinion, the book’s reminiscences have some unnecessary overlap and the editors could perhaps have more strongly encouraged each contributor to further develop instead the distinctivez things they had to say about Rotblat. Somewhat less forgivable, considering the rich details of Rotblat’s life, is the book’s lack of an index. A Polish Jew, Rotblat earned his doctorate in physics from the University of Warsaw. Among the Wrst to conclude in the late 1930s that the huge energy released by Wssion together with neutron multiplication led to the possibility of a chain reaction, Rotblat realized... (shrink)

The 19th Century New England author Thoreau provides an approach to conscience and unjust laws approximating that given by St. Thomas Aquinas in _Summa Theologiae_. But the portrait of conscience given by Thoreau in the 1848 oration “Civil Disobedience” is incomplete. Thoreau’s approach is solved by accepting insights given in Part I and Part I–II of _Summa Theologiae_. Allowing St. Thomas’ insights requires reform of Thoreau’s civil disobedience and conscientious objection. But Thoreau’s arguments are given new life.

Babylon 5, like other great sci-fi franchises, touched on important ethical questions. Two ethical conundrums relating to the series’ main characters included providing life-saving treatment to a c...

Some physicians in the United States have strong moral objections to the recent bans or near total bans on abortion in this country. The objections are particularly vehement among those who have been abortion providers. They are concerned about the impact of the new restrictions on patients—on their lives and health, especially patients who are socially marginalized and will not be able to travel to “friendly” states to have abortions (i.e., states that legally permit abortions). They are also worried about (...) the status of women, which they fear will be unequal to that of men in a society where women are not permitted to make such intimate decisions about their lives. For these physicians, not to mention their patients, the bans on abortion are morally devastating. They, the physicians, might even feel compelled by their conscience to provide this care—to engage in what some call the “conscientious provision” of care—even though they could lose their careers and their freedom by doing so. There is currently no legal protection for the conscientious provision of abortion care in the U.S., although there is substantial protection for the conscientious refusal of that care. Physicians working in jurisdictions that have abortion bans put themselves at serious legal risk if they defy these bans for reasons of conscience. In general, their freedom of conscience is very low compared to that of physicians who conscientiously refuse to provide abortions in jurisdictions where abortions are still legal. Using theories of conscience and conscientious objection that I develop in Conscience in Reproductive Health Care (Oxford 2020), I argue that this situation is morally untenable. (shrink)

There is no question that Fichte's theory of conscience is central to his system of ethics. Yet his descriptions of its role in practical deliberation appear inconsistent, if not contradictory. Many scholars have claimed that for Fichte conscience plays a material role by providing the content of our moral obligations—the Material Function View. Some have denied this, however, claiming that conscience only plays a formal role by testing our moral convictions in any given case—the Formal Function View. (...) My aim in this paper is to offer a new contribution to this debate. I begin by supplying further evidence in support of the view that conscience only plays a formal function in Fichte's ethics. Then I call attention to a deeper problem this view faces, namely, that it invites an infinite regress by making one's conviction a matter of higher-order reflection. The key to overcoming this threat, I argue, lies in Fichte's doctrine of feeling, whereby the criterion of one's conviction lies, not in a cognitive state, but in an affective state. In closing, I discuss the relevance of Fichte's theory for current debates over the nature of moral error and moral deference. (shrink)

In establishing a new Conscience and Religious Freedom Division within the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Health and Human Services and issuing new proposed regulations, the Trump administration has significantly expanded the power of health care providers over the medical choices of patients and has privileged the moral agency of health care providers over that of individual patients. When finalized, these regulations will replace those promulgated during the Obama administration, just as those regulations replaced those promulgated (...) in 2008 by the Bush administration. The 2018 proposed regulations interpret the federal conscience statutes more broadly than either of these predecessors. Among the many significant provisions in the proposed rules are definitional terms that reach a broader range of individuals and activities, the absence of balancing interests, and a powerful enforcement structure. (shrink)

The transition away from the highly intolerant and persecutory regimes of late-medieval and early-modern Europe was facilitated by four important developments. First, Europeans learned that social order and cohesion are threatened less by diversity than by intolerance of it. Second, the traditionally paternalist vision of the state’s role was called into question by a new valuation of the individual conscience and consequently of individual liberties. Third, the assumption that the meaning of symbols is objectively determined was replaced by the (...) recognition that symbols are intersubjectively determined by convention. Fourth, Europeans began to distinguish two senses of publicity: visibility and representativeness. The tenacious hold of these four assumptions is illustrated by laws of laïcité, which harken back to the medieval mindset on all four counts. (shrink)

Why conscience matters is a landmark in the literature on conscientious objection in healthcare. In it, Xavier Symons, bioethicist and postdoctoral research fellow at Harvard University, makes the...

In January 2018, the Trump administration established the Conscience and Religious Freedom Division within the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Civil Rights with the explicit goal of intensifying legal protection of religious and conscience objections in health care. The establishment of OCR’s new division illustrates the significant powers of administrative agencies to mold the substance of law without seeking legislative action. The mere formation of a division dedicated to protecting conscience rights is already having (...) a significant impact; it is causing health care entities, including hospitals, research organizations, and clinics, to change policies and practices to comply with the declared enforcement strategy. Administrative agencies also shape the law in what they decide not to pursue. For example, OCR has suspended enforcement of the Affordable Care Act prohibition against gender‐identity discrimination. (shrink)

Novel assisted reproductive technologies (ART) are poised to present our society with strange new ethical questions, such as whether lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) couples should be allowed to produce children biologically related to both parents, or whether trans‐women who want to experience childbirth should be allowed to receive uterine transplants. Clinicians opposed to offering such technologies to LGBT couples on moral grounds are likely to seek legal shelter through the conscience clauses enshrined in U.S. law. This paper (...) begins by briefly discussing some novel ART on the horizon and noting that it is unclear whether current conscience clauses will permit fertility clinics to deny such services to LGBT individuals. A compromise approach to conscience is any view that sees the value of respecting conscience claims within limits. I describe and critique the constraints proposed in the recent work of Wicclair, NeJaime and Siegel as ultimately begging the question. My purpose is to strengthen their arguments by suggesting that in the controversial situations that elicit claims of conscience, bioethicists should engage with the metaphysical claims in play. I argue that conscience claims against LGBT individuals ought to be constrained because the underlying metaphysic—that God has decreed the LGBT lifestyle to be sinful—is highly implausible from the perspective of a naturalized metaphysic, which ought to be the lens through which we evaluate conscience claims. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.1 (2001) 21-37 [Access article in PDF] Conscience and the Concealments of Metaphor in Hobbes's Leviathan Karen S. Feldman Introduction Conscience is not a topic of terribly heated debate in Hobbes research. 1 Nevertheless, my claim in this article is that conscience in the Leviathan, which Hobbes poses as an example of the dangers of metaphor, is not merely an example of the (...) dangers of metaphor, but rather is the most dangerous metaphor, the metaphor that corrupts knowledge and thereby makes error and deception possible. Hobbes's brief account of conscience, which appears in the chapter of Leviathan on the ends of discourse, tells the story of the insinuation of metaphor into proper nomenclature; however, his example of the metaphorical use of the word conscience turns the story into one in which public knowledge itself is made private and thereby corrupted. Moreover, according to the story, private conscience is itself invented by means of a metaphor; it is in effect metaphorized into being. 2 With the emergence of private conscience, the potential of privatization expands from the privatization of the meaning of words to an entire private sphere of opinion. The metaphorical corruption of conscience invents a new understanding of knowledge as isolated from other witnesses, and the resultant privatization of truth lends itself to the corruption of that truth. Thus, whereas Hobbes characterizes the wrong use of names (of which metaphor is an instance) as a threat to accurate judgment and reason (L 22-23, 34, 161-62), as I will argue in the sections following, Hobbes's demand for the preservation of proper meaning in Leviathan corresponds to an anxiety regarding privacy and its peculiar potential for corrupting truth and knowledge. Hobbes's worries as to the dangers that metaphor poses to the stability of the commonwealth thereby converge with his worries about the dangers of conscience to the principle of public authority (cf. Strong 1993). [End Page 21] Hobbes's condemnations of conscience In Leviathan, conscience is condemned as a source of principles of human decision and action in a commonwealth. The problem with conscience as a principle of action is that it renders each individual inventor of his own rules and judge of his own actions. In brief, individual conscience is incommensurable with the public authority that defines a commonwealth: Another doctrine repugnant to civil society, is, that whatsoever a man does against his conscience, is sin; and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself judge of good and evil. For a man's conscience, and his judgment is the same thing, and as the judgment, so also the conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is subject to no civil law, sinneth in all he does against his conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a commonwealth; because the law is the public conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private consciences, which are but private opinions, the commonwealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the sovereign power, further than it shall seem good in his own eyes. (L 311) In this account, conscience is not just inferior to civil law as a principle guiding action, but at odds with civil society and the good of the commonwealth. The fact that conscience is private renders it problematic for the commonwealth for several reasons: First, as privately invented, it may be erroneous. Likewise, because it is private, conscience does not possess any binding power outside the individual, private sphere. Each person may be bound by his own conscience, but insofar as consciences differ, standards of action differ, and this leads to the undermining and distraction of the commonwealth. Likewise, private consciences may be divergent from one another, and the conflicts in private judgment produce conflicting actions that disturb the peace of the commonwealth. This rule of privacy is, moreover, associated with primitive life and with the state of nature... (shrink)

ABSTRACT The article examines Old English claims to catholic ‘liberty of conscience’ and the way in which this engendered a discussion of English liberties in Ireland. Old English representatives sought to ground their claims to ‘liberty of conscience’ in established practice, custom and law. Their claims to ‘liberty of conscience’ also brought into play the vocabulary of corporate and parliamentary liberty. In response, New English protestants turned to ideas of duty and citizenship, which were equally embedded in (...) conceptions of English liberties. They argued that a catholic ‘conscience’ sat in opposition to ideas of duty to the king and the commonwealth. In doing so, the New English questioned both the basis and extent of the liberties possessed by the Old English. Such an exchange, this article argues, is illustrative of the way in which an English pairing of liberties, with ideas of duty and active citizenship, opened up an area of dispute involving a shared set of political concepts and vocabulary. (shrink)

This book explores from selected semioticians' international and cross-cultural viewpoints, the changing concepts of custom and community. The idea of the 'primitive' as a complex social system is explored in the context of recent studies of comparative law. The range of focus is from Lockean majority-rule to aboriginal self-determination, and includes a new look at waning ideologies such as the «old» feminism, Critical Legal Studies, and postmodernisms. Pragmatism is reinterpreted and reviewed with fresh eyes.

The vigorous legal and ethical debates over conscientious objection have taken place largely within the domain of health care. Is this because conscience in medicine is of a special kind, or are th...

The path to consensus about physicians’ exercise of conscience was not linear. It looped back on itself as new insights illuminated earlier deliberations and in turn led to further insights. In particular, coming to agreement about physicians’ responsibility in regard to referral charted a route through many course corrections.

The following is the text of an address delivered by Professor George at the twentieth anniversary conference of the Society of Catholic Social Scientists in New York, October 2012. George identifies the intellectual roots of recent threats to conscience rights—especially for people of faith—in the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology’s 2008 report that, he argues, makes ideological claims rather than using scientific evidence to support the denial of conscience rights to medical professionals in the areas of birth (...) control and abortion. (shrink)

Kant’s concept of conscience has been largely neglected by scholars and contemporary moral philosophers alike, as has his concept of “indirect” duty. Admittedly, neither of them is foundational within his ethical theory, but a correct account of both in their own right and in combination can shed some new light on Kant’s moral philosophy as a whole. In this paper, I first examine a key passage in which Kant systematically discusses the role of conscience, then give a systematic (...) account of “indirect” duties and the function of hypothetical imperatives in the course of their generation. I then turn to the possibility of moral error and the part “indirect” duty can play in its prevention. In conclusion, I try to show how clarifying the concept of “indirect” duty can help us to shed light on the nature of Kantian ethics as a whole. (shrink)

In a seventeenth-century English landscape populated with towering political and philosophical figures like Hobbes, Harrington, Cromwell, Milton, and Locke, William Penn remains in many ways a man apart. Yet despite being widely neglected by scholars, he was a sophisticated political thinker who contributed mightily to the theory and practice of religious liberty in the early modern Atlantic world. In this long-awaited intellectual biography of William Penn, Andrew R. Murphy presents a nuanced portrait of this remarkable entrepreneur, philosopher, Quaker, and politician.Liberty, (...) Conscience, and Toleration focuses on the major political episodes that attracted William Penn's sustained attention as a political thinker and actor: the controversy over the Second Conventicle Act, the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis, the founding and settlement of Pennsylvania, and the contentious reign of James II. Through a careful examination of writings published in the midst of the religious and political conflicts of Restoration and Revolutionary England, Murphy contextualizes the development of Penn's thought in England and America, illuminating the mutual interconnections between Penn's political thought and his colonizing venture in America. An early advocate of representative institutions and religious freedom, William Penn remains a singular figure in the history of liberty of conscience. His political theorizing provides a window into the increasingly vocal, organized, and philosophically sophisticated tolerationist movement that gained strength over the second half of the seventeenth century. Not only did Penn attempt to articulate principles of religious liberty as a Quaker in England, but he actually governed an American polity and experienced firsthand the complex relationship between political theory and political practice. Murphy's insightful analysis shows Penn's ongoing significance to the broader study of Anglo-American political theory and practice, ultimately pointing scholars toward a new way of understanding the enterprise of political theory itself. (shrink)

The text which follows was put together from answers given to questions at meetings held by PD Ouspensky in London and New York between 1935 and 1944. ...

When evaluating religious accommodation claims, courts refrain from examining the relationship between the specific claim and the common religious practice of the relevant religion. This paper rethinks this doctrine. I argue that it stems from understanding religious accommodation as a protection of conscience. This idea itself suffers from conceptual and practical challenges, which can be mitigated if we understand religion as a communal function of conscientious actions. The communal aspect bears practical and moral significance, and I explore three dimensions (...) of it: the epistemic implications; its effect on constituting moral obligations toward others; and its importance as part of one’s culture. A communal-conscientious approach to religion can mitigate many challenges that confront conscience accommodation. This suggests that the relationship between the individual’s claim and their communal practice is crucial and should be evaluated by courts. I conclude by outlining the main considerations for creating a new, nuanced doctrine. (shrink)

The issue of conscience and authority has long been on the agenda of moral philosophy. In particular, the views of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes came to the fore when there was freedom of religion and conscience. Their views continue to influence the moral philosophers of today's world. In terms of organizing and maintaining individual and social relationships, different perspectives from past to present have been made possible by taking into account the common life practices. In today's world, (...) the social configurations that have changed compared to the past and the problems arising from the encounter of different ethnic and social groups have caused re-emergence of solidarity in a common theme. The concept of cultural relativism, which is one of these common themes, refers to the evaluation of exposed judgments within the internal dynamics of culture. On the other hand, shaping of universal human rights and social solidarity on an intercultural ground makes the existence of an additional theme inevitable in terms of harmony and sustainability: conscience. Conscience is related to the commonization of the common living commitments and being in solidarity in sustaining social relations. Predicating the relations to be formed on the basis of conscience upon an essentialist foundation does not run parallel to the continuous reshaping of solidarity in practical life. In the absence of essentialist truths, and outside the original ethnic relativity, a new and sustainable togetherness starts to be shaped within these practices. Therefore, one of the themes that will spring to mind will be the values education. There are studies that include the answers given to the questions that come to mind about the theoretical possibilities of this and the determination and interpretation of the values already positioned in the practical structures. (shrink)

Aaron Ridley explores Nietzsche's mature ethical thought as expressed in his masterpiece On the Genealogy of Morals. Taking seriously the use that Nietzsche makes of human types, Ridley arranges his book thematically around the six characters who loom largest in that work—the slave, the priest, the philosopher, the artist, the scientist, and the noble. By elucidating what the Genealogy says about these figures, he achieves a persuasive new assessment of Nietzsche's ethics. Ridley's intellectually supple interpretation reveals Nietzsche's ethical position to (...) be deeper and more interesting than is often supposed: the relation, for instance, between Nietzsche's ideal of the noble and the ascetic or priestly conscience does not emerge as a stark opposition but as a rich interplay between the tensions inherent in each. Equally, he shows that certain under-appreciated confusions in Nietzsche's thought reveal much about the positive aspects of the philosopher's moral vision. The only book devoted entirely to the Genealogy, Nietzsche's Conscience offers a sympathetic but tough-minded critical reading of the philosopher's most important work. Delivered in clear and vigorous language and employing a broadly analytical approach, Ridley's commentary makes Nietzsche's reflections on morality more accessible than they have been hitherto. (shrink)

This is a concise, fluently presented examination of the relation between William Penn's religious convictions and his political behavior, from his years as an active young convert to the Quaker cause to his later years as governor of Pennsylvania. Although not a full biographical treatment of William Penn, the study presents new insights into Penn's life because it is based on many ignored but important pamphlets that Penn wrote. The young William Penn took a leading role in the Quaker fight (...) for the right of free assembly, the right of free speech, and freedom of conscience. However, when faced with governing a booming colony, these very principles and convictions had to be modified in order to maintain his and the Friends' control of Pennsylvania. Originally published in 1967. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

In a wide-ranging inquiry Richard W. Miller provides new resources for coping with the most troubling types of moral conflict: disagreements in moral conviction, conflicting interests, and the tension between conscience and desires. Drawing on most fields in philosophy and the social sciences, including his previous work in the philosophy of science, he presents an account of our access to moral truth, and, within this framework, develops a theory of justice and an assessment of the role of morality in (...) rational choice. In Miller's view, we are often in a position to claim that our moral judgments are true descriptions of moral facts. But others, relying on contrary ways of moral learning, would reject truths that we are in a position to assert, in dissent that does not depend on irrationality or ignorance of relevant evidence or arguments. With this mixed verdict on "moral realism," Miller challenges many received views of rationality, scientific method, and the relation between moral belief and moral choice. In his discussion of justice, Miller defends the adequacy, for modern political choices, of a widely shared demand that institutions be freely and rationally acceptable to all. Drawing on social research and economic theories, he argues that this demand has dramatically egalitarian consequences, even though it is a premise of liberals and conservatives alike. In the final chapters, Miller investigates the role and limits of morality in the choice of conduct, arguing for new perspectives on reason and impartiality. Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Legal assessment of the provisions of the Federal Law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations", which contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation and generally accepted norms of international law.

As the other entries in this section have surely made clear, Carolyn McLeod's outstanding monograph, Conscience in Reproductive Health Care: Prioritizing Patient Interests, is fertile ground for fruitful philosophical analyses of issues pertaining to conscience, trust, autonomy, and more, all of which are sure to be of great interest and benefit to scholars in areas such as bioethics, health policy, and feminist ethics. Conscience in Reproductive Health Care provides a compelling response to a timely bioethical dilemma: What (...) do we do when healthcare providers refuse certain health services to patients on grounds of conscience? McLeod contends that healthcare providers, in light of their fiduciary... (shrink)

Doctors often refuse patients' REQUESTS, even when patients request interventions that are legal and permitted by the medical profession. This is a fact about the practice of medicine so familiar that it is easy to overlook.Doctors' refusals are neither new nor infrequent, and only a small minority occasion any controversy. Surgeons refuse to operate when they believe a surgery is unlikely to succeed. Physicians refuse medications when they believe the medications are unlikely to be helpful. Clinicians refuse requested interventions because (...) of concerns about safety or efficacy, and they refuse because of less tangible concerns that are no less real. Some pediatricians refuse to supplement the growth hormone of boys... (shrink)

The tension between public duty and private conscience is a central theme of English history in the seventeenth century, when established authorities were questioned and violently disrupted. It has also been an important theme in the work of one of the foremost historians of the period, G.E. Aylmer. It makes, therefore, an especially appropriate subject for this volume. The contributors are leading historians, whose topics range from contemporary writings on conscience and duty to the particular problems faced by (...) individuals and groups, both Puritan and Royalist, at the center and in the localities. These scholarly and original studies throw new light on the innumberable dilemmas of conscience of seventeenth-century men and women, and together make a distinguished contribution to seventeenth-century history. (shrink)

This book provides a new interpretation of the ethical theory of G.W.F. Hegel.

Few thinkers exerted a greater influence upon British thought and public policy between 1880 and 1914 than T. H. Green. In his appraisal Richter applies to Green, usually studied as a philosopher, the techniques of analysis taken from sociology and the history of ideas. The result is important both as a study of a man who considerably affected the thought of his time and also as a contribution to the social and intellectual history of Victorian England. The chapter headings include: (...) Idealism and the Crisis of the Evangelical Conscience; Metaphysical Foundations; the Principles of Political Obligation; From the Old Liberalism to the New: Private Property, Capitalism and State Intervention; and the Life of Citizenship. (shrink)

Kaplan simulates the response to a long visit to the new Holocaust museum in Washington, D.C., which, crucially for Kaplan, is sited in direct view of the Jefferson and Lincoln monuments, powerful symbols of humanist democracy.

The contribution describes the legal phenomenon as a playing field characterized by a progressive regression of the law, understood as a sovereign will from top to bottom, both in the vision of formalist legal positivisms in continental Europe and in realist terms, in the United States. Soft law represents the main strategy to subordinate the law to the interests of the economy, elasticizing environmental law, making it favorable to the market, reducing ecology to the simplistic metric of CO2 emissions. The (...) consequence is a retreat of the statist vertical normativity of law which is not replaced by a de facto power granted to those who control the technology, built by design to close spaces for pluralism and democratic action, in the interest of surveillance and concentrated power in private and government oligopolies. The author concludes by advocating the urgency for genuinely innovative categories, particularly in the legal education, such as the commons, capable of including sustainability into a “new ecological jurisprudence committed to inclusion and solidarity rather than exclusion and struggle”. (shrink)

The figure of the sovereign individual has stood for about two decades at the center of an exegetical debate concerning its identity and ideality. What is often lost sight of in these debates is the role of the sovereign individual in Nietzsche’s genealogy of guilt and bad conscience in the Genealogy’s second essay. I argue for the following claims. First, that the figure of the sovereign individual is not a singular occurrence in Nietzsche’s published writings but is present in (...) sections from Daybreak and The Gay Science that have not been pursued in this context in the Anglophone literature; sections that shed new light on the sovereign individual. Second, that examination of these texts reveals that the sovereign individual is for Nietzsche embodied by Socrates and the Socratic individual. Third, and most importantly, that with the sovereign individual there emerges individualized conscience – the capacity for self-laceration that concerns one’s misdeeds alone and involves the belief that one’s misdeeds are entirely one’s own individual fault, rather than the fault of the community or the gods. A fourth, rather negative consequence, is that at the end of the day Nietzsche, in the Genealogy, does not manage to provide us with a genealogy of moral guilt. (shrink)

Volume 25, Issue 3, September 2019, Page 286-289.

At no time in the past century have there been fiercer battles over our public schools than there are now. Parents and educational reformers are challenging not only the mission, content, and structure of mass compulsory schooling but also its underlying premise—that the values promoted through public education are neutral and therefore acceptable to any reasonable person. In this important book, Rosemary Salomone sets aside the ideological and inflammatory rhetoric that surrounds today’s debates over educational values and family choice. She (...) offers instead a fair-minded examination of education for democratic citizenship in a society that values freedom of conscience and religious pluralism. And she proposes a balanced course of action that redefines but does not sever the relationship between education and the state. Salomone demonstrates how contemporary conflicts are the product of past educational and social movements. She lays bare some of the myths that support the current government monopoly over education and reveals how it privileges those of economic means. Through a detailed case study of recent controversy in a suburban New York school district, the author explores the legal and policy issues that arise when widely disparate world views stand in the way of political compromise on educational materials, techniques, and programs. Salomone builds a case for educational governance that places the developmental needs of the child at the center of family autonomy. She advances a plan that respects diverse values and visions of schooling while preserving the core commitments that bind our nation. (shrink)