According to the ideological surround model of research, a more “objective” psychology of religion requires efforts to bring etic social scientific and emic religious perspectives into formal dialog. This study of 245 Iranian university students illustrated how the dialogical validity of widely used etic measures of religion can be assessed by examining an emic religious perspective on psychology. Integrative Self-Knowledge and Self-Control Scales recorded two aspects of the “Perfect Man” as described by the Iranian Muslim philosopher Mortazā Motahharī. Use (...) of these instruments in correlation and multiple regression procedures identified Intrinsic, Extrinsic Personal, Religious Interpretation, Extrovertive Mysticism, Prayer Fulfillment, Universality, Connectedness, and Religiosity Scales as adaptive in their implications for a Muslim psychology of religion. Religious Crisis had maladaptive and Extrinsic Social, Introvertive Mysticism, and Quest Scales had ambiguous implications. These data illustrated how etic forms of understanding can clarify and can be clarified by emic insights. (shrink)

Fluctuating asymmetry (FA) is small deviations from perfect symmetry in normally bilaterally symmetrical traits. We examined the relationship between FA of five body traits (ear height, length of three digits, and ankle circumference) and self-reported scores of physical and verbal aggression in a sample of 90 boys aged 10 to 15 years. The relationships between FA and scores of aggression (particularly physical aggression) were found to be negative; in other words, the most symmetrical boys showed highest aggression. One trait (...) (ankle circumference) showed the characteristics of “ideal” FA—parametric mean of zero and a normal distribution. Mean asymmetries calculated from six repeated measures of ankle FA in 30 subjects taken over a period of five months showed strong negative associations with scores of physical aggression which were independent of age, height, and weight.It is argued that soft tissue “cyclical” FA (as opposed to “fixed” bony FA) is dependent on the secretion of hormones: for example, cortisol. Causal associations between behavioral traits such as aggresion and hormones will lead to similar correlations between FA and behavior. (shrink)

A reviewer of the original edition in 1970 of "The Perfectibility of Man" well summarizes the scope and significance of this renowned work by one of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century: "Beginning with an analytic discussion of the various ways in which perfectibility has been interpreted, Professor Passmore traces its long history from the Greeks to the present day, by way of Christianity, orthodox and heterodox, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, anarchism, utopias, communism, psychoanalysis, and evolutionary theories of man (...) and society. Both in its broad sweep and in countless supporting reflections, it is a journey through spiritual scenery of the most majestic and exhilarating kind." Thoroughly and elegantly, Passmore explores the history of the idea of perfectibility--manifest in the ideology of perfectibilism--and its consequences, which have invariably been catastrophic for individual liberty and responsibility in private, social, economic, and political life.John Passmore served for many years as a Professor of Philosophy at Australian National University. (shrink)

The study began with an introduction to Philosophy of Man. This Philosophical-Christological approach started with sense of self-awareness on this seemingly vain technological modern world. In the history of philosophy, there were three objects of study evolving by themselves, world, man and God in orderly fashion and repeating in interval phases. Self-experience shows three objects: first, existential unity (past), second, experiential unity (present) and third, transcendental unity (future). Western Philosophy banked on Aristotle’s notion of man as rational animal that led (...) to Dualism turned into Monism and finally into Pluralism making it harder to capsulate man’s unity. Thus, the universal question “what is man?” including his end remains unanswered. The problem with Western-Aristotelian Thought was its dependence on rationality as ultimate and highest faculty of man. The Greeks believed in immortality of soul but contradicted reality that human mind has no power over death (mortality). Faith transcends mortal-natural state of man however not in proud and arrogant manner but in utter surrender and subjection (Paschal). Faith turns truth from objective to personal. God’s and man’s identity was both revealed. Man as God’s image becomes definite in the revelation about Christ, the Son of God - the Perfect Man Eph. 4.13. KEYWORDS: Philosophy, Christ, Perfect Man, Philosophical-Christological approach,Christian anthropology, Qualitative Research Design, Philippines. (shrink)

This paper examines the coherence of Spinoza’s combined account of freedom, reason, and the affects and its applicability to real humans in the context of the perfectly free man Spinoza discusses towards the end of part 4 of the Ethics. On the standard reading, the perfectly free man forms the model of human nature and thus the goal to which real humans should aspire. A recently proposed non-standard reading, however, posits that the perfectly free man should not be considered the (...) model of human nature. Consolidating FRA into a system of ten theses and outlining their intricate interconnections, I argue that under both the standard and non-standard readings of Spinoza’s perfectly free man, FRA founders when applied to real humans. While it is no big news that FRA may face deep problems when applied to real humans, the paper is innovative: in the specific tensions in FRA it exposes; in the strategy deployed to expose the latter; and in showing that a recent non-standard approach to resolving these tensions is unsuccessful. Depending on the specific reading of FRA that I suggest, my critical conclusions may not apply to every reading of FRA. They nonetheless pose a serious challenge to similar readings prominent within the literature. (shrink)

This work is primarily a study in the history of ideas, but the author also incidentally presents some interesting views in normative ethics. Various meanings of perfectibility are distinguished: the author carefully differentiates, for example, between theories that man can reach a final state of perfection and theories that mankind can progress indefinitely. The history begins with Greek conceptions of human perfectibility; Hellenistic theories receive a separate chapter. Both orthodox and heretical--chiefly Pelagian-- Christian views are summarized. The Christian mystical tradition (...) and Protestant theories also receive separate attention. Modern theories that seek human perfection from government, education, or scientific progress are reviewed. Two very interesting chapters treat theories of natural progress from Joachim of Flora to Marx and from Darwin to Teilhard. Theories that reject perfectibility are reviewed briefly. Passmore completes his study with his own critical appraisal, in which he is particularly severe with contemporary ideas that man can be perfected by drugs or by revolution. The scholarship gathered together in this work is vast and the author's work of synthesis is most helpful. Passmore's own disposition is toward a tolerant scepticism in regard to all the theories of perfectibility that he reviews. His position might be summed up with the adage that the best is the enemy of the good, or perfection is the enemy of humanism. Many particular criticisms and many comparisons of views drawn from disparate historical contexts contain valuable insights, which will be useful to readers who disagree with the author's general position. Scholars will find all the references they need to check out the author's interpretations of various positions. Understandably, many will find particular interpretations inadequate, for the work covers a vast range of positions which it would be difficult for any one person to enter into perfectly.--G. G. G. (shrink)

Godwin's controversial claim for earthly immortality in the first edition of Political Justice has been largely dismissed by scholars as a flaw in his philosophy or as absurd speculation which Godwin cannily omitted from the later editions of the text. In this paper, I will demonstrate, not only that such claims were not nearly as idiosyncratic or eccentric as they have been presented, but that they constitute an intrinsic part of his overall philosophy regarding perfectibility and human progress. Moreover, by (...) examining the revisions made to Political Justice in the second and third editions, it will be possible to prove that the essence of his argument regarding material immortality was not as radically altered as is widely accepted. I will further show how the population controversy of the 18th century forced Godwin to apply his perfectibilist theory to contemporary demographic challenges and how he defended his concept of immortality from both the principle of population and, more particularly, Malthusian philosophy. (shrink)

What is health? What is it to be healthy? Our first answer must inevitably be the answer of St. Augustine, when confronted with the theoretical problem of time: “If no one asks me, I know the answer; if I want to explain it to the one who asks me, I do not know it.” In both cases the first sensation of one who aspires to theorizing is that of perplexity. I think, therefore, that this initial perplexity has its source in (...) two principal reasons, capable of reduction to these two assertions: first, the idea of health has a complex structure, and, second, the idea of health has a variable structure. Without a thorough study of this complexity and this variability, the construction of the medical anthropology that our historical level requires would not be possible. We will try to point out the fundamental lines of both. (shrink)

It is obvious that the use of these various terms does not result in a miscellany of ideas such as it occurs in many New Age theories. In perennialists’ writings we have come to realize that this is not an attempt to mix traditions together, but is instead an attempt to utilize existing terminology when it is appropriate. The paper has focused at studying the anthropology of perfection in perennial philosophy. It has addressed issues such as the nature of ‘self (...) and the states of self-realization’, selfessness and selfi shness’, ‘the categories of man’, ‘the process of exaltation’, ‘attributes’, ‘qualities’, ‘rights and obligations of the superior man in traditional worldview. In various places of the paper we have resorted to artworks belonging to various traditions and different times to communicate the ideas and worldviews. They show how essential the role of artists and the art they produce is in keeping alive the reverence for perfection and continuity of tradition through their inspired imagination. The superior qualities are not necessarily those of rulers and conquerors. They are rather to be found in mythical heroes, prophets of God and sages of various traditions; those who, in Ghazali’s words, “possess inner vision”. Such individuals hold attributes of perfection; their bodies die, yet their characters live beyond time and space inspiring generations after generations. After all, to be a superior being means starting a never-ending journey of becoming. (shrink)

Volume 24, Issue 3, June 2019, Page 3-18.

It is for Hume’s sympathetic attention to the complexity of human nature, and for his trying to do justice to it at the deepest levels of philosophical refl ection, that we should honour his memory.

A printed record of the symposium held in 1971 that was sponsored by the University of California's medical campus in San Francisco and the City and County of San Francisco to examine man's destiny and moral development.

THIS paper consists essentially of three parts. The first part argues the case for construing Nietzsche's remarks about Übermenschlichkeit as endorsing some specific set of character traits, of "virtues" if you like. To be an Übermensch, on this reading, is to possess or exhibit certain traits of character, traits which in the typical case are associated with notions of self-overcoming, sublimation, creativity, and self-perfection. An Übermensch, construed in this way, expresses Nietzsche's vision of the human ideal, of what human beings (...) should or might be like. In this sense Nietzsche merely continues the ancient project of articulating the human ideal, the conception of human perfectibility. Although Nietzsche's answer may appear to be shockingly different, the project of articulating a human ideal is scarcely radical. The project qua project is no different than that of Plato or Aristotle, the Stoics, Spinoza or Kant. For Plato, the philosopher-king represents the ideal of human self-perfection; for Aristotle megalopsychic man conjoined with the life of contemplation; for the Stoics apatheia and right reason; for Spinoza the intellectual amor dei was a necessary and perhaps a sufficient condition for human liberation; for Kant, the genuinely moral person qualifies as the human ideal, the person whose actions are always and only governed by the categorical imperative, although Kant would probably have called such a will a "holy" will rather than a human one. (shrink)

In terms of the Science of Theological Statement [Kalam] Abd Allah Baydawi concisely outlines perceived Islamic reality - in its modes of the naturally Possible, the apodictically Divine, and the humanly heroic Prophetic - as the process of perfecting man's spiritual structure.

This scholarly and perceptive account makes Hindu beliefs and practices intelligible by showing how the contradictions which have puzzled Westerners are rooted in human diversity. The author's thesis is that Hinduism is best understood neither as a philosophy nor as a religion but as a way of life. It is a process and a becoming, a continual progress toward moksa. It is each man's quest for the realization of his individual potentialities, never achieved because man's potential is infinite and because (...) it is his nature to become rather than to be. His aim is fourfold: to grasp Satcitänanda which is both Reality and himself; to become spiritualized, that is, to come to consider the human body, physical life, and rational faculties solely as instruments of the quest; to integrate all activities, thoughts, and feelings by understanding them as ways of being human, and hence as aspects of the quest; and finally to become free both from finitude and for fulfillment. There are four märgas or paths to these goals: thought, action, devotion, and discipline. There is no conflict among, or within, the märgas as, for example, between the yoga of ascetic contemplation and the Tantric yoga of erotic ecstasy. All are merely different paths to the same goal, suitable for different men or the same man at different times. There is an extensive bibliography.--L. G. (shrink)

This article examines the concept of the perfect, a key idea in Lev P. Karsavin’s metaphysics that largely determines his understanding of personhood and its ontological status. The associated concept of the perfect person develops throughout the entire philosophical period of the thinker’s work, from his Philosophy of History to his treatise “On Perfection,” written in the last year of his life in the Abez’ camps. In this article, I argue that the concept of perfection is the main (...) structural element in Karsavin’s religious–philosophical system, making it ontologically full and complete. I believe the Christian idea of the perfection of man in God, philosophical variations of which Karsavin finds in Nicholas of Cusa’s system of total unity and Vladimir Solovyov’s idea of Godmanhood, is both the initial intellectual intuition and the ontological premise of the thinker’s metaphysical constructions. His religious–philosophical work has a continuity with Russian culture’s spiritual tradition, where patristic thought of man considers the ideal to be the spiritual transcendence of the person in his striving toward the Perfect God. This evangelic idea turns out to be the central binding element both of Karsavin’s Christian personology and of his metaphysics of history, which is resolved in a metaphysical vein. (shrink)

A God would have the wisdom, power and concern to do all that must be done to supplement man's activities in such a way that only good is done, and this everywhere. If we could count on his existence, concern and aid, we could be sure of getting the right help and to the right degree. Only a God is both powerful and wise enough to provide all the help that would be needed, and only a God is good and (...) wise enough to give it always at the right time and in the right way. He alone can guarantee the perfect production of whatever was distorted and left undone because of man's impotence, ignorance and folly. It is tempting therefore to claim that men always do, or that they always should look to a God for the aid they need if good is to be fully realized. (shrink)

"Seymon Lyudvigovich Frank, the author of the volume here made available for the first time in English translation, was one of the leading Russian philosophers of this century; some authorities consider him the most outstanding Russian philosopher of any age...._ " _Man's Soul__ is a book which perfectly exemplifies the generous conception of the mission and competence of philosophy characteristic of Frank and the other members of the Russian metaphysical movement. Frank's stated aim in the treatise is to reclaim for (...) philosophy a field of investigation which, from the time of Plato and Aristotle to that of the Russian Idealists, philosophers had viewed as properly theirs, but which, since the mid-nineteenth century, they had allowed to fall into almost complete neglect: the study of the nature of the human soul...._ "The moral message of _Man's Soul__ is well summed up by its epigraph, quoted from St. Augustine: 'Let man first of all return to his own self, so that once he has, as it were, stepped therein, he may rise from thence and be elevated to God.'" -- from the foreword by Philip J. Swoboda. (shrink)

Our current moral relativism has blurred the distinction between true and false and even between right and wrong by accepting multiple truths and subjective truths as valid evaluations of reality. Serban documents that man, in the process of pursuing his goals, tends to manipulate others. Adapting through deception, particularly in crisis, is part of our animal heritage. Our thought processes, protective of our emotions and self-image, are perfectly adapted for the task of lying.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Human Perfection in Byzantine Theology: Attaining the Fullness of Christ by Alexis TorranceJoshua H. LimHuman Perfection in Byzantine Theology: Attaining the Fullness of Christ by Alexis Torrance, Changing Paradigms in Historical and Systematic Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), ix + 239 pp.As a part of the series Changing Paradigms in Historical and Systematic Theology, Alexis Torrance's Human Perfection in Byzantine Theology examines the role of Christ's human (...) perfection within key figures in the Byzantine tradition against the backdrop of trends in contemporary Orthodox theology. Torrance seeks to uncover a common "Christocentrism" within the Byzantine tradition that challenges the contemporary tendency among contemporary Orthodox theologians to "unmoor" theological anthropology from the doctrine of the humanity of Christ. Indeed, according to Torrance, some of these approaches go so far as to risk the danger of "theological shipwreck" (1). As general representatives of the tendency Torrance has in mind, we can name such figures as John Zizioulas and Vladimir Lossky, whose personalist anthropologies depart from the tradition by "bypassing or deferring Christology" (10) In the case of Zizioulas, for instance, Torrance sees the disintegration of theological anthropology into "a sentimental application or projection of worldly and hazy concepts of personality and 'community' to both the Godhead and the people of God" (10). If, for Torrance, the above thinkers appear to represent a wayward tendency (even if he takes issue with certain of their "starting points," Torrance nevertheless seems to agree with most of their conclusions), it is Fr. John Behr whose theology Torrance likely has in mind as risking "theological shipwreck."As we shall see, the overall intelligibility of Torrance's work appears only in the final chapter, against the backdrop of Behr's "unmistakably Christocentric" (206) anthropology. While Torrance joins Behr in bemoaning the non-Christocentric character of much of modern theological anthropology, nevertheless, he sees Behr's project as positing a Christocentrism that flies in the face of the Byzantine tradition. In light of Behr's Christocentrism (and in a way that is reminiscent of Gaudium et Spes §22), Torrance wishes to [End Page 373] show that, for any genuinely Byzantine doctrine, Christ, in his particular and enduring humanity, must be the starting point of the human ideal: "Human perfection and human destiny are only revealed, known, and bequeathed in the person of Jesus Christ, the God-man" (11). To this end, Torrance proposes a "fresh Christocentric paradigm" (3).Torrance's study provides insight into important texts which both implicitly and explicitly reflect the priorities of the Fathers. Taking the historical and systematic approach of Georges Florovsky's "neo-patristic synthesis" as his cue, Torrance highlights the centrality of Christ's humanity in four key figures. He examines the immovability of the human will in the eschaton in Maximus the Confessor (ch. 2), the particular ("depictable") and enduring humanity of Christ in Theodore the Studite (ch. 3), the attainability of human perfection in Symeon the New Theologian (ch. 4), and the possibility of deification through uncreated grace in Gregory Palamas (ch. 5). In each of these thinkers Torrance discovers a "thoroughly Christocentric gaze" (37), which begins from the concrete and particular human nature of Christ, and thereby provides a contrast with the abstract tendency of certain contemporary Orthodox thinkers. However, as we shall see, on account of the ambiguity surrounding the term "Christocentric," it is not always clear whether or how Christ's humanity and human perfection figure into the themes discussed. More problematically, it is not always clear whether Christ's perfect humanity provides an insight into human perfection or human nature, as such.For the purposes of this review, we will focus on Torrance's chapter on Theodore the Studite. Torrance's treatment of Theodore is distinct from his treatment of other Byzantine figures inasmuch as Theodore's teaching on Christ's depictability is historically situated in an explicitly Christological debate. While the studies on Maximus, Symeon, and Palamas certainly have themes that, in one way or another, advert to Christ's humanity, nevertheless none of particular issues treated can be said to have Christ's humanity as their essential starting point. This is to say that Christ's human perfection... (shrink)

Paul de Man calls for rhetorical reading attentive to the materiality of language and the metaphorical nature of all words and concepts. He insists that tropes are purely cognitive and devoid of any aesthetic function, and describes language as mechanical and non-human. He contests Schiller’s account of aesthetic education, in which the ‘aesthetic state’– enjoyment of beauty or pure aesthetic form – leads man to truth and moral freedom. He links Schiller’s advocacy of pure form with the idea in Kleist’s (...) short story about marionette theatre that human perfection in dance can best be achieved by mechanization and mutilation. Schiller argued that the ideal man is represented by the State; de Man quotes Goebbels on how the statesman is an artist who ‘mechanizes’ the masses and shapes an aesthetic State out of the people, just as artists shape their material. But even though the Nazis aestheticized politics, the essence of fascism remains power rather than language or form. Whether or not the late de Man’s account of the aesthetic is a consequence of his wartime espousal of an implicitly fascist notion of aesthetic totality, the aesthetic is not as inherently dangerous as he describes it. (shrink)

The following article considers K.N. Leont’ev’s religious and philosophical ideas concerning the historico-cultural process, its fateful direction and its eschatological end. The restriction of individual freedom in the domain of cultural history was assumed by Leont’ev due to his interpretation of faith in a personal God, the Owner of the world’s fate. A specific religious and philosophical thesis was made by Leont’ev that the cultural benefits of man are determined by his own choice between the sphere of obedience and the (...) sphere of revolt in regards to his relation to the Absolute. In the 19th century, humanity was inspired by the spirit of egalitarianism, but while attempting to challenge the divine authority, it will sooner or later find out that it was poorly mistaken and experience the restrictions of human nature in the face of the inevitable and catastrophic end of the cosmos. While being based on the hermeneutical teachings of H.-G. Gadamer, who philosophically rehabilitated man’s historicity and his pre-conceptions of cultural temporality, the author asserts that one should pay attention to the religious and philosophical schemes of Leont’ev in the context of the Sacred Tradition of the Church, which determined his thinking. It may be possible that the application of this method will lead to a more perfect understanding of Leont’ev’s religious metaphysics. (shrink)

Not long after the historian, Seeley, had defined ‘perfect liberty’ as ‘the absence of all government’, Oscar Wilde wrote that a man can be totally free even in that granite embodiment of governmental constraint, prison. Ten years after Mill's famous defence of civil freedoms, On Liberty, Richard Wagner declaimed:I'll put up with everything—police, soldiers, muzzling of the press, limits on parliament… Freedom of the spiriti is the only thing for men to be proud of and which raises them above (...) animals. (shrink)

Today it is very important to communicate with people close to each other by interests, ideas, values. Their realization serves the enlightenment of mankind in relation to a multitude of problems that can be solved only if humanity is oriented toward progress towards a new perfection and a return to God. Because the One, all inclusive life is always a self-excelling and poetic Renaissance and perfection of all principles in the Cosmos.

Those attempting to expound a comprehensive normative ethical theory are presumably motivated by the belief that there should be an ultimate reason people can give for their actions and a final response to the question of why we should act morally. Historically, one candidate for this ultimate end or reason is self-realization. To convince us of his theory the self-realizationist must successfully explicate the notion of the self—i.e., he must tell us what man’s distinctive nature or function is—and he must (...) have something to say about the perfecting of this self. (shrink)

In defining man, pre-Qin Confucianists first starts a discussion about the differences between man and beast. This is the Differences between Beast and Man. For the Differences between Beast and Man, pre-Qin Confucianists never analyze the differences between man and other animals from an ontological viewpoint through pure factual elements. Rather, they distinguish between man and beast from a normative viewpoint. The distinction between man and beast leads to a logical conclusion that, as man is fundamentally superior to beast, 'Man (...) is a different species from beast'. Understanding man in this way is common to all pre-Qin Confucianists, although there are some differences. After examining what humane is based on the difference between man and beast, pre-Qin Confucianists discuss the issue of human perfection with a further step. That is a question of the Differences between Sage and Selfhood with respect to how a sage is different from and the same as an ordinary person. Although Confucius states that he cannot set himself up as a sage, Mencius and Xunzi suggest a viewpoint of the Homogeneity of Sage and Selfhood that a sage and an ordinary person (or selfhood) are basically equal. This point is to highlight the universal equality of Sage and Selfhood in which a sage is no different from an ordinary person and any ordinary person can reach the level of a sage through efforts. Thus, pre-Qin Confucianists view man as a being between beast and sage, and, based on that, discuss the issue. In this context, this study intents to analyze the pre-Qin Confucianists' philosophical debate on man based on the viewpoints of the Differences between Beast and Man and the Differences between Sage and Selfhood. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Jesus, Man of Sin: Toward a New Christology in the Global EraSoho MachidaSin as the Common GroundThe blasphemous title of this article is likely to outrage more than a few devout Christians. I am aware that most Christians view Jesus as the most immaculate and beautiful person who ever lived. As a Buddhist scholar and practitioner, however, I cannot extinguish a long-held question from my mind. Was Jesus really (...) free from sin? I do not object to the view of those Christians who see him as the greatest living expression of compassion and courage. But the Christian construction of an untainted, perfect image of Jesus, the Son of God, raises certain problems that I would like to address. Although Jesus, the Anointed, could have had a special mission in the human world, the Son of Man did not appear as the Holy Ghost. He was incarnated in human form: “And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; we have beheld his glory, glory as of the only son from the Father” (John 1:14).It is important to carefully consider the meaning of the Incarnation. The fact that Jesus came to be born with flesh in this world means that he chose to stand on the common ground of sin with us. The sin that I refer to here is the most ontologically fundamental sin that is at the core of human experience. What links us with Jesus is none other than so-called Original Sin.To be sure, as a man who comes from a different religious tradition, I do not make this outrageous claim because I want to dispute the value of the divine personhood of Jesus, or because I am cynical about the most sacred object of Christian faith. I have a deep respect for the greatness of the Christian tradition that has developed around this very unusual person, Jesus Christ.On a personal level too, I do not think of Jesus as a distant figure, as merely the god of another religion. During my boyhood in Japan, I often attended an Episcopal church; and the first academic degree I earned in the United States was in theological studies. In light of all that I have learned from my own personal involvement with Christianity, I still believe that Jesus was a person who suffered like us as a sinful human being.If I were to choose the most important of Jesus’ words from the Bible, I would not hesitate to point to the following passage: “Eloi, Eloi, lema sabachthani? (My God, my God, why have you deserted me?)” (Mark 15:34). It is surprising how few Christian scholars have offered persuasive interpretations of these words, which Jesus is said to have uttered in the final moments of his life. Many Christians would rather not hear such contradictory, despairing words come from the mouth of Jesus. Yet [End Page 81] these words of extreme suffering contain the key message at the core of Christian faith.Though I am also interested in Jesus’ historical background and the political role he played in a tiny corner of the Roman Empire, it is not the purpose of this article to investigate the historicity of Jesus’ life, as many theologians and historians have attempted to do in recent years. I will focus instead on the philosophical implications of Jesus’ life and his physical body, and why I believe it is important to develop a new Christology for the coming global era.The Karmic Body of JesusFirst, why did Jesus have to experience the suffering of crucifixion? The evident answer might be explained this way: because he sacrificed himself to redeem the human race, which has been sinning since the time of Adam and Eve. I would like, however, to suggest a totally different answer: Jesus was crucified to atone for his own sin. He courageously showed the way each of us must take responsibility for our own lives. He deserves our high admiration, but not excessive mystification.I do not mean that Jesus committed any specific sin in his lifetime, but rather that as the Son of Man he too was... (shrink)

I argue that Aristotle’s unmodern conception of politics can only be understood by first understanding his distinctive picture of human agency and the excellence of political wisdom. I therefore undertake to consider three related puzzles: why at the outset of the Nicomachean Ethics [NE] is the human good said to be the same for a city and for an individual, such that the NE’s inquiry is political? why later on in the NE is political wisdom said to be the same (...) state of soul as practical wisdom? why in the Politics does Aristotle identify practical wisdom as the peculiar excellence of rulers when deliberation was said to be the common work of all citizens insofar as they are genuinely citizens? While these puzzles have individually received treatment in the literature, they have seldom been treated together. Taken independently, the passages in question can seem to express a more familiar conception of politics. In particular, each of the sameness claims made in and has too easily been assimilated to a more modern conception of the relation of ethics to politics and thereby domesticated. As I hope to show, in Aristotle is not simply asserting that the human good in a city supervenes on the good as achieved by its inhabitants ; and in he is not claiming only that political wisdom is a species of practical wisdom, but is rather asserting a more thoroughgoing identity between various types of deliberative excellence that are conventionally distinguished and assigned different names. Working through these passages will provide a sufficient basis for tackling, the question about the respective excellences of rulers and citizens. I will show that, despite his restriction of the exercise of practical wisdom to rulers, Aristotle imagines that non-ruling citizens will also exercise their political agency and thereby require a distinct rational excellence. More precisely, for Aristotle, there are two forms of political agency, deliberation on behalf of one’s community, which is perfected by practical-political wisdom, and the comprehension exercised by citizens on the basis of the view of life preserved by their character-virtues. Understood this way, the division of labor between rulers and citizens does not generate two spheres of activity, political and private, which could have unrelated excellences or concern distinct goods. (shrink)