Although he was not and could not have been a phenomenologist in the proper sense of the term, the writings of Origen of Alexandria contain certain insightful observations about the way in which Scripture is encountered in lived experience, and these can be fruitfully interpreted from a phenomenological perspective. The object of this essay is to present two aspects of Origen’s “proto-phenomenology of Scripture” and to draw from them a conclusion of theological-methodological import. The discussion will revolve around a (...) phenomenological distinction between Scripture and biblical text, a distinction which, though familiar to previous writers, has not yet been fully appreciated. (shrink)

In our study of the development of Buddhist ideas over time, one of the major problems is the absence of the links, connecting different strata, strands or schools of the Buddhist thought. Perhaps, the most extreme example of this is the origin of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda tradition, a complex teaching that emerged almost “full-grown” in the _Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra_. Our knowledge of the historical antecedents of Yogācāra is very scarce and, what concerns the school Sautrāntika/Dārṣṭāntika, contradictory. The _Māyājāla-sūtra_ very likely reveals important details (...) regarding the very origin of the Yogācāra tradition and is, therefore, a long-sought- for source. _Māyājāla-sūtra_ is a _sūtra_ in the recently recovered Sanskrit _Dīrgha-āgama_. It stands out from the other _Dīrgha-āgama sūtras_ by its diction and unique compositional and doctrinal features. One of its unique features is that its core terminology, its passages and similes are used extensively in the Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntika-Yogācāra sources, especially in the _Yogācārabhūmi_ and the _Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra_. In the article, I summarize the _sūtra_, overview these features and show that the central message of the _sūtra_ is the so-called _darśana-mārga_, a path of seeing, which is accompanied by supramundane insight (lokottara-prajñā), which enables a Buddhist adept to directly perceive the true reality and become an _ārya_, noble person. I argue that this central idea of the _sūtra_ is textually and doctrinally (or philosophically) interwoven with the specifically Yogācāra understanding of the _darśana-mārga_. Moreover, I show that one of the main ideas of the _sūtra_, the ambivalence of the sense objects, realized at the _darśana-mārga_, is likely an antecedent of the specifically Yogācāra teaching on the possibility of the same object to cause opposite types of experience, and, as such, an antecedent of the cornerstone Yogācāra principle of _vijñaptimātratā_ (the teaching that the objects of perception are mere representations of/in the mind). Another important aspect explored in this paper is the intertextuality of the _Māyājāla-sūtra_, its parallels and the first chapters of the _Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra_, which sheds important light on the origin of the latter text. I argue that these parallels to the Yogācāra teachings are, at the very least, their earlier precedents, and, because of that the _Māyājāla-sūtra_ may be called a proto-Yogācāra _sūtra_. (shrink)

Two opposing accounts of early language evolution, the compositional and the holistic, have become the subject of lively debate. It has been argued that an evolving compositional protolanguage would not be useful for communication until it reached a certain level of grammatical complexity. This paper offers a new, discourse-oriented perspective on the debate. It argues that discourse should be viewed, not as a level of language structure ‘beyond the sentence’, but as sequenced communicative behaviour, typically but not uniquely involving language. (...) This provides for continuity from exchanges making use of simple communicative resources such as single words and gestures to those making use of complex grammatical conventions. Supporting evidence comes from child language and from original experiments with adults using constrained language systems. The paper shows that the utility of emerging compositional language is not dependent on some critical level of complexity, and so defends the compositional account. (shrink)

The article reconstructs the false foundations of Soviet designs imaginable urbanization detects starting social places concepts of "classical" days of building socialism. Projected into the future the idea of permanent revolution, the destruction of "bourgeois barbarism" and desire the establishment of legal order Bolsheviks led the workers to the approval of a new type of state and the formation of a new anthropological type of person. This type - "eternal revolutionary", "architect of the new world" had to live with a (...) single purpose - to extend the principles of proletarian justice to the axis of the world. The epicenter of the factory or the formation of the new man was an industrial city - industrial zone heroically-miltarism work. The main method of the formation of cities and the new man was a total mobilization, the image of the antagonistic enemy of mythic-Titanic goal, collectively practice of collective responsibility, temporal-topeni the control of the state-party bodies the army-camp architecture, etc. The Communists sought to build the city for centuries, people, nomos chose to build incubators "eternal revolutionaries", the barracks of the unknown soldier or barracks devotees of "Stakhanovite". In the draft party not only needs to become an industrial base for future victories over bourgeois barbarism, but also a gathering place loyal fighters for a revolutionary breakthrough - the construction of communism all over the world. Social city - misguided or sinister space, which is not provided for the life of a healthy society. It is the fruit of pure nomos, state coercion, that denied cultural and national experiences, socio-economic patterns, cravings human being the ruins of the Communist concepts of permanent revolution and militarism of labor. The experience of the Communist daydreaming inspires the statement that as an axiom of the relationship of nomos and fuses in urban space is the right man for happiness. A key measure of their dialectical interaction is the reliance on the security and preservation of the integrity of human nature, national heritage, the experience of past generations. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that Berkeley is proto-phenomenologist. The term phenomenology will chiefly be understood in terms of the approach of Edmund Husserl. Berkeley is attentive to the correct use of significations in philosophical exposition, the subjective character of experience, the motility of the perceiver and the transcendence of things. Like the phenomenologists he rejects materialism, naturalism and scepticism. He seeks to preserve the evidences of ordinary perception, setting out an account of scientific theory that can cohere with (...) them. In the first part of this essay I go through some of the more clear-cut ways in which Berkeley anticipates Husserl and some of the latter’s successors. In the second part I lay out their criticisms of Berkeley, also indicating what they hold in common. In the third and final part I consider some of the ways in which Berkeley can meet these criticisms, either readily or through certain qualifications, and I bring out his most significant contributions as a proto-phenomenologist. My aim is to show there are more than traces of the phenomenological attitude in Berkeley. In his efforts to save the appearances, he goes back to that world in which we live and breathe, if not quite have our being. (shrink)

African philosophy of mind is still a developing area of African philosophy. The main issues driving debates in the field include the essential components of the human being (whether this being is wholly physical or partly physical and partly non-material), the relation of the body with the mind or consciousness, whether there is a unifying principle that grounds both body (matter) and consciousness, and whether there is an aspect of the human being that survives biological death. Physicalist theories such as (...) sense-phenomenalism, equi-phenomenalism, and quasi-physicalism have been proposed by some African philosophers as theoretical frameworks for thinking and rethinking the relation of the body with consciousness in the African universe. This chapter examines the plausibility of the three frameworks and argues that the persistence of the quality of subjective experience and the seeming independence of the subjective sphere require a recourse to panpsychism as a theoretical framework that better accounts for the fact of subjective experience. The chapter proposes a moderate version of panpsychism labelled proto-panpsychism as a metaphysical framework that adequately accounts for the phenomenon of consciousness while unifying the African universe of material and non-material entities. (shrink)

In Experience and Experimental Writing, Paul Grimstad moves both forward out of contemporary pragmatism into its future and backward through the history of pragmatism to its zero moment at the proto-pragmatism of the philosophical inception of literary America in the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson and his contemporaries. This is the moment that F.O. Matthiessen, writing backward from 1941 during exactly that period about which it is often said that pragmatism fell from its mantles, summarized as “one extraordinarily concentrated (...) moment of expression.”1 Grimstad, much like Matthiessen, moves American thought forward by first pressing it backward through those literary events just before philosophical pragmatism.. (shrink)

As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes progressively more engaged with society, its shift from technical tool to participating in society raises questions about AI personhood. Drawing upon developmental psychology and systems theory, a mediating structure for AI proto-personhood is defined analogous to an early stage of human development. The proposed AI bridges technical, psychological, and theological perspectives on near-future AI and is structured by its hardware, software, computational, and sociotechnical systems through which it experiences its world as embodied (even (...) for putatively disembodied AI). Further social and moral construction can occur building upon a simple “self” for AI synthesized from symbolic and statistical approaches to AI. (shrink)

Recent iterations of feminist theory and activism, especially intersectional, ‘third-wave’ feminism, have cast much second-wave feminism as politically unacceptable in failing to centre the experiences of less privileged subjects than the often white, often middle-class names with which the second wave is usually associated. While bearing those critiques in mind, this article argues that some second-wave writers, exemplified by Shulamith Firestone and Monique Wittig, may still offer valuable feminist perspectives if viewed through the anti-normative lens of queer theory. Queer (...) resists the reification of identity categories. It focuses on resistance to hegemonic norms, rather than on group identity. By viewing Wittig's and Firestone's critique of the institutions of the family, reproduction, maternity, and work as proto-queer — and specifically proto-antisocial queer — it argues for a feminism that refuses to shore up identity, that rejects groupthink, and that articulates meaningfully the crucial place of... (shrink)

Taste and Experience in Eighteenth Century Aesthetics acknowledges theories of taste, beauty, the fine arts, genius, expression, the sublime and the picturesque in their own right, distinct from later theories of an exclusively aesthetic kind of experience. By drawing on a wealth of thinkers, including several marginalised philosophers, Dabney Townsend presents a novel reading of the century to challenge our understanding of art and move towards a unique way of thinking about aesthetics. Speaking of a proto-aesthetic, Townsend surveys theories (...) of taste and beauty arising from the empiricist shift in philosophy. A proto-aesthetic was shaped by the philosophers who followed Locke and accepted that theories of taste and beauty must be products of experience alone. Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Alexander Gerard and Thomas Reid were among the most important advocates, joined by others who re-thought traditional topics. Featuring chapters tracing its philosophical principles, issues raised by the subjectivity of the empiricist approach and the more academic proto-aesthetic formed toward the end of the century, Townsend argues that Lockean empiricism laid the foundations for what we now call aesthetics. (shrink)

By the late 18th century, the Moravian mission project had grown into a global enterprise. Moravian missionaries’ personal and emotional engagements with the people they sought to convert impacted not only on their understanding of Christianity, but also caused them to rethink the nature of civilization and humanity in light of their frontier experiences. In this article I discuss the construction of ‘savagery’ in the mission ethnography of C. G. A. Oldendorp (1721–87). Oldendorp’s journey to slave-holding societies in the (...) Danish West Indies, where Moravian missions had been established in the 1730s, and his own experiences of the violence of these societies had such an impact on him that his proto-ethnographic descriptions of all the inhabitants of the Danish West Indies – from slaves to slaveholders – broke with traditional representations of savagery. He suggested two different paths for emotional transformation: one for slaves, and another for slaveholders. His views aligned with those of the later abolitionists, yet he was writing sixty years before those movements first gained public momentum in Great Britain. In many ways, therefore, this early mission ethnography reshaped contemporary understandings of ‘savagery’. I consider how Oldendorp did this in relation to a Moravian theology of the heart and love of Christ, the emerging Scottish Enlightenment philosophy of ‘love of humanity’ and its use in colonial encounters between missionaries and local people, and especially the emotions that were provoked by the extreme violence of the slavery system in this colonial contact zone. (shrink)

Argues that Nietzsche's pronouncements on psychology advert to basic facts about the constitution of inner experience and are thus incompatible with his anti‐essentialism. Nietzsche's analysis of non‐egoistic behaviour, his proto‐Freudian presentation of mental life as driven by processes inaccessible to self‐consciousness, and his analysis of the ascetic ideal, ressentiment, and self‐deception amount to a picture of human agency in which all significant aspects of inner experience are ‘in reality’ desires for the experience of power.

Příspěvek se zabývá analýzou Jamesova pojetí náboženské zkušenosti představené v knize The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902). Text sleduje základní obsahovou strukturu Varieties, rekonstruuje Jamesův přístup ke zkoumání náboženské zkušenosti a kriticky reflektuje předkládaná stanoviska. Postupně se proto zabývá mysticismem, filosofií a vědou o náboženství jakožto možnými garanty osobní náboženské zkušenosti. Ačkoli od prvního vydání Varieties uplynulo již přes sto let, Jamesovy myšlenky v nich obsažené jsou i dnes inspirací pro celou řadu badatelů a výzkumníků. Cílem příspěvku je poskytnout (...) čtenářům skrze historigrafickou analýzu Jamesova díla základní vhled do problematiky zkoumání náboženských zkušeností a objasnit argumentační postup obsažený ve Varieties. V závěru textu bude poukázáno i na reflexi některých Jamesových myšlenek ve vybraných současných neurovýzkumech náboženských zkušeností. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophical and scienti .c discussions of mind developed from a 'proto-concept of mind ',a mythical,tradition- alistic,animistic and quasi-sensory theory about what it means to have a mind. It can be found in many di .erent cultures and has a semantic core corresponding to the folk-phenomenological notion of a 'soul '.It will be argued that this notion originates in accurate and truthful .rst-person reports about the experiential content of a special neurophenomenological state-class called 'out-of-body experiences '.They can be (...) undergone by every human being and seem to possess a culturally invariant cluster of functional and phenomenal core properties similar to the proto-concept of mind. The common causal factor in the emergence and development of the notion of the soul and the proto-concept of mind may consist in a yet to be determined set of properties realized by the human brain, underlying the cluster of phenomenal properties described in the relevant first-person reports. This hypothesis suggests that such a neurofunctional substrate ed human beings at different times, and in widely varying cultural contexts, to postulate the existence of a soul and to begin developing a theory of mind. (shrink)

The paper examines narrative operations involved in the temporal configuration of experience within a general framework of the phenomenological treatment of temporality. Taking as its point of departure a most basic instantiation of temporal experience, namely that of a ticking clock, it argues that the narrative dynamics which give form and charge the interval between tick and tock with significant duration are directly derived from the time-constituting operations of the embodied mind and, as such, are independent of their linguistic articulations. (...) Thus, it critically invokes Husserl’s account of time-consciousness, more specifically his model of retention-primary impression-protention, first in the context of Francisco J. Varela’s account of the neurodynamics of lived time, and then with reference to David Carr’s argument for continuity between narrative and the world of our experiences and actions. Building on these critical trajectories, the paper outlines how proto-narrative elements of lived time form a basis for the properly narrative operation of emplotment and, in its final section, discusses some of the complex relations between lived time and narrative time by contrasting Carr’s account of narrative with Paul Ricoeur’s model of triple mimesis. (shrink)

In “Mind, matter and metabolism,” Godfrey-Smith’s objective is to “develop a picture” in which, first, the basis of living activity in physical processes “makes sense,” second, the basis of proto-cognitive activity in living activity “makes sense” and third, “the basis of subjective experience in metabolically situated cognitive processes also makes sense.” show that he fails to attain all three of these objectives, largely owing to the nature and modularization of metabolism.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Everyday Utopia: What 2,000 Years of Wild Experiments Can Teach Us About the Good Life by Kristen R. GhodseeMark A. AllisonKristen R. Ghodsee. Everyday Utopia: What 2,000 Years of Wild Experiments Can Teach Us About the Good Life. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2023. 352 pp., hardcover, $29.99. ISBN 9781982190217.Kristen R. Ghodsee has written a wide-ranging, highly readable, and commendably radical vindication of utopian thought and experimentation. Everyday (...) Utopia is aimed at the educated lay reader—itself, perhaps, a utopian projection—rather than specialists. Nevertheless, all but the most erudite and cosmopolitan of scholars will encounter unfamiliar and compelling utopiana within its pages. While her earlier book, Why Women Have Better Sex Under Socialism: And Other Arguments for Economic Independence (2018), concentrated on "state-sponsored solutions" to the deprivations of capitalism and patriarchy, the present volume sets its sights squarely on the private sphere, and utopian visions "for rearranging our domestic lives" (17).Ghodsee situates this turn to the domestic in two contexts. The first is the COVID-19 pandemic, which revealed the frangibility of the international commitment to gender equality. "Women around the globe woke up and realized that decades of feminism had done little to reverse the social expectation that mothers, sisters, wives, and daughters should provide care for young children, elderly parents, and sick relatives, as well as perform the emotional labors that hold families together in times of crisis," she laments (xii). Everyday Utopia's second context is the spate of recent works of "popular neo-utopianism," including Rutger Bregman's Utopia for Realists (2017), Aaron Bastani's Fully Automated Luxury Communism (2019), and Peter Diamandis and Steven Kotler's Abundance: The Future is Better Than You Think (2012) (14). What Ghodsee finds wanting in this discourse is its myopic focus on the public sphere, and its unspoken presupposition that our private and domestic lives have no such need of utopian renovation. But it is just this presupposition [End Page 285] that the COVID-19 lockdown discredited, although many other indicators (runaway housing and childcare costs, the environmental crisis, the epidemic of loneliness) already suggested as much. Ghodsee rightly insists that "where we reside, how we raise and educate our children, our personal relationship to things, and the quality of our connections to friends, families, and partners impact us as much as tax policies, the price of energy, or the way we organize formal employment" (14). As utopian thinkers from Plato forward have understood, moreover, it is short-sighted to suppose that sweeping economic and political transformations are possible without a concomitant rethinking of the "intimate worlds" that subtend these public domains (15).Accordingly, Everyday Utopia devotes its succeeding chapters to examining alternatives to the dominant institutions of the contemporary private sphere, including the single-family household, the monogamous couple paradigm of childrearing and mating, and the institution of private property. In each case, Ghodsee plumbs the past and limns the present to highlight utopian alternatives to contemporary norms. Among this book's greatest strengths is its consistently international range of examples and admirably sustained commitment to feature "experiments that have received relatively less attention" in the extant literature (xv).Take, for example, the chapter on communal alternatives to single-family homes. Ghodsee includes many of the usual (and eminently worthy) suspects: Buddhist and Christian cenobite monasteries, Fourierist phalansteries, Israeli kibbutzim, and the Corbusier-inspired "microdistricts" of the former Eastern bloc (47). But we also learn of less canonical phenomena, such as the Neolithic proto-city of Çatalhöyük, "one of the first major settlements in the world," where as many as eight thousand people lived in an essentially contiguous structure, in highly egalitarian and likely non-consanguineous households (32). Or consider the Beguine nuns, a lay order founded in 1190 that survived, albeit in attenuated form, into the twentieth century. The Beguine lived communally in urban areas, enjoying liberties unthinkable not only to their cloistered counterparts, but to virtually all their female contemporaries: they brewed beer, made lace, taught school—and traversed the streets unchaperoned. The chapter concludes with a discussion of contemporary cohousing. In Denmark, roughly one percent of the population was living in co... (shrink)

I present an interpretation of the works of Nietzsche’s middle period as offering a phenomenological inquiry. This constitutes an extension of the famous existentialist interpretation of his philosophy. Nietzsche’s concern with the individual qua individual leads him to consider how the human being experiences 1) himself, 2) the presence of others and 3) how the world and the objects therein appear to him. This concern focuses on the human being as an embodied intentional consciousness. I propose to consider Nietzsche (...) as a phenomenologist avant la lettre, that is, as a philosopher whose inquiry anticipates traditional phenomenology. To flesh this out, I explore Nietzsche’s phenomenological view on embodiment and his notion of the body as „die große Vernunft“ (grand reason). I also explore how this view of the situated body forms the ground for Nietzsche’s ethical elaborations. This leads me to conclude that the embodied Übermensch is the phenomenological ethical ideal of Nietzsche’s philosophy, the only one that may allow the individual to flourish. (shrink)

This thesis is a defense of the Content View on perceptual experience, of the idea that our perceptual experiences represent the world as being a certain way and so have representational content. Three main issues are addressed in this work. Firstly, I try to show that the Content View fits very well both with the logical behaviour of ordinary ascriptions of seeing-episodes and related experiential episodes, and with our pretheoretical intuitions about what perceiving and experiencing ultimately are: that preliminary (...) analysis speaks for the prima facie plausibility of such a view. Secondly, I put forward a detailed account of perceptual episodes in semantic terms, by articulating and arguing for a specific version of the Content View. I provide arguments for the following theses: Perceptual content is two-layered so it involves an iconic level and a discrete or proto-propositional level. Perceptual content is singular and object-dependent or de re, so it includes environmental objects as its semantic constituents. The phenomenal character of perceptual experience is co-determined by the represented properties together with the Mode, but not by the perceived objects: that is what I call an impure representationalism. Perceptual content is 'Russellian': it consists of worldly objects, properties and relations. Both perceptual content and phenomenal character are 'wide' or determined by environmental factors, thus there is no Fregean, narrow perceptual content. Thirdly, I show that such a version of the Content View can cope with the objections which are typically moved against the Content View as such by the advocates of disjunctivism. I myself put forward a moderately disjunctivist version of the Content View, according to which perceptual relations must be told apart from hallucinations as mental states of a different kind. Such a disjunctivism is 'moderate' insofar as it allows genuinely relational perceptual experiences and hallucinations to share a positive phenomenal character, contrary to what Radical Disjunctivism cum Naïve Realism holds. Showing that the Content View vindicates our pre-theoretical intuitions and does justice of our ordinary ascriptive practices, articulating a detailed and argued version of the Content View, and showing that such a version is not vulnerable to the standard objections recently moved to the Content View by the disjunctive part, all that can be considered as a big, multifaceted Argument for the Content View. (shrink)

Early modern commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics contain a lively debate on whether experience is ‘rational’, so that it may count as ‘proto-knowledge’, or whether experience is ‘non-rational’, so that experience must be regarded as a primarily perceptual process. If experience is just a repetitive apprehension of sensory contents, the connection of terms in a scientific proposition can be known without any experiential input, as the ‘non-rational’ Scotists state. ‘Rational’ Thomists believe that all principles of scientific knowledge must rely on (...) experiential data, because experience consists in an apprehension of facts rather than objects. And it is only apprehension of facts that can justify knowledge of principles. In this context, the role of mathematical knowledge is special, because it is self-evident. So Thomists must either show that mathematical principles do rely on experience, or that they do not express knowledge claims. (shrink)

On the basis of archaeological data and cognitive research, this article proposes an evolutionary story about aesthetic experience, arguing three intertwined theses. Aesthetic experience is adaptive; that is, it represents a specific implementation of the epistemic goal of knowing. It refunctionalizes antecedents and precursors: play and dreaming, technology and the ability to manipulate, and proto-aesthetic elements and aesthetic preferences. Mind and aesthetic experience co-evolve; that is, aesthetic experience requires mind reading and metacognition, and it helps them to reach their (...) advanced metarepresentational architecture. (shrink)

The second part of the book gives a systematic analysis of this important principle in the Proto-Samkhya, Samkhya, and Samkhya-Yoga texts."--BOOK JACKET.

About forty meanings attributed to the term consciousness can be identified and categorized based on functions and experiences. The prospects for reaching any single, agreed-upon, theory-independent definition of consciousness appear remote. Here, the goal is to search for a theory-dependent optimal and general definition accommodating most views. This quest is mostly based on the premise that evolution must have optimized our mental system in terms of experience and function. Based on a dual-aspect dual-mode proto-experience/subjective experience optimal framework, an (...) optimal definition of consciousness describes it as a mental aspect of a system or a process with two sub-aspects: conscious experience and conscious function. A more general definition describes consciousness as a mental aspect of a system or a process, which is a conscious experience, a conscious function, or both, depending on contexts and particular biases . Both experiences and functions can be conscious and/or non-conscious. Our definitions are a posteriori insofar as they are based on observation and categorization. (shrink)

The extended dual-aspect monism framework of consciousness, based on neuroscience, consists of five components: (1) dual-aspect primal entities; (2) neural-Darwinism: co-evolution and co-development of subjective experiences (SEs) and associated neural-nets from the mental aspect (that carries the SEs/proto-experiences (PEs) in superposed and unexpressed form) and the material aspect (mass, charge, spin and space-time) of fundamental entities (elementary particles), respectively and co-tuning via sensorimotor interaction; (3) matching and selection processes: interaction of two modes, namely, (a) the non-tilde mode (...) that is the material and mental aspect of cognition (memory and attention) related feedback signals in a neural-network, which is the cognitive nearest past approaching towards present; and (b) the tilde mode that is the material and mental aspect of the feed forward signals due to external environmental input and internal endogenous input, which is the nearest future approaching towards present and is a entropy-reversed representation of non-tilde mode; (4) the segregation and integration of information, and (5) the necessary ingredients of SEs (such as wakefulness, attention, re-entry, working memory, stimulus at or above threshold level, and neural-net PEs). This framework leads to structural and functional coherence between the mind and the brain, bridges the explanatory gap (the gap between SEs and their neural-correlates), and leads to our mundane subjective experiences. This extended dual-aspect monism (eDAM) framework (Vimal, 2008, 2010, 2013, 2015a, 2015b) could be the fundamental basis of various religions and philosophies. This is a Western perspective. On the other hand, Eastern perspectives emphasize the practical methods for achieving altered experience at samadhi state. An important corollary of these methods (such as yogic method) is the sublimation of negative aspects of seven groups of self-protective energy system (desire, anger, ego, greed, attachment, jealousy, and selfish-love) into their positive aspects. Their negative aspects create war and suffering, whereas their positive aspects advance science and technology, family values, peace, and happiness. Here, the Western perspective framework is extended to include the concepts of the sublimation process to encompass Eastern perspectives. The four elements (war, suffering, peace, and happiness) are ubiquitous in both space and time because they are essential contributors to the variations for natural selection in our evolutionary system. The sublimation process optimizes the system: minimizes war and suffering, maximizes peace and happiness, and enhances family values and individual progress. This is consistent with both Eastern and Western perspectives. (shrink)

In the third Whitehead Psychology Nexus Studies, we have discussed (i) the dual-aspect-dual-mode proto-experience (PE)-subjective experience (SE)framework of consciousness based on neuroscience, (ii) its implication in war, suffering, peace, and happiness, (iii) the process of sublimation for optimizingthem and converting the negative aspects of seven groups of self-protective energy system (desire, anger, ego, greed, attachment, jealousy, and selfishlove)into their positive aspects from both western and eastern perspectives (Vimal, 2009b). In this article, we summarize the recent development since then as (...) follows. (1) In (Vimal, 2010), we rigorously investigated the classical and quantum matching and selection processes for precisely experiencing a specific SE in a specific neural-network. (2) In (Vimal, 2009i), we unpacked the quantum view of superposition related to the superposition-based hypothesis H1 of our framework in terms of subquantum dual-aspect primal entities (bhutatmas) and addressed the related explanatory gaps. (3) We developed alternative hypotheses of our framework, namely, the superposition-then-integration-emergence based H2, the integration-emergence based H3, the intelligent mechanism based H4, and the vacuum/Aether based H5. We concluded that our framework with H1 is the most optimal one because it has the least number of problems (Vimal, 2009j). (4) We found over 40 different but overlapping meanings attributed to the term ‘consciousness’ and suggested that authors must specify which aspect ofconsciousness they refer to when using this term to minimize confusion (Vimal, 2009f). (5) We proposed definitions of consciousness, qualia, mind, and awareness (Vimal, 2009h). (6) We investigated the necessary ingredients for access (reportable) consciousness: wakefulness, re-entry, attention, working memory and so on (Vimal, 2009g). (7) We discussed Nâgârjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-origination with respect to our PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2009a). (8) We linked dynamic systems theory and fractal catalytic theory with standard representation theory using our framework (Vimal, 2009d). (9) We introduce the PE-SE aspects of consciousness in theoretical classical and quantum physics including loop quantum gravity and string theory (Vimal, 2009k). (10) In (Vimal, 2009c), we proposed that the SE of subject or ‘self’ in self-related neural-network is tuned to the self-related SEs/PEs superposed in other innumerable entities during samadhi state via matching and selection processes. This leads to bliss, ecstasy, or exceptionally high degree of climax at samadhi state. We conclude that, so far, the dualaspect-dual-mode PE-SE framework with hypothesis H1 is the most optimal framework for explaining our conventional reality because it has the least number of problems. Keywords: Evolution of consciousness; Internal representation; Sensorimotor interaction; Dual-aspect model; Subjective experience; Protoexperiences, Explanatory gap; Mind-brain problem; Purusha; Prakriti; Eastern and Western perspectives; Yoga; Sublimation process; Whitehead; Process and Reality; Occasions of experience; Superposition; Subquantum dual-aspect primal entities (bhutatmas); Superposition-then-integration-emergence; Integration-emergence; Intelligent mechanism; Vacuum/Aether; qualia; Mind; Awareness; Nâgârjuna; Classical and quantum physics; Loop quantum gravity; String theory. (shrink)

In Hard Truths Elijah Millgram argues that ‘partial truth’ is pervasive and for that reason bivalence 1 may rarely be assumed. As classical logic assumes bivalence, and inferences from partial truths to partial truths are central to our thinking, classical logic rarely has application, the argument continues. And so we must develop an account of inference from partial truths to partial truths; as well, our metaphysics must be revised. While the novel positions of Hard Truths 2 raise many interesting challenges, (...) my focus is limited to offering an alternative to Millgram’s account of predication and to exploring some issues raised by his appeal to ‘fit’ in his definitions of truth and partial truth. 1. Introduction to partial truth Millgram defines truth and partial truth in terms of fit, as follows: Advancing a claim as fully true demands complete fit; assessing a claim as partially true allows for slack … but only so much of it. Claims are said to completely fit, slackly fit or not fit, the world, in §6.3. But, the word ‘fit’ is first introduced in §1.2, and it is experience or proto-experience, that fits into moulds provided by claims, thoughts, sentences and predicates. I won’t dwell on which fits what, 3 but on the notion of a ‘complete fit’ and the contrast with a ‘slack fit’; this discussion leads me to ponder the clarity and implications of appealing to these notions in definitions like the above. Millgram’s explanation of fit comes in the context of his account of predication, according to which, most predicates do not quite apply. It’s this that is primarily responsible for his promotion of partial truth. I sketch an alternative account of language whereby predicates do apply because language has come to life as a constituent of the things we do: …. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: At Home in the Commonplace Re‐Thinking Proto‐Modernism: Dickinson Re‐Thinking High Modernism: Stevens.

The article demonstrates the experience of religious reading of the iconic work of the prominent Kyiv bibliologist and academician of the end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th century V. Rybinskyi. The need for such a reading is determined by the fact that the Biblical texts contain a lot of empirical material relevant from the point of view of the history and theory of religious studies. Therefore, a kind of reconstruction of the field of theoretical positions important for (...) the formation of the “science of religion” in the domestic intellectual tradition is actualized. At the same time, given the weak systematization, a certain theoretical amorphousness and the need to carefully “read” such provisions, it would be correct to say that Rybinskyi’s work has only the motives of “proto-religious studies.” The article proposes relevant provisions that characterize the position of the Kyiv researcher in the field of the source and methodological problems of religion research; in matters of the origin and historical development of religious phenomena; in evaluation of the socio-cultural and political dimensions of religious institutions. The arguments given by V. Rybinskyi on the structural components of a religious ritual or religious institution in general, both in its evolution and in functional connections, are valuable for religious studies. It is shown how the Kyiv Biblical scholar in his own research hypostasis and apologetic intention closely approaches the formulation of “protoreligious” provisions. The eloquent example once again traces the complexity of disciplinary formation in the na­tional culture of the “science of religion” and the complexity of rational knowledge of this phenomenon as a specific way of spiritual and practical development of reality.Manuscript received 07.08.2020. (shrink)

This article proposes a communicative, imitative, and reflective account of musical learning and expertise. It starts from an affirmative yet critical reading of Høffding and collaborators, notably their idea of a musical arch, meant to bridge distinctions between low-level procedural enactment and high-level reflective cognition. While we embrace much of their analysis, we argue that they uphold tensions between these levels. Drawing on recent enactivist thought, phenomenological and hermeneutic resources, and developmental psychology, we propose a ‘linguistic turn’ that allows us (...) to situate the enactive body in what has been called an ‘original communication-situation’. The original communication-situation encompasses procedural proto-linguistic behaviour and a reflexive level of linguistic co-intentionality procedurally coupled with other bodies. From this perspective, musical co-creation within the normative space of the musical arch is a dialectical actualization of vertical and horizontal experience, reflecting transformative accomplishments of symbolic bodies within a linguistic field of participatory sense-making. The normative space of musical performance is the result of emergent features of music as embodied social practice. (shrink)

lt is hypothesized that people use formally incorrect deductive procedures, and this is sometimes advisable. The particular "prototypicaiity heuristic" investigated is: to determine validity of a proof, (a) work out an example, and (b) pick a "good" rather than arbitrary example. An interaction was predicted betv;een validity of inference and proto-typicality of example. Experiment 1, although quite sensitive to "calibration' variables, does not reveal the interaction in reaction times. However, Experiment 2, in which subjects' time was limited, seems to (...) elicit the interaction in subjects' first-trial confidence judgments; the explanation proposed is that subjects then decide they must shift to a "quick and dirty" heuristic. Experiment 3 provides some preliminary evidence that subjects' 'metaheuristic". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Euripides' Escape-Tragedies: A Study of Helen, Andromeda, and Iphigenia among the TauriansHelene P. FoleyMatthew Wright. Euripides' Escape-Tragedies: A Study of Helen, Andromeda, and Iphigenia among the Taurians. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. viii + 433 pp. Cloth, $125.Due to their putatively lighter tone, exotic foreign settings, and concluding "resolutions" of past misfortunes, Euripides' Helen, fragmentary Andromeda, and Iphigenia Among the Taurians (henceforth IT) have often been described as (...) proto-romances or tragi-comedies. Wright's study follows recent trends in defining ancient Greek dramatic genres above all through their performance context; he argues that the plays belong firmly in the tragic camp and develop serious philosophical and religious themes that deliberately leave their audience in a state of aporia. The plots of these plays share an escape from disaster/remote and threatening environments. Although we cannot firmly date IT, Wright tries to make the case that these apparently unique shared elements suggest that the plays were performed as a coherent trilogy in 412 B.C.E. The book does not [End Page 465] attempt to address in detail many aspects of these (relatively neglected) plays that have been extensively discussed by other critics. Instead Wright focuses on the plays' generic status, their possible mythical innovations, their remote settings, and their philosophy and theology.Although there are many unusual mythical elements in these plays, Wright makes a detailed case that Euripides most probably recombined elements previously known in the tradition to a novel effect, rather than inventing them. He casts considerable doubt on Stesichorus' palinode and Herodotus as origins for Euripides' innocent Egyptian Helen, however. Wright challenges previous assumptions by arguing that Euripides does not develop the plays' barbarian settings. Indeed, there is little ethnic or geographical detail beyond a few initial sketchy references, and the plays blur the differences between Greeks and barbarian "others." The Egyptians Proteus, Theoclymenus, and Theonoe are, genealogically speaking, Greek (183). After a lengthy discussion of the problems of defining philosophical elements in tragedy, Wright links the plays' extensive treatment of the unreliable nature of human language and knowledge of reality to discussions of comparable themes in the fragments of the Sophists, especially Gorgias and Democritus. Finally, Wright argues that the plays, by stressing the impossibility of understanding the divine forces that govern the universe, represent an unusually bleak theological picture. The dei ex machina that conclude Helen and IT belatedly outline mysterious divine patterns governing the confusing dramatic events, but humans can only repeatedly misinterpret their experience and name the divine forces governing their lives, erroneously in Wright's view, as tuche\.These issues, above all the themes of illusion and reality and the nature of divinity in the plays, have in fact been discussed before, but Wright attempts a fuller (with the exception of his attenuated discussion of ritual) and methodologically tighter discussion. This represents both the book's strength and weakness. Without its exhaustive review of dated and (putatively) weakly argued earlier critical views, the book could, and in my view ideally should, have made its positive case more forcefully in half the length. At the same time, by failing to engage with important earlier treatments of central topics, Wright leaves the reader with the impression that scholarly work on these issues is far less nuanced than it has in fact been. To give a few examples that he neglects altogether, his discussion of Aristophanes' parody of Euripides in Thesmophoriazusae (120, n. 196; see also 50–51) does not take advantage of Zeitlin's seminal article on the topic ("Travesties of Gender and Genre in Aristophanes' Thesmophoriazusae," published most recently in her Playing the Other: Gender and Society in Classical Greek Literature [Chicago, 1996], 375–416); he does not make use of John H. Finley's extensive study of Euripides, Thucydides, and the sophists (Three Essays on Thucydides, [Cambridge, Mass., 1967]); other important methodologically sophisticated work on philosophy and tragedy, such as that of Mary Whitlock Blundell (Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics [Cambridge, 1989]) or Christopher Gill (Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: The Self in Dialogue [Oxford, 1996]), does not even appear in the notes. [End Page 466... (shrink)

There has recently been emphasis put on providing two-factor accounts of monothematic delusions. Such accounts would explain (1) whether a delusional hypothesis (e.g. someone else is inserting thoughts into my mind) can be understood as a prima facie reasonable response to an experience and (2) why such a delusional hypothesis is believed and maintained given its implausibility and evidence against it. I argue that if we are to avoid obfuscating the cognitive mechanisms involved in monothematic delusion formation we should split (...) the first factor (1 above) into two factors: how abnormal experience can give rise to a delusional ‘proto-hypothesis’ and how a ‘proto-hypothesis’ in consort with normal experiences and background information, can be developed into a delusional hypothesis. In particular I will argue that a schizophrenic is faced with the unusual requirement of having to identify an introspectively accessible thought as one's own, and that this requirement of identification is the central experiential abnormality of thought insertion, auditory verbal hallucination, and alien control (i.e. passivity symptoms). Additionally, I will consider non-experiential factors which are required for the formation of a delusional hypothesis. (shrink)

In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to (...) become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms. (shrink)

When Johann and Daniel Bernoulli founded fluid dynamics they encountered several problems. To go beyond the vision of Newtonian particles, a new set of images was needed in order to deal with the spatial extensibility and lack of form of fluids. I point to evidence that analogy was an essential abductive strategy in the creation of this imagery. But its heuristic behavior is complex: analogy can provide an initial model or proto-model that establishes the starting point of a theoretical (...) process, but it can play other roles as well. The historical genesis analyzed here shows that the participation of analogy in physicists’ creativity is not so restricted and that its richness opens up the field for very different roles and strategies in model-based discovery processes. Analogies can crop up intermittently in the evolution of a theory; and they can cooperate with images, extreme case reasoning and thought experiments, and even activate these processes at origin. Although it may seem that the contributions of analogy are generative in the sense of helping to discover new aspects of reality, we must stress the evaluative function that sometimes is performed by analogical reasoning in order to gain confidence. The study of the Bernoulli’s genesis of the foundations of fluid dynamics generates interesting hypotheses about the multiple roles that analogy can play in scientific model-based reasoning. (shrink)

Adam Ferguson’s twin reputations as the most republican of the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment and as one of the founding fathers of sociology make him one of the most interesting figures in eighteenth-century political thought. I argue that in his Essay on the History of Civil Society and elsewhere, Ferguson develops a novel understanding of the place of warfare in human social experience. By deploying a proto-sociological account of the naturalness of warfare between nations he proposes a normative (...) criterion for the assessment of civilisation. This argument sets Ferguson apart from contemporaries like Kant who argued for perpetual peace as a criterion of civilisation. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that 1) art is, for Cassirer, a symbolic language whereby images (or poetic expressions) work analogously to verbal signs in order to frame and codify meaningful objective contents, namely symbolic formations that constitute objects in a specific region of culture. I claim that 2a) both art and language rely on what I call symbolic-poietic mimesis: a function meant to 2b) combine imitative and constructive states in order to shape a proto-meaningful core according to its (...) symbolic pregnance and 3a) employ forms that are, on the one hand, pure (not derived from experience) and, on the other hand, sensuous (figurative signs). The idea is that while 4a) both language and art are oriented towards objectivity as the constitution of cultural objects, 4b) they also differ in their respective directions. On the one hand, language pursues stable and fixed verbal references. On the other, art relies on moving and living forms meant to codify a dynamic weft of aesthetic values. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Incomprehensible Certainty: Metaphysics and Hermeneutics of the Image by Thomas PfauThomas ZingelmannPFAU, Thomas. Incomprehensible Certainty: Metaphysics and Hermeneutics of the Image. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2022. xxiii + 785 pp. Cloth, $80.00Thomas Pfau reconstructs one of the most traditional and possibly most decisive philosophical debates, [End Page 559] namely, the one about the form and function of appearance (Schein). This debate is taken up (...) on the basis of the concept of image. This means that Pfau concentrates historically as well as systematically on a specific topic within this debate. The book is divided into two major sections.In the first section, Pfau examines how the history of the metaphysics and theology of the image develops, starting with Plato in the first chapter. The basic idea in this section is that the image has a crucial epistemic role in the metaphysical and theological systems of the authors addressed. Here Pfau shows that Plato, at the latest in the Sophist, develops a theory of images that revalues appearance contrary to the assumptions in the Republic. Chapter 1 is about the mediation of unity and multiplicity, as it is also shown in Plotinus. Chapter 2 attempts to show how the Byzantine icon embodies the conviction that the invisible truth of the visual world can be revealed only through images. Pfau's demonstration of various epistemic dimensions of the image then begins with chapter 3: the eschatological vision from Augustine to Bonaventure to Julian of Norwich. Chapter 4, the last of the first section, reconstructs Nicholas of Cusa's position, which attempts to understand mystical visions mediated by images of Christ.The second section examines how the metaphysics of the image—in the sense of an epistemology, which tries to establish ultimate justifications—nevertheless persists and even evolves despite two crucial switches in philosophy. On the one hand, this concerns philosophy that subordinates the visual to the abstract (for example, Hegel) and, on the other, the supposedly nonmetaphysical status of the image in the developing natural sciences. Chapter 5 then attempts to show, through Goethe's botanical investigations and reflections, how, despite the establishment of the natural sciences, Goethe attempts to defend intuition as a scientific method and appearance as a scientific object of investigation. This position is then pursued historically in chapter 6, through the work of Lyell, Darwin, and Ruskin, where the visible is understood as the connecting point of the sciences in general. Gerard Manley Hopkins is then identified in chapter 7 as representing a position that combines theological with proto-phenomenological arguments to highlight the epistemic value of images. The last chapter then deals with decisive developments at the beginning of the twentieth century. In phenomenology (Husserl), painting (Cézanne), and poetry (Rilke), a conception develops that epistemically valorizes sensual and intuitive experience.Generally speaking, Pfau attempts to trace historically what arguments and positions have been developed on the relationship between image and knowledge. His work is based on the conviction that the image is the basis for human orientation in the world and is therefore of great epistemological value. Of outstanding importance for his question is that the epistemological value of images is not to be located in the properties of images, that is, an ontology of the image; rather, Pfau is interested in those positions that reflect on the relationship between knowledge and [End Page 560] experience of images. While clarifying the ontological status of images remains important, the epistemological status of images—what role the experience and usage of images has for humans—is in the foreground. Pfau reconstructs positions that hold that the pictorial is a medium of knowledge. He puts forward the thesis that there is a tradition that is of the opinion that in and through the medium of the image—and this closes the arc to the Schein-debate—being can be experienced by man. In other words, the invisible is to become recognizable through the visible. Of particular importance is his reading of the late Platonic dialogues: While appearance and being are still thought of as distinct in these dialogues, they are not opposed, in the sense of an epistemic opposition. Plato's... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 125-126 [Access article in PDF] Sextus Empiricus. Against the Grammarians (Adversos Mathematicos I). Introduction, Commentary, and Translation by D. L. Blank. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Pp. lvi + 436. Cloth, $105.00. Sesto Empirico. Contro gli astrologi. Introduction, Commentary, and Translation by Emidio Spinelli. Naples: Bibliopolis, 2000. Pp. 230. Paper, L. 70.000. No historian of philosophy should be retailing the old canards (...) that the Hellenistic philosopher Sextus Empiricus was silly, wholly confused, or merely a compiler and not a philosopher in his own right. These translations and commentaries, along with the recent work of Richard Bett, James Hankinson, and others, should bury those notions forever.Against the Grammarians is the first and Against the Astrologers is the fifth volume of Sextus's six-volume Against the Teachers of the technai or professional arts and sciences (grammar, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astrology, and music). Sextus is not against all forms of the study of these matters; in fact, one of the skeptic's "rules for living" is that he will engage in an art (techne) to make a living (Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I.24). But he is against the claims of each of them to special technical expertise. He prefers the unpretentious experience of everyday life—living by the phenomena; non-expert, practical forms of grammar, astronomy, music—to fancy theories about the nature of things.Against the Grammarians is Sextus's critique of the interpreters of poetry and prose—today's English professors and historians. Philosophers will be amused by his deconstruction of various sorts of lit crit arrogance and rashness that are still with us. Regrettably, some of us are not immune from the same critiques.Against the Astrologers is Sextus's critique of the Chaldean soothsayers. He is not against the observation of celestial phenomena for agricultural or navigational purposes. His critiques of the astrologers for lack of empirical evidence and promotion of superstition make him sound like a proto-scientist.One originality of Sextus's work was his combination of a dogmatic Epicurean critique of the grammatologists and astrologers with a skeptical aporetic critique. Precisely because he does not hesitate to make use of the arguments of others, some interpreters have decided that Sextus was unoriginal and derivative. But Blank and Spinelli both show that he recombines these arguments in ways that no one else had done. That is one of the ways of being original in philosophy. The upshot is that he is our earliest source of quite a number of critiques of grammarians and astrologers.The use of dogmatic arguments raises the problem of whether Sextus engages in so-called "negative dogmatism" in these volumes. Right at the beginning of Against the Astrologers, Sextus accuses them of violating "right reason." What right does a skeptic have to invoke such a standard? Some have felt that at this stage Sextus was a dogmatic skeptic, invoking one set of truths to tear down another. But that is not necessary. Blank and Spinelli explain this well with a combination of points. One, we can see the dogmatic and Epicurean attacks as clearing the ground for the following skeptical equipollence of arguments. Two, we can follow Jonathan Barnes in assuming that each claim that something has been demolished assumes the counterargument that it has been proven, so that the implied upshot is equipollence. Three, "right reason" can be the sort of unpretentious practical reasoning and living in accord with the appearances that the skeptics often claimed to live by.Spinelli and Blank provide many useful improvements over the previous English translations of these texts by Bury and the Italian translations by Russo. Blank rightly relies on Spinelli's 1995 translation and commentary on Sextus's Against the Ethicists and Spinelli rightly relies on Blank for a number of points. Spinelli supplies the Greek on facing pages of the translation; Blank does not. Spinelli also supplies five Greek zodiac charts and a beautiful print of a fifteenth-century zodiac.Neither Blank nor Spinelli unduly lionizes Sextus. They admit that... (shrink)

This essay aims at providing a brief analysis of John Dewey’s 1896 essay The reflex arc concept in psychology by identifying in it “proto-aesthetic” elements that will be thematized in an explicitly aesthetic sense only, almost forty years later, in Art as experience. This latter can be indeed considered both as a hapax and an apex of a path in which Dewey progressively focuses on matters that can be deemed properly aesthetic and of which The reflex arc concept in (...) psychology can be seen as one of the first steps. Our analysis will attempt at showing this connection by spanning the reflex arc idea, amended by Dewey in this essay, and that of “an” experience as a proper aesthetic experience through the fundamental concept of coordination. (shrink)

The book begins with an overview of globalization, showing how wealth and power are concentrated in the hands of a transnational elite while ever increasing numbers of people are being marginalised. Institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and the International Monetary Fund are intent upon exercising a new hegemony over individuals as the role of the traditional nation state is transformed. At the centre of this power shift is a group of high-tech robber barons who dominate the Information Age (...) and exploit the technologies of globalization for their own narrow interests. The second part of the book explores the rise of the new grass roots oppositional movements around the world. Manifest in such diverse struggles as the uprising of the Zapatistas in Mexico and the battle of Seattle against the World Trade Organisation, this new postmodern politics is "de-centred" and has little interest in the old ideologies that dominated much of the twentieth century. The final section of the book contextualizes postmodern politics by drawing on contemporary examples. The authors discuss the demise of socialist and proto-socialist experiments in Chile, Grenada, Nicaragua and Cuba and the emergence of postmodern movements in Latin America. The final two chapters take a specific look at the Zapatista movement and its significance for revolutionary struggles around the world. (shrink)

In this article, the collective experimenter, arising in scientific projects from those modeled on the Alvarez group to megascience, is studied in the framework of the model of trading zones, as well as Actor-Network Theory. The collective experimenter is defined as a network of actors whose forms are trading zones, including the core – the empirical collective subject of cognition – and the peripheral part. The multitude of actors of the collective experimenter includes the core, as well as the community (...) of intentions and the external actors that are part of the periphery of the collective experimenter. Attention is focused on the differences between the author of epistemic claims, the subject of cognition and scientific collaboration. A classification of collective experimentalists is proposed that includes four types of ontologies. The classification is applied to JINR scientific projects, and within its framework projects of the Alvarez type, big science, proto-megascience and megascience are distinguished. Ways of developing projects to the megascience-level through the formation of cores-communicative communities in the structure of the collective experimenter are proposed. Premised on the results obtained, recommendations are formulated for the development of the JINR experiments program. (shrink)

DRACO.WOLFANDDOTCOM.INFO is an interactive proto-videogame installation that immerses users, personified as abstract dragons in a cathartic, stochastic, full-body immersive videogame experience, in cyberspace. The work attempts to playfully shift user consciousness towards non-human embodiment, by real-time 3D meshing the data from the human body into a mirrored abstract, ill-defined dragonic 3D shape. It gifts humans with special virtual powers, such as flying and cusping fireballs, as they fight for their progression in the game-space and facing annihilation, through invisible, interactional (...) camera-based technologies which will be exposed in this paper. Inside the piece’s virtual world, users play as endangered dragons in the XXIst century populated by companies, websites and humanoids eager to stop the mythological beasts. The dragons progress in the game-space by inflicting damage upon the city’s landscape. The stochastic game-space ascends in difficulty as the levels progress, slowly changing the joystick’s response into faster speeds and generating larger city-scapes, inducing the game’s ultimate goal of a cathartic ilinxian state of disruption and otherness in human perception. (shrink)

The emergence of individuality during the evolutionary transition from single cells to multicellularity poses a range of problems. A key issue is how variation in lower‐level individuals generates a corporate (collective) entity with Darwinian characteristics. Of central importance to this process is the evolution of a means of collective reproduction, however, the evolution of a means of collective reproduction is not a trivial issue, requiring careful consideration of mechanistic details. Calling upon observations from experiments, we draw attention to proto‐life (...) cycles that emerge via unconventional routes and that transition, in single steps, individuality to higher levels. One such life cycle arises from conflicts among levels of selection and invokes cheats as a primitive germ line: it lays the foundation for collective reproduction, the basis of a self‐policing system, the selective environment for the emergence of development, and hints at a plausible origin for a soma/germ line distinction. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I defend an interpretation of the methodological development of transcendental philosophy from Kant's first Critique to Fichte's later Jena-period Wissenschaftslehre. Both Kant and Fichte claim that experience is founded upon certain a priori subjective structures and capacities. However, I argue that the methodology of Kant's first Critique includes a number of assumptions and explicit doctrines that limit his ability to explain experience. The chief problem of Kant's theory of method is, I claim, his distinction between the methods (...) of philosophy and mathematics, whereby the method of construction is limited to mathematics. I argue that Fichte attempts to solve Kant's problem by expanding the method of construction to philosophy itself. As a method, construction has two aspects. First, the task of the philosopher is to reconstruct discursively the spontaneous process whereby subjectivity is self-constructing. By "self-construction," I refer to a functional structure wherein subjectivity is the achievement of a range of proto-conscious, primitive mental activities. Second, the method of the philosopher is similar to the method of geometric construction, viz., the postulation of a task to be completed regarding which one---beginning from putatively self-evident resources---creatively and imaginatively seeks out a solution. Fichte turns to construction since there is no algorithm for philosophical reflection and he revises Kant's important doctrines regarding intellectual intuition and the productive imagination. However, though Fichte's solution to Kant's problem is promising, the notion of construction itself generates a number of problems. (shrink)

La question des frontières des arts plastiques et littéraires contemporains peut être approchée à travers l'exemple de la géopoétique de Kenneth White. Renonçant à réduire l'art à la production d'une représentation dominée par le plaisir de la vue, le mouvement esthétique de la géopoétique cherche à faire de la création artistique un geste de participation aux matières de la terre sur fond d'une expérience polysensorielle où la marche et le nomadisme constituent des explorations d'un proto-monde. L'oeuvre écrite ou plastique (...) est destinée à conserver des fragments et traces de cette aventure sensible, ouvrant ainsi la voie à une rencontre qui n'est plus un spectacle mais une expérience quasi chamanique. Reste à savoir dans quelle mesure on peut s'émanciper totalement de la représentation pour accéder à une auto-présentation du cosmos dont l'artiste serait le médium. (shrink)

In this article I shall largely make use of terms like “responding,” “responsive,” and “responsivity.” These terms are not part of traditional philosophy. They became indispensable for my own thinking when I tried to develop a theory of radical Fremdheit, of alienness or otherness. Hence I came to a sort of responsive phenomenology that does not replace current variants of phenomenology, but sets a new tone. This is what I try to show in my article. I shall proceed in four (...) steps. In the first step, dealing with the formation of the theory, I try to show how our experience of radical otherness leads to the key concept of responsivity. In the second step, I shall describe the main features of responsivity and its pathological deviations. In the third step, this perspective will be expanded by referring to co-affection and co-responsivity as elements of proto-sociality. The fourth and last step will offer a practical outlook, raising the question to what extent responsivity can be organised and institutionalised. (shrink)

The enactivist account of consciousness posits that motivated activation of sensorimotor action imagery anticipates possible action affordances of environmental situations, resulting in representation of the environment with a conscious “feel” associated with the valences motivating the anticipations. This approach makes the mind–body problem and the problem of mental causation easier to resolve, and offers promise for understanding how consciousness results from natural processes. Given a process-oriented understanding of the way many systems in non-conscious nature are “proto-motivated” toward realizing unactualized (...) possibilities, and can use symbolic objects to “proto-represent” unactualized possibilities, it becomes more clear how self-organizing systems can subserve subjective consciousness. If a system executes, in a unified way, both a proto-desire and a proto-representation of the same unactualized possibility — in order to provide a kind of causal power for the unactualized possibility — then the result is the familiar experience of phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

My essay is devoted to the very early and attractive understanding of the lived body in Ortega y Gasset’s thought. I focus especially on the text “Vitality, Soul, Spirit” of 1925, which can be considered a proto-phenomenological approach to the issue of embodiment. Ortega identifies “vitality” with “the intrabody” and makes the latter the founding dimension of subjectivity, at the basis of the affective sphere (“soul”) and at the basis of the intellectual and volitional sphere (“spirit”). In a manner (...) very close to Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts, he also shows how the body is the only reality of which there is simultaneously external perception, as if it were just another thing in the world that everyone else can see, and internal perception, which only the self can have and feel. The study also points out, however, the two major difficulties that I detect in Ortega’s precocious attempt. A first doubt concerns the too sharp stratification of vitality, soul and spirit, as can be seen in the analysis of the experiences of pain and of mobility. A second doubt concerns the ontological hesitations surrounding Ortega’s position, which is torn between a coherent phenomenological perspective and a vitalist position in which my body is only an emanation of the lifestream of the universe. (shrink)

Aristotle's solution to the problem raised in Ch. 4 depends on his account of how we arrive at thoughts on the basis of experience. In his view, we standardly acquire a term for a kind on the basis of contact with members of a kind, without thereby knowing that the kind in question exists. Further, we can grasp such terms without knowing that the kind has a unifying basic feature that explains its necessary properties. Our understanding of the kind is (...) to be compared with that of a craftsman and not that of a proto‐scientist. Aristotle's view is distinguished from several twentieth‐century accounts of these issues. (shrink)