Theories postulating saltational evolution are a necessary consequence of essentialism. If one believes in constant types, only the sudden production of a new type can lead to evolutionary change. That such saltations can occur and indeed that their occurrence is a necessity is an old belief. Almost all of the theories of evolution described by H. F. Osborn in his From the Greek s to Darwin were saltational theories, that is, theories of the sudden origin of new kinds. The Darwinian (...) revolution did not end this tradition, which continued to flourish in the writings of Thomas H. Huxley, William Bateson, Hugo De Vries, J. C. Willis, Richard Goldschmidt, and Otto Schindewolf. Traces of this idea can even be found in the writings of some of the punctuationists. (shrink)

Efforts to bring science into early 19th century breeding practices in Central Europe, organised from Brno, the Hapsburg city in which Mendel would later turn breeding experiments into a body of timeless theory, are here considered as a significant prelude to the great discovery. During those years prior to Mendel's arrival in Brno, enlightened breeders were seeking ways to regulate the process of heredity, which they viewed as a force to be controlled. Many were specialising in sheep breeding for the (...) benefit of the local wool industry while others were showing an interest in commercial plants, especially fruit trees and vines, and later cereals. Breeders explained their problems in regulating heredity in terms of climatic influences disruption due to crossing sports or saltations. Practical experience led them to the concepts of 'inheritance capacity' and the 'mutual elective affinity' of parents. The former was seen to differ among individuals and also among traits; the latter was proposed as a means of adding strength to heredity. The breeders came to recognise that traits might be hidden and yet transmitted as a 'potential' to future generations. They also grew to understand that heredity would be strengthened when a quality was 'fixed' within a lineage by 'pure blood relations.' Continued selection of the desired quality might then lead to 'a higher perfection.' But the ultimate 'physiological' question about breeding, 'what is inherited and how?,' found no answer. Major figures in this development included Abbot Napp, the one who asked this question and who was due to receive Mendel into the monastery in 1843, and Professor Diebl whose lectures on agriculture and natural science at the Brno Philosophical Institute Mendel would attend in 1846. Here we analyse their progress in theorizing about breeding up until about 1840. In discussing this development, we refer to certain international contacts, especially with respect to information transfer and scientific education, within the wider context of the late Enlightenment. (shrink)

The relatively late acceptance of Darwinism in German biology and paleontology is frequently attributed to a lingering of Lamarckism, a persisting influence of German idealistic Naturphilosophie and Goethean romanticism. These factors are largely held responsible for the vitalism underlying theories of saltational and orthogenetic evolutionary change that characterize the writings of many German paleontologists during the first half of the 20th century. A prominent exponent of that tradition was Karl Beurlen, who is credited with having been the first German paleontologist (...) to present a full-fledged theory of saltational evolution and orthogenetic change. A review of Beurlen's writings reveals motives and concerns far more complex, however, and firmly rooted in contemporary völkisch thought and Aryan Science. Beurlen's mature theory of evolution can indeed be understood as his own contribution to Aryan Geology and Biology, tainted as it was with National-Socialist ideology. Evolutionary biologists of the time who opposed the theories of Beurlen and likeminded authors, i.e., idealistic morphology, typology, saltational change, orthogenesis and cyclism did so on Darwinian principles, which ultimately prevailed. But at the time when the battle was fought, their adherence to the principle of natural selection was likewise ideologically tainted, namely in terms of racial theory. National-Socialist ideology was unable to forge a unity of evolutionary theory in Germany even amongst those of its proponents who endorsed this ideology. (shrink)

Standard biological and philosophical treatments assume that dramatic genotypic or phenotypic change constitutes instantaneous speciation, and that barring such saltation, speciation is gradual evolutionary change in individual properties. Both propositions appear to be incongruent with standard theoretical perspectives on species themselves, since these perspectives are (a) non-pheneticist, and (b) tend to disregard intermediate cases. After reviewing certain key elements of such perspectives, it is proposed that species-membership is mediated by membership in a population. Species-membership depends, therefore, not on intrinsic (...) characteristics of an organism, but on relationship of an organism to others. A new definition of speciation is proposed in the spirit of this proposal. This definition implies that dramatic change is neither necessary nor sufficient for speciation. It also implies, surprisingly, that an organism can change species during its lifetime. (shrink)

In Chapter Five of The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way, Jerry Fodor argues that since it is likely that human minds evolved quickly as saltations rather than gradually as the product of an accumulation of small mutations, evolutionary psychologists are wrong to think that human minds are adaptations. I argue that Fodor’s requirement that adaptationism entails gradualism is wrongheaded. So, while evolutionary psychologists may be wrong to endorse gradualism—and I argue that they are wrong—it does not follow that they are (...) wrong to endorse an adaptationist explanation for how the human mind evolved. (shrink)

Building on work by Popper, Schweber, Nozick, Sober, and others in a still-growing literature, I explore here the conceptual kinship between Adam Smith''s ''invisible hand'' and Darwinian natural selection. I review the historical ties, and examine Ullman -Margalit''s ''constraints'' on invisible-hand accounts, which I later re-apply to natural selection, bringing home the close relationship. These theories share a ''parent'' principle, itself neither biological no politico-economic, that collective order and well-being can emerge parsimoniously from the dispersed action of individuals. The invisible (...) hand operates on ''memes'' the way natural selection operates on genes. Like Darwin''s concept, it brings together traditional opposites, ''nature'' and ''selection,'' forming a saltation-mitigating transition between biological instinct and full-blown conscious design. Herschel''s criterion of confirmation, which Darwin long strove to satisfy, is itself an invisible hand-like meme – a ''Midas effect'' revealing and rewarding the fittest theories, Darwin''s and Smith''s emphatically among them. (shrink)

La parution récente en français du livre de M. Denton : “Evolution. Une théorie en crise” , qui traite des theories explicatives actuelles de l'évolution, nous amine à rappeler les caracteres généraux des grandes theories biologiques et à présenter une critique sommaire du livre en question.La science West pas une simple accumulation de connaissances. Le scientifique ne doit pas se contenter de decrire et de mesurer des faits. Son but eat d'essayer de les relier et de construire des théories qui (...) tentent de nous faire comprendre le “reel”, objet de ses recherches.Cependant, la nature du matériel biologique — c'est-à-dire les espèces vivantes et les catégories qu'on y a reconnues, classe ou ordre par exemple — est si complexe qua la biologie actuelle est fort loin encore Wavoir réalisé une synthèse qui ressemble, méme très approximativement, à la classification de Mendéleiev pour les éléments chimiques.Malgré cette complexité, les biologques ont réussi à construire la th6orie du fait de l'evolution et ils proposent aujourd'hui une théorie explicative de cette évolution qui, bien qua critiquée, est incontestablement bien étayee. Nous allons essayer de définir la structure des grandes théories biologiques; ensuite nous analyserons sommairement quelques-unes des critiques qui sont adressees aux theories de l'évolution.Considering the publication in French version of Michael Denton's book, Evolution : A Theory in crisis , in which he critizes the synthetical theory of the biological evolution, we thought it useful to point out the main errors of argumentation contained in that book by first referring to the characteristics of general biological theories.In biology, there exist elementary theories - such as that dealing with the extinction of giant Reptiles - and general theories - such as the chromosomic theory of heredity and the explanatory theory of evolution. The latter generally consist of a group of elementary theories imbricated so that they form a whole like a jig-saw puzzle. An example is provided by the synthetic theory of evolution that can be defined in 20 propositions divided into two categories : the propositions relating to the naturalists' observations - which correspond to descriptive concepts - and those relating to the data of the population genetics - which correspond to explanatory concepts . The general scheme of the theory is formed by a network of relations between the descriptive concepts and the explanatory concepts. There also exist other theories in general biology supported by thousands of minor facts which only together can be of proof of validity. These theories are quite reliable and cannot be questioned by facts still to be explained. Questioning can only happen if they are confronted to well-established data in nearly equal numbers.In his work, Denton does not deny the phenomenon of biological evolution, but he criticizes the syntheticians' ideas by emphasizing that no great evolutive changes can be accounted for by the complex mechanism of random mutations and selection. He goes back to a typological concept of the zoological classification in some way similar to that of Vialleton's. However, Denton agrees with the phenomenon of the biological evolution and accepts the existence of "saltations" among the great zoological groups. The arguments used by Denton merely show that he is not conversant with the complexity of sciences particularly in comparative anatomy and zoology, the teaching of which is being somehow neglected today.By giving as an example the structure of the aortic arches in Amphibians and by a summary of the variations of those structures and the evolution of the blood-circulation in Vertebrates, we proved that the typological argument is of no value. As a matter of fact, a study of the now living beings clearly shows the gradual transition - e.g. a transition by a very large number of feasible stages - from the Lower Vertebrates to the Higher Vertebrates. In particular, there have been several attempts at double circulation and there still exist many species in which the blood of the double circulation is mixed. It seems therefore obvious that the double circulation has been achieved, stage by stage, with many intermediate schemes; we are inclined, therefore, to conclude that this succession of small transformations was produced by a huge mechanism of selected small mutations.Our present-day biological knowledge includes a number of examples large enough to consider the “argument of the impossible” used by Denton is due to inadequate fossil data and not to any mysterious mechanism such as macromutations. Let us say again that the typological structures seem to occur only when the data of comparative anatomy and zoology are over-simplified. (shrink)

Evolution in modern life requires high replication fidelity to allow for natural selection. A simulation model utilizing simulated phenotype data on cellular probability of survival was developed to determine how self-replication fidelity could evolve in early life. The results indicate that initial survivability and replication fidelity both contribute to overall fitness as measured by growth rates of the cell population. Survival probability was the more dominant feature, and evolution was possible even with zero replication fidelity. A derived formula for the (...) relationship of survival probability and replication fidelity with growth rate was consistent with the simulated empirical data. Quantitative assessment of continuity and other evidence was obtained for a saltation evolutionary process starting from low to moderate levels of survival probability and self-replication fidelity to reach the high levels seen in modern life forms. (shrink)

Do we need a Darwinian theory of cultural evolution? In one sense, certainly. It is obvious that there are patterns of cultural change-evolution in the neutral sense-and any theory of cultural change worth more than a moment's consideration will have to be Darwinian in the minimal sense of being consistent with the theory of evolution by natural selection of Homo sapiens. Our species name is well chosen, and it is culture that makes us the knowing hominid, so a minimally Darwinian (...) theory of culture must hold that the phenotypic traits that make cumulative culture possible-mainly, language and the habits of sociality-evolved by natural selection, unaided by what I call skyhooks: saltations in Design Space that could not be the outcome of standard evolutionary mechanisms (Dennett, 1995). This minimal Darwinism is simply the denial of the.. (shrink)

Complex, multigenic biological traits are shaped by the emergent interaction of proteins being the main functional units at the molecular scale. Based on a phenomenological approach, algorithms for quantifying two different aspects of emergence were introduced (Wegner and Hao in Progr Biophys Mol Biol 161:54–61, 2021) describing: (i) pairwise reciprocal interactions of proteins mutually modifying their contribution to a complex trait (denoted as weak emergence), and (ii) formation of a new, complex trait by a set of n ‘constitutive’ proteins at (...) concentrations exceeding individual threshold values (strong emergence). The latter algorithm is modified here to take account of protein redundancy with respect to a complex trait (‘full redundancy’). Irreducibility is considered a necessary and sufficient criterion for strong biological emergence; if one constitutive protein is missing, or its concentration drops below the threshold the trait is lost. A definition based on ‘unpredictability’ is dismissed, because this criterion is irrelevant for the evolution of a complex trait, and apparent unpredictability may rather reflect our basic deficits in understanding unless we can provide an unequivocal proof for it. The phenomenological approach advocated here allows to identify hidden rules according to which strongly emergent traits may be organized. This is of high value for understanding the evolution of complex traits which seems to require the saltational advent of all constitutive proteins ‘in one turn’ to arrive at a functional trait providing for an improved fitness of the organism. Rather than being a purely random process, it may be guided by fundamental structural principles. (shrink)

It is argued that a chief obstacle to a naturalistic explanation of the origins of mind is human exceptionalism, as exemplified in the 17th century by Descartes, and in the 20th century by Noam Chomsky. As an antidote to human exceptionalism we turn to the account of aesthetic judgment in Darwin’s Descent of Man, according to which the mental capacities of humans differ from those of lower animals only in degree, not in kind. Thoroughgoing naturalistic explanation of these capacities is (...) made easier by shifting away from the substance-metaphysical implications of the search for an account of mind, toward a dispositional account of the origins of mindfulness. (shrink)