La reprise est un concept fondamental de la philosophie d’Eric Weil. Conjointement avec le couple attitude/catégorie de la Logique de la philosophie, il désigne l’acte même par lequel se constitue, pour Eric Weil, le discours philosophique. C’est aussi un concept opéra­toire par lequel il est possible d’appliquer les catégories philosophiques à l’analyse histo­rique des discours humains dans leur complexité. Il fait ainsi le lien entre logique et pratique de la philosophie, sous la forme d’une logique appliquée et d’une pratique (...) du dialogue philosophique. Cet article commence par situer la reprise par rapport aux concepts d’attitude et de catégorie. Puis, il envisage quelques uns des usages possibles du concept de reprise avant de conclure en esquissant, sans prétendre à l’exhaustivité, quelques unes des orientations possibles de la recherche sur ce concept. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 71 - 105 Grotius’s theory of punishment provides a unique lens through which to view his evolving thought on sovereignty between _De Indis_ and _De iure belli ac pacis_ and the implications of that evolution for Grotius’s theory of the ius in bello. Throughout both works, Grotius attempted to leave open the possibility of private punishment and private warfare, a position not easily squared with prevailing views of sovereign authority. Initially, Grotius was content (...) with a theory marrying the private right of punishment with more traditional Scholastic views of sovereignty through a transfer of the private right from individuals into the hands of the sovereign. This theory also adopted traditional views of subject responsibility for sovereign acts—and, by extension, the exposure of subjects to punishment for the acts of their sovereign. By the time of his mature work, however, Grotius turned away from natural law justifications for collective responsibility and collective punishment, denying that subjects had to answer for the acts of their sovereign as a necessary incident of the compact creating civil society. This led Grotius to refer virtually all forms of collective responsibility, such as reprisal or punishment exacted through war, to the law of nations. This sharp reduction of the natural consequences of the creation of sovereign power also enabled Grotius’s argument that the private right of war, and in particular the private right of punishment, remained available after the creation of civil society. (shrink)

Le texte est consacré aux aspects essentiels de la théorie des démonstrations en logique mathématique et à ses ramifications contemporaines. La distinction établie par Kreisel entre théorie générale des démonstrations et théorie reductive des démonstrations est reprise et l'accent est mis sur la théorie reductive ou les sous-systèmes de l'analyse classique, en particulier l'induction transfinie. Le texte comporte une critique de la justification de l'induction transfinie de Takeuti et se termine par une liste des développements contemporains les plus (...) significatifs en théorie de la preuve.This article deals with the essential aspects and the contemporary developments of proof theory in mathematical logic. The distinction between general proof theory and reductive proof theory borrowed from Kreisel is used as the main axis of the paper, but the emphasis is on the reductive theory of classical analysis and transfinite induction. A foundational critique of Takeuti's justification of transfinite induction is offered and details on the most significant contemporary developments of proof theory close the article. (shrink)

Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other. In the present paper I investigate the relation between epistemic luck and prominent internalist and externalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that the dichotomy between internalist and externalist concepts of justification can be characterized in terms (...) of epistemic luck. Whereas externalist theories of justification are incompatible with veritic luck but not with reflective luck, the converse is true for internalist theories of justification. These results are found to explain and cohere with some recent findings from elsewhere in epistemology, and support a surprising picture of justification, on which internalism and externalism are complementary rather than contradictory positions. (shrink)

On trouvera dans ce volume des textes qui refletent certains aspects de la dernieres philosophies de Maine de Biran, ainsi que de nombreux temoignages de ses lectures entre 1818 et 1823. Sa pensee se developpe selon trois perspectives: une redefinition de la philosophie a l'occasion d'une critique detaillee de Bonald (sur l'origine du langage et la definition de l'homme, notamment), une reflexion sur la morale (qui s'efforce de trouver une troisieme voie a partir de Condillac et Kant), et une (...) class='Hi'>reprise de la tradition religieuse (Lamennais, Bossuet, Fenelon, commentaire de l'Evangile de saint Jean). Son evolution vers un platonisme de plus en plus marque, la presence croissante du christianisme peuvent se lire a travers de nombreux textes et appendices - tous inedits (sur Plotin, Proclus, saint Augustin) - ou s'elabore plus nettement le theme de la troisieme vie. (shrink)

On Carlos Moya's Reply to the Argument from Luck Resumen: Esta nota crítica se centra en el argumento de Carlos Moya (2017, 168-70) a favor de la conclusión de que el Argumento de la Suerte representa en realidad un problema mayor para los compatibilistas que para los libertaristas. La Sección 1 introduce brevemente el Argumento de la Suerte. La Sección 2 discute la distinción de Moya entre dos concepciones de deliberación práctica, y propone una manera alternativa a la de Moya (...) de entender la crítica al libertarismo que se basa en la condición de que cualquier decisión libre debe tener una explicación contrastiva. Finalmente, la Sección 3 resume la respuesta libertarista de Moya al Argumento de la Suerte, y sugiere un modelo alternativo de determinismo que Moya podría considerar para completar su argumento. Palabras clave: libre albedrío, Argumento de la Suerte, libertarismo, compatibilismo, explicación contrastiva, determinismo. Abstract: This review focuses on Carlos Moya’s (2017, 168-70) argument for the conclusion that the Argument from Luck actually represents a greater problem for compatibilism than for libertarianism. Section 1 briefly introduces the Argument from Luck. Section 2 discusses Moya’s distinction between two conceptions of practical deliberation, and suggests a justification that Moya does not consider for the condition that any free decision must have a contrastive explanation. Finally, Section 3 summarizes Moya’s libertarian response to the Argument from Luck, and suggests an alternative model of determinism that Moya might consider to complete his argument. Keywords: free will, Argument from Luck, libertarianism compatibilism, contrastive explanation, determinism. (shrink)

Les textes -- Tiédeur et laxisme d'Érasme -- Rigueur et sobriété de Luther -- Les prédécesseurs de Luther -- Lignes do force du débat -- Que reste t-il de nos prières et de nos efforts? -- La doctrine des deux règnes -- La liberté le traite de la liberté du chrétien de M. luther -- Serf arbitre et nouvelle théologie -- L'oeil et le regard -- L'exigence de vérité -- La justification -- Essai de résumé du Traite du serf (...) arbitre de Martin Luther. (shrink)

Comment penser l’amitié sans recourir à une affirmation politique ou théologique? Nous montrons d’abord la reprise chrétienne et la transformation de l’amitié, telle que la concevait l’Antiquité, à partir de la réinterprétation augustinienne des textes de Cicéron. Puis nous proposons de réfléchir à cette nouvelle conception de l’amitié, en nous appuyant sur les textes de Jacques Derrida, qui cherche à établir la possibilité d’une amitié d’« avant les amitiés », fondée sur aucune fraternité. Pour Derrida, une telle amitié est (...) rendue possible par le langage, qui se pense d’abord comme hospitalité. Nous reprenons enfin la lecture des textes d’Augustin, pour montrer leur convergence avec cette nouvelle définition de l’amitié, en éclairant le rôle qu’y joue la confessio. (shrink)

What are the consequences of evolutionary theory for the epistemic standing of our beliefs? Evolutionary considerations can be used to either justify or debunk a variety of beliefs. This paper argues that evolutionary approaches to human cognition must at least allow for approximately reliable cognitive capacities. Approaches that portray human cognition as so deeply biased and deficient that no knowledge is possible are internally incoherent and self-defeating. As evolutionary theory offers the current best hope for a naturalistic epistemology, evolutionary approaches (...) to epistemic justification seem to be committed to the view that our sensory systems and belief-formation processes are at least approximately accurate. However, for that reason they are vulnerable to the charge of circularity, and their success seems to be limited to commonsense beliefs. This paper offers an extension of evolutionary arguments by considering the use of external media in human cognitive processes: we suggest that the way humans supplement their evolved cognitive capacities with external tools may provide an effective way to increase the reliability of their beliefs and to counter evolved cognitive biases. (shrink)

What are the consequences of evolutionary theory for the epistemic standing of our beliefs? Evolutionary considerations can be used to either justify or debunk a variety of beliefs. This paper argues that evolutionary approaches to human cognition must at least allow for approximately reliable cognitive capacities. Approaches that portray human cognition as so deeply biased and deficient that no knowledge is possible are internally incoherent and self‐defeating. As evolutionary theory offers the current best hope for a naturalistic epistemology, evolutionary approaches (...) to epistemic justification seem to be committed to the view that our sensory systems and belief‐formation processes are at least approximately accurate. However, for that reason they are vulnerable to the charge of circularity, and their success seems to be limited to commonsense beliefs. This paper offers an extension of evolutionary arguments by considering the use of external media in human cognitive processes: we suggest that the way humans supplement their evolved cognitive capacities with external tools may provide an effective way to increase the reliability of their beliefs and to counter evolved cognitive biases. (shrink)

The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification is well-known among epistemologists. Propositional justification is often conceived as fundamental and characterized in an entirely apsychological way. In this chapter, I focus on beliefs based on deductive arguments. I argue that such an apsychological notion of propositional justification can hardly be reconciled with the idea that justification is a central component of knowledge. In order to propose an alternative notion, I start with the analysis of doxastic justification. (...) I then offer a notion of propositional justification, intersubjective propositional justification, that is neither entirely apsychological nor idiosyncratic. To do so, I argue that to be able to attribute propositional justification to a subject, we have to consider her social context as well as broad features of our human cognitive architecture. (shrink)

According to a widely held view in the philosophy of mathematics, direct inferential justification for mathematical propositions (that are not axioms) requires proof. I challenge this view while accepting that mathematical justification requires arguments that are put forward as proofs. I argue that certain fallacious putative proofs considered by the relevant subjects to be correct can confer mathematical justification. But mathematical justification doesn’t come for cheap: not just any argument will do. I suggest that to successfully (...) transmit justification an argument must satisfy specific standards, some of which are social. I contrast my view with Huemer’s inferential conservatism, which makes mathematical justification too easy to get. Although in this article I focus on mathematical inferential beliefs, the view on offer generalizes to other inferential beliefs. (shrink)

D. Justin Coates argues that, in ‘Freedom and Resentment’, P. F. Strawson develops a modest transcendental argument for the legitimacy of our moral responsibility practices. I disagree with Coates’ claim that Strawson’s argument provides a justification, in Wittgenstein’s and/or Strawson’s sense of that term, of our responsibility practices. I argue that my interpretation of Strawson solves some difficulties with Coates’ argument, while retaining its advantages.

Philippe Van Parijs’s ethical justification of basic income is based on the argument that job resources must be shared equally. Underlying this idea are two important claims: (1) all individuals in society hold an ex. ante entitlement in job resources and (2) job resources are tradable: First, I present the real-libertarian argument for sharing job resources. Next, I identify and critically review three different objections against this view: the liability objection, the cooperation objection and the parasitism objection. I believe (...) the parasitism objection poses a serious challenge to basic income, and argue that Van Parijs’s most plausible response-based on the idea that job resources are socially owned-is flawed. I provide the outline of an alternative normative basis for grounding a person's ex ante entitlement to job resources using an institutionalist approach. (shrink)

Como posso estar certo de que existe qualquer coisa de externa aos meus próprios pensamentos? Muitos filósofos procuraram ou apresentar uma prova da existência do mundo externo, ou rejeitar a inteligibilidade da própria ideia de uma “prova” nesse contexto. O objetivo desse artigo é mostrar que o denominado “problema do mundo externo” decorre de uma má compreensão acerca do que seja justificativa epistêmica. Apresento o que denomino “paradoxo de Berkeley” de modo a mostrar que o uso ordinário da linguagem não (...) deve funcionar como critério de correção para a aplicação de conceitos como conhecimento e existência. Concluo que tanto as tentativas tradicionais de se apresentar uma prova da existência do mundo externo quanto as tentativas de se mostrar que o problema não faz sentido são equivocadas. O que deve ser levado em conta no exame do problema do mundo externo é o contexto em que a proposta cética é feita. (shrink)

Resumo: Arthur Schopenhauer ficou conhecido como o pensador do “pessimismo filosófico”. Tratase de uma doutrina que, em linhas gerais, apresenta uma determinada interpretação acerca do valor do mundo, mas que, em seu sentido ainda mais básico, questiona a possibilidade de atribuição de valor ao todo da existência: há “justificação” para a existência? A partir da resposta a essa pergunta, o filósofo alemão desenvolve sua “metafísica da vontade” e, como seu desdobramento, sua teoria da “redenção”, ou soteriologia. Entretanto, o “filósofo do (...) pessimismo” também afirma, em sua obra, que há uma “ordenação moral de mundo” e um “significado moral da existência”, o que parece ir na direção oposta ao “pessimismo”. O presente artigo analisa o significado das noções de ordenação moral de mundo e justificação da existência no pensamento de Schopenhauer, a fim de demonstrar em que medida significado moral da existência e pessimismo filosófico se relacionam no pensamento do autor.: Arthur Schopenhauer is known as the thinker of “philosophical pessimism”. It means, in general lines, the doctrine that presents a certain worldview, but in its more basic sense, it questions the possibility of giving a meaning to the whole of existence: is there “justification” for the existence? By answering this question the German philosopher develops his “metaphysics of the will” and, as its unfolding, his theory of “redemption”, or soteriology. However, the “philosopher of pessimism” also asserts in his work that there is a “moral ordinance of world” and a “moral meaning of existence”, which seems to go on the opposite direction of what is claimed by the “pessimism”. The present paper analyses the sense of the notions of moral ordinance of world and justification of existence in Schopenhauer’s thought, in order to demonstrate how far moral meaning of life and philosophical pessimismo interact in his thought. (shrink)

Il peut sembler de mauvaise méthode et même de mauvais augure pour la recherche en général de voir un article de plus limiter son propos à la justification du choix, heureux ou malheureux, de son titre. Au risque de décevoir et de perdre les premiers lecteurs, ce pourrait bien être le cas ici : sont mis en relation et même dans une relation privilégiée, celle de types-idéaux distincts de la réalité empirique fluctuante, les concepts de passivité et d?inconscient (en (...) tous les cas de raisonnement inconscient, soit une place très particulière accordée à l?inconscient, comme on va le voir). Or, s?il est sûr que ces concepts ne se recouvrent pas, il n?est pas du tout certain qu?ils se recoupent même a priori. Les lignes qui suivent seront donc consacrées à la jonction possible d?un concept de passivité et d?un concept d?inconscient, jonction qui trouve peut-être sa meilleure occasion dans la psychophysiologie de Wilhelm Wundt. Mais pour qui s?est penché un peu sur ces questions, l?entreprise semble plutôt désespérée. Le premier obstacle, de taille, est le suivant : si l?on entend par passivi­té l?ensemble des activités pré-réflexives de la conscience, il se pourrait fort que la catégorie de la passivité telle qu?elle est élaborée en site empiriste au xix e siècle ne recoupe a priori aucun concept d?inconscient, pour la simple raison qu?elle apparaîtrait dans le cadre de psychologies génétiques qui. (shrink)

Pierre Poiret (1646-1719) s’est fait l’éditeur infatigable de nombreux textes mystiques, y compris ceux de ses contemporains. Se distinguent notamment les Œuvres complètes de Madame Guyon (1648-1717), qu’il a rassemblées en trente-neuf volumes, certains parus après sa mort : c’est le cas des Justifications (trois tomes, 1720), ce dossier d’autorités que Mme Guyon avait rassemblées pour sa défense au moment de la querelle du quiétisme. On s’est proposé de confronter cette édition au manuscrit (l’exemplaire adressé à Bossuet, conservé à la (...) Bibliothèque nationale de France). Poiret s’y révèle d’une scrupuleuse fidélité, contraint à des modifications certes importantes mais toujours pour servir l’original, récupérant la quasi-totalité du manuscrit, le transformant il est vrai, par les vertus de la seule mise en forme, en anthologie de la « doctrine mystique » (selon les termes de la préface) commune. (shrink)

Corinne de González De Léon; Classificatory Schemes and the Justification of Educational Content: a re-interpretation of the Hirstian approach, Journal of Philo.

This article asks whether a myth can be collapsed into history by describing the material signs of memory as "evidence." In a story dear to the Venetian hearts, in 1177 the Republic of Venice defeated the imperial fleet and brought peace back to Italy. For centuries, this narrative was recounted and its truth upheld against growing political and scholarly criticism, first through the ritual display of evidence, then through its discussion in a large literary production. In the seventeenth century, it (...) is argued, the notion of evidence was abandoned in favor of the sheer affirmation of power. (shrink)

Quand, en 1938, au cri de "Penser nous devons", Virginia Woolf exhorta les femmes à résister à leur assimilation "dans la procession des fils des hommes cultivés", elle ne pouvait pas imaginer qu'à peine trente ans plus tard les interventions féministes sur les savoirs scientifiques allaient non seulement prolonger la lutte pour l'égalité d'accès au savoir, mais inaugurer une critique approfondie des contenus des savoirs. Du dedans des disciplines académiques, cette lutte illumina en profondeur ce que Woolf avait déjà compris (...) : la noble idée du savoir désintéressé sert de justification pour les pires exclusions et injustices. Cet ouvrage propose un parcours original des chemins par lesquels la pensée féministe contesta le caractère "neutre" du savoir, depuis les politiques des mouvements jusqu'aux épistémologies alternatives du standpoint feminism anglo-américain. Ce livre se veut une ressource pour chercheures et chercheurs intéressés par la portée politique et théorique du féminisme mais est aussi, modestement, dédié à toute personne qui aspire à d'autres savoirs possibles, ici et maintenant. (shrink)

Empirical evidence shows that secrecy in science has increased over the past decades, partly as a result of the commercialization of science. There is a good prima facie case against secrecy in science. It is part of the traditional ethos of science that it is a collective and open truth-seeking endeavor. In this paper, I will investigate whether secrecy in science can ever be epistemically justified. To answer this question, I first distinguish between different sorts of secrecy. Next, I propose (...) an account of what it is for a practice to be epistemically justified, with the help of work by Alvin Goldman and Philip Kitcher. I then discuss motivations for secrecy in science that are found in the literature to see whether they amount to, or can be turned into, epistemic justifications for secrecy. The conclusion is that, although some forms of secrecy are epistemically justified, secrecy that arises from special, often commercial, interests is not. (shrink)

Despite the importance of the “historiographical revolution” in Kuhn’s work, he did not carry out a specific study about it. Without a systematic investigation into it, he even affirms that the “old” historiography of science (OHS) is unhistorical, suggesting its summary disqualification in the face of his “new historiography” of science (NHS). My wider project, of which this paper is a part, is to better discuss the issue of the justification of the NHS. In this paper, I discuss the (...) justification (and the genesis) of the OHS, focusing on Condorcet and Comte and resorting especially to Koyré. This will allow us to understand that the relation between the OHS and the NHS is a new instance of inter-theoretical incommensurability. And, indeed, that the NHS is not stricto senso a new historiography. It is the same historiography used for other disciplines (art, philosophy), which in the twentieth century begins to be applied to science as well. (shrink)

I wish to discuss in this paper some of the problems involved in determining whether subjects on particular occasions are justified in coming to believe a proposition. I will argue that in attributing actual justification to a particular subject–subjective justification–we have to take into account factual-psychological questions and that these are the source of fundamental difficulties. These factual-psychological questions concern the beliefs someone uses in the process of acquiring another belief and the actual connections she makes among her (...) beliefs.But why should epistemologists be interested in making attributions of actual justification to particular subjects? After all, if the central goal of epistemology is to guide us in choosing rational strategies for supporting our beliefs, or to assess whether theories are well grounded or acceptable, epistemologists should be concerned with the justification a theory or proposition might have independently of anyone actually coming to believe it. This may be so, but it has to be shown that it is so. Moreover, the consideration of the factual-psychological questions involved in attributions of subjective justification seems to be necessary in some recent hybrid forms of naturalized epistemology. I call them ‘hybrid’ because, unlike Quine’s naturalized epistemology, they include in the epistemological task more than naturalistic explanations of how we acquire our language and beliefs. Besides taking into consideration the actual processes of our coming to believe or accept sentences, they also make use of epistemic notions like justification, warrant, relevant or right connection among beliefs, and so forth. (shrink)

Deleuze a contribué à mieux nous faire entendre la puissance affirmative du désir et la portée métaphysique des hallucinations et délires. Une logique de la folie qui excède la question du langage et des choses... Cet essai prolonge une intuition restée en friche : la prise au sérieux de la dimension " théologique " des délires dont la catégorie psychiatrique obsolète des " délires mystiques " est une occultation au lieu d'être l'explication, le dépliement qu'elle aurait pu suggérer.

Cet article montre comment la non-élaboration du processus d’adolescence peut se faire sentir chez l’adulte, surtout quand il devient parent et que son enfant devient adolescent. À partir des notes prises juste après chaque séance dans un cadre de soins, l’auteur retrace ici la cure-type d’un homme d’une quarantaine d’années, dont l’adolescence du fils réveille des traumas en lien avec sa relation à son propre père violent, jusqu’alors impensés. La cure permet une transformation des traumas et une reprise du (...) conflit œdipien et favorise une évolution qui peut se résumer par un assouplissement de l’imago paternelle allant de pair avec une position de père plus assurée et des liens père-fils plus consistants. (shrink)

We discuss the role of practical costs in the epistemic justification of a novice choosing expert advice, taking as a case study the choice of an expert statistician by a lay politician. First, we refine Goldman’s criteria for the assessment of this choice, showing how the costs of not being impartial impinge on the epistemic justification of the different actors involved in the choice. Then, drawing on two case studies, we discuss in which institutional setting the costs of (...) partiality can play an epistemic role. This way we intend to show how the sociological explanation of the choice of experts can incorporate its epistemic justification. (shrink)

According to the received view, genuine mathematical justification derives from proofs. In this article, I challenge this view. First, I sketch a notion of proof that cannot be reduced to deduction from the axioms but rather is tailored to human agents. Secondly, I identify a tension between the received view and mathematical practice. In some cases, cognitively diligent, well-functioning mathematicians go wrong. In these cases, it is plausible to think that proof sets the bar for justification too high. (...) I then propose a fallibilist account of mathematical justification. I show that the main function of mathematical justification is to guarantee that the mathematical community can correct the errors that inevitably arise from our fallible practices. (shrink)

I argue that scientific knowledge is collective knowledge, in a sense to be specified and defended. I first consider some existing proposals for construing collective knowledge and argue that they are unsatisfactory, at least for scientific knowledge as we encounter it in actual scientific practice. Then I introduce an alternative conception of collective knowledge, on which knowledge is collective if there is a strong form of mutual epistemic dependence among scientists, which makes it so that satisfaction of the justification (...) condition on knowledge ineliminably requires a collective. Next, I show how features of contemporary science support the conclusion that scientific knowledge is collective knowledge in this sense. Finally, I consider implications of my proposal and defend it against objections. (shrink)

In ethics, the use of empirical data has become more and more popular, leading to a distinct form of applied ethics, namely empirical ethics. This 'empirical turn' is especially visible in bioethics. There are various ways of combining empirical research and ethical reflection. In this paper we discuss the use of empirical data in a special form of Reflective Equilibrium (RE), namely the Network Model with Third Person Moral Experiences. In this model, the empirical data consist of the moral experiences (...) of people in a practice. Although inclusion of these moral experiences in this specific model of RE can be well defended, their use in the application of the model still raises important questions. What precisely are moral experiences? How to determine relevance of experiences, in other words: should there be a selection of the moral experiences that are eventually used in the RE? How much weight should the empirical data have in the RE? And the key question: can the use of RE by empirical ethicists really produce answers to practical moral questions? In this paper we start to answer the above questions by giving examples taken from our research project on understanding the norm of informed consent in the field of pediatric oncology. We especially emphasize that incorporation of empirical data in a network model can reduce the risk of self-justification and bias and can increase the credibility of the RE reached. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In ethics, the use of empirical data has become more and more popular, leading to a distinct form of applied ethics, namely empirical ethics. This ‘empirical turn’ is especially visible in bioethics. There are various ways of combining empirical research and ethical reflection. In this paper we discuss the use of empirical data in a special form of Reflective Equilibrium (RE), namely the Network Model with Third Person Moral Experiences. In this model, the empirical data consist of the moral (...) experiences of people in a practice. Although inclusion of these moral experiences in this specific model of RE can be well defended, their use in the application of the model still raises important questions. What precisely are moral experiences? How to determine relevance of experiences, in other words: should there be a selection of the moral experiences that are eventually used in the RE? How much weight should the empirical data have in the RE? And the key question: can the use of RE by empirical ethicists really produce answers to practical moral questions? In this paper we start to answer the above questions by giving examples taken from our research project on understanding the norm of informed consent in the field of pediatric oncology. We especially emphasize that incorporation of empirical data in a network model can reduce the risk of self‐justification and bias and can increase the credibility of the RE reached. (shrink)

The problem of induction is formulated as a set of three questions, namely: ‘What is the nature of the attitude of acceptance that we adopt in relation to certain theories?’ ‘What are the rules according to which we select those theories which we accept?’ and, ‘What is the justification for the adoption of those rules?’. An original answer is proposed for each question in turn, with the help of the new concepts of sub-theory, established sub-theory, aberrant, arbitrary and degenerate (...) theories. The answer to the third question follows the lines of Reichenbach's pragmatic strategy. (shrink)

Frecuentemente se ha señalado a la fenomenología de Husserl como una "filosofía de la fundación última y radical auto-responsabilidad." Aquí, sin embargo, examinaremos qué sentido puede tener hablar de "fundación última" y "auto-responsabilidad radical" en filosofía. La "idea de la filosofía" que propone Husserl como una "ciencia universal y rigurosa" de "fundación última" ha sido malinterpretada por sus críticos contemporáneos, que no han prestado atención a su aclaración que esta idea "ha de ser realizada sólo mediante valideces relativas y temporales (...) en un proceso histórico infinito", ni tampoco al hecho que él ya ha replanteado la noción moderna de razón. Que la filosofía ha de proveer una fundación última a toda efectuación de la razón, así como su propia justificación sólo significa que es últimamente responsable de todo sentido y validez en general, así como de sí misma. Empero, el ego consciente activo, con sus efectuaciones racionales –cognitivas, volitivas y emotivas– como el "fundamento absoluto de todas mis validaciones", es precedido por un estrato más profundo, pre-consciente, irracional y pasivo de tendencias emotivas y desiderativas, impulsos e instintos hacia la conciencia y la racionalidad. Así, todo "evidenciar" y Geltungsfundierung se ve finalmente absorbido en una Genesisfundierung. En última instancia, ninguna "evidencia" racional puede ser "adecuada", sino que es esencialmente abierta e inadecuada. La tan criticada "conciencia absoluta" de Husserl está en efecto enraizada en un "absoluto más definitivo y verdadero", a saber, la identidad y diferencia del presente viviente estático-fluyente que pertenece a un ser finito, temporal, perspectivista, encarnado e intersubjetivo. La defensa de la razón y del "discurso fundacional" es para Husserl una cuestión de la "supervivencia de la humanidad" y su preservación de la barbarie. Pero no es una "adquisición permanente" sino la responsabilidad de una "tarea infinita". Así, la filosofía es una "ciencia todo-abarcadora fundada en un fundamento absoluto [...] aunque por cierto bajo la forma de un programa sin fin".Husserl’s phenomenology has been frequently referred to as a “philosophy of ultimate foundation and radical self-responsibility.” Yet here we will examine philosophy’s notion of “ultimate foundation” as “radical self-responsibility.” The “idea of philosophy” that Husserl proposes as a “universal and rigorous science” of “ultimate foundation” has been grossly misinterpreted by his contemporary critics, who have not paid heed to his clarifica-tion that this idea is “to be realized only by way of relative and temporary validities and in an infinite historical process,” nor to the fact that he has already recasted the traditional Modern notion of reason. That philosophy is called upon to provide an ultimate foundation to every accomplishment of reason, as well as its own justification, means that it is ultimately responsible for every sense and validity in general, and for itself. However, the active conscious ego, with its rational –cognitive, volitional and emotional– accomplishments, as the “absolute foundation of all my validations,” is preceded by a deeper, pre-conscious, irrational, and passive stratum of emotional and desiderative tendencies, impulses, instincts and strivings towards consciousness and rationality. Thus every “evidencing” and Geltungsfundierung is finally absorbed within Genesisfundierung. Ultimately no rational “evidence” can ever be “adequate,” but is essentially openended, and inadequate. Husserl’s much criticized “absolute consciousness” is in fact an “absolute” rooted in a “more definite and true absolute,” namely, the identity and difference of the static-fluent living present belonging to a finite, temporal, perspectivist, incarnate and intersubjective being. The defense of reason and of “foundational discourse” is for Husserl a question of “humanity’s survival” and its preservation from barbarity. Yet it is not a “permanent acquisition” but the responsibility of an “infinite task.” Thus philosophy is an “all-embracing science grounded on an absolute foundation [...] though of course in the form of an endless program.". (shrink)

In this article, the author presents the interpretation of Juan Cruz Cruz, according to whom the philosophy of subjectivity of the later Fichte succeeded in overcoming the errors of the subjective idealism of his youthful period, and which was the only part of Fichte’s philosophy that Hegel knew. For this reason, following Pareyson, Dr. Cruz claims that today we are better prepared to understand the strictly logological character of Fichte’s doctrine of science, understood as a science of science, which at (...) the same time reflects on the ultimate indemonstrable principles of any reflective process of rational self-justification. (shrink)

In this paper we intend to discuss the importance of providing a physical representation of quantum superpositions which goes beyond the mere reference to mathematical structures and measurement outcomes. This proposal goes in the opposite direction to the project present in orthodox contemporary philosophy of physics which attempts to “bridge the gap” between the quantum formalism and common sense “classical reality”—precluding, right from the start, the possibility of interpreting quantum superpositions through non-classical notions. We will argue that in order to (...) restate the problem of interpretation of quantum mechanics in truly ontological terms we require a radical revision of the problems and definitions addressed within the orthodox literature. On the one hand, we will discuss the need of providing a formal redefinition of superpositions which captures explicitly their contextual character. On the other hand, we will attempt to replace the focus on the measurement problem, which concentrates on the justification of measurement outcomes from “weird” superposed states, and introduce the superposition problem which focuses instead on the conceptual representation of superpositions themselves. In this respect, after presenting three necessary conditions for objective physical representation, we will provide arguments which show why the classical representation of physics faces severe difficulties to solve the superposition problem. Finally, we will also argue that, if we are willing to abandon the presupposition according to which ‘Actuality = Reality’, then there is plenty of room to construct a conceptual representation for quantum superpositions. (shrink)

Over the past decade, many philosophers have argued that to respect the moral equality of their citizens, states should be neutral toward certain forms of diversity among their populations. Areas in which the state neutrality has been advocated include, but are not limited to, citizens’ different religions; languages; and sexual orientations. However, there remains an important area where its normative (ir)relevance has not been discussed: That of neurodiversity. After identifying several ways in which contemporary states disfavor the interests of neurodivergent (...) groups relative to the neurotypical majority, including those of autistic people; dyslectic people; and people with ADHD, the most promising would be-justifications for such unequal treatment are considered. They maintain respectively that states only have to be neutral toward differences that feature in people’s conceptions of the good life; that addressing the discussed neuro-inequalities is too costly, whether financially or otherwise; that doing so raises intolerable risks of a public backlash; and that a commitment to neuro-neutrality leads to overinclusion. None are found to be convincing across the board, which leads me to conclude that states should become significantly more neuro-neutral than they are today. (shrink)